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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis explores the political economy of natural resources in Brazil and 
Chile. The cases are drawn from oil and copper mining respectively. Using 
the twin lenses of historical institutionalism and critical international 
political economy (IPE), I probe into the significance of states and state 
enterprises in resource management. In this thesis, I seek to explain the 
process of market opening reforms in strategic resources industries, 
particularly the extent to which sector-specific dynamics and institutional 
complexities have obstructed the full privatisation of the resource sectors. 
Not only has neoliberalism been implemented partially, the persistence of 
state ownership in Brazil and Chile has reconfigured the balance between 
states and markets in managing strategic industries. Consequently, I 
demonstrate how state enterprises and labour unions have responded to 
demands of global competitiveness by way of maintaining a structure of 
relationships that address commercial goals, sectoral interests, and public 
policy objectives. Evidently, reforms have taken place prior to the commodity 
boom in 2003 and the rise of Left-led governments in the region. Overall, my 
comparative historical approach contributes to broader debates on IPE of 
natural resources, political economy of development, and Latin American 
politics. 
3 
Contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. 2	  
Contents .................................................................................................................. 3	  
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... 7	  
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ 8	  
List of Appendix ..................................................................................................... 9	  
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 10	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................................................... 12	  
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 16	  
1.1	   The argument of the thesis ....................................................................... 20	  
1.2	   Consequences of neoliberalism in resource sectors ................................ 23	  
1.2.1	   Regulatory institutional frameworks ................................................. 24	  
1.2.2	   Restructuring SOEs in resource sectors ............................................. 27	  
1.2.3	   Managing labour demands ................................................................. 29	  
1.3	   Structure of the thesis .............................................................................. 32	  
Chapter 2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................ 37	  
2.1	   Ontological and epistemological considerations ..................................... 38	  
2.2	   Research strategy ..................................................................................... 40	  
2.3	   Comparative research design .................................................................... 41	  
2.4	   Research methods .................................................................................... 46	  
2.5	   Challenges in the field .............................................................................. 50	  
Chapter 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON RESOURCE POLITICS ............. 51	  
3.1	   What we know about resource governance .............................................. 52	  
3.1.1	   Governance-centred approaches to resource politics ........................ 53	  
3.1.2	   Systemic approaches to resource governance .................................... 61	  
3.1.3	   Structure, agency, and politics: Towards a new analytical 
framework? .................................................................................................... 67	  
3.2	   Historical institutionalism as a framework of institutional change ....... 70	  
3.2.1	   From path dependence to incremental routes of change ................... 77	  
3.2.2	   Ideational aspects of institutional change ......................................... 85	  
3.3	   Critical International Political Economy (IPE) perspectives .................. 88	  
 4 
3.3.1	   Deconstructing the hegemony of neoliberalism ................................ 89	  
3.3.2	   Reconstituting state power under neoliberalism ............................... 91	  
3.3.3	   Reforming the resource sector ............................................................ 94	  
3.4	   Combining historical institutionalism and critical political economy .... 97	  
Chapter 4 RESOURCE POLITICS IN BRAZIL AND CHILE ............................. 100	  
4.1	   Political economy of natural resources in Latin America ...................... 101	  
4.1.1	   State capacity and industrial development ...................................... 105	  
4.2	   Political economy of natural resources in Chile ..................................... 107	  
4.2.1	   The nitrate economy of Chile ............................................................ 109	  
4.2.2	   Copper politics and state-led development ....................................... 114	  
4.2.3	   Neoliberalism under the military dictatorship ................................. 125	  
4.3	   The politics of natural resource governance in Brazil ............................ 129	  
4.3.1	   Cycles of resource extraction under exports-led growth model ....... 130	  
4.3.2	   Political continuity between Estado Novo and Military 
Government ................................................................................................. 133	  
4.3.3	   The prelude to market opening: Crisis and restructuring ................ 148	  
4.4	   Comparative strategy in resource politics: Brazil and Chile ................... 151	  
4.4.1	   Analytical themes in the succeeding chapters .................................. 154	  
A.	   Regulatory institutional frameworks ................................................... 155	  
B.	   Restructuring state enterprises ............................................................ 156	  
C.	   Managing labour demands ................................................................... 157	  
4.5	   Conclusions ............................................................................................. 157	  
Chapter 5 POLITICS OF COPPER MINING IN CHILE, 1990-2011 ................. 160	  
5.1	   Embracing continuity under Concertación government, 1990-1999 .... 162	  
5.1.1	   Contradictions between neoliberal discourses and practices ........... 171	  
5.2	   Institutional change in broader patterns of continuity, 2001-2009 ..... 175	  
5.2.1	   Institutional change in taxation ........................................................ 176	  
5.2.2	   State responses to labour flexibility .................................................. 188	  
5.3	   Neostructuralism as a competitive strategy ........................................... 196	  
5.4	   Conclusions ............................................................................................ 203	  
Chapter 6 CAPITAL-LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE CHILEAN COPPER 
SECTOR ............................................................................................................. 206	  
6.1	   Pressuring for reforms: CODELCO and the Chilean economy ............. 209	  
6.2	   Demystifying corporate governance in CODELCO ................................ 216	  
6.2.1	   Persistence of state ownership in copper industry ........................... 216	  
5 
6.2.2	   Competitive strategies of CODELCO ............................................... 223	  
6.3	   Managing labour demands in copper industry ...................................... 227	  
6.3.1	   Alianza Estratégica as a pact between state and labour .................. 230	  
6.3.2	   Conflicts in private mining ............................................................... 235	  
6.4	   Conclusions ............................................................................................ 240	  
Chapter 7 PETROLEUM GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL, 1990-2011 ................... 245	  
7.1	   Political legacies of neoliberalism in petroleum sector .......................... 247	  
7.1.1	   Changing the market structure of the Brazilian oil industry ........... 252	  
7.1.2	   Re-forming the developmental state ............................................... 258	  
7.1.3	   Evaluating the impacts of reforms ................................................... 266	  
7.2	   From continuity to change: Novo desenvolvimentismo in Brazil ......... 273	  
7.2.1	   Continuity in petroleum governance between Cardoso and Lula .... 275	  
7.2.2	   Novo desenvolvimentismo in petroleum governance ...................... 281	  
A.	   Institutional layering in regulatory frameworks .................................. 281	  
B.	   Reorganising states and markets ......................................................... 285	  
C.	   Linking oil wealth and social policy ..................................................... 287	  
7.3	   Conclusions ............................................................................................ 292	  
Chapter 8 CAPITAL-LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE OIL INDUSTRY ........... 294	  
8.1	   Explaining PETROBRAS’ competitiveness and efficiency .................... 295	  
8.1.1	   Ownership structure of PETROBRAS .............................................. 301	  
8.1.2	   Culture of innovation ....................................................................... 306	  
8.1.3	   Internationalisation of PETROBRAS ................................................ 312	  
8.2	   Labour conflictivity in the oil industry ................................................... 315	  
8.2.1	   Claiming labour autonomy prior to democratisation ....................... 317	  
8.2.2	   Labour as opposition during neoliberal restructuring .................... 322	  
8.2.3	   The return of state capitalism: What about the oil workers? .......... 328	  
8.3	   PETROBRAS and Brazil’s national development strategy .................... 332	  
8.4	   Conclusions ............................................................................................ 334	  
Chapter 9 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................ 336	  
9.1	   Comparative dimensions of the research .............................................. 338	  
9.1.1	   The politics of reforming the state ................................................... 338	  
9.1.2	   Restructuring state enterprises ........................................................ 344	  
9.1.3	   Managing labour demands ................................................................ 351	  
9.2	   Theoretical implications of the findings ................................................ 354	  
 6 
9.3	   Moving the debate forward .................................................................... 360	  
9.4	   Conclusions ............................................................................................. 362	  
APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... 364	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 374	  
7 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Modes of incremental change ......................................................... 82	  
Table 4.1 Ownership of the nitrate economy .................................................. 111	  
Table 4.2 The Chilean economy ..................................................................... 118	  
Table 4.3 Financing in PETROBRAS (in million cruzeiros) ......................... 140	  
Table 5.1 Permanent and subcontracted workforce in CODELCO ............... 193	  
Table 6.1 Own workforce productivity index, GMT-10 + CODELCO ........... 215	  
Table 6.2 Key changes in CODELCO corporate governance ....................... 220	  
Table 6.3 Legitimacy of unions from political parties’ perspectives ............ 227	  
Table 6.4 Alianza Estratégica under Concertación government .................. 232	  
Table 7.1 Risks and rewards in different E&P models .................................. 254	  
Table 7.2 Sales from privatisation in petrochemical sector, 1992-1996 ....... 255	  
Table 7.3 Results of bidding in E&P sector under 1997 Petroleum Law ...... 267	  
Table 7.4 Participation share in Brazilian distribution sector, 2010 ........... 268	  
Table 7.5 PETROBRAS' ownership of oil concessions, 2010 ........................ 272	  
Table 8.1 PETROBRAS' financial performance ............................................ 297	  
Table 8.2 Obligatory investments in R&D by concessionaires, 2001-2010 300	  
Table 8.3 PETROBRAS’ capital expenditure on Brazil (US$ billions) ........ 305	  
Table 8.4 PETROBRAS' integrated expansion of international activities .... 315	  
Table 8.5 PETROBRAS participation in PAC initiative ................................ 333	  
 8 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 4.1 International prices of key exports in Chile, 1925-1940 ............... 115	  
Figure 4.2 Public and private mining investment under Pinochet government
 ................................................................................................................ 128	  
Figure 4.3 PETROBRAS performance in refining sector, 1954-1990 .......... 149	  
Figure 4.4 PETROBRAS performance in upstream activities, 1954-1990 .... 151	  
Figure 5.1 Comparison of public and private mining investment ................ 166	  
Figure 5.2 Evolution of copper prices ........................................................... 168	  
Figure 5.3 Copper production-price relations under 'Left-led' Concertación
 ................................................................................................................ 180	  
Figure 5.4 Production share of mining companies in Chile, 2004-2010 ..... 183	  
Figure 5.5 Copper revenues as SWFs in Chile, 2006-2010 .......................... 185	  
Figure 5.6 Global copper importers, 2000-2009 ........................................ 200	  
Figure 6.1 Contribution of publicly-owned mining to fiscal revenue ........... 210	  
Figure 6.2 Copper production in Chile, 1990-2010 ...................................... 212	  
Figure 6.3 Foreign capital in Chile, 1974-2009 ............................................ 213	  
Figure 6.4 Public opinion on legitimacy of unions ....................................... 229	  
Figure 7.1 National refining capacity ............................................................ 270	  
Figure 7.2 Brazil’s rate of external dependence on energy ........................... 278	  
Figure 7.3 Map of oil concessions in Brazil .................................................. 280	  
Figure 7.4 Petroleum production and consumption in Brazil ...................... 281	  
Figure 7.5 Access of state-controlled and private enterprises ...................... 283	  
Figure 7.6 A global view of exploration models and oil production ............. 284	  
Figure 7.7 Oil wealth distribution in Brazil .................................................. 290	  
Figure 8.1 Success rate of PETROBRAS in oil exploration ........................... 297	  
Figure 8.2 Proven reserves of PETROBRAS in Brazil, 2000-2010 .............. 299	  
Figure 8.3 PETROBRAS' Oil and gas production, 2003-2010 ..................... 299	  
Figure 8.4 PETROBRAS’ ownership structure at the end of 2010 ............... 302	  
Figure 8.5 PETROBRAS investments across hydrocarbons chain .............. 309	  
Figure 8.6 PETROBRAS’ workforce, 2003-2010 ........................................... 311	  
Figure 9.1 Share of Chilean mineral exports, 2010 ....................................... 347	  
9 
List of Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 List of Interviewees .................................................................... 364	  
Appendix 2 PETROBRAS' Performance as a State Enterprise .................... 368	  
Appendix 3 Continuity and Changes in Chilean Mining Governance, 1971-
2011 ........................................................................................................ 370	  
Appendix 4 Key Aspects of Alianza Estratégica Phase III (2007-2010) ....... 372	  
Appendix 5 Oil Wealth Governance under 1997 Petroleum Law ................. 373	  
 10 
Abbreviations 
 
ANP Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis 
BNDE Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento 
BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social 
BRASPETRO Petrobras International Braspetro B V 
CDI Comissão de Desenvolvimento Industrial 
CENAP Centre of Oil Upgrade and Studies 
CENDA 
Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo 
Alternativo 
CESCO Centro de Estudios del Cobre y Minería 
CNIC Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad 
CNP Conselho Nacional do Petróleo 
CNPE Conselho Nacional de Politíca Energética 
CNTI Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Indústria 
COCHILCO Comisión Chilena del Cobre 
CODELCO Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile 
CONAMA Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiental 
CORFO Corporación de Fomente 
CREAI Carteira de Crédito Agrícola e Industrial do Banco do 
Brasil 
CSN Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 
CTC Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre 
CUT 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile / Central 
Única de Trabajadores 
CUT Central Única dos Trabalhadores 
CVRD Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
DNP-CUT Departamento Nacional dos Petroleiros da CUT 
DNPP Departamento Nacional dos Petroleiros e Petroquímicos 
DT Dirección del Trabajo 
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
ENAMI Empresa Nacional de Minería 
ENAP Empresa Nacional de Petróleo 
ENDESA Empresa Nacional de Electricidad 
EPE Empresa de Pesquisa Energética 
FAFEN Fábrica de Fertilizantes Nitrogenados 
FCUP Federação Única Cutistas dos Petroleiros 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
FENAPE Federação Nacional dos Petroleiros 
FEES Fondo de Estabilización Ecónomica y Social 
FGV  
FINEP Financiadora de Estudos e Projectos 
FMC Federación Minera de Chile 
FOCH Federación de Obreros de Chile 
FTC Federación de los Trabajadores del Cobre 
FUP Federação Única dos Petroleiros 
GCC Global Commodities Chains 
11 
HI Historical Institutionalism 
IBP Instituto Brasileiro de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis 
INTERBRAS PETROBRAS Commercial International SA 
IOC International oil company 
IPE International Political Economy 
IRS Internal Revenue Service (SII in Chilean) 
ISI Import Substitution Industrialisation 
MME Ministério de Minas e Energia 
NOC National oil company 
PAC Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento 
PETROBRAS Petróleo Brasileiro 
PND Programa Nacional de Desestatização 
PRF Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones 
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores 
PUC Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 
PUC Rio Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro 
RC Rational Choice 
RENAVE Empresa Brasileira de Reparos Navais 
SEAM Mechanised Agriculture Equipment Service 
SEP Public Enterprise System 
SERNAGEOMIN Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería 
SINDIPETRO Sindicato dos Petróleiros 
SOE State-owned enterprise 
SONAMI Sociedad Nacional de Minería 
STIEP 
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na Indústria de Extração 
de Petróleo 
SWF Sovereign wealth fund 
TST Tribunal Superior do Trabalho 
UFRJ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 
WIR World Investment Report 
WST World Systems Theories 
 
 12 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
Every intellectual project accumulates immense debts to individuals and 
organisations for its accomplishment. This PhD thesis is no exception. It is a 
piece of work that has evolved through constant exposures in various debates 
with fellow scholars and colleagues who helped me in thinking through the 
arguments of the PhD. First and foremost, I thank the University of Sheffield 
for providing financial support to conduct this research between 2008 and 
2011, particularly the Overseas Research Studentship (ORS) Scheme and the 
University of Sheffield Studentship Award. Partial costs of the fieldwork were 
also covered by the University of Sheffield Excellence Exchange Scheme, 
Department of Politics, and Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS). 
Sections of the thesis came out as journal articles and book sections, which 
were funded either by my department or by professional associations. Most 
of all, I extend my sincerest gratitude to a supportive academic environment 
in Sheffield. Professor Jean Grugel, who served as my supervisor and mentor, 
continues to inspire me to study Latin American politics. Her persistent 
emphasis on the contradictions between theory and reality, the need to 
understand development policy as trial and error, and the complex process of 
accumulating social scientific knowledge are lessons that I intend to bring 
with me as I progress in my academic career. Secondly, I would like to thank 
Eliza Massi, whom I knew at Lund University in 2006, for patiently reading 
several drafts of the dissertation until it was finally submitted. She is my 
staunchest critic and closest friend. Her insightful comments regarding 
Brazilian industrial policy and development economics were especially 
brilliant in clarifying the arguments of the thesis. Whilst disagreements 
remain between us, we share common interests to study markets, 
developmental states and emerging powers in the changing world order. 
Anne Jerneck, Martin Lemberg, France Bourgouin, Joe Turner, Sarah Jane 
Smalley, Chun-Fung Chen, and Joao Carvalho helped in preparing the thesis 
during the final stages. Your efforts are highly appreciated. Finally, the staff 
and students in the Department of Politics were crucial in making my 
intellectual journey more meaningful. Our beloved graduate secretary, Miss 
13 
Sarah Cooke, deserves the first mention. She has helped me get by the 
doctoral programme in countless ways. I also need to thank my colleagues-
friends who shared the postgraduate experience with me: Gabe Silles-Brugge, 
Laura McLeod, Dora Feijao, Sam Wyatt, Flo Reiche, Daniel Wunderlich, Wei 
Chin, Silke Staab, Suruchi Pacharne, Sandeep Rajan and Yeosun Park. In 
addition to my colleagues, I most definitely must thank Afzalina Azmee, Leo 
Bastos, and Thais Fonseca; they are statisticians who have nothing in 
common with me except that we are all cool. Thanks to my Turkish gang in 
Sheffield who promised to grant me honorary citizenship when one of them 
becomes Prime Minister – Defne Gunay, Ali Onur Ozcelik, Hilal Gezmis, 
Nuray Aridici, Ozgun Duman, and Ozlem. 
 
This PhD dissertation required fieldwork trips in Brazil and Chile. I have 
been lucky to receive positive research support in both places. In Chile, I 
would like to thank my interviewees; among them are the numerous mining 
union leaders in Antofagasta and Calama, Consejo Minero, Sociedad 
Nacional de Minería (SONAMI), various government officials in Santiago, 
Copiapo and Antofagasta, and the CODELCO managers and senior officials 
especially in Andina and Chuquicamata. They shared expert knowledge and 
their own personal history in the Chilean mining industry. Miss Ingrid Castro 
of CODELCO Andina was very helpful in identifying the ‘right people’, giving 
access to company archives, and for facilitating interviews in Chuquicamata. 
During the field research, I was working with Dr. Jonathan Barton in the 
Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, Pontificia Universidad Católica de 
Chile (PUC Chile). The secretary of the institute, Miss Elizabeth Lizama 
Acevedo, was also a good friend who helped in following up interviewees and 
improving my Spanish skills. My language exchange partners, Álvaro Róman 
and José Mercado, also introduced me to Latin American culture. But my 
Chilean social life would not be complete without Mauro Castro and his 
friends, in addition to the new friends I met in Santiago.  
 
My fieldwork research in Brazil in April-August 2010 would have failed 
without the key informants who agreed to my request for interviews. These 
people include management and senior officers in the Ministério de Minas e 
 14 
Energia (MME), Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural, e 
Biocombustíveis (ANP), Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE), Instituto 
Brasileiro do Petróleo (IBP), and of course, the petroleum unions in Rio de 
Janeiro. My host institution, Department of Sociology and Politics at the 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), became 
possible through the support of Professor Angela Paiva. Whilst I tried my 
best to learn Portuguese through my rudimentary Spanish, I profusely 
apologise for not having been able to speak this beautiful language properly. 
Most importantly, special thanks to my friends in keeping my sanity intact as 
I dealt with Brazilian bureaucracy and several weeks of holidays. Thanks to 
Leo and Thais, Luís Marola, fellow news writers Felicity Clark and Sibel 
Tinar, Piti Lacerda and her family, and to the many Brazilians I failed to 
mention but have made my stay in Brazil an exceptionally brilliant time.  
 
As a migrant who yearns for home, I feel indebted to my social network in 
Sweden, United Kingdom and the Philippines. Mine Islar, Tony Marañon, 
Erma Peterssen, Bernadette Larsson, Lana Nilsson, Stephanie Limuaco, Kat 
Pauso, Katrina Macapagal, Gabby Valbuena, Kenneth Cardenas, Alvin 
Camba, Raffy Simbol, Madelline Romero, Julie de los Reyes, Tet Grajo, 
Sabrina Gacad, Cristina Madarieta, Jairus Andico, Mark and Sharine Lim, 
and others, thank you for keeping my solitary life abroad interesting at all 
times. Equally important, my new family in Sheffield has been very 
supportive of my academic endeavours. To the Turners – Nicola, Mike, Luke, 
Miranda, Jessica, James, Caroline, Glenn, Nessa, and Beryl – it was such a 
pleasure knowing you all. I should also thank Aidan Turner for being patient 
and understanding with me. I hope that the years to come will be great for us. 
Finally, and I wish to labour this point, I cannot complete this thesis without 
my family in the Philippines. I know you have all been waiting to see the ‘end 
of my studies’. It took another six years but I hope it was worth the wait for 
all of us. My family has been a source of inspiration and strength in times of 
despair and loneliness. One cannot fully express appreciation except by 
dedicating the outcome of four years of hard work to them. To Mama, Papa, 
Istian, May, and Macky – and our extended family abroad – we may live 
apart but my heart remains with you in our home. Maraming salamat po. 
15 
  
 16 
Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I explore in this thesis the political economy of natural resources in Brazil 
and Chile. I situate my arguments in the debates on state autonomy, global 
political economy, and development politics. More specifically, I probe into 
the significance of states in natural resource governance. Since the 1980s 
development policies towards natural resources in Latin America have been 
shaped by neoliberalism. At face value, economic restructuring appears to be 
a critical juncture in the region, and in particular reference to resource-rich 
states, its adoption involved the opening of previously state-controlled 
extractive industries, corporate restructuring of state enterprises, and 
flexibilisation of labour relations. The overarching logic of the reform project 
was global competitiveness and the valorisation of private capital as the 
primary motor of recovery from the economic crisis in 1982. This constituted 
an apparently radical break away from state-led development. However, as 
the cases of Brazil and Chile show, neoliberalism was not a hegemonic 
paradigm imposed from above that restructured state-market and state-
society relations. Although economic imperatives have opened up their 
strategic resource sectors, in both countries, a new discourse was articulated 
to achieve a more inclusive politics of development. In this thesis, I explore 
the extent to which Brazil and Chile have shifted towards a neo-
developmental policy paradigm. Whilst this emerging logic of state action is 
still nascent, my research elaborates on what the relationship between states, 
markets, and organised labour within the context of natural resource sectors 
might look like. 
 
Whilst the central focus of the thesis is on states and resource management, 
my research has implications to debates on institutional theory and on post-
neoliberalism in Latin America. Some scholars are now speaking of post-
neoliberal governance in Latin America in reference to the rise of Left-led 
governments (Burdick et. al. 2009; Grugel & Riggirozzi 2009; Levitsky & 
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Roberts 2011; E. Silva 2009). The contemporary export boom in South 
America is, in fact, underlined by the extensive and intensive exploitation of 
natural resources. Indeed, the commodity boom is permitting national elites 
in the region to reconstitute the bargain between the state and the public. 
However, the extent to which we can genuinely speak of a post-neoliberal 
phase of development depends ultimately on the extent to which 
neoliberalism was, and remains, embedded and how far changes to states, 
their developmental roles, and state-market-society relations have been 
deeply ‘locked in’. Whilst Latin American political economists have traced the 
political turn towards the Left, the task for second wave generation of 
researchers is to identify the new roles for the state in economic governance, 
particularly in natural resource management, and the tensions arising from 
national development strategies under Left-led governments. 
 
Theoretically, my strategy is to draw from historical institutionalism (HI) and 
critical political economy perspectives to investigate the complex processes of 
institutional change from neoliberalism to neo-developmentalism. I aim to 
develop a distinctive historical institutionalist approach that emphasises 
political time, conflicts in preferences and motivations, and ideational 
sources of change in analysing the significance of states in resource politics. 
It is, in fact, important to move beyond stark dichotomies between neoliberal 
and post-neoliberal political economies. The task of this thesis is to 
investigate how natural resources are managed in the context of economic 
liberalisation in Brazil and Chile. By tracing the continuities and changes in 
economic reforms in the strategic sectors of copper and oil, I contribute to 
the analysis of the triangular structure of social relations – that is, the 
relationship between labour, business/capital, and states – and the diversity 
of capitalist organisation and sets of power configurations within a 
globalising world order. Instead of binary oppositions, these two models of 
growth can be understood as phases of capitalist modernisation underpinned 
by natural resource exploitation. 
 
Central to Latin American political development is the role played by natural 
resources in shaping conflicts around distribution, alliances between states 
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and private capital, and modes of incorporating organised social sectors – 
particularly labour unions – in the reconstitution of development models. 
Phrased somewhat differently, top-down projects of development are 
emerging across resource-rich states as a result of external demand. For 
example, intense political debates have developed in recent years as regards 
how to best use resources for welfare provision without falling into the trap of 
the ‘resource curse’. One way to do this, as the case studies detail, is to use 
resource revenues directly and indirectly to ameliorate the costs of 
neoliberalism through the financing of social and anti-poverty policies but 
within the framework of fiscal discipline. As commodity prices remain 
buoyant after a decade of overproduction and low prices, Latin American 
governments have begun to ‘actually govern from the left’ (Levitsky and 
Roberts 2011: 10). As I argue in the thesis, the current economic 
transformation sweeping the region, albeit unevenly and in complex ways, 
can and should be understood through the political economy of natural 
resources. This, inevitably, reflects and feeds into dominant debates about 
economic growth, distinctive transformative capacities of states, and 
reconstitution of models of development in the post-Washington Consensus 
context. 
 
In the literature on post-neoliberalism, Brazil and Chile are grouped together 
because of the important role played by institutionalised party politics as 
opposed to protest movements in explaining the rise of the Left (Castañeda & 
Morales 2008; Levitsky & Roberts 2011; Panizza 2009). However, I expand 
the comparison by looking at the distinctive aspects of their resource 
governance models, which is currently the backbone of economic recovery 
and sustained growth. Both are exemplary of ‘politicised capitalism’, in which 
the state has traditionally structured business relations and organisational 
capacity of labour unions (Schneider 1999, 2004a).1 They likewise reflect the 
difficulties of challenging neoliberalism and moving beyond private sector-
                                                   
 
1  These scholars view the rise of Left governments as a function of organisational 
differentiations, such as the degree of institutionalisation of left-wing political parties and 
social movements.  
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driven models of extraction. National policy choices of greater state activism 
sit alongside the consolidation of embedded notions of global 
competitiveness. Whilst economic imperatives have produced a general 
pattern of market-opening in extractive industries, Left governments have 
embraced state intervention in varying degrees and differing scope. 
 
The thesis focuses on the extent to which attempts at privatisation and 
market opening of extractive industries have succeeded in the petroleum and 
mining industries of Brazil and Chile respectively. This dual comparison – 
between Brazil and Chile as well as between oil and copper – allows me to 
analyse how resource sectors have been transformed first by past legacies 
and second by discourses of neoliberalism. Whilst oil in Brazil was deemed 
crucial for its ambitious industrialisation project between 1930 and 1985, 
copper mining in Chile is the single commodity that has shaped its political 
economy since 1930. In other words, copper and petroleum are evidently of 
political and economic importance to states and strategies of development. In 
the context of neoliberal globalisation, how do we explain the persistence of 
state control in the extractive industries despite two decades of economic 
restructuring in favour of private participation? Equally, what are the 
changing roles played by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and organised 
labour in the contestation of resource governance? In seeking answers to 
these two issues, the following questions comprise the main themes of the 
thesis: 
• To what extent have market-opening reforms in strategic resource 
sectors empowered the private sector in Brazil and Chile? 
• To what extent have state enterprises achieved political autonomy 
from the state and what does this imply for resource management? 
• What has been the role of labour unions in shaping labour relations in 
extractive industries in the context of global market integration? 
 
These questions interrogate the intrinsically politicised processes of 
institutional transformation in Brazil and Chile. The first question unpacks 
the tensions between neoliberal and neo-developmental strategies of 
managing resources and analyses how far policy reforms towards greater 
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state intervention in the resource sector have been carried through by Left 
governments in power. The latter two questions explore how state controlled 
enterprises graft competitive strategies in response to pressures of global 
competitiveness and domestic politics. Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has 
been embraced in the economic governance of resources yet these reforms 
have been incompletely applied to strategic industries. Upon the election of 
Left governments in Brazil and Chile, the persistence of state ownership and 
limited privatisation in the extractive sectors were further strengthened by 
highly interventionist policies. I attempt to unpack this complex process of 
institutional change and transformation of state-market-labour relations.  
 
1.1 The argument of the thesis 
 
My argument is that states are engaging in hybrid strategies of neo-
developmentalism, which represent a cluster of ideas attempting to explicitly 
incorporate demands from below with growth strategies based on an export-
led model of development. More specifically, the thesis makes the following 
claims regarding the political economy of extractive resources in Brazil and 
Chile. Firstly, from a historical institutionalist perspective, states are said to 
accumulate capacities in managing the economy but that process is neither 
an outcome of rational calculations of politicians nor a neat process of 
institutional change. Political development is a structured process and 
institutions governing resources emerge from historical conflicts and 
constellations (Thelen 1999: 382). Put simply, the success and failures of 
elites to implement neoliberal reforms are contingent on several factors, such 
as the impact of material and discursive aspects of globalisation to policy-
making, the sector-specific feature of extractive industries, and the 
organisational capacity of labour (Hay & Marsh 2000; Shafer 1994; Schamis 
1999). Whilst we find a general trend of market opening and retention of 
state enterprises in Brazil and Chile, their experiences of military 
dictatorship and democratisation deviate significantly – especially the role of 
labour unions in democratic transition – signifying the distinctive ways of 
dealing with the ‘labour’ question. Notwithstanding the historical specificity 
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of the cases, my claim is that the differences in outcomes of neoliberal 
restructuring rests on the degree of state cohesion, organisational capacity of 
unions, and the relevance of state enterprises towards national development 
strategies in an increasingly complex, globalised world order. Inevitably, 
reforms to legitimise private capital participation imply a redistribution of 
power.  
 
Secondly, the research casts doubts on the validity of post-neoliberalism as a 
bifurcating heuristic category to understand resource politics of the ‘New 
Left’ in contemporary Latin America. We need to move beyond the stark 
distinctions between neoliberal and post-neoliberal paradigms of 
development. At face value, Brazil and Chile posit different models of 
governance – the former associated with developmentalist statism and the 
latter with neoliberalism – but the findings suggest that the changes in policy 
orientation are embedded in broader patterns of political continuity. I offer a 
nuanced view of state agency in the global political economy, which posits 
resource management as hybrid strategies constituting neo-
developmentalism (neodesarollismo, neostructuralismo in Chile, or in Brazil 
novo desenvolvimentismo). However, rather than an opposing category to 
neoliberalism, neo-developmentalism is at best a cluster of ideas that attempt 
to explicitly incorporate social equality to growth strategies based on export-
led model of development. The combination of state activism and market-
friendly policies is evidently shown in the governance of natural resources. 
Whilst competitiveness imperatives drive elites to adopt laws legitimising 
private participation, states are also given more resources to rethink about 
state-society bargain in the context of an export bonanza. Equally, labour 
issues are depoliticised and a technocratic approach to governance has been 
embedded by neoliberal models of political economy. It is far from surprising 
that labour reforms have failed to address labour flexibility and expansion of 
labour rights without significant pressures from below. Notwithstanding 
these challenges of social inclusion, the cases show solid evidence of neo-
developmental strategies though how far this can be sustained remains an 
open question.  
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Thirdly, I challenge what Terry Lynn Karl (1997) calls the ‘paradox of plenty’, 
where economically, resources are understood to generate negative effects to 
growth and economic diversification, and politically, to undermine attempts 
at strengthening state capacities (Auty 1993; Ross 1999, 2012). Shafer (1994) 
argues that the characteristics of leading sectors in developing countries 
shape policy preferences of business firms who also press demands towards 
the state as well as the institutional capacity and autonomy of the state itself. 
Using HI perspective, I argue that political elites in Brazil and Chile have 
developed differentiated capacities to engage with the global economy, and 
have therefore, successfully crafted state strategies to address the challenge 
of the resource curse. The combination of neoliberal and pro-state 
intervention reforms have resulted into development policies alleviating the 
resource sector from price fluctuations and external shocks. For example, 
changes in taxation and royalty policies went hand in hand with the adoption 
of stabilisation funds, sovereignty wealth funds, and specific allocation of 
rents for social development. At the same time, the Central Bank and 
Ministry of Finance are the key decision-making bodies in managing mineral 
revenues, which exemplify the technocratic legacy of neoliberalism. 
 
Finally, insights from critical political economy perspectives complement 
historical analysis by placing domestic institutional changes into the 
changing international context as a result of the export bonanza and the rise 
of emerging powers. The argument reflects Peter Evans’ (1995) Embedded 
Autonomy, in which state crafting in the natural resources sector lies mainly 
in the successful construction of ‘developmental coalitions’ between states, 
firms, and organised labour. In spite of market opening, states are not 
monolithic entities stripped off any capacity to resist economic imperatives. 
By paying attention to goals and motivations of actors in reforming states 
and markets, I posit a counter argument to the economic convergence 
hypothesis (Phillips 1998, 2004; Soederberg 2010; Taylor 2010). 
Neoliberalism is neither an inevitable process derived from the inexorable 
logic of globalisation nor a political project that reduces the complex 
reconstitution of state power. Instead, one can view the politics of 
institutional reforms as a gradual process of adaptation from pressures of 
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change ultimately conditioned by structural context and strategic actions of 
agency. More broadly, the case studies support Joel Migdal’s (2009: 177, 192) 
stress on the vast differences in each state’s practices in engaging with the 
public, pointing to new research emphasising the single image and multiple 
practices found within sets of states.  
 
In a nutshell, market-opening reforms in Brazil and Chile are part of the 
broader political project associated with neoliberalism to depoliticise 
governance, reconfigure the role of labour unions in economic management, 
and restructure state enterprises to advance competitiveness and 
modernisation of the industry. However, the picture is far more complex and 
messy than these political economies being neoliberal. As the cases detail, 
governing coalitions in post-dictatorial Brazil and Chile have implemented 
economic reforms that reflect strategies of increasing state control in 
regulating commodity production alongside market mechanisms to push 
public enterprises towards international competition. The research 
challenges the dominant view of looking at post-neoliberalism as intrinsically 
against neoliberalism. In short, post-neoliberal resource governance can be 
characterised as a phase of development shaped by political legacies, 
contingency in action, and changing global contexts. 
 
1.2 Consequences of neoliberalism in resource sectors 
 
The starting point is that extractive resources have historically been 
subjected to foreign intervention by states and firms, and have remained one 
of the most internationalised sectors in Latin America. Throughout the 
twentieth century, traditional mining countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Chile have politicised mining sectors because of foreign control over 
mineral resources, which typically generated nationalist sentiments and 
labour conflicts. Similarly, foreign participation in mining activities is 
reflected in the rise of a truly globalised commodity chain linking states, 
workers, and private capital in an intricate network of demand and supply. 
However, what has remained contentious is the degree to which resource-
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rich states should give up their control over natural resources and what type 
of interventions are appropriate in the era of global market integration. 
Whilst extractive industries still require states to be efficient, for example 
through institutional capacities to administer taxation, contracts and 
licenses, what is contested is the productive or entrepreneurial role of state. 
In cases where participation of SOEs is enshrined in constitutions, as in 
Brazil and Chile, neoliberal reforms have changed the balance between public 
and private extraction. Finding what are acceptable terms between state and 
private capital is difficult. Nevertheless, the key to understanding the logic of 
neoliberalism is to refer back to the general theoretical assumption of the 
intrinsically productive nature of private capital. In the advent of 
neoliberalism, state enterprises have been judged using efficiency standards 
of the private sector despite the well known fact that unlike private 
companies, SOEs must achieve both commercial and non-commercial goals. 
This perceived rational belief in private accumulation strategies is the driving 
force behind the success and/or failure of state capitalism to be re-embedded 
in light of the failure of neoliberalism to deliver stable growth. I investigate 
the consequences of neoliberalism in natural resource sectors in three 
thematic areas – regulatory institutional frameworks, corporate governance, 
and labour management.  
 
1.2.1 Regulatory institutional frameworks 
 
The neoliberal reforms introduced in the 1980s were aimed at extracting and 
processing natural resources both through state-led and private-oriented 
means of commodity production, with the aim of making Brazilian and 
Chilean exports more competitive. There exist similarities and differences in 
the model of extraction between the two cases. On the one hand, the Chilean 
economy was – and remains – dependent on copper mining; however, the 
country has successfully transformed itself towards becoming the leading 
exporter of copper that provides roughly 35 percent of global supply. 
Evidently, the copper mining sector has experienced considerable change in 
terms of state governance throughout the twentieth century but the market-
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oriented policies embraced by the military dictatorship between 1973 and 
1989 have profoundly shaped the post-dictatorial political economy of Chile. 
Above all, emphasis has been placed on private sector participation alongside 
state production through the state enterprise, Corporación Nacional del 
Cobre de Chile (CODELCO). On the other hand, the success of the Brazilian 
petroleum industry is based not on the possession of massive amounts of 
proven oil reserves but in the development of deep sea drilling technology 
and the steady expansion of oil refining and processing. The state-controlled 
enterprise, Petróleo Brasileiro (PETROBRAS), has become a major player in 
the global oil industry by way of establishing a culture of innovation among 
the labour force and adopting an internationalisation strategy to exploit 
overseas markets. What underpins this strategy is the monopoly of 
PETROBRAS in the Brazilian oil market for fifty years. The discovery of new 
oil reserves in 2007 should be viewed as an outcome of the strong alliance 
between the Brazilian state and PETROBRAS in developing the oil industry. 
In short, the developmentalist ideology did not fade away in the petroleum 
sector. More generally, political legacies have shaped state governance in 
Brazil and Chile, including the persistence of state control in strategic 
extractive industries, which were not reversed by neoliberalism.  
 
In the literature, the consequences of neoliberalism in resource extraction are 
as follows: (1) the adoption of a taxation regime characterised by low taxes 
but also shift towards a wider tax base that eventually moves beyond 
resource sector; (2) a guarantee for firms of their rights to lease and develop 
mineral blocs without state interference through a tight concession grants 
contract; and (3) some credible indication of state commitments to reduce if 
not completely reverse the effects of nationalisation of resources, all in the 
name of competitiveness in the globalised extractive industry (Rendfew 2011; 
Sánchez et. al. 2001; WIR 2007). Equally, private capital is conceived as a 
source of economic dynamism through foreign direct investments (FDI), 
technological/knowledge transfer, and sophisticated techniques in managing 
environmental and social costs (Eden 1991). The findings of the thesis 
suggest that economic reforms towards market opening do not necessarily 
lead to such outcomes. In theory, the goals of neoliberalism were to slim 
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down the scope of state activities in the economy and to strengthen state 
capacities in overseeing effective taxation and delivery of technical support 
for private firms.2 However, in practice, states are constantly struggling to 
manage dual roles: first, opening the market of natural resources for private 
participation in response to pressures of competitiveness; and second, 
responding to popular demands of retaining the politicised/public role of 
SOEs and appeasing labour to prevent costly strikes and work stoppage. 
Finding what are acceptable terms of reform is difficult because state 
attempts at naturalising the market generate mobilisation from below as 
defensive strategy of labour and other social movements. As natural resource 
geography and anthropological literatures document very well, governing 
natural resources – whether we speak of water, land, mineral, or oil wealth – 
entails complex articulations of citizenship, territory and the nation 
(McCormick 2009, 2007; Perreault 2008b, 2006; Perreault & Valdivia 2010; 
Sawyer 2004; Valdivia 2008). My argument challenges the apolitical and 
technocratic view of resource management and suggests a power-orientated 
analysis of reforms by linking the discursive justifications of policy elites 
towards actual policy outcomes. 
 
Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that neoliberalism is a watershed 
politically, socially, and economically in terms of how states have structured 
conflicts between capital and labour. Mining reforms have embedded policy 
practices that make latent opportunities to contest the commodification of 
nature. For example, mining management reflects the depoliticised and 
technical solutions proffered by technocrats and technopols in highly 
contentious issues, such as restructuring SOEs, appointing members of the 
Board, and managing labour unrest, all in the name of economic stability and 
growth. Teichman (2001: 199) argues that the striking result of neoliberalism 
is the access of owners/executives of very powerful conglomerates – grupos 
                                                   
 
2  This implies capable and strong bureaucratic agencies providing clear rules and 
transparent processes in contract bidding, in acquiring environmental and social licenses 
to operate, and in facilitating inspections in mines and oilrigs. Ironically, mineral 
extraction, to be successful, requires a very efficient state that can deliver public goods for 
the private sector to invest in mining.  
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económicos – in policy-making, which is indicative of how elites internalised 
the narrative of the private sector as the new driving forces of 
competitiveness in Latin America. In these circumstances, business groups 
are given access to the highest echelons of state power because of an 
ideological commitment of state elites on the productive and growth-oriented 
nature of private capital whilst also perceiving public firms as essentially 
wasteful and inefficient. 
  
1.2.2 Restructuring SOEs in resource sectors 
 
A second key contribution of this research is explaining how state enterprises 
achieved competitiveness during the two decades of economic restructuring. 
Whilst the creation of state enterprises marked the radical shift in favour of 
state control in the resource sectors, neoliberal democracy in Brazil and Chile 
has produced significant changes in capital-labour relations in ways that 
reflect the legitimacy of private capital and the lack of confidence in state 
intervention. Democratisation opened the formal institutional channels and 
informal means for organised business to gain access to the state (Panizza 
2009; Teichman 2001). In Brazil and Chile (see Chapters 6 and 8), its key 
consequence is the ideational diffusion of business standards, international 
practices, and actual changes in corporate governance that mirror the 
operations of the private sector. In other words, state enterprises were being 
judged using the logic of global competitiveness, which subsequently induced 
changes in organisational norms and management practices within the firm. 
This includes changing the rules in appointing board of directors, the powers 
of the President of the company vis-à-vis the board, and the representation of 
labour in decision-making. Nevertheless, neoliberalism failed to alter the 
ownership structure of PETROBRAS and CODELCO and decision-making 
powers have remained in the hands of the state. Equally, the management of 
labour conflicts have remained subject to government intervention. The 
reforms in corporate governance and labour management are thus shaped by 
the state, which exemplifies the historically constituted institutional 
capacities of the state to exercise political control. 
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However, we should not exaggerate the observable general pattern of state 
enterprise restructuring. Although a common recipe of corporate governance 
reforms did emerge in the 1990s, Brazil and Chile, along with other 
developing countries, have experienced variegated outcomes in the process of 
adopting changes in state enterprise management. They also have discrete 
sets of competitive strategies, which vary in success. In Brazil, PETROBRAS 
was a political and technocratic consequence of nationalism, which explains 
the persistence of state control in the oil industry and the existence of public 
and private shareholders in the company rather than 100 percent state 
ownership. Since PETROBRAS had to achieve both its commercial interests 
and its public goals, the ownership structure permitted the company to 
strategically expand operations outside the Brazilian territory. Upon market 
opening in 1997, PETROBRAS’ technological expertise in deep sea drilling 
combined with its highly skilled labour force have allowed the company to 
evolve into a vertically integrated energy firm capable of extending its scope 
and reach outside the domestic market. The ‘return of the state’ in Brazil was 
only possible because of a highly efficient and sufficiently competitive state-
controlled energy firm. In Chile, CODELCO was the outcome of bitter 
political conflicts between pro-foreign capital and leftist forces that was only 
resolved through the nationalisation of copper mining in 1971. Its highly 
politicised origins explain the difficulties of opening state ownership to 
private investors. CODELCO has no internationalisation strategy because the 
best quality of copper ores in the world is still located in the Chilean mines. 
Naturally, its competitive strategy is confined to investment decisions aimed 
at expanding operations in Chile and developing technology to extract 
minerals via underground mining. Its major problems stem from its lack of 
flexibility to access capital for financing these projects – the unintended 
consequence of keeping private investors out of CODELCO’s capital shares.  
 
Finally, in both cases, state enterprises have not been shielded from the 
political motives of the state. Although modern corporations are 
characterised by the separation of ownership and company management, 
state enterprises are still subject to routine interventions of the state. Under 
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the new law passed in 2010 in Brazil, PETROBRAS is automatically given 30 
percent minimum participation share in all exploration and development 
activities in the pre-salt reservoir. This move is politically driven since it was 
perceived as the appropriate step to increase the stake of the government in 
extractive activities. In Chile, CODELCO can be called for legislative 
enquiries in National Congress if necessary. It implies that all company 
decisions are scrutinised publicly through the media or congressional 
hearings. To sum up, neoliberalism does not simply depoliticise governance 
to achieve economic imperatives. Although CODELCO and PETROBAS are 
technocratic and competent on their own, their autonomy to make economic 
decisions to compete internationally was never completely isolated from 
political pressures.  
 
1.2.3 Managing labour demands 
 
The final contribution of this research is to analyse how labour management 
is practised by states and state enterprises in their attempts to modernise 
extractive industries. Using the twin lenses of political economy and 
historical institutionalism, I examine the specific claims of labour unions vis-
à-vis the ruling government in Brazil and Chile and the extent to which 
labour mobilisation contributes to the reconstitution of natural resource 
governance. Within the international and comparative political economy 
literature (Cook 2007; Mosley 2010), collective labour rights are crucial in 
production costs through the linkages between unions and bargaining on the 
one hand, and wage and non-wage benefits, on the other. Therefore, the 
extent to which, and the ways in which, private capital and state enterprises 
are managing labour is crucial in the reconstitution of governance models. As 
markets become increasingly globalised, the mode of entry of private capital 
in sectors influences the conditions upon which workers organise themselves 
in defence of labour demands (Mosley 2010). The core yet complex question 
is whether trade unions have gained more or less power in the face of intense 
neoliberal restructuring, and their role in shaping the more blurted period of 
‘post-neoliberalism’. Most research on Latin American post-neoliberalism 
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focus on the role of civil society in remaking social contracts between the 
state and public during moments of crises, facilitated by the rise of new 
actors, such as organisations of unemployed workers, more independent 
trade unions, social movements, and organised local communities who have 
challenged marketised notions of social citizenship (Grugel & Riggirozzi 
2012, 2009; Panizza 2009; Silva 2009). However, this literature – largely 
concerned with identity politics, collective mobilisation, and their impacts on 
neoliberal reforms – has missed the role of labour unions (especially in 
natural resource sectors) in shaping national debates. In this thesis, I bring 
back the politics of managing capital-labour conflicts taking into account the 
complex internationalisation of extractive industries and the multitudes of 
attempts by state managers at controlling labour activism. Although 
historically the position of organised labour is recognised as consequential 
for national politics (Bergquist 1986; Collier & Collier 2002; Garréton 2003), 
the power of labour is highly differentiated across sectors, and as Mosley 
(2010) argues, is shaped by the manner in which transnational firms 
organise their transaction and operations.3 In short, economic globalisation 
has altered existing political institutions that structure the tripartite relations 
between states, firms and workers.   
 
In the wider context of global restructuring, changes in labour reforms 
combined with technocratic approaches to mining governance have 
weakened unions’ capacity to influence collective bargaining agreements as 
well as in representing genuine economic demands of workers (Burdick et. al. 
2009; Colburn 2002). Nevertheless the labour rights agenda in extractive 
industries did not completely disappear during and after neoliberal 
restructuring in Brazil and Chile. Instead, the success of labour in shaping 
resource governance through unions and bargaining is, to a significant 
                                                   
 
3 Labour unions have unparalleled capacity for collective action which no other social or 
political actor possess. Their role in capitalist production in the context of rapid economic 
and political modernisation in Latin America provides them a potent source for collective 
grievance and sustained political mobilisation. The location of organised workers in 
spatially concentrated production, especially their strategic positions in export sectors, 
provides labour unions the unusual capacity to disrupt economic and political systems 
(Collier & Collier 2002: 40-42). 
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extent, structured by differentiated capacities of union organising, political 
legacies of demobilisation, and state acquiescence to the labour agenda 
(Burgess & Levitsky 2003; Cook 2007; Hunter 2010; Levitsky 2003). Whilst 
greater labour flexibility has become part of the business model of managing 
globalised sectors, the protection of collective rights in low and middle-
income countries has been difficult. On the one hand, ‘directly owned 
multinational production generate pressures for protection of collective 
labour rights” (Mosley 2010: 12) by way of standardising practices across 
regions, bringing in ‘best practices’, and investing resources for long term 
production. On the other hand, arms-length production relationships where 
multinational companies transfer the transactions to the market (instead of 
the firm) through subcontracting and offshore activities, cost considerations 
especially in labour-intensive industries decrease the incentives to offer 
labour protection (Mosley 2003, 2005, 2010). However, downward pressures 
of competition to state enterprises and foreign firms are filtered by domestic 
politics and institutional contexts, which overall shape outcomes of the 
bargain between states, firms, and trade unions. I want to focus on the fate of 
unions in highly internationalised sectors. Moreover, as Cook (2007: 2-3) 
puts it, labour laws are not just about adjustments to the global market but 
also span the arenas of rights and citizenship. They directly affect recognised 
human rights of associations and the representative organisations of workers 
– the unions – and the contestation around making democracy more 
inclusive and adhere to social justice claims.  
  
In Brazil and Chile, we find distinctive regimes of labour incorporation, 
though both are reconstituted along the lines of the global competitiveness 
agenda. The diversity in national contexts means that struggles for labour 
rights vary between public and private companies and between unionised 
and subcontracted workers. Equally, state responses to the globalisation of 
resource extraction are different, and oftentimes, do not cohere with the 
demands of labour unions. On the one hand, state managers follow the logic 
of competitiveness to respond most effectively to demands of efficiency 
underpinned by the internationalisation of commodity production. On the 
other hand, political elites manage popular demands through an expanded 
 32 
agenda of labour rights – e.g. in Chile where workers’ rights were 
dramatically watered down in governance agenda for years – or through 
greater state intervention in social policy – e.g. in Brazil by directly linking 
resource wealth and social development. What unites both cases is that states 
are under intense pressure to ameliorate the costs of neoliberal restructuring. 
Through a detailed empirical examination of how labour unions participated 
in key national debates in political economy (and not just in resource 
governance per se), I argue that we are now witnessing the resurgence of 
‘repoliticised’ economic governance, characterised by more contentious 
political actions of organised workers in defence of greater state involvement 
in the political economy of strategic industries. This, of course, occurs in the 
context of high commodity prices and therefore greater bargaining power for 
unions to make their demands appeal for public acquiescence. Although 
traditional labour movements across the region are in decline (Haarstad 
2009a, 2009b; Oxhorn 1998), it is still difficult for political elites to ignore 
the social clamour for a ‘return of the state’. If we place resource sector union 
demands in the regional context, then evidently labour unions have been one 
of the strongest backers of the post-neoliberal agenda. In circumstances 
where they have bargaining power, for example in strategic industries in 
Brazil and Chile, the contestation of export-led growth is principally led by 
mining unions. 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the research methodology of the thesis. I explain the 
selection of Brazil and Chile as a paired comparison as well as the analysis of 
two different resource sectors. Here, I argue that my thesis seeks to elucidate 
the ways in which general conditions applicable to countries with resource 
endowments are dealt with in particular ways by states. As such, my cases 
studies are also not mirror images of each other. That is, they do not show a 
similar process taking place in two different contexts. The chapter also 
recognises the shortcomings and limitations of the PhD thesis, as well as the 
challenges in doing extensive fieldwork research in a political economy topic. 
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In Chapter 3, I present the theoretical framework on how to examine the 
political economy of natural resources. The chapter develops a framework 
that synthesises two perspectives drawn from comparative politics and 
international political economy. On the one hand, I use HI approach to 
explain the degree of institutional change within broader patterns of 
continuity using concepts like incremental change, critical juncture, and 
ideational aspects of institutional transformation. On the other hand, I draw 
upon critical political economy perspectives as a way of understanding the 
changing role of states in development and how states manage capital-labour 
conflicts in a globalising world economy.  
 
In Chapter 4, I examine the politicised nature of resource management in 
Brazil and Chile placed within the broader context of Latin America’s export-
led growth model based on primary commodities. As opposed to a strictly 
economistic view on natural resources as ‘normal’ commodities mediated by 
laws of supply and demand, economic decisions were constituted by 
competing articulations of the role of the state and foreign capital in resource 
governance. Equally, pressures to foster stable labour relations in an industry 
characterised by tensions and labour conflicts meant contradictory forms of 
governance. To sum up, the contested role of the state is reflected in the 
difficulties in striking a balance between addressing both the volatility of 
international markets and domestic demands for nationalisation of natural 
resources. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on copper governance in Chile under the Left and Centre 
governing coalition La Concertación por la Democracia (henceforth 
Concertación). In this chapter, I examine the political economy of continuity 
and changes in mining policy between 1990 and 2011. It is argued that 
Chilean copper politics is, at best, constituted by a governance model 
consisting of depoliticisation of economic management and centralisation of 
decision-making towards technocratic elites. Nevertheless, the strategic 
position of mining in the Chilean economy necessarily makes its governance 
highly politicised, which is best exemplified by the tension between the 
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strong presence of a state enterprise and an overtly pro-business attitude of 
state agencies. By examining contemporary policy themes, namely private 
property rights, royalty distribution and taxation, and its linkages with 
broader economic management, I clarify the boundaries between public and 
private authority as well as the difficulties in strengthening state 
participation in the economy. I challenge the sweeping claims on Chile as an 
overtly neoliberal state by way of analysing the significance of the recent 
reforms on taxation and labour regulation in generating a new discourse 
based on stronger state involvement in the economy. These incremental steps 
towards a stronger, more politicised state constitutes neo-structuralist policy 
paradigm under Concertación governments.  
 
Chapter 6 examines capital-labour relations in the copper industry, 
particularly the attempts at modernising CODELCO without privatisation of 
the state enterprise. It challenges the orthodox view of Chile as a simple case 
of self-reinforcing path dependence towards neoliberalism. Whilst the 
implementation of economic restructuring in the state enterprise suggests 
the hegemony of neoliberalism, conflicting interests and power relations 
mould political outcomes that do not necessarily conform to neoliberal ideas. 
The argument is that CODELCO as a state enterprise performs a buffer role 
between state and private capital, which is the driving force behind the 
politicised reforms on its competitive strategies. The chapter traces the 
reasons behind the difficulty of introducing private assets in CODELCO’s 
ownership structure, which influences the limits of the reform agenda related 
to the modernisation of the company – namely in grafting competitiveness 
policy and labour management. In the second part, it examines labour 
conflicts and the differing patterns of capital-labour relations in Chile. The 
world of labour is complex, and nothing best captures the contradictions of 
managing labour than the variegated patterns of labour conflicts in public 
and private mining sectors.  
 
I present the second case study – petroleum governance in Brazil – in 
Chapter 7. Unlike the tumultuous history of asserting state control over 
copper vis-à-vis foreign capital, petroleum in Brazil has been associated with 
35 
national development, and therefore, its ownership and control has been – 
and remains – in the hands of a centralised state since 1930. In this context, 
perhaps it is not surprising that neoliberal reforms have failed in fully 
privatising the petroleum industry and in reducing the market power of 
PETROBRAS. Policy discourses did emerge around the logic of private sector 
participation and institutional change brought about the partial exposure of 
PETROBRAS to foreign competition through the market opening reform 
agenda. What transpired in the 1990s was the process of breaking the state 
monopoly across the petroleum and natural gas commodity chains. Whilst 
the centralised state adopted political discourses of international 
competitiveness, the necessity to attract FDI, and technocratic governance, 
the reforms were, at best, partial and incomplete in terms of implementation. 
Nevertheless, there is marked continuity in petroleum policy between the 
reformist government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula Ignacio da 
Silva in his first term. However, favourable structural conditions – 
PETROBRAS achieving self-sufficiency status in oil consumption, a new era 
of growth under the Workers’ Party (PT) government, and expansion of 
consumption feeding into more sustainable growth – have allowed for the 
Left government to enact certain strategic actions, and ‘govern on the Left’ 
(Levitsky & Roberts 2011: 10). Both under Lula da Silva’s second term (2006-
2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-present), the Brazilian government found a 
balance between market incentives and state regulation in the petroleum 
industry. In this context, we can speak of neo-developmentalism (novo 
desenvolvimentismo) – characterised by the renewal of an activist state that 
directly makes reference to social equality and growth – as a competitive 
strategy for resource-rich states. Neoliberalism should therefore be 
understood as something of an interlude between old and new 
developmentalism that has enabled the Brazilian state to pursue active 
policies to support public enterprises and recognise the competitive effects of 
private capital in making the petroleum industry more globally competitive.  
 
Chapter 8 brings us back to corporate governance and labour relations in the 
Brazilian petroleum sector. In contrast to the effect of neoliberalism to 
CODELCO, economic restructuring in the petroleum industry led to the 
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reconstitution of a stronger PETROBRAS in the oil sector. Its competitive 
strategy throughout the 1990s was geared towards further 
internationalisation of its economic activities, backed up by the Brazilian 
state through direct and indirect forms of support. However, as explained in 
Chapter 7, the return of the state has heightened the politicisation of 
petroleum. There exist greater pressures to manage PETROBRAS as an 
international company, taking the state enterprise further away from the 
state. The narrative of global competitiveness has allowed the company to 
manage commercial decisions and labour conflicts without excessive 
interference from the Brazilian state. Neoliberal reforms placed PETROBRAS 
management in a dilemma of performing both public and profit-oriented 
roles on equal footing. This problem was accentuated by the difficulty of 
managing labour interests and stable economic governance under Fernando 
Cardoso. The chapter explores these tensions by focussing on episodes of 
mobilisation of petroleum workers in the 1990s and the return of 
politicisation following the discovery of new oil reserves. The findings suggest 
that, unlike in Chile, where the private sector operates in a ‘free market’, the 
dominant role of PETROBRAS as a market player means that political 
demands are negotiated between the state and labour (via PETROBRAS) and 
not between private capital and workers. The main challenge for organised 
workers, then, is to claim autonomy in relation to a corporatist state whilst 
adjusting to the internationalisation of PETROBRAS.  
 
In the concluding chapter, I return to the theoretical debates on resource 
governance, institutional change, and global political economy of 
development to illustrate how the case studies answered the research 
questions posed in this introduction. In Chapter 9, I offer insights about the 
future of post-neoliberal governance in Latin America through the Brazilian 
and Chilean experiences of natural resource management. More broadly, I 
argue that historical institutionalist lenses fit well with critical political 
economy perspectives to explain state transformation, changing balance of 
power between public and private authority, and the increasing difficult of 
managing labour in the context of globalisation of commodity production. 
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Chapter 2  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this thesis, I employ a comparative case study research design to examine 
changes and continuities in the transformation of states and of natural 
resource governance. It applies ‘contextualised comparisons’ (Locke & 
Thelen 1995), which seek for paired comparisons of different issue areas 
within the two case studies. On the one hand, the thesis disconfirms the 
argument of convergence towards neoliberalism through a concrete 
empirical investigation of capitalist diversity within a specific cluster of 
states, those endowed with natural resources. Brazil and Chile are exemplary 
of politicised capitalism, where states take a predominantly active role in 
pursuing growth strategies via natural resource exploitation. On the other 
hand, the thesis is also exploratory in conceptual terms as it maps out the 
constitutive elements of neo-developmentalist policy paradigm (as well as its 
continuities and changes with neoliberalism). It contributes to the emerging 
literature seeking to explain the sets of policy reforms specific to natural 
resources that states apply to address economic growth and resource 
dependency. Neither is my thesis exhaustive nor does it generalise across the 
Southern Cone or developing countries. Through the cases of Brazil and 
Chile, my thesis analyses how the general conditions applicable to countries 
with resource endowments are dealt with in particular ways by states. As 
such, my cases studies are also not mirror images of each other. That is, they 
do not show a similar process taking place in two different contexts. Instead, 
I detail how (state) agency is exercised in different ways – paying attention to 
the role of history, political legacies, and the changing structures of 
opportunities – in order to demonstrate the quite varied strategies of 
economic governance of resource-rich states. In the proceeding sections, I 
elaborate on the key methodological issues that I faced during the research 
process, including discussions on ontology, epistemology, the overall 
research design and the choice of specific methods. 
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2.1 Ontological and epistemological considerations 
 
In this thesis, I do not aim to test hypotheses or develop causal relationships 
between variables. Instead of grand theoretical designs which 
decontextualise politics in the name of parsimony and deductive research, 
my goal is rather limited. I wish to analyse political life by focussing on the 
contingent relations between explanatory elements, which implies 
recognising the role of political time and ideational factors as part of 
unfolding social processes.  
 
In rejecting conventional positivist methodologies, it is worth clarifying that 
knowledge production is inherently subjective (indeed political) but that we 
can still construct theoretical propositions (rather than theory as a coherent 
paradigm). As Robert Cox argues (1981), theory – and by extension social 
scientific knowledge – is created for someone, for something, and serves 
some purpose. It postulates that the social world is constitutive of material 
and ideational factors, to which the researcher mediates by way of 
interpretation of social facts in developing an argument or narrative. 
Nevertheless I remain sceptical that the findings can travel beyond the case 
studies. Theoretical constructs are a method of simplification to understand 
the complexity of social reality. We can attempt to move from individualising 
comparison towards generalisation (Tilly 1984) through for example asking 
‘the same or at least similar questions of very different contexts thus allowing 
for divergent answers’ (Bendix 1978: 15 in Tilly 1984: 68). But we should 
avoid standardising schemes and recognise the importance of individual 
historical narratives. In analysing development strategies, I note three key 
assumptions: (a) that national elites devise individual strategies although 
ideational diffusion and the spread of free market beliefs have considerably 
influenced policy-making; (b) within each state previous institutional history 
and patterns of conflicts place some constraints in grafting solutions to 
problems; and finally, (c) institutional transformations do not necessarily 
equate to changes in structures of power, or of relations of production, but 
rather the evolution of politico-economic institutions should be viewed as 
shifts in contemporary beliefs and ideas vis-à-vis the relative strength of the 
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dominant paradigm. The mode of inquiry of comparative historical research 
fits comfortably with my research strategy. 
 
More importantly, contingencies of history go a long way in explaining 
disparate pathways of. As social science methodologies remind us, general 
patterns take particular forms. In Orihuela’s (2011: 20) study on the 
evolution of green states in Chile and Peru, he argues that despite 
institutional convergence, pre-existing institutional legacies and the 
particularities of case-specific contexts give different quality to social 
phenomena spreading across economies, polities, and societies. More 
broadly, Ellen Immergut (1998: 19) makes plain the position of new 
institutionalism: causality is contextual, to which complex configurations of 
factors are causally significant but are difficult, if not impossible, to be 
broken down into causally independent variables. The same combination of 
factors may not necessarily produce the same results if repeated at a later 
point in time.4 The case of neo-developmental states in Brazil and Chile are 
the same. Its form and reach depend on (national) processes of state-
building, differing international contexts upon which states are situated, civic 
institutions, and distinctive political styles of governing labour relations. 
These factors likewise interact with political economy structures and cultural 
legacies, which in combination shape trajectories of economic development. 
These contextual variables explain, to a significant degree, why Chile has 
taken a more marketised variant of neo-developmental strategy whilst Brazil 
has retained several elements of state intervention in economic governance. 
Although similar structures and conditions may exist, as well as convergence 
towards (neoliberal) policy agendas, state structures and the triangular social 
relations between states, markets and labour unions co-vary across cases in 
the region. 
 
                                                   
 
4 But equally, human actors have the capacity to learn from history, and we do so to avoid 
mistakes of the past, such that the same levels of unemployment and inflation 
comparable to the thirties would yield to fascist movements again (Immergut 1998: 19). 
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2.2 Research strategy 
 
I am interested in the study of the changes in state structures, the interaction 
between material-institutional contexts and ideational policy frames, and the 
changing patterns of state-labour relations in strategic sectors. As such, the 
research follows a comparative historical approach developed in comparative 
politics and historical institutionalism schools in understanding how history, 
politics and contingency shape developmental outcomes (Brady and Collier 
2004; Katznelson 2009; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Pierson 2004). 
However, I do not strictly follow the conventional tools utilised by 
comparative politics. I do not deny the fact that there is selection bias in the 
case studies (Geddes 1990, 2003; King, Keohane & Verba 1994). Since the 
political world is shaped largely by contingency, exogenous shocks, and 
international contexts, political choices cannot be derived from a single 
explanatory variable. Some studies have utilised this approach, and has 
inspired my work, including Peter Hall’s (1989) The Political Power of 
Economic Ideas, Theda Skocpol’s (1979) States and Social Revolutions, and 
Barrington Moore’s (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
As these writings exemplify, pairing exclusively in terms of ‘most similar’ or 
‘most dissimilar’ cases fails to offer adequate explanations in understanding 
the modern world. Case studies can bring key insights on political struggles 
(and power relations) between actors over time, unpack the weight of 
structural constraints vis-à-vis the capacity of agency, and it can shed light in 
understanding how internal legacies have lasting effects to present and future 
political choices. In the specific cases under investigation, Brazil and Chile 
are considered as cases of stable institutional configurations marked by 
respect for private participation and presence of state enterprises to manage 
extractive industries. Formal policies aimed at accepting neoliberalism 
converged upon the transition to political democracies. Upon the election of 
the Left, political elites have sought to balance public and private modes of 
resource extraction. Neoliberalism had a single recipe but quite varied 
applications, and the adoption of particular reforms was determined by the 
interactions among states, markets and politics. On their own, each country 
case shows why the weight of the initial conditions is insufficient to explain 
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political development, since changing contexts and agency choices are 
equally fundamental. Case studies offer detailed accounts of the particular, 
and this fine-grain attention to given processes can help develop arguments 
to make broader theoretical propositions of more general patterns. In the 
words of José Orihuela, ‘mono-causal explanations or absolute universality 
claims too much for social sciences’ (Orihuela 2011: 27). 
 
As sociologist Charles Tilly (1984: 12-13) insists, undertaking the systematic 
study of big structures and large places and people must be historical in 
limiting their scope to a period bounded by the playing out of certain well-
defined processes, and it should recognise that time matters, that when and 
things happen within a sequence affects how they happen, and that every 
structure or process constitutes a series of choice points (emphasis in 
original). The revival of writing on ‘huge comparisons’ of ‘large processes’ In 
his own work, Tilly argues that the development of capitalism and the 
formation of powerful, connected national states dominated all other social 
processes and shaped all social structures. Methodologically, systematic 
enquiry on large processes applies individualising comparisons as a starting 
point. It highlights the contrasts existing between different human situations 
and social structures and it also underscores the inescapable artificiality of 
conceptual distinctions (Tilly 1984: 66). In other words, comparative 
historical approaches move seamlessly between empirical evidence and 
Weberian ‘ideal types’ to reveal the relationship of variables.  
 
2.3 Comparative research design 
 
The problem of (institutional) change rests on the difficulty of comparing two 
different cases. In political science, most especially, research designs have 
been formulated using John Stuart Mill’s principles of ‘most similar’ and 
‘most different’ cases (George & Bennett 2005; Lichbach & Zucherman 
2009). The approach assumes that two countries appear to be comparable by 
way of reducing properties of institutions into paired variables, measurable 
through indices. Rather than finding a singular variable to explain complex 
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processes of political change, and especially in developing country contexts 
where the research process is less straightforward, my thesis explores how 
states respond differently to the general conditions, namely the changes 
taking place at the global levels – an export bonanza driven by China, the 
increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of multinational players 
including emerging market SOEs, and the dominance of neoliberalism as a 
competitive strategy (Brautigam 2009; Jenkins 2012; Goldstein 2007; Moran 
2010; Nem Singh & Bourgouin forthcoming). In short, I am interested to 
explore the diversity of state strategies of managing the export bonanza, and 
the distinctive ways in which market reforms were embraced by national 
elites to adjust to the global economy.  
 
In this context, there are four main justifications for the comparison of Brazil 
and Chile. Firstly, both are natural resource-rich states endowed with 
strategic resources, which have proceeded in managing the sectors through a 
combination of market mechanisms and state intervention in the last three 
decades. On the one hand, Chile’s export economy depends on copper 
earnings since the 1929 Great Depression, which was a critical juncture that 
decisively shifted its economy from nitrate to copper mining for its major 
export commodity. On the other hand, although Brazil has a plethora of 
natural resources, the oil industry stands out as exceptionally important in 
achieving industrialisation – the main economic goal of the Brazilian state 
since 1930 – because the sector is intricately woven in other productive 
sectors, such as transport, petrochemicals, heavy capital goods, and 
manufacturing. Since Vargas’ era, it was deemed crucial for Brazil to achieve 
energy security by way of being self sufficient in its energy needs if the 
country wants to reclaim its rightful place in the world economy. In the 
context of neoliberal globalisation, both countries have managed their 
resource sectors by combining policies in favour of private capital 
participation and strategic state intervention in the sectors. Whilst Brazilian 
elites have applied a more (neo) developmentalist approach, Chile has 
persistently struggled to reform the neoliberal legacy but has been equally 
successful in introducing reforms to increase the stake of the Chilean state in 
mining management. The comparison thus exemplifies how states react 
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differently to quite similar economic conditions as instantiated by the 
changes in the global political economy. Although neoliberalism was 
incompletely applied in both countries, the specific interactions between the 
state, state enterprises, private capitalists, and labour unions are in fact 
conditioned by political legacies, historical conflicts, and extent of autonomy 
of state enterprises to devise their respective competitive strategies.  
 
Secondly, the comparison looks at how structural characteristics of their 
respective extractive industries, oil in Brazil and copper in Chile, affect the 
political choices of national governments. Whilst Brazil and Chile are 
resource-endowed states, the types of resources matter in structuring 
agential actions. In Chile, its economic size, the strong presence of 
multinational firms at the global level, and the tension between the presence 
of a state enterprise and private firms in the copper industry have convinced 
political elites to deploy the competitiveness argument, which was accepted 
by the mining unions and big business. As Chapter 6 shows, corporate 
reforms and labour management practices in CODELCO were driven by the 
belief on the efficient and productive nature of the private sector. Neoliberal 
reforms are thus more difficult to reverse in Chile. However, in Brazil, its 
economic strength, the history of state intervention, and the fact that the 
global oil industry remains highly oligopolistic and restrictive to foreign 
capital provided the justification for the Brazilian state to introduce quite 
easily new forms of control in the oil industry alongside policies inviting 
foreign private firms in the sector. From Lula da Silva’s perspective, the fact 
that 77 percent of the global oil industry remains exclusively accessible to 
national oil champions is sufficient grounds to limit the activities of foreign 
companies in the newly discovered oil reserves. These divergent state 
strategies of managing resources point to the distinctive ways states interpret 
their positions in the international system as well as the perceptions as 
regards how to best exploit resources for national economic goals. 
 
Thirdly, the comparison brings together two cases where political parties and 
institutionalised formal rules are crucial in policy-making processes, which is 
quite distinctive in Latin American politics (Castañeda 2006; Castañeda & 
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Morales 2008). Scholarly works on comparative politics in Latin America, 
especially from rational choice perspectives, have pointed out the increasing 
importance of party politics, political leadership, and executive-legislative 
relations in national political processes as a result of region-wide 
democratisation (Ames 1995; Geddes 1994; Helms 2012; Morgenstern & 
Nacif 2002). My work complements this growing literature by focussing on 
Brazil and Chile – specifically the coalition of left and centre parties in the 
post-dictatorship era – and the ways governing coalitions negotiate economic 
reforms with organised labour unions in strategic sectors. My work thus 
responds to the critique of rational choice institutionalism to historical 
institutionalism regarding the lack of microfoundations of politics in the 
latter. By specifying how national policy agendas of Left governments were 
articulated and the contentious process between state elites and other actors 
in policy debates, I demonstrate how institutionally contextualised 
motivations are linked to the nature of policy outcomes. For example, I show 
how the passage of royalty taxes in Chile and the successful changes in the 
types of contracts for foreign capitalists in Brazil are based on the power of 
interpretive agents (or in Schmidt’s (2010) term ‘sentient’ agents) to 
enunciate communicative discourses to produce institutional transformation. 
However, I recognise that the relationship between intensions and outcomes 
are hardly straightforward. The problem of identifying change 
(explanadum/outcome) as casually related to actor intentions and ideas 
(explanans/causal variable) lies on the mechanisms that link these factors. 
Motivations can be apparent or concealed, which posits a challenge in 
identifying causal mechanisms; intermediate steps are devised by actors to 
achieve the desired outcomes (Portes 2010). Nevertheless, my empirical 
research shows evidence of agency expressing ideas and discourses within 
‘bounded institutional’ contexts thus allowing me to identify change taking 
place albeit in gradual terms. 
 
Finally, my thesis compares, to a far lesser extent, the different roles of 
labour unions in the political economy of reforms in Brazil and Chile. This is 
a key contribution to the literature on post-neoliberalism in so far as 
explicating who are the carriers of endogenous institutional change. As 
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mentioned in the introduction, labour unions are one of the key supporters of 
the post-neoliberal agenda in Latin America. In Brazil and Chile, the role of 
unions is rather complex and is conditioned by their reconstituted 
relationship with labour parties and state enterprise managers. In Chile, we 
see a stratification of the mining union movement as a consequence of 
neoliberal restructuring in public and private mines. However, the recent 
episodes of contentious mobilisations against thwarted privatisation under 
the Right government show the historically accumulated strength of 
collective action based on class politics in Chile. In Brazil, there appears 
considerably less detail regarding the contentious mobilisation of petroleum 
workers but they are nevertheless key in the passage of the new petroleum 
laws under Lula da Silva (who himself was a trade union leader since the 
1970s). One key justification here rests on the nature of the labour movement 
in Brazil. Unlike in Chile where trade unions have been fragmented and 
organised into distinctive confederations, the political legacy of Getúlio 
Vargas in Brazil is the prevalence of single category representation organised 
in a hierarchical fashion. This implies that local petroleum unions at the local 
levels (e.g. SINDIPETRO in different oil-producing municipalities) are 
affiliated with the regional confederation (FUP at the state/regional levels), 
who are consequently affiliated with the national confederation (e.g. CUT). In 
effect, there is far less competition among unions, which is reflected in the 
fairly cohesive position of petroleum unions on different political issues. This 
also explains the discrepancy in the number of interviews with union leaders 
between Brazil and Chile. In Chile, I conducted interviews with union leaders 
in state-owned CODELCO, private copper companies, private gold 
companies, and leaders at the levels of confederation of mining workers. In 
addition to this, I conducted interviews with other social groups – indigenous 
community leader and environmental activists – who have been critical of 
the Chilean mining policy. However, in Brazil, I only spoke with 
representatives from the unions in one of the oil-producing municipalities 
(SINDIPETRO NF), one in Rio de Janeiro (FUP), and one representative of 
the PT party in Brasilia. The representative in national confederation of 
workers, CUT, pointed me to directly conduct interviews with the oil union 
leadership. Across the interviews in Brazil, however, there have been 
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consistent answers reflecting the greater cohesiveness and solidarity between 
unions and left parties. In the final section, I discuss the specific research 
methods I applied in my research. 
 
2.4 Research methods 
 
There are mainly two key research techniques applied in my fieldwork. 
Firstly, I used semi-structured interviews to gain insights from a wide array 
of actors involved in policy debates. Appendix 1 provides a list of interviewees 
in Brazil and Chile. These were mostly collected in two research trips, during 
which I stayed for five months in Chile (July 10 –November 20, 2009) and 
another five months in Brazil (April 06 –August 27, 2010). I carried out all 
the interviews in English, Spanish and Portuguese, although the 
transcriptions were done by myself and native speaking translators. The total 
number of interviews, usually between 30 minutes and 1 hour-30 minutes, 
was 66. Although I attempted to achieve a balanced number between the two 
cases, it was substantially more difficult to get interviews in Brazil than in 
Chile. Additionally, the number of interviews also reflects the highly 
structured nature of politics in Brazil as opposed to Chile. Whilst there are far 
more unions to interview in Chile (and the interviews show the conflictual 
viewpoints of actors as well), the highly organised structure of business 
groups and labour movement in Brazil effectively means that there is less 
gain in doing more interviews of the same category of actors. So for example, 
I only conducted one interview with the organisation of private oil 
companies, IBP, but they had three representatives in the different business 
areas responding to my questions. Since PETROBRAS is the dominant actor 
in the oil industry, I focussed my energy on acquiring interviews with the 
unions in PETROBRAS, namely FUP and SINDIPETRO who represent the oil 
workers. Finally, one major hurdle in Brazil was to get an interview with the 
current directors of PETROBRAS. Whilst eventually there had been 
interviews with past officials and current external consultants for the state 
company, PETROBRAS itself was very difficult to acquire interviews. It 
would have been helpful to speak with the senior management especially 
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those involved in investment strategy and internationalisation policy of the 
company, but this requires having extensive personal contacts with the 
government or within the industry. Nevertheless, I was very fortunate to have 
conducted a significant number of interviews with members of the executive 
board and mid-level management of the regulatory agency, ANP, as well as 
with the Deputy Secretary in the Oil Sector of the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy (MME). From my perspective, they are the most insightful interviews 
in understanding the justifications of introducing neoliberal reforms (ANP) 
and the policy changes introduced by Lula da Silva (MME). Combined 
together, these interviews offer a credible narrative as regards the 
motivations/intentions of state agencies in altering the rules as well as the 
consequences of the new laws in 2010 with respect to autonomy of ANP, 
PETROBRAS, and the perceived new roles of MME and the new state 
enterprise PETROSAL. 
 
The assumption I make when using interviews for data analysis is that key 
informants are bearers of knowledge who have access and influence to 
decision-making structures. It is through the reconstruction of competing 
narratives among different state and non-state actors that we can see 
interpretive agents at work. As Joel Migdal (1994, 2001) argues, whilst there 
is a coherent image of a state, it is the multiple, often contradictory actions of 
bureaucrats and officials at various parts of the state that we can explain how 
change happens. Because ideas and institutions are sticky, change in the real 
world only happens when we connect norms, values, and everyday practices 
to the ideas and discourses of agents. In short, institutional change takes 
place when ideational change does appear. So we need to observe the 
justifications of different actors motivating their actions and places these 
ideas into the wider institutional and structural contexts.  
 
Hence interviews are windows of opportunities for the researcher to see the 
interactions between the cognitive frameworks of agents and the wider 
institutional contexts constraining political action. Whilst state bureaucrats 
justify their policy actions on the basis of some organisationally embedded 
ideas, we can observe how outcomes reflect these ideas that are recognisably 
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constrained by the wider institutional contexts upon which actors act. 
Conversely, we expect certain norms, beliefs, and cognitive frameworks when 
conversing with business groups and labour unions. This is largely a result of 
the lived experiences of agents, which shape their perceptions, worldviews, 
and positions in political life. The interview process is thus like a 
conversation that requires flexibility to capture the essence of the two-way 
social interaction between the researcher and the bearer of knowledge (Kvale 
& Brinkmann 2009). In contrast to the rigidity of structured interviews with 
pre-set questions and intellectual parameters, semi-structured interviews 
generate insights by giving the interviewee the chance to explore some 
themes that researchers often miss out during the preparation stage. Equally, 
this skews the balance of power between the researcher and the interviewee. 
Whilst in structured interviews the researcher is privileged as the interpreter 
of knowledge with the power of setting agendas on what is deemed 
important, the flexibility in semi-structured interviews allows the ‘subject to 
speak up’. What appears to be a minute point is in fact important when 
conducting interviews across a spectrum of political actors. Whilst unions 
privilege questions on labour rights and collective negotiations, and therefore 
offer insights regarding their role as challengers of the state, business groups 
and state officials tacitly define what they see as important issues in 
governance. Thus, copper policy in Chile is narrowly defined by elites and 
business groups as achieving stable growth via tax and political stability (see 
Chapter 5) whilst unions and indigenous groups express their resistance 
against what is perceived as highly exclusionary politics (Nem Singh 2010). 
From the perspective of unions and social groups, copper governance is also 
about participation and what they consider as the role of the state in mining 
management differs quite clearly from the regulators and private sector. This 
flexibility in the interview process opens up opportunities for researchers to 
explore theoretically rich terrains of knowledge rather than following a priori 
standards of elite interviewing. This subjectivity in the object of inquiry is 
inevitably part of the research process, which case study designs address by 
way of triangulation of methods (Kvale 1996; Yin 2003, 2008). 
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The second key research technique applied during fieldwork is extensive 
archival and documentary analysis of various government papers, policy 
positions, annual reports of private and state-owned companies, interviews 
with unions and other actors via newspapers and websites, and use of 
secondary sources produced in Brazil and Chile. For example, I examined 
government documents and newspaper articles to verify the arguments and 
insights acquired from the interviews with actors. During fieldwork, I 
collated the following: national legislations; presidential decrees, letters and 
speeches to Congress; formal statements of unions and business groups; and 
annual reports of state enterprises. In order to do this, I had to go to the 
library archives in the National Congress in Chile and Brazil, various library 
facilities of government agencies and business associations (especially in 
Brazil where documents in Portuguese are not available online), acquired 
brochures and position papers of unions upon doing the interviews. In the 
fieldwork process, I visited selected regions of particular relevance to the 
research, particularly in Brasilia (Brazil), Antofagasta, Calama, and Copiapo 
(Chile) whilst being based in Rio de Janeiro and Santiago de Chile.  
 
Crucially, the procurement of secondary materials written by Chileans and 
Brazilians is an important part of the fieldwork. I recognise the unequal 
power relations within academia and the dangers of excessive reliance on 
social scientific knowledge produced in the English-speaking world. I have 
thus tried to correct this by conducting longer periods of fieldwork research 
in Brazil and Chile as well as becoming more sensitive to local knowledge. As 
a student from the developing world, I recognise the imbalance between 
scholars from the centre and the periphery. One significant method of 
redressing this is to give credit to where it is due: by taking locally produced 
literature with respect and citing them as equally valuable as those produced 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. No research is inherently objective and value-free. 
In addition, the longevity of the field research in Latin America is motivated 
by my view that institutions, ideas and interests are culturally contextualised. 
We cannot divorce theory from praxis, and the ways in which a scholar’s 
theoretical lenses shape the view of reality. Without a minimum 
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understanding of culture and history, it is difficult to understand why 
institutions and political systems produce divergent consequences.  
 
2.5 Challenges in the field 
 
Whilst most researchers would like to think that the process of data 
collection and data analysis are straightforward, in reality they are hardly so. 
During the fieldwork, I have encountered several problems that may have 
compromised my ability to acquire the information I hoped for. Firstly, my 
language skills could have been improved further to enhance access to 
secondary literature. Since I had to learn both Spanish and Portuguese 
simultaneously in 2008-2009, it was inevitably difficult to gain proficiency in 
both languages prior to the field research. My native language, Filipino, was 
very helpful in learning Spanish at a conversational/intermediate level within 
five months in 2009. This considerably facilitated my Portuguese when I 
moved to Brazil in 2010. In order to ensure the accuracy of my translations 
and data analysis, I have sought help from native speakers to translate, 
transcribe, and read my work. There were also available documents in 
English utilised to validate the acquired materials and interviews. Secondly, 
as mentioned beforehand, access to key informant interviewees were far 
more difficult in Brazil than in Chile. Although I intended to conduct around 
40 interviews in Brazil, in the end I only managed to get 22 interviews as a 
result of the hierarchical structure of organised social groups as well as the 
restrictive access to PETROBRAS. In hindsight, I could have increased the 
interviews with unions by reframing the questions to specify the demands 
and contexts of workers in every sector of the oil industry. For example, it 
may have been possible to get interviews with workers and union leaders in 
the refineries and distribution areas although this would have to be done via 
CUT and FUP as well. As a way of triangulating my analysis, I have tried to 
extensively use secondary literature written by area studies scholars, 
especially by Brazilian and Chilean scholars, as well as different primary 
documents written in Spanish and Portuguese. Nevertheless, I hold full 
responsibility for any shortcomings and mistakes in the thesis. 
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Chapter 3  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON RESOURCE 
POLITICS 
 
 
After decades of neoliberal restructuring, it is a puzzle why some developing 
countries like Brazil and Chile have state enterprises in extractive industries. 
To explain this, I explore the political economy of natural resources during 
the high tide of neoliberalism in the context of Left governments. Whilst 
there exists a broad swath of research analysing different models of resource 
management, most have focussed on the changing roles of foreign capital in 
shaping economic development, role of technology in transforming state 
strategies of global trade and production, or a broad-brush analysis of power 
of transnational actors (Bridge 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Bunker 1985; Bunker & 
Ciccantell 2005; Jenkins 1987). Although this lacuna is gradually being filled 
in by critical geography’s excellent work on the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’ 
and ‘geographies of activism’, there fall short and do not theoretically 
integrate structure, contingency and politics.5 In short, they place insufficient 
emphasis on the state in relation to structures of (global or national) power 
in shedding light how the global neoliberal order permits specific 
development projects in some contexts and not in others. Crucially, labour 
unions were regarded as having less agential power to contest neoliberalism 
despite the traditional view of organised labour as the primary actor 
reflecting collective action in twentieth century Latin America.6 With a few 
exceptions (e.g. Gudynas 2010, 2011a, 2011b), there is scarcely any coherent 
                                                   
 
5 For this literature, see Bebbington 2012; Bebbington & Humphreys-Bebbington 2011, 
2010; Bebbington et. al. 2008; Bebbington et. al. 2008; Bridge 2004a, 2004b, 2008; 
Bury 2005; Castree 2007a, 2007b; Castree & Braun 2001, among many others. 
6 This, of course, excludes research looking at labour unions and outcomes of labour reforms. 
However, they do not pay enough attention to resource sector unions because of the 
social division existing between these ‘labour aristocrats’ and working classes. For an 
overview, see Burdick et. al. 2009; Cook 2007; Roberts 1998. However, Haarstad (2009a, 
2009b) makes an excellent contribution to the debate on the repoliticisation of labour 
issues in extractive industries by way of examining the disarticulation of labour issues 
and the extent to which neoliberal reforms have disenfranchised labour. 
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intellectual project exploring the linkages between natural resources, state 
politics, and contestation of labour unions that accounts for the rapidly 
changing political economy of development.  
 
The task of this chapter is to review what has been written thus far regarding 
natural resource governance as a political model. That state-society relations 
and state-labour relations were reconstituted under neoliberalism is widely 
acknowledged. Yet the extent to which changes in state-society relations have 
been shaped by resource sectors remains understudied. This is quite unusual 
given that primary commodities have historically shaped political economy.  
 
The chapter consists of three main sections. In Section 3.1, I provide an 
overview of the debates around the politics of natural resources and how 
conventional approaches fail to capture the different forms of state 
adaptation to neoliberalism in governing resources. In Section 3.2 and 3.3, I 
present my alternative theoretical framework to understand contemporary 
political economy of extractivism: historical institutionalism (HI), which 
emphasises incremental changes, critical junctures and ideational processes 
as a way of explaining institutional transformation; and critical international 
political economy (IPE), which draws strongly on strategic choices of agency 
– in states and labour unions – within structured contexts as explanations of 
the consequences of neoliberal reforms in Brazil and Chile. Finally, Section 
1.4 discusses the complementarities between HI and critical IPE as a 
framework to explain changing continuities in resource governance. 
 
3.1 What we know about resource governance 
 
Natural resources produce rents, defined as the difference between the costs 
of extraction and the return from land, labour and capital; or in the context 
of resource wealth, rents are ‘super-normal (oligopoly or monopoly) profits’. 
The growing scarcity of resources due to the scale and intensity of resource 
use and material mobilisation in the twentieth century (Dauvergne 2008; 
McNeill 2000) has produced an inter-disciplinary dialogue within and 
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beyond social sciences to analyse how nature is utilised, governed, and 
commodified by societies. A variety of social and political aspects have been 
discussed extensively across disciplines, for example: the consequences of 
intensifying extractive-based growth strategies in spatial terms (Bebbington 
2010; Bebbington et. al. 2008; Bebbington & Humphreys-Bebbington 2011);7 
the (re)constitution of collective identities based around opposition to 
commodification of land use and resource extraction (McCormick 2007, 
2009; Perreault 2008a, 2008b; Sawyer 2004; Wolford 2010); and the 
depoliticised debates around ‘good governance’ of resources in key policy 
areas like taxation, revenue management, and environmental and social 
mitigation (Gunvald Nilsen 2008; Hinojosa et. al. 2010; Humphreys et. al. 
2007; World Bank 2006; WIR 2007). The literature is vast. My PhD thesis is 
located within debates on the political economy of neoliberalism, the 
developmental roles of states, and in conceptualising citizenship through the 
lens of labour rights. I necessarily focus on the literature on resource 
extraction, state capacity, and neoliberal modalities of governing nature. 
With this massive caveat, the recent literature on resource politics can be 
divided roughly according to two main perspectives: (a) state politics 
focussing on the resource curse, rentier states, and depoliticised good 
governance; and (b) more systemic approaches looking at how changes in 
production and consumption affect global production chains.   
 
3.1.1 Governance-centred approaches to resource politics 
 
The resource curse, in strictly economic terms, is often used loosely to 
describe the negative effects of the Dutch Disease. It refers to the 
appreciation of real exchange rates caused by the sharp rise in exports and 
                                                   
 
7 Specifically, this is the ESRC project led by Tony Bebbington (RES-051-27-0191) at the 
School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester entitled “Conflicts 
over the countryside: civil society and the political ecology of rural development in the 
Andean region”. Please see the following link for further details: 
http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes/. 
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the tendency of a booming resource sector to draw capital and labour away 
from a country’s manufacturing and agricultural sectors, thereby, raising 
their production costs (Ross 2001b: 305). Similarly, institutional 
endowments are the key to the success of an exports-oriented growth 
strategy – the likely hypothesis used to explain the disparate paths of 
resource-abundant and resource-scarce states as well as the so-called 
exceptionalism of some resource-rich states like Australia, Botswana, 
Canada, Chile, Malaysia, and Norway (Acemoglu et. al. 2003; Mehlum et. al. 
2006; Sachs & Warner 1997, 2001). Whilst econometric studies are able to 
establish correlations between natural wealth and institutional quality, for 
example Mehlum et. al.’s (2006) distinction between producer-friendly and 
grabber-friendly institutions to theoretically abstract rent-seeking and 
production, unfortunately, these studies do not explain well why some 
countries succeed in a less deterministic fashion. In fact, the resource curse 
thesis is being challenged not so much for its methodology but for the way 
high powered economic theories are enacted, practised, and legitimised as a 
device to structure relations of power and how theorising collides with and 
adjusts to already existing politico-economic and socio-cultural conditions 
(e.g. Weszkalnys 2011). Nevertheless, the importance of the resource curse as 
a reference point in debates on governing extractive resources must be 
recognised. Political studies have begun to discuss the resource curse from 
institutionalist and political economy perspectives, and it is this debate that I 
focus on the rest of the chapter.  
 
The literature on natural wealth exploitation gravitated around the notion of 
what Terry Lynn Karl (1997) calls the ‘paradox of plenty’ – a debate 
dominated by economists and political scientists interested at the economic 
and political consequences of resource dependency. The resource curse 
literature examines the political choices of elites that lock in development 
strategies towards a cycle of resource dependency, which then negatively 
affects the quality of political institutions, the capacity of the state to exert 
state autonomy from rent-seeking groups, and the prospects of minimising 
conflicts in contexts of civil wars and secessionism (Karl 1997; Hammond 
2009; Ross 2001a, 2006, 2012; Smith 2004; Uldefer 2007). In particular, the 
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central issue in Latin American political economy is the ways export led 
growth strategies have failed to improve state capacities to effectively collect 
more revenues and diversify the tax base (and economy more generally) in 
order to diminish reliance on resources.  
 
One way of understanding state capacity and resource dependency is via the 
lens of taxation. In Latin America, resource rich states have had few 
incentives to develop robust, capable tax administration systems as a result 
of the ease of extracting resource revenues. Because oil and mineral rents are 
drawn from foreign capital rather than general taxation, political elites 
generate income without necessarily seeking for the support and cooperation 
of citizens. Historically, regional elites exerted political autonomy at the 
expense of hollowing out the centralised state. This process of state building 
lacks one key feature of institutional development: the creation of a social 
contract between the state and society that historically comes through 
contractual taxation systems (Brautigam et. al. 2008; Levi 1988; Tilly 1992). 
Whilst this argument is now contested on empirical and theoretical grounds,8 
it remains the case that institutional capacity to tax is necessary, especially in 
contexts of resource-dependent economies where alternative sources of 
taxation have failed to develop (Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010; Smith 2007). 
Evidently, reforms towards strengthening state capacity become more 
difficult to achieve when states are left to deal with sudden downturns in 
international commodity prices. An export bonanza also poses a major 
challenge – politicians and bureaucrats tend to inject revenues in the 
domestic economy bringing forth inflationary pressures. Terry Karl refers to 
this political behaviour as the ‘politics without limits’ mentality, which in 
Venezuela resulted into the breakdown of prudent macroeconomic 
                                                   
 
8 Rentierism does not necessarily obstruct accountability because: (a) some regimes – Saudi 
Arabia being the exemplary case –are able to buy off dissent and generate more rents; (b) 
the links between taxation and representation in European history have far less support 
for rentier state theory than is often supposed; (c) citizens may still want to hold their 
rulers accountable even without being taxed; and (d) the rentier state theory may find 
less support outside of the Middle East context due to the existence of rentier 
democracies (Herb 1999, 2003, 2005; Hertog 2010a, 2010b; Waterbury 1994, 1997).  
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management. 9  As an explanatory framework, these studies explore the 
collusion between states and big business, the role of external actors in 
perpetuating authoritarian regimes in resource dependent states (e.g. United 
States, donor agencies), and the ways resources support factions in countries 
plagued by civil strife (Karl 1997; Ross 1999, 2001b, 2001c, 2006; Smith 
2004, 2007; Uldefer 2007). 
 
The discovery of minerals and petroleum requires simultaneous state 
reforms to manage the sudden influx of revenues and to strategically use 
resource rents for economic growth. Asset immobility and geographical 
concentration of resources allow for the development of extractive sectors 
without necessary linking extraction to production of intermediate goods 
(Dunning 2008: 6; Gallo 2008; Hammond 2009). Some take a more 
pessimistic view on this, claiming that extraction occurs within uneven global 
economy and where the niche of peripheral states in the international 
division of labour lies in serving primary commodities for the global economy 
– Harvey (2003) brands this as capital ‘accumulation by dispossession’. With 
respect to the question of citizenship (and quality of democracy), mining 
politics tend to be highly technocratic and rent distribution is confined 
among elites. Although democratic states are subjected to pressures for 
transparency and accountability, the way in which economic reforms are 
designed and implemented have followed an authoritarian style of decision-
making. For example, mining resources are associated with centralisation of 
power at the expense of democratic accountability, deterioration of public 
institutions, and uneven capabilities to tax different sectors (Dunning 2008; 
Gallo 2008; Karl 1997; Mejía Acosta & de Renzio 2008; Ross 2012).   
 
In explaining the strengths and limitations of contemporary growth 
strategies of resource-rich states, questions of timing and sequencing of 
reforms matter. Contingency and politics also mean that human agency is 
                                                   
 
9  In some instances, political elites deliberately use resource rents in consolidating 
authoritarian regimes, a survival strategy of states in resisting calls for democratisation 
and attempts to curtail corruption and rent-seeking. See Ross 1999, 2001c. 
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consequential to the political economy of market reforms. In this context, 
governance-centred approaches fall short as a result of structural 
determinism; contrary to econometric studies on resource curse (Sachs & 
Warner 1997, 2001), there exists no linear causality between resource 
abundance and institutional development. The same can be said about 
political studies on the resource curse – best captured by the rentier state 
hypothesis. Firstly, advocates of the rentier state theory only explain the 
durability of authoritarianism as a result of oil wealth in Africa and the 
Middle East (Beblawi 1990; Beblawi & Luciani 1987). The theory does not 
travel beyond these regions, especially in Latin America where resource rich 
states like Chile, Mexico and Venezuela have experienced sustained periods 
of democratic rule (Dunning 2008; Hammond 2009). 10  Outside Latin 
America, Indonesia and Malaysia stand out as cases of economies with initial 
dependency on petroleum but moved towards economic diversification. 
Escaping the resource curse is possible given specific historical conditions 
that allow elites to break away from resource dependency (through economic 
reforms); power relations among rent seeking groups change over time 
leading to authoritarian breakdown and creation of nominal democracies 
(Abidin 2001; Rosser 2007).11 Secondly, the overemphasis on the role of oil 
rents as key to the stability of authoritarianism is inadequate in grasping the 
implications of current political changes in the world today, such as the wave 
of democratic transition in the Arab region in 2010, the adaptation of Gulf 
monarchies – including Saudi Arabia – to the global economy through 
                                                   
 
10 Whilst oil-rich Mexico and Venezuela have more problematic histories of democracy 
compared to Brazil and Chile, oil has played a crucial role in maintaining political 
stability and nominal democratic rule. In both countries, complete political breakdown 
was avoided through the specific institutional mechanisms in place to redistribute oil 
rents. The durability of the political system that shielded the elites from incentives to 
embrace reforms was, ironically, the same reason for the cyclical political crises in Mexico 
and the collapse of liberal democracy in Venezuela (González 2008; Karl 1990, 1997). 
Nevertheless, these cases show that oil and democracy are not necessarily incompatible. 
11 Rosser (2007: 40) argues that two major factors have paved way for Indonesia to escape 
the resource curse: (a) the political victory of counter-revolutionary social forces over 
radical populist and communist social forces during the 1960s that created pressures for 
immediate industrialisation; and (b) the decision of Japan to move its capital from the 
United States to Southeast Asia benefited Indonesia enormously as it provided the 
resources to diversify export markets. In addition, other factors disrupted the 
consolidation of Indonesia towards oil dependency during state formation, such as Dutch 
colonialism, Japanese occupation, and bombardments of oil refineries. 
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complex state reforms, and the shift towards the Left in Latin America whose 
platforms make explicit references to growth and equality – all of which 
indicate the limitations of rentier state theory in analysing the political 
economy of natural resources and democratisation (Grugel & Nem Singh 
Forthcoming; Hertog 2010a, 2010b). Finally, the iterative application of 
rentier state theory outside the Middle East has encountered methodological 
critiques. The weakness of this approach stems from the empirical scope and 
research ambition of rentier politics, wherein scholars sought to correlate oil 
boom in the 1970s and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle 
East. There are two lines of critiques here. On the one hand, new research on 
rent-seeking and coalition politics (Brownlee 2007; Slater 2010, Smith 2007) 
have argued that whilst ‘the global oil market does create a single set of 
political constraints common to all exporting countries’ (Smith 2007: 196), 
some political leaders in oil-rich states invested in developing complex 
political institutions and not in repression. Following the tradition of Karl 
(1997) and Migdal (2001, 2009), the disparate paths of state-building among 
oil-rich states can be explained through timing and sequencing of state 
reforms. A second criticism emerges from the literature on post-
neoliberalism in Latin America. Regional governments have sought to 
challenge neoliberal mining reforms by way of directly subsidising anti-
poverty and social policies and changing the institutional frameworks in 
favour of state intervention in the minerals sectors. With democracy being 
the ‘only game in town’, Left governments are subjected not only to pressures 
of redistribution but also to maintain more transparency and democratic 
accountability (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; Panizza 2009). Put simply, the 
challenge of resource governance rests not only in the technocratic 
management of the sector but also how broader strategies of political 
inclusion are able to deliver economic growth and welfare provision. The 
notion of citizenship and quality of democracy – themes that resource curse 
literature did not engage with – are now recognised as important. Whilst 
rentier state theory was useful in the past to explain authoritarian stability in 
the Middle East, its analytical purchase is very limited as it fails to grapple 
with the changing realities of the world. The theory is insufficient to explain 
why some oil-rich countries have achieved nominal democratic regimes (or 
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embarking on political liberalisation reforms). It also dismisses the 
increasing complexity of rent-seeking and coalition politics, especially in the 
context of global market integration, in which resource-rich states are 
introducing domestic reforms in light of the radically different challenges 
imposed by globalisation (Herb 2005; Hertog 2010a, 2010b). 
 
In this context, one cannot insulate domestic politics from the effects of 
global interdependence. A fundamental difference between the post-war and 
the post-Cold War era is the indispensible role of global governance 
institutions in shaping domestic political and economic choices. There exists 
a rich literature on how international financial institutions and private 
authority regimes influence the governance agenda (see Section 1.3). In light 
of the commodity boom, global initiatives by international organisations 
(most notably the World Bank) and civil society organisations (e.g. 
Transparency International and Revenue Watch) have began to work with 
national governments in the management of their natural resources. One 
prominent example is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), which really is about developing international standards of what 
constitutes good governance of resources. Other initiatives include those 
linking climate change, deforestation, and resource exploitation to questions 
of sustainable development. These governance efforts have been criticised for 
being too technocratic, depoliticised, and highly insensitive to the realities of 
the developing world. According to Nem Singh & Bourgouin (forthcoming), 
the global architecture of resource management can be characterised as an 
array of norms, standards and procedures that articulate a linear 
interpretation of governing nature, which is devoid of understanding of the 
tensions between what ought to be done and what is currently practised in 
mining activities. Above all, the economic reforms in the sector since 1980s 
have prioritised in enhancing the legitimacy of private sector participation, 
which in the context of weaker governments, have led to the dissolution of 
state autonomy in making accountable decisions. As regards revenue 
management, World Bank’s solution of ‘saving money for the rainy day’ 
glosses over the need for governments to respond to poverty legacies of the 
past, all of which are outcomes of neoliberal reforms.   
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Contrary to recommendations from the World Bank on fiscal tightening even 
in times of plenty, Left governments in Latin America have sought to link 
resource wealth and social development in addressing growth and social 
inequality. Social redistribution, by way of financing anti-poverty and social 
policies, has returned in the growth agenda. For the first time since the debt 
crisis of 1982, export-dependent countries experienced large surplus in trade, 
fiscal accounts, and overall economic growth as a result of high prices of 
agricultural, mineral, and petroleum prices. And whilst neoliberal reforms 
have institutionalised lower taxes (and less rents) for states, as Hinojosa et. 
al. (2008: 15) argue, a low tax regime to attract foreign investment does not 
in any way preclude possibilities of enhancing welfare outcomes: states 
choose to mobilise revenues from mining, or any other sector, in the manner 
that best maximises social investments, or they can opt to finance social 
services and social security institutions through different means – for 
example, by inviting private sector to run parallel insurance, to completely 
shift the burden of social protection from public to private risk management, 
or to retain strong state presence. The Chilean case is exemplary. A 
comprehensive welfare system has developed within the neoliberal mining 
and social policy legacies of the dictatorship, which includes a low tax base 
for the copper sector (Nem Singh 2010). At the core of the debate on 
extractivism and social policy is the extent to which elites are predisposed to 
policy latitude and political spaces to deploy fiscal resources in addressing 
social inequality. Poverty reduction strategies, especially when financed by 
export taxes or royalties, are both political and technical questions on how to 
best maximise scarce resources in an environment antithetical to state-
managed models of social inclusion (Barrientos & Hinojosa 2009; Hujo 
2012).  
 
Overall, whilst some insights of governance-centred approaches are valuable, 
advocates of this perspective cannot conceive of resources as a tool for social 
development. In response, systemic approaches to resource extraction 
problematise the underlying relations of power between states and markets. 
At the heart of the global political economy is the increasing complexity of 
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raw materials processing, in which technological innovation and trade 
strategies of dominant states drive the expansion of economies of scale and 
simultaneously shape the global division of labour – an emphasis on the 
systemic nature of production networks embedding states and ordinary 
people in a hierarchy of spatial relations (Bunker 1985; Bunker & Ciccantell 
2005; Ciccantell & Smith 2005). Equally important, natural resources are 
inherently produced within complex systems of production, marketing, and 
consumption in which states are penetrated by firms, intermediary actors, 
and workers (Bridge 2008; Coe et. al. 2008; Cumbers et. al. 2008; Topik et. 
al. 2007; Topik & Samper 2007). These complementary views on macro-level 
processes – what I call ‘systemic’ approaches to natural resources – analyse 
states as rational actors located in a web of global production network, a 
theme that I discuss more extensively in the next section.  
 
3.1.2 Systemic approaches to resource governance 
 
A more familiar approach to resource extraction takes a long term view of 
globalisation as a historical process of change that inserted Latin America in 
the global economy through colonisation and consolidation of exports-led 
growth in the liberal era; some extend the globalisation of commodity 
production as an outcome of competing trade strategies of dominant states in 
their quest to undermine the challenges of matter and space (Arrighi 2000; 
Bunker & Ciccantell 2005; Cardoso & Faletto 1979; Galeano 1973). The 
interaction between society and nature takes place through the social 
creation and use of technologies that underpin the elaboration of national 
strategies of trade dominance. In turn, development strategies integrated 
local economies into a global international economy through raw materials 
processing. World system theories (WST) of resource extraction have long 
recognised the limitations imposed by socio-material features of resources. 
Nevertheless the quest for overcoming the laws of nature through expanding 
economies of scale, searching for rare resources located in particular sites of 
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extraction, and developing superior technology than what existed beforehand 
has all guided the rise and fall of core states in the world order.12 The 
analytical focus is the reproduction of global inequality in production and 
terms of trade at the expense of peripheral economies, which Marxist-
inspired theories aimed to remedy through a pragmatic strategy of import 
substitution industrialisation. By drawing upon the interaction of matter, 
space and technology in spatial terms at a given political time, globalisation 
can be conceived as the process of forging interdependence between (and 
integration of) the local and the global, the concrete and the abstract, and the 
social and the environmental. Similarly, resource geographers emphasised 
the importance of space, place, and context in understanding the new 
geographies of resource extraction and social conflicts (Bebbington 2012; 
Bebbington et. al. 2008; Bridge 2002, 2004b, 2008).  
 
Although often accused of being overly deterministic, WST and new 
historical materialism do not see the state declining in the era of 
globalisation. Whilst the most recent stage of globalisation diminishes the 
capacity and autonomy of the state in the periphery, the state remains the 
locus of power – and consequently states act as intermediary between (other) 
states and among firms – that mould the ways local economy is integrated 
into global markets. Its main strength rests on the historical approach of raw 
materials extraction by articulating the politics of growth and inequality 
through the lens of competition for securing raw materials and processing 
resources into high value commodities for consumption. Therefore, beyond 
Marx, their discussion of land, labour and capital cut across the three realms 
                                                   
 
12 Bunker & Ciccantell’s new historical materialism (2005: 22-23) analyses how global 
powers become dominant by looking at how the laws of nature are subjected to 
economies of scale: (a) universally applicable physical and mathematical laws of space, 
time, inertia, gravity, and energy; (b) material processes manifesting these laws, such as 
geological formations, hydrological cycles, and interactions of different chemicals and 
minerals under different pressures and temperatures; and (c) the resulting technological 
developments that arise from the limits imposed by nature. The first two realms structure 
the potentials of technological innovations by setting the ceiling for the continuous 
expansion of economies of scales. This drives societies to seek new technologies that 
expand the space to overcome the limits of scale, which eventually become the narrative 
of the social, organisational, and economic history of human civilisation. 
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of reality – they reconfigure the interactions between society and nature 
through distinctive historical moments of capital accumulation. 
 
However, its major weakness rests on explaining regimes of accumulation 
based on production. By not paying attention to the changes in other parts of 
the commodity chain, WSTs lack analytical rigour as regards why some 
extractive states succeed to compete in the global economy. The rise of a 
multi-polar world order, characterised by emerging powers seeking more 
influence in global governance, has further challenged the validity of WSTs. 
Whilst imperialism and colonial conquests were shaped by trade strategies 
on raw materials extraction, economic growth in emerging markets, 
especially Russia, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, are underpinned by the 
existence of vital resources allowing for their unprecedented dominance in 
the age of resource scarcity. For example, the most prominent grouping, 
BRICS, has developed historically some national champions which are vital 
in securing vital resources such as mining, steel, and petroleum (Goldstein 
2007; Goldstein & Pusterla 2010; Pedersen 2008). By simplifying state 
strategies of resource extraction as unitary responses to demands of foreign 
capital, WSTs fail to explain varying responses to globalisation not only by 
states themselves through new competitive and regulatory functions but also 
by private firms which increasingly organise through cooperative 
arrangements (Cutler et. al. 1999a, 1999b; Bruce Hall & Biersteker 2002).  
The latter trend challenges state-centric notions of legitimacy and 
reformulate authority in global governance. WSTs, with their concern on 
structures of global order, confer little agency to states in the periphery; 
overall, this skews contemporary understandings of state power in the 
neoliberal world order. For example, several resource abundant late 
industrialising states – Brazil, Chile, India, and Malaysia – have retained 
their SOEs as powerful economic actors with political roles as buffer between 
the state and private capital. Differential economic and state capacities result 
to particular engagement of states and SOEs with the global international 
economy.  
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The global commodity chains (GCCs) approach diverges from WSTs by 
examining economic processes in the commodity chain from the production 
of tradable goods (supply chain) towards the export for consumption 
(demand chain) with clearly identifiable steps – processing, transporting and 
marketing (Bridge 2008; Coe et. al. 2008; Topik et. al. 2007: 14-15).13 GCCs 
focus on complex interactions between states and firms by spatially locating 
actor rationalities in a chain of production and consumption activities. In 
comparison to WSTs, GCCs take seriously the power of private actors in 
shaping regulatory roles of states by differentiating the relational aspects of 
public and private power across the commodity chain. Whilst processing and 
transporting focus on the supply side, marketing pays closer attention to the 
demand side. The advocates of GCC approach are interested to know if crops 
and mineral exports are dictators of production and if the same product is 
produced under distinctive labour structures, ownership rights, and 
processing regimes. Instead of accepting policy choices as given, GCCs trace 
state responses to the multitude of pressures exerted by private actors in the 
chain. The local economy is a focal starting point in their analysis of changes 
in the global production networks. Market power is analysed in terms of the 
capacity of firms to produce goods as well as the ways in which policies are 
formulated to boost the competitive advantages of states. In this way, GCCs 
make a distinction between mere raw materials exporter and those states 
with greater market share (and control) in production. For GCCs, it is not 
enough to hold deposits of oil and minerals and then extract resources, or 
possess massive sizes of land to produce agriculture exports. State actors 
must craft policies that are economically rational and devise development 
strategies aimed at gaining control in the race for technological advancement 
to move up in the globalised value chains. In other words, GCCs do not see 
the world economy as a static economic order but rather emphasise 
possibilities for states to achieve economic mobility and political power 
within the global capitalist system.  
 
                                                   
 
13  Different names refer to this approach, they refer to global production network (GPN), 
global chain value (GCV), or global commodity chain (GCC) approach. 
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To further distinguish WSTs and GCCs, we can use coffee as an example of 
the analytical distinctions between the two approaches. On the one hand, 
WSTs typically focus on the exploitative relations of production in the local 
economy and dependent relationships between raw material producers and 
consuming states (Bunker 1985; Bunker & Ciccantell 2005). On the other 
hand, GCCs explain the varying strategies of producer states like Brazil and 
Costa Rica in the global market and how their competitive advantage in 
coffee production is in fact shaped by the changes on the demand side. Both 
countries are considered as new world producers which exercised market 
power and supplanted MNCs in capturing the world market. A variety of 
factors within the production network are used by GCCs: technological 
innovation in production; the boost in demand brought about by the steady 
rise of the United States as an economic power; and the changing social 
construction of coffee from a bourgeoisie luxury good towards a working 
class drink. In particular, Americans embraced coffee drinking, and with 
their purchasing power, the status of coffee was transformed from being a 
luxury good towards an affordable commodity for working classes. The 
United States gained economic domination after the Second World War; by 
1960 US was importing 60 percent of world coffee. But these external 
changes have been complemented by state policies in supply and demand 
side. On the supply side, whilst Brazil succeeded in becoming a price-maker 
due to its ability to respond to the global expansion of coffee consumption, 
Costa Rica found its niche through technological innovation emphasising 
quality rather than quantity of production. On the demand side, the tax-free 
import policy in the US as well as the introduction of blenders and roasters 
has altered the quantity and quality of coffee. Indeed, the increasing 
complexity of consumption in the commodity chain has affected state policies 
of producers and the coffee industry at large (Topik & Samper 2007: 124).  
 
As with other systemic explanations, GCCs gloss over the conflicts around the 
construction of state strategies to respond to globalisation in exchange of a 
global view/scope of commodity production. Concerned with economic 
processes, the ‘political’ aspect of governance is lost in the analysis. Since 
GCCs trace flows of goods from production in the local economy to the 
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consumption, pervasive economism assumes states and businesses as 
rational, unitary actors organising themselves with a priori interests. Whilst 
not completely dismissing labour, their treatment of workers is at best a 
depoliticised view where labour power constitutes the production chain. 
Although newer research now recognise the importance of labour in 
production processes and social justice demands (Bair 2009; Kuruvilla & 
Verma 2006; Riisgard & Hammer 2011; Selwyn 2011), the discussion 
remains labour not as complex and non-homogenous agency but as singular 
rational actor attempting to shape commodity chain governance. Political 
studies have always challenged this by arguing that governance is highly 
political, undoubtedly complex, and outcomes are less structurally 
determined. Although GCCs offer a critical and complex account of the 
commodification of nature by society, my focus on human agency and 
political action as explanations to the uneven introduction of neoliberalism – 
the reconstitution of state autonomy and of labour politics – makes this rich 
theoretical framework less appealing. 
 
Finally, both systemic approaches treat labour as analytically separate from 
the state’s role in managing production processes. In the globalised 
international economy, the ‘labour question’ is not simply about how labour 
laws reflect demands of competitiveness and highly skilled human resources. 
Labour issues also raise questions about workplace representation, 
citizenship rights, and democracy. How do ordinary people organise for their 
collective interests and how do they seek to influence political outcomes? The 
politics of labour, essentially, seeks to unravel the extent to which existing 
political arrangements are legitimated in response to demands from below. 
Echoing the criticism against systemic approaches, political economy misses 
the political and social life on the ground – how workers organise, how 
legitimacy is acquired and contested, and how power struggles are resolved 
through bargaining and conflict – all of which can only be understood 
through a detailed process tracing of history, structure and contingency in 
state-market-labour relations. 
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To sum up, whilst systemic and governance-centred explanations offer a 
broad perspective on governance, they are insufficient thus far in 
problematising the political aspects of state reforms. Whilst complex 
macroeconomic processes undoubtedly transform natural resources, both 
approaches remain ambivalent to questions of state agency and the extent 
governance is depoliticised. In so doing, although they recognise the 
structuring effects of resources, they fail to explain why some resource-rich 
states are capable of transforming resource wealth into productive wealth, 
and they do not explore how neoliberalism serves as a critical juncture for 
state-society and state-market relations. Tellingly, the relations of power 
among states as well as between states and other actors are reduced into 
rational calculations based on pre-defined economic motives. This clearly 
ignores the ways institutions shape power configurations and the importance 
of history and legacies in constraining strategic actions of different actors. In 
the next section, I argue why a synthesis of HI and critical IPE perspectives 
offer the analytical tools to understand the politics of neoliberal resource 
governance.  
 
3.1.3 Structure, agency, and politics: Towards a new analytical 
framework? 
 
Most analyses of state projects and developmentalism in the era of 
neoliberalism have revolved around traditional policy areas like social 
welfare, industrial strategies, and broad-brush macroeconomic policies. 
What is missing, especially in the Latin American context, is a critical take on 
the changing power configurations between states, markets, and organised 
labour in one of the leading sectors of the economy: commodity exports. As 
neoliberal reforms swept the developing world, scholars assumed a form of 
convergence towards free market orthodoxy. The explanation varies in focus. 
Some emphasise the limitations of developmentalist ideology followed by the 
social embedding of neoliberalism whilst others look at coalition politics and 
elite pacts as the determinants of reform outcomes. Moreover, the 
convergence hypothesis asserted rather than proved that a single recipe of 
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market opening leads to homogeneity in economic organisation and 
production (Cerny 1997, 2010). It was, in short, assumed that natural 
resource sectors followed linear pathways of addressing competitiveness and 
growth. And as conventional explanations demonstrated, resource exports 
were viewed as negatively contributing to economic growth and general 
social welfare. An anti-resource bias in the literature was predominant until 
after the return of high prices in 2002.  
 
In answering the question ‘how do we explain divergent pathways of 
extraction and the return of the state in resource management?’, we need to 
turn to a political rather than an economic or geographical perspective on 
resource governance. Whilst neoliberalism has undoubtedly transformed the 
resource sectors, the fact is that we now see an increasingly strong preference 
for state-led management models rather than leaving economic decisions in 
the invisible hands of the free market. The commodity boom since 2002, 
fuelled by growing resource scarcity and the rise of China, is the new 
international context which underpins the diverse array of strategic 
development policies of resource-rich states (Beeson et. al 2011; Jenkins 
2011; Jenkins & Peters 2009; Pirages & Cousins 2005; WIR 2007). Tellingly, 
our theoretical lenses in analysing natural resources and its contribution to 
economic growth and democracy have been conditioned by the real world 
transformation of the global economy. The contents of state-led management 
differ between the 1970s and 2000s, and elites are more conscious of the 
environmental and social consequences of extractivism.  
 
In unpacking the gaps in the resource curse and neoliberalism literature, we 
must distinguish natural resources as a specific type of capital that generates 
wealth quite differently compared to manufacturing, industrial production, 
and even finance. As Section 3.1.1 discussed, resource wealth is subject to 
international shocks and commodity price fluctuations. The income derived 
from resource extraction is uncertain and windfall profits are unreliable 
sources of domestic financing for the state (Humphreys et. al. 2007). Equally, 
ownership structures of resources sector are fairly stable and market power 
and competition within the industry change very slowly. This explains 
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partially why major mining and oil-producing states have retained state 
enterprises out of the privatisation agenda as a way of maximising rents and 
keeping state control over these so-called strategic industries (Hertog 2010a, 
2010b; Vivoda 2009). In Latin America specifically, windfall profits have 
given political elites the opportunity to assert state autonomy away from 
rent-seeking groups and allowed for the regional governments to devise 
finance welfare policies despite the prevailing doctrine of fiscal conservatism 
internationally (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; Hogenboom 2012). 
 
The success of some resource-rich states to use resources for growth and to 
advance state-controlled forms of economic liberalisation can be explained 
through a framework that accounts for the simultaneous changes in domestic 
political arrangements and global political economy. In theoretically and 
empirically exploring change, I utilise the twin lenses of HI and critical IPE 
perspectives. Historical institutionalism probes into the dilemmas of actors 
in making political choices under contexts of structural constraints by way of 
focussing on power, conflicts, and path dependence. In other words, 
institutional change in governing resources is mediated by political legacies, 
contexts, and contingent actions. This brings us to the paradox of 
institutional development: institutions are forged to create stability through 
institutional reproduction but contingency (especially during critical 
junctures) leads to the breakdown if not the gradual replacement of stable, 
recurring political arrangements. In addition, political economy perspectives 
are attentive to the international conditions, the arrays of social forces and 
the interdependent relationships among actors in the global economy. 
Dominant paradigms of development are not theoretical abstractions but 
consequences of history and experiences of states and non-state actors. The 
hegemony of neoliberalism should not be taken as a given. Instead, it is a 
product of the accumulation of intellectual and pragmatic thinking about 
development, growth and politics. As Chapters 5-8 detail later, neoliberalism 
is not an inevitable process but rather contested. The next two sections 
explore the theoretical tools to examine the politics of natural resources in 
Brazil and Chile – historical institutionalist and critical IPE perspectives.  
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3.2 Historical institutionalism as a framework of institutional 
change 
 
In an attempt to ‘bring the state back’ into mainstream political science, 
some authors (see Evans et. al. 1985) argued for the need to contextualise 
politics institutionally. That is to say, scholars should pay closer attention to 
the conditions that structure the ensemble of state institutions, which in turn 
affects political behaviour. In so doing, the neo-institutionalism literature has 
brought forth a corrective to the dominant behaviouralist and agency-centred 
approaches in the 1970s and 1980s. An institutional contextualisation of 
politics necessarily shifts the focal point of political analysis from the 
influences and behaviour affecting the state towards the variegated capacities 
of institutions of states and the diverse patterns of interactions between 
political elites and social groups. The main variants of neo-institutionalism – 
rationalist, historical, sociological, and discursive – share interest in 
unravelling the explanatory power of institutions as the driving force behind 
political behaviour. In contrast to old institutionalism, neo-institutionalism 
expands the definition of what can be considered as institution and then 
draws from the different aspects of institutions to explore patterns of change 
and continuities. A broader definition of institutions is necessary – one that 
include formal organisations and informal rules, norms and procedures. The 
most widely accepted definition is by Peter Hall, in which he refers to 
institutions as “formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units 
of the polity and economy” (Hall 1986: 19). As opposed to formal 
organisations, Immergut (1998) argues that the defining features of neo-
institutionalism include context, conflict and history.  
 
How do institutions understood as ‘sets of regularised practices with a rule-
like quality’ (Hall 2010: 204) structure the behaviour of actors and political 
dynamics after institutional creation? Consequentially, what is the 
relationship between the evolution and transformation of policy paradigms, 
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on the one hand, and institutional change – the development of the state 
itself – on the other?14 Whilst the first generation of neo-institutionalist 
literature concentrates on how and why institutions emerge, the second-
order question is when and how institutions change. Moving beyond the 
structure–agency debate, the second movement of institutionalist analysis 
has sought to find overlaps among different neo-institutionalist approaches, 
that would eventually lead to theoretical cross-fertilisation, rapprochement, 
and integration (Campbell & Pedersen 2001b: 249). Such attempts have been 
done in studies in comparative politics looking at dynamics of change in 
policy learning, party politics, and economic governance (Blyth 2001, 2009; 
Campbell 2001a; Hay 2001; Hunter 2010; Smith 2007). Despite the 
analytical payoff in using institutionalism to explain policy shifts in Latin 
America, there is still a lacuna in explicating patterns of economic 
governance from the perspective of institutional theory and political 
economy. This apparent gap is even more evident in theorising post-
neoliberalism in Latin America and the wider developing world. 
 
The starting point is to differentiate what the three main schools of thought 
deem as mechanisms of institutional change: Rational choice approaches 
view institutions as incentive structures that reduce the uncertainties 
resulting from the multiplicity of (fixed) individual preferences (North 1990; 
Ostrom 1990; Shepsle 2006; Weingast 1996, 2002); sociological 
institutionalism takes norms, cognitive frames and meaning systems as 
guiding human action according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Powell & 
DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1991, 2001); and finally, historical institutionalism 
examines institutional development as outcomes of concrete historical 
struggles among actors, assigning equal weight on the intended and 
unintended consequences of political actions (Immergut 1998; Mahoney & 
                                                   
 
14 Hay (2001) makes a distinction between policy change and institutional change, in which 
the former is a necessary but insufficient condition for the latter. Policy is an expression 
of an authoritative body, the state in this context, and institutions span to a constellation 
of formal organisations, procedures, norms, practices and patterns of interactions. For 
example, state-labour relations is considered an institution in the sense that it exhibits 
regularised, iterative patterns of managing conflicts (Collier & Collier 2002; Cook 2007). 
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Thelen 2010).15 Their shared research question is to explicate institutional 
change despite the inherent stickiness of institutions. However, beyond the 
common phrase that ‘institutions matter’, the approaches take disparate 
paths in analysing ideas, institutions, and interests. They all differ in their 
treatment of endogenous and exogenous sources of change, which is 
consequential for explanations regarding mechanisms that permit change in 
political life.  
 
More specifically, my thesis is interested in explaining paradigm changes, or 
the difficulties of moving beyond (neoliberal) modalities of economic 
governance. By empirically tracing the ways in which neoliberalism was 
challenged by neo-developmentalist ideas in Brazil and Chile, I offer an 
explanatory framework capable of explicating the contested nature of 
neoliberal reforms, the limitations imposed by historical legacies and 
inherited political systems to reform agendas, and the ways new ideas 
become dominant (or gain legitimation) in the public spheres. In essence, 
historical institutionalism that closely accounts for ideas and institutions 
seeks to unravel the role of political time – i.e. uneven temporality and 
contingency – in illuminating gradual shifts from existing paradigms of 
development. This adds to the growing literature on the role of history, 
contingency and ideational factors in shaping power relations, and 
consequently affects institutional evolution in political systems (e.g. Bell 
2011, 2012a, 2012b; Berman 2011; Schmidt 2012). 
 
In this context, my work emphasises institutional continuities with changes 
rather than abrupt, dramatic changes in political systems. From this 
perspective, I argue that we cannot explain the persistence, if not resilience, 
of governance regimes without sufficient attention to the role of state 
                                                   
 
15 There is an emerging fourth strand of neo-institutionalism, discursive institutionalism 
(Schmidt 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010), which is known very differently across the social 
sciences depending on scholars’ degree of commitment to the explanatory power of ideas 
and discourses. For example, some coin this as the ideational turn (Blyth 2002, 2009), 
ideational institutionalism (Hay 2001), discursive institutionalism (Campbell & Pedersen 
2001a), or constructivist institutionalism (Hay 2006). For a broader overview of the 
debate, see Bell 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Béland & Cox 2011; Schmidt 2010, 2012. 
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capacity, policy legacies, and ideational diffusion of neo-developmentalism. 
As we probe further into the empirical world, for example, how to account for 
the heterodox nature of policy alternatives from the free market orthodoxy in 
Latin America as well as the apparent consolidation of austerity politics in 
post-crisis Europe and United States despite the overwhelming failures of 
neoliberalism (Crouch 2011; Harvey 2010; Peck 2010), the only theoretical 
way of explicating change is by understanding constraints and how political 
agency is exercised albeit in incremental fashion. In Schmidt’s (2010) terms, 
how do constructs of meanings enable action, which in turn produce 
institutional change? My thesis accounts for changes in governance regimes 
by giving analytical premium to questions of context, history, and 
legitimation of economic narratives to justify state responses to globalisation. 
Although there is significant disagreement between historical 
institutionalism and discursive institutionalism over the role of ideas as a 
source of institutional change (see Bell 2011, 2012b; Schmidt 2010, 2012), I 
do not engage in this debate but instead take both ideas and institutions as 
constitutive explanation for change. 
 
My choice of deploying historical institutionalist explanations is further 
justified by the limitations of rational choice institutionalism, particularly its 
universalistic ambitions as well as its excessive emphasis on electoral rules 
and parliamentary politics, in analysing Latin American politics (Weyland 
2002b).16 In its attempt to offer parsimony and elegance, rational choice 
institutionalism neglects the autonomy of the state (especially the executive) 
to exercise control over policy-making and its emphasis on formal rules 
render the approach incapable of elucidating crisis politics (Weyland 2002b: 
64-65, 73).17 Whilst self-interest and strategic calculations undeniably are key 
                                                   
 
16 Rational choice institutionalism began to fill important gaps in the literature, for example 
through rigorous analysis of formal rules, electoral designs, and congressional 
manoeuvrings – topics which gained relevance in light of democratisation.   
17 Some examples of rational choice institutionalism include Ames 1995; Geddes 1994; 
Morgenstern & Nacif 2002. Interestingly, Berrio et. al. (2011) map out different policies 
of hydrocarbons nationalisation in Latin America using a carefully formulated rational 
choice framework. 
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aspects of politics, they do not in themselves account for the complexity of 
politics, such as the role of informal rules and practices, historical 
circumstances, and cultural factors. Comparative politics scholars have 
begun to embrace cross-fertilisation, for example the shift in Wendy Hunter’s 
work from purely rational choice to explain the role of military in policy-
making towards a synthesis of rational choice and historical institutionalism 
to explore the rise of the Workers’ Party in Brazil (Hunter 1997, 2010; see 
also Ames 2001; Lichbach & Zuckerman 2009). Others have fully applied 
historical institutionalist lenses in Latin American politics (Brooks 2009; 
Collier & Collier 2002). In this thesis, within new institutionalism I intend to 
explore more systematically the role of ideas in enabling change and 
continuity, as shaped by the wider structural contexts, path dependent 
historical processes, and institutional dynamics. 
 
At its broadest, historical institutionalism is interested in how political 
struggles are mediated and shaped by permanent structures and institutional 
settings in which these conflicts take place. This approach consists of (a) 
explaining the role of political conflicts and power struggles in shaping 
possibilities and limitations of institutional change; (b) drawing linkages 
between material and ideational sources of institutional change; and (c) 
focussing on critical junctures and incremental pathways of policy change to 
explore state transformation (Campbell 2001; Hall 1989, 1993; Hay 2001, 
2011; Thelen 1999). Instead of states as monolithic or rational actors, the 
state is conceived as a structural context upon which actors situate 
themselves and as agency in its own right with the capacity of shaping 
different pathways of political outcomes (Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Thelen & 
Steinmo 1992). The state cannot be reduced to an aggregate of individual 
interests of state actors, the vector sum of political forces, or the condensed 
expression of the logic of economic necessity (Evans 1995: 18). Unlike 
rational choice approaches that view institutions as constraints to agents’ 
strategic calculations, political actors contest and frame policy ideas into 
concrete proposals that are negotiated by competing interests within 
structured, power-laden political contexts.  
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The HI perspective best explains the delineation between the origins and 
development of institutional structures and processes over time, with its 
emphasis on sequencing of development, timing of events, and phases of 
political change. Temporality, which underlies institutional formation and 
change, offers insights into the complex and uneven process of state 
transformation and political change. Whilst institutional formation during 
critical junctures is crucial in shaping path dependency, institutional 
evolution over time suggests the less trivial nature of state transformation, 
which is sensitive to the unintended consequences of strategic actions. A 
dynamic view of state transformation underpinned by ‘punctuated evolution’ 
rather than punctuated equilibrium has the potential to unravel the 
discontinuous conception of political time in which periods of comparatively 
modest institutional change are interrupted by more rapid and intense 
moments of transformations (Hay 2001, 2002: 161-163).  
 
From a historical institutionalist perspective, institutions represent 
compromises or relatively durable though still contested settlements based 
on specific coalitional dynamics, they are always vulnerable to shifts. Hence, 
change and stability are inextricably linked. On the one hand, stability is not 
a static situation, but instead it requires on-going mobilisation of material 
resources and (ideational) political support with the aim of resolving 
ambiguities in rules (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 8-10). Different coalitions are 
mobilised by competing interpretations of one and the same rule – hence we 
find struggles over meaning, application and enforcement. This emphasis on 
compliance to the rules based on active agency constantly interpreting rules 
is the main driver of change. It allows me to identify the properties of 
institutions deemed more permeable for change. Subsequently, change is 
conceived as distributional instruments laden with power implications rather 
than a function of exogenous factors (Hall 1986, 2010; Mahoney & Thelen 
2010). Structural contexts, which can is distinctive from institutions as wider 
political, economic and social contexts operating in a strategically selective 
manner, influence how specific institutions operate (Bell 2011: 898). Hence, 
we can think about structural changes (or continuities) as the context upon 
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which actors within institutions enact and interpret rules to initiate gradual 
changes over time. 
 
This emphasis on gradual route towards change by way of analysing resource 
(and ideational) mobilisation is increasingly accepted as the way forward in 
institutional analysis. According to rational choice perspectives, the sets of 
rules and expectations have variegated consequences to different actors, 
thereby, making institutions subjected to resource allocation and distribution 
problems (see Knight 1992; Moe 2006). However, their explanations of 
stability as the Pareto-equilibrium for actors and change as exogenously 
driven by punctuated disequilibria still fall short in recognising the uneven 
temporalities of change and the inherently conflictual and power-driven 
nature of institutional transformation. This tendency retains a creational 
bias and an over emphasis upon factors explicating institutional formation 
rather than the evolution. This critique, of course, goes the same for some 
advocates of historical institutionalism who find difficulty in moving beyond 
explications of institutional rigidity, inertia and stasis rather than change 
(Bell 2011; Hay 2001: 195). Incremental forms of institutional change are 
thus reflected in the changing interpretations of rules and expectations – an 
emphasis on agency, contingency, and ideational sources of state 
transformation. This does not deny the existence of dramatic changes, such 
as in revolutions and democratisation, but we need a theory that can account 
for ‘normal politics’ rather than these exceptional circumstances in history. 
 
In this context, an emergent literature taking ideas and ideational changes 
more seriously has become fashionable in political analysis. With historical 
institutionalism’s methodological emphasis on process-tracing, certain 
affinities exist among scholars looking at relationships between context and 
conduct, the ideational and material, and the discursive and the political. In 
this vein, some scholars working in the margins of historical institutionalism 
have been interested on the evolution of ideas and institutional 
arrangements. They draw upon ideational sources of institutional change, 
such as cognitive/psychological aspects, crisis narratives, logics of 
communicative action, and ‘orders of social learning’ as explanations of 
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paradigm shifts (see Bell 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Blyth 2002; Hall 1989, 1993; 
Hay 2001, 2004a, 2004b; Schmidt 2008, 2010; Weyland 2002a, 2008). 
Political outcomes are driven by iterative yet cumulative changes drawn from 
a set of ideational and material sources that permit (or otherwise) alternative 
options in moments of decision-making. These are the building blocks of 
institutional change, in which choices are mediated by ‘structured 
contingency’. Put simply, choices are structured over time as historical 
interactions construct the different choices of elites at a particular moment, 
which are then reflected by the narrowing and expanding range of policy 
options in different circumstances (Karl 1997: 6-12). The next two sections 
explain how institutions evolve: through incremental change in rules, 
regulations and expectations and through diffusion of policy ideas within 
state-market-labour complexes.  
 
3.2.1 From path dependence to incremental routes of change 
 
The HI’s strong feature of institutional stickiness, marked by path dependent 
lock-in effects with the resultant emphasis on exogenous shocks to explain 
change, has been widely criticised (Hay & Wincott 1998). However, the 
underlying historical mechanisms – critical junctures and path dependence – 
have remained critical in explaining dramatic changes in political life. Whilst 
this specific version of HI allows me to explore the extent to which 
neoliberalism was a critical juncture in Brazil and Chile, it does not permit 
any analysis of gradual counter-neoliberal shifts in resource governance. The 
earlier HI literature has emphasised structural constraints to the state as 
facilitating political continuity, in which institutional transformation is 
viewed in terms of sudden bursts of events followed by stasis.  Bearing clear 
influence is the idea that ‘political development is a structured process and 
institutions emerge from historical conflicts and constellations’ (Thelen 1999: 
382). But whilst sufficient attention has been given to inertia and rigidity, 
there is growing recognition of the uneven temporality and its consequences 
to the transformation of the state. In other words, institutional change can be 
viewed in terms of the intended or unintended consequence of strategic 
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action (intuitive or instrumental) that is filtered by institutional 
environments favouring certain actors, strategies, and perceptions (Hay & 
Wincott 1998: 955). 
 
In this context, delineating between institutional origin and institutional 
adaption is necessary to unpack the structure and contingency of politics that 
shape institutional outcomes. Most historical institutionalist literature 
characterise institutional evolution by identifying the relatively long periods 
of path dependent institutional stability and reproduction which are 
punctuated by critical phases of institutional flux – ‘critical junctures’ – 
during which more dramatic change become possible. Critical junctures 
constitute the starting points for many path dependent processes. These 
periods of contingency are moments in history during which constraints on 
actions are lifted or eased, and therefore, the structural influences affecting 
political action are relaxed allowing for human agency to exercise far greater 
weight over institutional constraints (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007; Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010).  
 
The notion of critical juncture clearly goes beyond HI school and has its 
origins from economics, which attempts to explore self-reinforcing processes 
and feedback mechanisms that paved the way for initial conditions deemed 
as inefficient to become embedded and reproduced in stable institutional 
equilibria (see David 1985; North 1990). Within neo-institutionalist 
literature, the rational choice school embraced the concept of relative 
sequencing and policy feedback to deductively seek for patterns of continuity 
and change. As Peter Hall (2010: 205) puts it, institutional change occurs 
when shocks exogenous to the system of institutions alter the context; when 
ceteris is no longer paribus, thereby, making the delineation between periods 
of institutional stability and disequilibria. 18  The emphasis on uneven 
                                                   
 
18 Take note of the noticeable intellectual shift of Peter Hall in the last two decades. His path-
breaking analysis of the political economies of neoliberal reforms in Britain and France 
has been seminal to historical institutionalism with strong emphasis on the ideational 
aspects of institutional change (Hall 1986, 1989, 1992, 1993). However, his recent works 
reflect closer affinities to rational choice institutionalism with his synthesis of micro-
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temporality and its intended and unintended consequences allows 
researchers to identify social mechanisms that underpin social and political 
processes. Within the framework of path dependence, scholars consider two 
types of sequences which can bring forth institutional change. On the one 
hand, self-reinforcing sequences are associated with the formation and long-
term reproduction of given institutional patterns via ‘increasing returns’ and 
‘positive feedback mechanisms’ during which the probability of further steps 
along the same path increases with each move down that path. To put it in a 
different way, the costs of exit – to switch to another plausible alternative – 
increases because continuing the same path has relative benefits as opposed 
to changing political action (Farrell & Newman 2010; Pierson 2000, 2004). 
On the other hand, reactive sequences are chains of temporally ordered and 
causally connected events, wherein each event within the sequence is in part 
a reaction to temporally antecedent events (Mahoney 2000). Whereas the 
former is characterised by reinforcing processes, reactive sequences are 
marked by backlash processes that transform and sometimes reverse early 
events. The series of reactions and counterreactions make a powerful 
framework that stress contingency in political choices and conflictual nature 
of actor interests.  
 
Evidently, timing and sequencing of actor choices are more crucial in 
designing new institutional arrangements, such that settings in which Event 
A precedes Event B will produce a different outcome when the ordering is 
reversed. Those who have initial advantages over others can have more 
capacity to shape political outcomes as it becomes reinforced over time 
through institutional arrangements. Deriving from a power-laden analysis of 
institutional transformation, the degree of opposition by other actors against 
existing institutional arrangements affects the turn of events and the overall 
political outcome (Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Pierson 2004). As many works 
on historical sociology demonstrate, temporality, order and sequencing offer 
explanatory powers linking large-scale events to outcomes in political 
                                                                                                                                               
 
foundations of change and role of firms in stable institutional settings with historical 
institutionalism (Hall 2010; Hall & Soskice 2001, 2003; Hall & Taylor 1998). 
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systems, such as democratisation, industrialisation and state-building 
(Ertman 1996; Moore 1966; Skocpol 1994; Tilly 1975, 1984). Similarly, 
political changes in Latin America have been explicated through the lenses of 
structural constraints and critical junctures, for example in labour 
incorporation, the role of civil society in democratic transitions, and the 
impact of democratization to the success of consolidating neoliberal reforms 
(Collier & Collier 2002; González 2008; Cook 2007).  
 
However, advocates of critical junctures as explanation of political change 
face several methodological problems. For one, critical junctures only matter 
when political actors take advantage of them through strategic action. Actors 
become agents during veto points of the political systems, or moments of 
institutional vulnerability that provide ‘strategic openings’ for social and 
economic groups to mobilise and shape the political outcome (Immergut 
1992). Political institutions – e.g. electoral rules, constitutional arrangements 
and structure of government – leave in some settings independent, 
sometimes unintended, consequences to political development. Political 
opportunities for change need to be exploited by actors by way of perceiving 
the dominant paradigm as untenable, and therefore, requiring decisive 
interventions through a new set of goals and mechanisms in response to the 
shortcomings of existing paradigm and institutions.  
 
But how scholars identify the critical juncture is still contested in political 
analysis; very few works have demonstrated accurately path dependent 
processes during which certain historical periods comprise the critical 
moments of institutional transformation (see Cook 2007; Collier & Collier 
2002; Skocpol 1979). Though critical junctures may be conspicuously 
identifiable in some cases, oftentimes these ostensible moments are difficult 
for scholars to point out. For example, Colin Hay (2001: 193) argues that 
paradigm change may not occur within an institutional context when ‘crisis 
narratives’ are not associated with perceived institutional and state crisis, if 
crises simply exhibit elements of contradictions, failures, ruptures or 
catastrophes. Policy development involves an iterative yet cumulative process 
within the context of an ascendant paradigm, in which the alterations in the 
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trajectory of institutional evolution are invariably associated with paradigm 
shifts during periods of (perceived) crisis. To sum up, path dependence 
literature thus far have successfully interrogated critical inquiries on what 
structural constraints and contextual factors in the formation and 
reproduction of institutional patterns – and implicitly treat change as 
exogenous shocks or sudden bursts followed by stasis – but never really dealt 
with the question of endogenous institutional change.  
 
In these circumstances, the response of historical institutionalism is to 
examine institutional evolution in terms of gradual and incremental change 
that take place in uneven temporalities and power-laden conflicts among 
actors. In comparison to the earlier literature, scholars advocating for 
incremental change emphasises the evolutionary, dynamic processes of 
policy change and the development of the state itself. Instead of abrupt 
bursts of transformation followed by long periods of stasis, institutional 
stickiness oftentimes persist, making apparent the need for interpretive 
agents to actively seek loopholes in existing arrangements to enact change. 
One seminal piece in this area is Mahoney & Thelen (2010: 14-32) who 
elaborate a framework illustrating different modes of gradual institutional 
change. They challenge orthodox assumptions about compliance of actors as 
an a priori trait of institutions, which is underlined by the argument that 
institutions are created to subject actors to establish regularised patterns of 
behaviour through compliance with rules, procedures, and normative claims 
of institutions. In contrast to the ‘sticky’ versions of HI, this more flexible HI 
accommodates constructivist accounts (Bell 2011, 2012a) by conferring 
interpretive agents the ability to act within their wider structural and 
institutional contexts. If political institutions have power-distributional 
elements, actors must maintain, create, or forge new rules to establish 
compliance of ‘losers’ in existing institutional arrangements. In this 
theoretical approach, political conflict is at the core of institutional 
transformation, in which old and new rules are contested and redefined by 
winners and losers. As Table 3.1 demonstrates, we can think about 
incremental change in four ways: (a) displacement, which refers to the 
complete replacement of existing rules with new ones, and this entails radical 
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shifts in institutional context either abruptly or in slow moving way; (b) 
layering, which occurs when new rules are established alongside old ones 
and this fundamentally alters the structuring effect of old institutional 
arrangements to actor behaviour; (c) drift, which is present when rules 
remain formally the same but their impact changes as a result of shifts in 
external conditions; and (d) conversion, which transpires when rules remain 
formally the same are interpreted and enacted in new ways (Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010: 14-16; Streeck & Thelen 2005; Thelen 2003). These patterns of 
institutional change, which encapsulate dramatic and incremental forms of 
institutional transformation, are conditioned by how ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
interpret and apply the rules within constrained contexts. 
 
Table 3.1 Modes of incremental change 
 
Displacement Layering Drift Conversion 
Removal of old rules Yes No No No 
Neglect of old rules - No Yes No 
Changed impact/enactment 
of old rules - No Yes Yes 
Introduction of new rules Yes Yes No No 
Source: Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 16. 
 
Institutional displacement takes place in situations where weaker actors have 
reconfigured power relations successfully, in which institutions can be wholly 
replaced by new ones as a reflection of the interests of winning coalitions. 
However, actors within winning coalitions also negotiate to enact change. 
This signifies the array of interests among actors despite a shared goal. For 
example, Pinochet succeeded in establishing a dictatorship with himself at 
the centre of power and other military generals on the side. His government 
sought for a new social engineering project – neoliberalism – that would 
reverse all economic policies under Salvador Allende. When Pinochet 
attempted to denationalise copper mining through privatisation, the military 
defended to retain CODELCO as a 100 percent state owned enterprise 
because the company symbolised national patriotism and was a source of 
patronage for the armed forces. As a compromise, private sector expanded its 
space in the economic spheres through a series of market opening reforms 
whilst CODELCO was left in the hands of the military (Vergara 2008; 
Vergara 1985). The advance of market institutions pits against the old statist 
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system inherited from Salvador Allende. As more actors defect in favour of 
the new marketised system, the new rules slowly erode support for the old 
system and eventually take over the institutional setting.  
 
For institutional layering to take place, victories do not need to be clearly 
defined, thereby, keeping the old rules intact. If strong veto players have 
more control over resources to protect old institutions, opposing actors can 
push for new rules alongside old ones in their attempts to reconfigure power 
relations. This occurs when subordinate groups mobilise resources and 
political support but they are not strong enough to displace existing political 
arrangements. Some economic ideas have become normalised to the extent 
that they form the core sets of institutional practices, a notable example of 
which is the independence of Central Bank and Ministry of Finance in setting 
fiscal and monetary targets as a public good (Bell 2005; Burnham 1999; Hay 
2004b). If one examines the explicitly post-neoliberal states in Latin 
America, most Left-led governments have given the above-mentioned state 
agencies wider policy latitude alongside expansion of the state in the socio-
economic spheres (Levitsky & Roberts 2011; Tussie 2009). Actors do not take 
advantage of the gap between rules and enforcement. Instead, they create 
new rules as a way of reconfiguring relations of power between actors.  
 
A second set of institutional change happens if actors exploit the gap between 
rules and enforcement (institutional drift and conversion) by actively 
applying divergent interpretations of one and the same rule. The ambiguity 
of rules – a permanent feature of institutional life – allows for political 
skirmishing and contestation from subordinate groups. In cases of 
institutional drift, rules remain the same but the very inaction of actors 
because of neglect or incapacity to act produces change. Thus, despite the 
similar and stable rules, there are diverse outcomes as a result of differing 
interpretations (narrow/broad) and enforcement (strict/lax) of those rules. 
On the other hand, institutional conversion takes place when rules remain 
formally the same but are enacted (and thus interpreted) in new ways. The 
gap between the design and enforcement is produced by actors who actively 
exploit the inherent ambiguities of the institutions (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 
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17). By redeploying the rules in myriads of ways, institutions are converted as 
new goals, purposes and objectives are instantiated by actors within 
institutions. In this context, conversion takes place when actors seize the 
space in the interpretation and implementation of existing rules. An 
exemplary case for this is the reinterpretation of the labour laws in Brazil. At 
the onset, Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) established the Labour Code aimed at 
controlling a potentially disruptive labour movement through the creation of 
obligatory union taxes (imposto sindical) and single union representation 
(Collier & Collier 2002). For decades, unions s0ught to become autonomous 
from the state by attempting to free themselves from the shackles of the 
authoritarian corporatist system that was inherited by the military 
dictatorship. However, as neoliberal reforms were introduced in the 1990s, 
the union leadership began to defend these same rules in securing financing 
for union activities in the context of austerity and spending cuts. By actively 
reinterpreting these rules, the labour code was transformed from being 
mechanisms of authoritarian control towards defensive methods for unions 
in the face of neoliberalism (Cook 2007; Hall 2009). 
 
There are two caveats in this typology. Firstly, these are ideal types of 
institutional change which are more difficult to identify in the real world 
because political life is messier and more complex. In reference to Latin 
America, formal rules – the main emphasis on mainstream HI and RC 
accounts – do not necessarily determine political change (Weyland 2002). 
The line drawn between winners and losers as well as between intentions and 
outcomes are less clear, and logically, various types of institutional change 
take place simultaneously. Mahoney & Thelen (2010: 13) recognise that rules 
are not just designed but they also have to be applied and enforced by actors 
other than the designers, and therefore open up space for change through 
rule implementation and enforcement. However, state capacity and 
administrative capability are given relatively less attention, which is really 
one of the reasons for the widening gulf between an intellectually coherent 
paradigm and actual practice of reforms in the real world. Secondly, 
institutions are ontologically prior to actors, which imply that agency is 
exercised within institutional contexts, and are, therefore, mutually 
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constitutive (Bell 2005, 2011). Agents rarely act in a rules-free environment, 
which implies that the dialectics between rules and ideas take place in 
existing structural and institutional contexts. Institutions have sufficient 
flexibility and agential space for interpretive agents to apply discretion and 
gradually effect change. By focussing on how political contexts and 
configurations of power relations interact with ideas, we can identify the 
endogenous properties of institutions that permit change. The next section 
thus examines how ideas are diffused beyond institutional settings and how 
particular economic ideas become dominant by reifying, legitimating, and 
linking them to actual policy practices. In so doing, I bridge the literature 
examining the co-constitution of ideas and institutions as motors of change. 
 
3.2.2 Ideational aspects of institutional change 
 
It is widely recognised that discourses and ideas have constituting causal 
effects on political change, especially when intense moments of 
contradictions and ruptures in policy making produce transformation of the 
state (Campbell 2001; Gofas & Hay 2010; Hall 1989, 1993; Hay 2001, 2004, 
2011). Shifts in policy paradigms are linked but independent to the 
development of the state itself. I am thus interested on how new ideas (e.g. 
neo-developmentalism) become embedded in institutional contexts, which 
eventually displace dominant ideas in growth models. In other words, how 
can we explain the rise and fall of development paradigms? Most analyses of 
policy change and growth paradigms start with the Kuhnian differentiation 
between periods of ‘normal’ and ‘exceptional’ science/policy-making. Actors 
learn from past policy choices so that the consequences of old ideas become 
embedded with attempts at crafting new strategies of adjusting to the global 
economy – a process often associated with social learning (Hall 1993). The 
real world is full of contradictions and inconsistencies; actors constantly 
adjust their beliefs and expectations as a way of ensuring coherence in 
paradigms and policy practices. Ostensibly, policy interventions as responses 
to external pressures are not homogenous but are distinguishable according 
to ‘orders of social learning’. Hall (1993: 278) identifies three levels of policy 
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intervention, namely interventions in the overarching goals, in the 
techniques used to attain these goals, and in specific policy instruments 
available to decision makers. The levels of policy learning inform actors of 
what is doable, possible, and limited in making political choices. The change 
in policy paradigms are generated depending on the degree of change 
undertaken by the state, and in parallel, the extent institutions are receptive 
to ideas of change (Blyth 2003; Hall 1989, 1993). 
 
In this vein, institutional evolution is a function of political time – the 
process of iterative yet cumulative change – wherein the contradictions, 
ruptures, and tensions between opposing ideas of doing politics are necessary 
but insufficient conditions of institutional change (Campbell 2001; Hay 2001, 
2004b). Material resources, external environment, and structural constraints 
are shaping what are conceivable adjustment strategies for political elites. 
The techniques and policy instruments available within an existing paradigm 
cannot produce institutional transformation mainly because persistent 
contradictions are only highlighting the problems in existing institutional 
arrangements, clearly without offering a ‘supply of alternative ideas’. This has 
significant consequences on how scholars conceptualise institutional change. 
In the first place, actors must perceive an institutional crisis to recognise the 
need to find alternative solutions to resolve existing problems of economic 
paradigms. Because ideas are sticky and institutions are resistant to change, 
emergent alternative paradigms – which require ideational change prior to 
institutional transformation – take time before displacing existing political 
arrangements. Within political economy research, the durability of 
neoliberalism stems from its initial capacity of redressing stagflation and in 
weakening rent-seeking of organised social groups, most notably labour. 
Although the legitimacy of monetarism was a result of its success as a crisis 
management strategy, the iterative process of constructing narratives has 
strengthened, if not sustained, the dominance of neoliberal policies. This is 
evidently the case in developed and developing countries by way of applying 
managerial and technocratic approaches to economic governance. In policy 
practice, neoliberal reforms have been substantiated through 
denationalisation of state-controlled markets, deregulation of service 
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provision, and flexibility in labour markets (Burnham 1999, 2001; Campbell 
& Pedersen 2001b). 
 
One powerful effect of recognising the causal effects of ideational factors is 
the extent to which discourses of globalisation – mainly competitiveness and 
private sector standards of efficiency – have been used by national elites to 
justify their policy preferences (Hay & Marsh 2000). Some scholars (Hay 
2004b; Weiss 1998: Chapter 6) have shown empirically that globalisation is 
not ‘global’ but depending on the construction of narratives by governing 
elites, globalisation can be seen as a subject-less force that creates 
imperatives for marketised governance to be adopted. The importance of 
ideas is most astutely reflected if one examines neoliberalism as a dominant 
paradigm that informs not just states but also publics about how to frame 
issues and solve problems. Within development politics literature, this 
involves thinking of neoliberalism from the point it was conceived – the 
material, political, and institutional factors that forged the Washington 
Consensus – until the time it was implemented and recalibrated in response 
to political resistance to the free market logic. The notion of political time, 
evolution of the state, and consequences of economic ideas can best explain 
the construction and unravelling of neoliberalism as a paradigm of growth 
and economic development in Latin America – the birthplace of free market 
experimentation.   
    
The difficulty of moving beyond neoliberalism rests on the fact that policy 
ideas worked effectively through the combination of external imposition, elite 
consensus, and implicit societal consensus around the need for a new 
strategy of development (Grugel 2009; Panizza 2009; Teichman 2001). In 
Gramscian terms, neoliberalism was constituted through a combination of 
consent and coercion forged through class politics and power alliances. One 
way neoliberalism appeals to the public is in terms of the differing 
conceptions of market reforms. Whilst Latin Americans respond positively to 
globalisation when asked about consumer welfare, inflation and regional 
integration, they generally have negative views about neoliberalism if asked 
about privatisation and state retrenchment (Baker 2003, 2009). This 
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indicates, indeed, the importance of cognitive frameworks in defining what 
are within the realm of possibilities for policy elites as well as the ways ideas 
are appropriating claims in ‘selling neoliberal reforms’ to society.  
 
Within this context, ideational approaches can complement the widely 
acknowledged weakness of historical institutionalism: its difficulty in 
explaining formation of actors’ motivations and interests; its overemphasis 
on institutional rigidity, inertia and stasis rather than (incremental) change 
and evolution; and its treatment of institutions as structural constraints 
rather than as endogenous sources of transformation (Hall & Taylor 1998; 
Hay 2001; Hay & Wincott 1998). But equally, historical institutionalism 
offers the analytical tools to explain continuities and changes between 
neoliberalism and emerging alternative paradigms under late capitalism. The 
framework involves the careful application of path dependence and 
incremental change as analytical levers to complement ideas as drivers of 
institutional change. In other words, institutional design is not destiny. 
Instead, a persuasive discourse to promote the acceptance of policies can take 
place, which gradually displace existing rules, in this case neoliberal mining 
policy, as the dominant ‘game in town’. Like Stephen Bell (2011), I follow an 
agency-centred, ‘resource-based’ approach looking at how agents use rules, 
institutional sources of authority, expertise or other institutional resources to 
effect change. Overall, the new institutionalist approach interrogates and 
opens up the often acknowledged yet rarely unexplored question on the 
coherence of neoliberalism as a cluster of ideas and as a distinctive set of 
policy practices. In so doing, it makes apparent the contested nature of 
market opening reforms and the variegated consequences of neoliberalism in 
commodity production. To analyse the particular consequences of 
neoliberalism to emerging governance models, critical political economy 
perspectives are applied in this thesis. 
 
3.3 Critical International Political Economy (IPE) perspectives 
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Although domestic politics, to a significant extent, determines paradigms of 
development, the context of globalisation alters the material and ideational 
factors influencing state strategies of development. Part of the story is that 
the international system, the embedded structure of power, and the 
continuing legitimation of hegemonic economic ideas both open 
opportunities and constraints to political choices in the Global South. In this 
context, I advocate for the selective use of critical IPE perspectives in 
exploring states, resource management, and the politics of development in 
Brazil and Chile. This broad category of IPE perspective, however, needs 
refining and contextualisation as it equally fails to capture the diversity of 
experiences of states and ordinary people. The tendency of scholars to 
neglect domestic politics in favour of systemic view of the global economy 
signally fails to explain how national elites aspire and negotiate their 
competitive strategies in domestic spheres of decision-making. Without any 
reference to institutional evolution – and this is squarely about conflicts 
between public and private authorities – critical political economy can lose 
sight of the meaningful changes taking place within broader patterns of 
institutional continuity.  
 
3.3.1 Deconstructing the hegemony of neoliberalism 
 
Broadly speaking, critical political economy scholars apply historical 
materialism in explaining the confluence of political and social forces in the 
attempts of state managers to consolidate, legitimise and maintain a 
neoliberal paradigm of growth. Neo-Gramscians focus on the role of social 
relations and of social forces in the construction of a neoliberal order, in 
which concrete social struggles are embedded in state power and capitalist 
mode of production (Cox 1981; Gill & Law 1989: 476). The hegemony of 
neoliberalism as an ideology is constituted by the interaction between 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions, maintained through social 
orders that define those elites who can exert influence in defining the 
architecture of governance, the ‘rule-makers’, and those who craft strategies 
based on prevailing structures, the ‘rule-takers’. However, the global order is 
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continually in flux because the architecture of rules are subjected to 
negotiation and contestation between those who hold power and those who 
do not. This, inevitably, requires the constant reproduction of specific 
relations of power by way of deploying a relatively coherent, collective image 
of world order that is legitimate in the eyes of the rule takers (Cox 1981). The 
ascendant paradigm of neoliberalism, therefore, is a global project not so 
much because of how it was initially conceived but because of the reifying, 
legitimating process of framing, reframing, and deploying various policy 
techniques and instruments to assert the developmental role of private 
authorities and external actors. 
 
Nothing best captures the deconstruction of neoliberalism as a grand 
narrative than the historical experience of Latin America. In the heyday of 
neoliberal reforms, the twin crisis of debt management and macroeconomic 
instability brought forth the unrelenting search for new ideas as a crisis 
management strategy. The demise of inward-looking strategies of growth for 
developing countries was a gradual process that involved the loss of faith of 
political elites to the state as the engine of development and the subsequent 
rise of supply side economics as the only way of addressing the economic 
crises plaguing many pockets of the developing world. Neoliberalism is the 
combination of, on the one hand, the proliferation of ideology that emanated 
from Washington with roots to 19th century laissez-faire, and on the other 
hand, of pragmatic politics that dismantled the statist logic of development 
through a coalition of radical market reformers.  
 
Equally, neo-Gramscian framework allows not only for the problematisation 
of the attempts to internationalise state power, particularly of the American 
state, but also emphasises the social forces at work to resist neoliberalism 
(Cox 1999; O’Brien et. al. 2000). Whilst neoliberalism and its logic of no 
alternative have indeed become global, it is being contested in arenas of 
formal decision making and simultaneously in the streets by organised and 
spontaneous civil society actors. The articulation of the failure of neoliberal 
democracies across the region, and indeed in the Global South, has been a 
source of discourses for counter-hegemonic ideas (O’Brien et. al. 2000; 
 91 
Robinson 2008). If hegemony is built on coercion and consent, then, the 
rejection of neoliberal ideas is as important as policy choices of state elites.  
 
Trade union politics, especially in enclave economies, is the terrain of 
resistance against elite projects of cooptation. Organised workers politicised 
labour conflicts, wherein their organisational capacity provided the weapon 
to challenge the oligarchical and exclusionary nature of Latin American 
democracies. What is particularly striking is the depoliticisation of varying 
articulations of citizenship, rights, and democracy. Under military 
dictatorships, most unions were demobilised and labour reforms were 
targeted towards weakening collective labour rights (Cook 2007; Drake 
1996). In this context, critical IPE perspectives offer complementary 
arguments regarding the consequences of neoliberalism to state 
restructuring and labour mobilisation. I explore this in the next two sections. 
 
3.3.2 Reconstituting state power under neoliberalism 
 
What remains unexplored is the extent to which state power is transformed 
by transnational flows of capital, discourses of global competitiveness, and 
actual institutional changes to re-regulate markets in favour of greater 
private capital participation. Consequently, have neoliberal reforms hollowed 
out developing states in terms of their capacity to respond to pressures of 
competitiveness? This is a theoretical and empirical question. Some scholars 
argue, quite sweepingly, that the decline of post-war national welfare states 
have paved the way for growth strategies aimed at strengthening its 
competitive advantage (Cerny 1995, 1997, 2008, 2010). Some evidences 
deployed include the rise of mobile capital, technological innovation, and 
state-sponsored regional projects towards liberalisation, which constitute 
reconfigurations of state power (Ohmae 1990, 1995; Sachs & Warner 1995). 
As a matter of policy proposition, Sachs & Warner (1995: 4) argue that strong 
reformers outperform weak reformers both in terms of decline of GDP 
between 1990 and 1994 as well as earlier resumptions of economic growth. 
Other scholars emphasise the breakdown of state-led corporatism in favour 
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of regulating capital and mediating market opening at the expense of labour 
acquiescence to reforms (Jessop 2002; Muñoz Goma 1996; Veggeland 2009). 
From this perspective, the internalisation of neoliberalism rests on the 
punitive discipline of financial markets; pressures for homogenisation and 
economic efficiency erode traditions of state intervention. Cerny (1997: 267-
268) argues that variations of institutional arrangements reflect ‘different 
modes of managing a complex transition in which the political and economic 
distinctions… are blurred and possibilities for alternative equilibria are fluid’.  
 
This convincing thesis was applied in various regional and institutional 
settings to trace the normalising tendency of economic rationality, the 
mismatch between global competitiveness and state-led policies on wealth 
creation, and the seemingly inevitable convergence towards marketised 
governance (Cerny & Evans 2004; Evans 2010; Kirby 2009; Kirby & Murphy 
2010; Lunt 2010; Radcliffe 2010; Soederberg 2010; Taylor 2010). However, 
the totalising claims of competition state hypothesis are untenable if one 
accounts for the distinct institutional and organisational logics of states as 
well as the persistence of dirigisme and developmentalism in several 
industrialising countries, most notably East and Southeast Asian tigers, 
Brazil, Mexico, India, and China (Evans 1995; Phillips 1998, 2005; Schneider 
2000; Weiss 1998, 2003). There exist significant deviations among states in 
terms of their strategy of adaptation to the global political economy. 
Crucially, resource-rich states face a distinctive set of pressures as a result of 
mineral wealth and their institutions must possess endogenous properties to 
sufficiently manage both the pressures of liberalisation and the resource 
curse (Migdal 2009; Slater 2010; Smith 2007). And far from what the theory 
presupposes, Chile – the earliest experiment of monetarism, is full of 
contradictions and tensions, wherein modes of depoliticisation of economic 
management and repoliticisation of contentious policy issues are intertwined 
in policy-making (Nem Singh 2010; Taylor 2010). This critique also finds 
evidence in welfare states that undertook economic restructuring only to fail 
in fully dismantling state social provision (Hall 1989; Pierson 1994). To sum 
up, there are neither singular nor linear pathways of achieving economic 
reforms. As critical geographers rightly point out, neoliberalism takes 
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multiple forms and substance across regions and states, and is conditioned 
by the extent state-society relations have been reorganised by attempts at 
naturalising the market (Kurtz & Brooks 2008; Radcliffe 2005).  
 
The final controversy explores the hollowing of the state under conditions of 
neoliberalism. Whilst globalisation may be transforming political and 
economic relations between states and private authorities, institutional 
change does not necessarily produce policy convergence towards market-
oriented governance (Mosley 2005; Weiss 1999, 2003, 2005; Weiss & 
Hobson 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999). Some states historically accumulate 
capability to manage pressures from above and develop effective strategies of 
adaptation to the globalised political economy. Whilst there is no such a 
thing as capability across all policy sectors, states develop strengths in 
certain policy competencies as a way of achieving state effectiveness. 
Transformative state capacity requires a bureaucratic apparatus capable of 
coordinating change in response to pressures of convergence towards 
market-oriented governance. Although this has been widely documented in 
East Asia (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990), Latin American states 
are presumed incapable of balancing private interests and strategic 
developmental goals. Weiss (1998) demonstrates the success of 
developmental states as a result of the compatibility between state goals and 
the bureaucracy. 19  Across Latin America, the lack of an effective state 
apparatus has been attributed, in various degrees and extent, to the strength 
of political classes to direct state-building away from redistributive politics, 
the inability of organised labour to challenge power structures, and the 
absence of a conducive external environment to facilitate policy autonomy 
(Collier & Collier 2002; Evans 1995, 1979; Haggard 1990; Schneider 1999, 
                                                   
 
19  In contrast, Johnson (1982) argues that the impressive level of coordination and 
competition among bureaucratic agencies in Japan enabled the national leaders to 
promote its coherent agenda. Whilst the state maintains autonomy and coherence, it still 
requires a state that remains connected to society. Hence, embedded autonomy is the 
critical balance between isolating the state from social pressures and maintaining its 
linkages with society. Evans (1995) compares the variation of state involvement in Brazil, 
Korea and India to show that the varying relationships of the state with economic groups 
are critical to successfully control excessive protectionist policies and in influencing the 
state agenda to support business interests.  
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2004a). Whilst the literature on state capacity can offer a corrective to the 
misapplication of global competitiveness as a globalising logic in developing 
world contexts, doing so requires some nuanced analysis especially if used 
within the particular case of resource sectors.  
     
The first corrective is to take a dynamic view of institutional capacity. If 
indeed state capacity is historically accumulated over time, the extent we can 
gauge policy autonomy in the international system is difficult to identify. One 
way of capturing this is to place the analysis of institutional reforms within 
the context of the dyadic responses of business and organised labour. State 
effectiveness is undoubtedly based on the capacity of state elites to negotiate 
complex policy reforms through constructive engagement with business 
associations and labour unions. This highly politicised task must be 
institutionally contextualised, which implies understanding the structural 
constraints imposed on actors in their political choices and strategic action. 
The second corrective is to explore sector-specific requirements of what 
constitutes effective governance of natural resources. As mentioned earlier, 
the literature on the resource curse and commodity chains have fallen short 
in taking into account the ways structure, politics and contingency have 
shaped political interventions and state reforms. However, those taking 
political economy perspectives have in equal measure assumed the hollowing 
of state capacities as a result of globalisation of production and finance. In 
empirically tracing state capacity, the thesis identifies policy reforms that 
have addressed ways of preventing the resource curse effects and growth 
strategies in commodity production. In the final section, I explore the ways 
states manage state enterprises and forge political pacts between big business 
and labour unions as a way of addressing the challenges of resource-based 
strategies of development.  
 
3.3.3 Reforming the resource sector 
 
One core idea of the thesis is that the resource sector has never been analysed 
as a strategic sector that can potentially contribute to economic growth and 
 95 
political inclusion. Whilst the resource curse has had conceptual stretching 
despite its limited analytical purchase in many developing regions, 
contemporary resource governance is implicitly depoliticised, highly 
technocratic, and adopts ‘best practices’ rather than critically exploring 
relations of power, conflicts, and tensions in market opening reforms of 
extractive industries. To this extent, the contribution of critical political 
economy is to bring in business and labour where political time, institutional 
contexts, and structural constraints from the international and domestic are 
given weight in political analysis. 
 
In the 1990s, scholars began to acknowledge the superficial dichotomy 
between states and markets. Critical IPE examines the consequences of the 
increasing importance of market actors – and here a distinction must be 
made between multinational enterprises and domestic capital – in 
reconstituting state power and modes of neoliberal governance (Eden 1991; 
Strange 1991). Susan Strange (1996, 1997) suggests scholars to view politics 
and economics as well as the international and the domestic as inextricably 
linked to each other. In International Relations, the role of international 
business has blurred the public/private divide as MNCs acquire authority in 
their codes of conducts and make certain business practices acceptable for 
society (Cutler. et. al 1999a; Dunning 1998). The acquisition of political 
authority, and consequently carving a more politicised role for big business, 
is recognised as causally affecting firm behaviour in global markets and 
legitimacy in domestic economic spaces. This, inevitably, implies thinking of 
private capital differently. Rather than conceptualising firms as atomistic, 
competitive actors in the marketplace driven solely by homogenous, rational 
calculus of profit maximisation (Cutler et. al. 1999b: 333), businesses 
organise themselves through private or public-private arrangements that 
structure their own behaviour as well as state and social actors. In turn, this 
may constitute private authority over time by gaining legitimacy, which may 
be reinforcing or undermining state policies in managing globalisation. 
Central to this process are the traits of MNCs, such as expert knowledge, 
technology, and capital, which developing states and SOEs do not possess. In 
this context, cooperation between TNCs on a global scale is possible despite 
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competition, making economic relationships more complex than trade, 
particularly in sectors experiencing dramatic liberalisation, for example 
telecommunications, financial services, and the minerals sector. In some 
cases, state responsibilities have been voluntarily abrogated for market actors 
to fill in, thereby, giving firms the power traditionally reserved to states.20 
Ruling themselves has consequences to authority, legitimacy, and power 
relations in the globalised economy.  
 
There are variations in the relative importance of state and private authority 
across different economic areas (Cutler et. al. 1999: 342-343). The state (a) 
can be more involved, such as in intellectual property rights and trade 
politics; (b) become secondary to private self-regulation, as in knowledge-
based oligopolies and debt rating; (c) or is present but with less importance, 
like in standards setting in telecommunications and IT industries and in 
negotiating compensations between MNCs and affected mining communities. 
The distribution of authority in governance between state and market actors 
is partly due to the competitive advantage of actors in reducing transaction 
costs and improving efficiency. Sometimes firms have more capability to 
create institutions to regulate markets due to their knowledge. In other 
situations, the state exercises its traditional political (monopoly of violence) 
and economic (creating legal frameworks) powers. In contexts of collusions, 
leading firms organise themselves to control supply of goods in global 
markets, though as the oil cartel OPEC demonstrates, states can exert the 
same influence given certain conditions. States and firms are co-constitutive 
forces being reshaped by neoliberal globalisation. The determinants of state 
responses to global competitiveness are not the laws of supply and demand 
but the intersection of power relations, material and organisational 
resources, and ideational beliefs. 
 
                                                   
 
20 Cooperation, as defined by Keohane (1984) and extended by Cutler et. al. (1999: 334), as 
requiring active adjustment of behaviour to reach mutual goals as well as the sense 
obligation that extends cooperation into the future and gives it the mantle of authority.   
 97 
As resource sectors vividly demonstrate, private sector organises themselves 
domestically and internationally to be able to maximise the benefits of 
structurally-oligopolistic markets at the same time they share responsibilities 
with host states crafting the rules of the game. What constitutes effective 
resource management is contested and highly politicised. As states 
endeavour to achieve regulatory and entrepreneurial roles in the economy, 
managing claims of firms and unions is consequentially a difficult enterprise. 
The logic of the free market has subjected state-owned companies to 
restructure according to the rules of global competitiveness. This is reflected 
in asset selling of states, the adoption of a language of reform, and the 
embrace of labour flexibility in markets. As Chapters 6 and 8 demonstrate, 
ideational diffusion of global neoliberalism to domestic politics meant 
reframing the role of state enterprises in a (neoliberal) world order as well as 
placing labour unions in its place – one where their voices become less vocal 
in management decisions. Oligopolistic structures of resource sectors mean 
that principal companies can maintain the core business functions whilst 
subsidiary firms (subcontractors) below the complex commodity chain offer 
necessary services, including labour, for commodity production.  
 
To sum up, critical political economy offers the analytical tools to understand 
the conditions of neoliberalism which structure the behaviour of big business 
and organisational responses of natural resource-based unions. Equally, it 
also opens up the question of state transformation in the context of 
globalised markets, state retrenchment, and changing contours of 
public/private authorities. The final section brings together historical 
institutionalist and critical political economy strands of research to analyse 
resource politics in Latin America. 
 
3.4 Combining historical institutionalism and critical political 
economy 
 
The synthesis between critical political economy and neo-institutionalist 
literature offers novel ways of understanding institutional transformation in 
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analysing political economies of extractive industries in Brazil and Chile. 
There are three ways in which I draw these two theoretical perspectives 
together. Firstly, the historical institutionalist strands analyse the 
interactions between political legacies, institutional contexts and ideational 
factors to explain changes towards greater state intervention in the economy 
without necessarily displacing neoliberalism in toto. By recognising the 
incremental route of transforming the rules of the game, I show how different 
patterns of neo-developmentalism emerges based on the specific 
configurations of power and conflicts between actors. Put differently, the 
exercise of political agency – especially by state actors – to challenge 
neoliberalism in Brazil and Chile takes place in the context of immense 
structural constraints at the national and global levels. Secondly, the critical 
political economy approach complements HI by explaining how specific ideas 
of competitiveness and logic of private sector efficiency become part of the 
new institutional context under the neoliberal world order. This also permits 
an analysis of the limits of institutional complexities in shaping the responses 
of state enterprises and labour unions. By implication, it signifies the need to 
proffer agency to state managers and labour unions in contesting, indeed in 
reconfiguring, the relations of power and economic production in the 
strategic industries. Conversely, they influence the process of state 
transformation. In mapping out the interactions between states, private 
sector, state enterprises, and organised labour, we can understand the 
increasingly complex nature of political economies in the era of late 
capitalism. This implies that development strategies of middle-income 
countries reliant on natural resources, encapsulated by the idea of neo-
developmentalism, is in fact a hybrid strategy combining market incentives 
and state regulation. Finally, the combination of the two perspectives allows 
me to analyse state strategies in managing globalisation within the global-
national nexus. It allows me to identify how neoliberal reforms have been 
embraced and legitimated in national policy debates, and have been deployed 
subsequently to justify narratives of (national) development. The scope of 
neoliberal policies determines the degree of ascendancy of neo-
developmentalism in Brazil and Chile. Consequently, neo-developmentalist 
strategies are as diverse as neoliberal policies. In the next chapter, I examine 
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the historical development of copper mining and petroleum industries in 
Chile and Brazil respectively. It traces the centrality of natural resources in 
the consolidation of export-led growth models of development in Latin 
America. 
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Chapter 4  
RESOURCE POLITICS IN BRAZIL AND CHILE 
 
 
To trace how neoliberalism has reshaped resource governance and the 
relations of power between states, markets, and labour unions, the starting 
point is to explore the extent to which statist models of resource management 
were constituted, embedded and unravelled in Latin American political 
economy. In comparison to finance and production, natural resources have 
played an exceptionally important role in regional and national political 
economies. In political debates, the key question for actors was the extent to 
which states can sustain export economies in the context of volatile 
international markets. This debate on resource governance, however, was 
made complex by the control of foreign capital of key exports of Latin 
America. The unions in resource sectors shaped public perceptions by 
advocating for nationalisation of resources. Indeed, the consolidation of a 
governance model seeking for a stronger, more capable state in managing 
resources is rooted on intense collective mobilisation based on class politics 
(Bergquist 1986; Shafer 1994).  
 
In this chapter, I offer a nuanced account of the rise and fall of state 
intervention in extractive industries in Brazil and Chile. One insight is the 
conflictual relations between state elites, foreign capital and labour 
movement in managing resources, which is reflected in the articulation and 
uneven adoption of state-led development. I argue that natural resource 
governance throughout the twentieth century was shaped by the 
contradictions of the nature of commodity exports and attempts at 
autonomous direction of growth strategy. There were centralising and 
decentralising tendencies which permitted the rise of import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) as a strategy to counter export dependence – elite 
cohesion, favourable international order, and ‘ideological supply’ – in which 
political conflicts were the main driving engine of institutional and economic 
transformation. In this context, the chapter sets out the initial conditions, 
 101 
structural constraints, and international order that have subsequently helped 
in formulating neoliberalism as the new political project. The argument will 
progress in three stages. In the first part, Section 4.1, I offer a historical 
overview of resource politics in Latin America. Section 4.2 explores the 
political economy of natural resources in Chile tracing as far back as the 
nitrate export economy towards copper. Section 4.3 introduces the Brazilian 
case study, examining the role of natural resources in terms of national 
security, industrial development, and state attempts at exalting political 
autonomy. I examine the construction of desenvolvimentismo 
(developmentalism) as a guiding state ideology for economic management, as 
reflected in the oil industry. Finally, in Section 4.4, I bring together both 
cases and explain the analytical strategy in analysing the political economy of 
natural resources in contemporary globalisation. 
 
4.1 Political economy of natural resources in Latin America 
 
Latin America’s integration to the world economy took place through the 
exports of primary commodities. Three major factors influenced the 
consolidation of export-led growth model in the region. Firstly, the choices of 
elites were shaped by the ‘commodity lottery’ or the distribution of resources 
based on natural endowments, geographical and geological limitations, and 
demand characteristics based on the changing global economy. Some 
commodities faced greater competition (e.g. sugar) and others had monopoly 
or greater share of global markets (e.g. metal minerals). The evolution of 
commodities from luxury to basic consumption likewise affected the 
sustainability of commodity production. Secondly, commodity specialisation 
was a conscious political decision depending on the smooth functioning of 
mechanisms of export led growth, namely capital, labour and the state. 
Finally, what was invariably crucial as the principal determinant of success or 
failure was the policy-economic environment. This was conditioned by 
consistency in economic policy, state administrative capacity, and ability of 
elites to contain labour unrest (Bulmer-Thomas 1994; Topik et. al. 2007).  
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Broadly speaking, one can put a timeline of the liberal era – 1880s-1930 – 
and the subsequent response of states, namely ISI strategy, which was 
punctuated by neoliberalism after 1982. The failure of export-led growth 
model was a result of the tensions between production for the internal 
market and the global economy, a history of elite bias in states, difficulties in 
developing national economic capacity, and the strong presence of foreign 
capital in the most important sectors of regional economies (Cardoso & 
Faletto 1979; Furtado 1970; Jenkins 1984). Without exception, economic 
performance until the late 1920s remained heavily dependent on the fortunes 
of the export sector. One diagnosis of the situation was that commodities 
markets were exposed to international shocks – exemplified by the Great 
Depression – which necessitated policies towards structural change, 
industrialisation, and diversification of the non-export economy (Cardoso & 
Faletto 1979; Tandeter 2006). 21  The succeeding decade to the Great 
Depression unleashed a fundamental change in intellectual thinking and 
strategy of recovery from the crisis. This was underpinned by the emergent 
protectionism across United States and Europe, which were Latin America’s 
primary export destinations. With the Second World War further restricting 
international trade, the region experienced modest growth in volumes of 
export. As such, the post-war years were critical in making a choice: either 
state elites opt for inward-looking industrialisation to reduce vulnerability 
from flux in external economic conditions, or promote export-oriented 
growth that could combine export intensification and export diversification.  
 
The states that had begun to build industrial bases – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay – decisively embarked on import 
substitution because of the capacity of ISI model to generate rapid growth in 
output and employment in manufacturing. This Keynesian strategy required 
heavy investments on manufacturing, which was effectively translated as 
                                                   
 
21 The prices of primary commodities fell dramatically, in which the unit value of exports 
dropped by 50 percent and those with modest plunge in prices such as banana and oil 
were sectors dominated by foreign capital. Import prices also went down as a result of 
free falling world demand and this brought forth a sharp decline in export volumes across 
the region (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: 196-199). 
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protection for domestic producers from international competition through 
tariff rates and state financing. However, domestic private firms lacked 
access to additional finance for large-scale investments and technological 
capacity to mount sophisticated industrial enterprises (Bulmer-Thomas 
1994: 277-288). This strategy had the obstacle in the way of moving beyond 
the ‘easy’ phase of industrialisation – production of nondurable consumer 
goods – towards implementing changes in the industrial structure to produce 
consumer durables and heavy capital-based products. In effect, the 
limitations of ISI were rooted on the combined lack of technological skills of 
domestic capitalists and the burden of financing industrial projects to the 
national state.  
 
In the case of Brazil, Peter Evans (1979) described the economic strategy as 
the ‘triple alliance’ between state, multinational capital, and domestic 
economic elites. The military government began to appropriate legislations 
that created the conditions for foreign capital to enter domestic markets. The 
MNCs, mainly dominated by American firms at that time, possessed the 
technology, marketing strategy, management skills, and access to finance, to 
develop the intermediate and capital goods-sectors. The government policy 
was grafted in the hope that the necessary transfer of skills and technology 
could take place in partnership with foreign capital. However, clear conflicts 
in goals between national governments and MNCs persisted because the 
more profitable sectors rested in consumer production which required little 
technological transfer, and in other cases, foreign investment materialised in 
terms of overtaking established domestic firms (Biersteker 1978; Jenkins 
1984, 1987).  
 
In this context, the absence of sufficient domestic investment necessitated 
the creation of state enterprises that occupied the ‘empty spaces’ of the 
economy. These are basic and infrastructure industries characterised by high 
risks, large scale of operations, and are of strategic importance to the state for 
accruing rents (Trebat 1983). The economic logic behind this move was to 
build competitive industries as a way of overcoming structural heterogeneity 
and the political argument was that these products are too sensitive to 
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national sentiments to be controlled by foreign companies. Key industries 
deemed strategic, such as petroleum, metal minerals, steel, 
telecommunications and electricity, were then transferred in the hands of the 
state. In Brazil, for example, PETROBRAS was created after intense national 
debates around the strategic value of oil both as an industry on its own and as 
a complementary to manufacturing and industrial sectors. This transpired in 
differing success rates across the region. Bulmer-Thomas (1994: 283) argues 
that those with larger markets – Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – had been 
more successful in experimenting on state-led development compared to 
smaller ones like Chile and Colombia.  
 
ISI shielded manufacturing industries from international competition but its 
economic outcomes were far from optimal. The high barriers to entry in 
oligopolistic market structures in combination with distortion in factor prices 
and lack of competition yielded to inefficiency and unsustainable production. 
With the internal market unable to support domestic firms due to escalating 
input costs, the competitiveness of Latin American products stifled. Inherent 
in the model was the systematic neglect to the inflationary effects of 
unfettered protectionism. To sum up, Bielschowsky (2009: 185) diagnoses 
the constraints on structural change in Latin American political economies:  
 
Systemic competitiveness was low, productive and export 
specialisation focused on goods of low levels of knowledge 
intensity, with little international dynamism, few domestic 
productive linkages, and insufficient capacity to generate 
externalities... International engagement tends to be unfavourable, 
balance of payments problems recurrent, and growth both limited 
and unstable. 
 
In this context, the inability to penetrate world markets for manufactured 
goods meant strengthening the importance of primary commodities for 
exports. Equally, this prevented governments to switch their strategy towards 
simultaneous export intensification and export diversification. A key obstacle 
was that the new environment of import substitution had an anti-export bias, 
which made diversification more difficult and export earnings concentrated 
in traditional products. This lack of dynamism of export earnings alongside 
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failing production of competitive goods was a formidable combination for 
balance of payment problems. The modest gains by the import substitution 
model during boom years were reversed by the stabilisation programmes to 
curb inflation. Most of all, political elites failed to tackle the problem of social 
inequality and anti-rural bias of the development model.  
 
4.1.1 State capacity and industrial development 
 
State capacity has been presumed to indicate institutional strength to 
coordinate complex policy reforms, specifically the establishment of 
bureaucratic technocrats to guide import substitution. However, a broader 
definition of state capacity is necessary to take into account the differential 
capacities of states specific to extractive industries. State capacity can be 
defined as a slow-moving process of accumulating institutional cohesiveness 
in which the most relevant actors accept the validity of both codified rules 
and practices and informal practices. We can, ultimately, attribute capacity to 
complex political settlements aimed at strengthening political and economic 
institutions.22 In Latin America, the problem of import substitution rests not 
so much on its economic logic but on the lack of institutional capacity to 
manage the economy. Political elites failed to implement difficult reforms to 
overhaul the distribution of rents, restructure the tax system, and achieve 
some degree of state accountability in decision-making. In the resource curse 
literature, state reforms typically involve revenue management, property 
rights, and complex linkages between taxes, trade policy, and commodity 
production. In Venezuela, for example, whilst the (petro) state developed 
certain skills such as monitoring, regulating, and promoting the mining 
                                                   
 
22 Kurtz (2009) further argues that state-building - the effective creation of bureaucracy in 
the face of wars - requires not simply the centralisation of authority but also the 
successful negotiation between rural agricultural elites and urban-centred elites or 
authorities at the centre. By threatening the collective survival of elites itself, a process of 
political incorporation occurs either in the form of oligarchy or imposition of absolutist 
bureaucratic settings. The effect is to force elites to organise their interests within state 
institutions and/or harmonise the interests between the central state and the powerful 
regional/local elites. Where agrarian relations and elite politics are unfavourable, state 
building is difficult to succeed. 
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industry, it failed to build extensive, penetrating, and coherent 
bureaucracies, as reflected in the low level of taxation in oil countries 
compared to its neighbours (Karl 1997:61). State capacity is critical in 
governing economic change by way of adapting to external shocks. 
Institutional capacity, in this context, refers to the ability of policy-making 
authorities to pursue domestic adjustment strategies in cooperation with 
organised economic groups to upgrade or transform the industrial economy 
(Weiss 1998: 5). 
 
The historical accumulation of state capacity is the fundamental difference 
between East Asian and Latin American states. In particular, East Asia had 
succeeded in using export-led growth through manufacturing as a 
competitive strategy in the global economy.23  Chile stands out in Latin 
America as an exception. The state possessed effective control over policies 
on public investments, which was also supported by a distinctive institution, 
the Contraloría, which was in charge of auditing public accounts, ruling on 
the legality of executive decrees, and issuing advisory opinions on the 
constitutionality of proposed legislations. Section 4.2 provides detail as 
regards the accumulation of state capacity and embedding of party politics in 
Chile. Equally, in Brazil, the military backed revolution of Getúlio Vargas 
(1930-1945) had successfully centralised power for the federal government 
away from traditional oligarchs in regional states. Section 4.3 details the 
Vargas era as a dramatic reorientation of state role and watershed moment 
for developmentalist ideology to become dominant for nearly 70 years. Put 
differently, I am certainly looking at two distinctive case studies where the 
patterns of state capacity building, state-society bargaining, and labour 
incorporation differed quite significantly compared to the rest of the region.  
                                                   
 
23 A combination of structure and agency best explains the East Asian Miracle. The following 
key factors are crucial to consider: (a) the ability of political elites to impose land reform 
that redistributed income and land; (b) the supportive international environment that 
made protectionism conducive for growth, namely the easy access of Asian imports to the 
growing US market; and (c) policy dynamism of East and Southeast Asian states 
characterised by their switch from easy phases of import substitution towards exports 
oriented growth in manufacturing. See Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; Weiss 
1998, 2003. 
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Section 4.2 discusses this argument through a concise economic history of 
Chilean resource politics. 
 
4.2 Political economy of natural resources in Chile 
 
Chilean political historians often give emphasis to the role of party politics, 
relatively successful state building, and the salience of natural resources 
(Salazar & Pinto 1999). Its two key export sectors – nitrate and copper – were 
fundamental in shaping political conflicts, in which the nature of commodity 
production, international order and ideological tensions defined the political 
choices of elites. Chile’s political system developed a very wide spectrum of 
ideologically oriented, mass based political parties marked by a long tradition 
of democratic pluralism. The creation of a viable export economy after 
independence sustained the relatively stable political system in Chile, in 
which silver, copper and wheat were the main sources of state revenue. What 
sustained the emergent elite democracy after independence was the political 
pacts between the dominant class of exporters and importers in Central 
Chile, who were divided in several respects but were united behind the 
maintenance of a liberal political economy (Bergquist 1986; Collier 1993). In 
the years immediately following the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), Chilean 
agriculture flourished as a pastoral economy especially sheep-raising in the 
South. However, the impetus for agricultural innovation had reached its 
limitations due to fierce international competition, periodic outbreak of plant 
blights, and vagaries of climate.  
 
Copper mining had mixed outcomes due to the exhaustion of high-grade 
copper ores, and it reached a point where expensive capital for investment 
was needed from the domestic copper producers. But facing the choice 
between a booming nitrate economy and seemingly depleted copper mines, it 
was easy for Chilean capitalists to place their money in a sector with higher 
dividends and lower risks. However, in 1904 William Braden revolutionised 
copper mining by introducing the flotation process in El Teniente – the 
technology that aided the American copper industry to prosper. He 
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established the American Braden Copper Company. The mine was too costly 
so Braden sold his rights to the Guggenheim family in 1908. The family 
further expanded their activities in the Chilean copper sector by investing in 
the newly acquired lands in Chuquicamata in Atacama Desert. It took five 
years and an investment of US$100 million before Chuquicamata began to 
profit. The Guggenheims transferred El Teniente and Chuquicamata to 
another American firm, Kennecott Copper Company. Braden sold his mining 
rights in Potrerillos located in Northeast of Copiapo to Andes Copper Mining 
Company, a subsidiary of Anaconda Copper Company. Between 1916 and 
1927, the American firm developed what was to be the third large-scale 
copper mine in Chile. Through the massive investments of American 
companies, these mines – known as Gran Minería – transformed Chilean 
mining into a large-scale copper mining industry with its production 
increasing by 300 percent and its share in the world market leaping from 4.3 
to 10 percent (Collier & Slater 2004: 157-161). In addition to the reliance of 
the copper sector on modern technology rather than labour, it recovered 
completely thanks to the steadily increasing demand for copper in the First 
World War. Between 1914 and 1918, copper production tripled whilst exports 
more than doubled, as exemplified by wartime sales which jumped by 400 
percent in four years. Following the logic of Bunker & Ciccantell (2005), the 
drive for technology and desire for territorial expansion of private capital had 
overcome the difficulties imposed by the natural environment. Indeed, as 
early as 1917 copper exports constituted as high as 19 percent of national 
economic production (Collier & Slater 2004: 161). However, it must be 
pointed out that Chile received very little from copper mining until the 
Washington Agreement in 1951 gave the country 20 percent control of copper 
production (CODELCO 2010: 26-27). 
 
The development of a more complex economy, encompassing agriculture, 
nitrate and mining industries, required the construction of a strong, effective 
state. Upon winning the war against Bolivia and Peru, Chile took over the 
nitrate fields, or oficinas, in the North and its fairly developed taxation 
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system allowed for the gradual expansion of the reach and scope of the state 
whilst maintaining an open export-oriented economy.24 The Chilean state 
and the upper classes of the Central Valley exercised direct control in the 
political sphere, and through its firm hand over the peasants in the 
countryside, the political classes managed to employ clientelistic tactics to 
retain elite and state cohesiveness (Collier & Collier 2002: 104, 169-195). The 
issues on Chilean control over nitrate enclave and the disposition of the 
Chilean government over the revenues had the concrete effect of breaking 
elite consensus, which precipitated the bloody civil war of 1891. Nevertheless 
the rise and fall of nitrate between 1880 and 1930 fundamentally altered 
pattern of Chilean economic development. Class conflicts, especially the 
persistent tensions between the state, foreign capital, and nitrate workers, 
undoubtedly shaped copper politics of the twentieth century.  
 
4.2.1 The nitrate economy of Chile 
 
The successful annexation of Northern Chile after the War of the Pacific 
represents a critical juncture in terms of building state capacity and 
consolidating a foreign capital-dominated nitrate economy. The rise of a 
Marxist labour movement, which forced the political classes to respond to the 
‘social’ question via labour incorporation, was also shaped by the fortunes of 
the nitrate export economy. There were three key characteristics that had 
profound influence over the development of Chilean economy even after its 
collapse. First, nitrate was a speculative commodity and the health of the 
industry depended not only from domestic output but also on the economic 
fortunes of its main consumers – Germany, France, United States and 
Belgium. For example, the Allied Powers created a central purchasing 
agency, the Nitrate of Soda Executive, which eliminated competition among 
Allied countries and forced Chile to lower the prices of nitrate. Equally, 
                                                   
 
24 One indicator of state capacity was the ability of the Chilean state to administer taxation in 
the nitrate fields and use export taxes to finance not just the war but also the 
development of state infrastructures (Gallo 2008; Kurtz 2009). 
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technological innovation undercut the labour-intensive nitrate production in 
Chile. The discovery of chemical fertilisers such as the British sulfate of 
ammonium followed by the new ways of processing fertilisers in Germany 
poured tons of synthetic nitrates into the European market. Most 
importantly, the permanent collapse of the nitrate economy was almost 
forthcoming as a consequence of the difficulties faced by United States and 
Europe in the Great Depression. Nevertheless, nitrate production stimulated 
the growth of foreign trade, expansion of state spending, and supported 
national production of light and durable consumer goods. However, the 
scope of foreign ownership undercut severely the possibilities of directly 
contributing to capitalist accumulation in Chile (Bergquist 1986). The 
Chilean state maintained an export-oriented model that was reversed after 
the collapse of the nitrate economy.  
 
Second, export taxes on nitrate and iodine (a by product of nitrate 
processing) served as direct revenues for the state, which placed the burden 
of managing production to the state. The acquisition of nitrate fields after the 
War of the Pacific did not result into nationalisation. As Table 4.1 illustrates, 
British capitalists and merchant houses, which had financed the transport 
and commercialisation of Peruvian-owned nitrate and guano, had been given 
privileged position even after the annexation. The Chilean state refused to 
nationalise nitrate because it was cheaper and more efficient to maintain a 
system wherein foreign owners operated the fields and the state accrued 
revenues. In 1895, British capital controlled 60 percent of nitrate exports 
though the Chilean nitrate producers appreciated their control up to 60 
percent in 1918 (Collier & Slater 2004: 161). The country’s finances remained 
precariously dependent on the money generated by export taxes. The collapse 
of nitrate prices in 1914 was felt not just by the Chilean salitreros but also the 
state itself, which in the end temporarily forced Chile to restructure its tax 
policies. The government adopted a series of reforms: reduction of public 
salaries by 10 percent; imposition of taxes on alcohol, tobacco, gifts, estates 
and stock transfers; and the overhaul of Customs Code that increased levies 
on imports and imposed special surcharges (Collier & Slater 2004: 169). 
Equally, in the attempt of Congress to exert its power during a period of 
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crisis, it authorised the taxation of income, capital investments, and property. 
Such capacity to enact reforms in very difficult circumstances point to the 
historically accumulated institutional capability of the Chilean state 
(Blakemore 1974; Gallo 2008).  
 
Table 4.1 Ownership of the nitrate economy 
 1878 1895 1926 
Britain 12 60 41 
Chile 22 13 42 
Germany 7 8 - 
Peru 52 8 1 
Others 7 11 16 
Source: Bergquist 1986: 35. 
 
Finally, nitrate production indirectly affected workers’ mobilisation. The 
location of nitrate production, the structure of ownership in the industry, the 
demography of the labour force, the nature of the work process, and the 
working conditions in oficinas and northern port towns all had effects to the 
opportunities and challenges for ordinary workers (Bergquist 1986: 37). The 
emergent autonomous working class culture of salitre workers was 
conditioned by the unique environment and nature of nitrate production. 
Nitrate capitalists recruited actively in Southern Chile during periods of 
economic expansion and dismissed workers and closed operations during 
cyclical downturns. The very high levels of labour turnover meant people had 
to move into multiple types of jobs. In depressing times, this had led to a 
massive exodus of workers. Given the relative lack of employment 
opportunities in agriculture and mining and relatively high wages in the 
North, nitrate workers simply waited for the next economic upswing. Nitrate 
workers collectively expressed the harsh reality of dependence on cyclical 
work and the limited independence of geographical mobility of the work they 
chose in the North. The establishment of political and social institutions was 
aimed at countering public and private repression in key export economies. 
As Bergquist (1986: 47) explicates, given the importance of the export sector 
to national economic health, worker organisation – with their potential to 
reduce capital accumulation and paralyse production in the most dynamic 
sector – had to be prevented. With stiff competition among nitrate 
capitalists, workers consisting mainly of single men were able to move 
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around for better working conditions. Equally, mutual aid societies were 
formed in nitrate pampas to enrich their lives and buffer the harsh 
conditions of living in the North. These implied a new set of cultural values 
and attitudes distinct from other sectors of the Chilean working classes – one 
that justified rejecting unsatisfactory conditions and defying authorities quite 
successfully. The cultural and social activities, initiated by transport workers 
and found support in the nitrate industry, constituted the working class 
institution called mancomunal. These were incipient autonomous levers at 
the disposal of workers for organisation and socialisation, which challenged 
not just the liberal values of the Church but also the cultural monopoly of the 
Chilean ruling classes (Cruzat A 1981; González Miranda 2002). 
 
The cultural autonomy of nitrate workers had affinities with the anti-
capitalist logic drawn from anarchists and socialist ideals. In the infamous 
1907 workers’ strike in the oficinas (nitrate fields) that ended in a bloody 
massacre, they demanded the abolition of capitalists’ control over workers, 
mainly the script system, a better exchange rate for the fichas,25 better safety 
devices as well as free night school, and most crucially, workers wanted 
immunity for those engaged in collective action (Bergquist 1986; González 
Miranda 2002). This, above all, implied recognising the legal, public nature 
of working class institutions. Whilst clear divisions existed between how to 
achieve workers’ liberation between anarchists and socialists, what became 
evident was the failure of direct action and the necessity to engage in party 
politics, and in so doing, legitimise the state and its political apparatus. 
Workers’ unions developed a distinctive class identity in contrast to the 
dominant liberal ideals of the ruling classes. Founded in 1909 by a 
conservative lawyer, the Federación de Obreros de Chile (FOCH) gained 
political support from the nitrate workers in the North. By the 1920s the 
socialists, whose power base was centred on nitrate workers in the North, 
                                                   
 
25 In an effort to maintain workers due to ‘labour shortage’, nitrate factory owners devised 
ingenious credit and payment schemes and sometimes required deposits to retain 
workers by making it costly to move. Workers were paid only once a month, and between 
payment days they were given a form of scrip, or fichas, which can be used to purchase 
food, clothing, tools, and others in company stores (Bergquist 1986: 38). 
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successfully consolidated a workers’ movement, which embraced transport 
workers, urban workers, students, teachers, and white-collar workers. The 
FOCH began to take an explicitly socialist stance, inspired by the Russian 
Revolution, which was eventually linked to the leftist parties in the 1930s. 
This was so successful that for the first time the Chilean political classes had 
to make concessions and seek alternative means of controlling labour. In 
1924, in the brink of a political crisis, Arturo Alessandri sought the military to 
enact the Labour Code and create tribunals with the power to decide over 
conflicts of workers and between employers and employees (see Collier & 
Collier 2002: 172-195).  
 
To sum up, Chile’s insertion in the world economy was underpinned by 
primary commodities, which were controlled by British and American 
capitalists. By 1913, nitrate and copper accounted for 78.3 percent of Chile’s 
exports (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: 59). Capital in Chile, ipso facto, was foreign 
and therefore its economic fortunes depended on volatile global markets. The 
nadir of the nitrate economy was punctuated by a global decline in demands 
for natural resources proceeded by intense state protectionism as a way of 
recovering from the devastating human effects of the Great Depression. As 
explained previously, copper mining was revolutionised by foreign capital 
whilst regional salitre elites in the North were taking advantage of very 
lucrative, labour-intensive production of nitrate and its derivatives. Drawing 
from HI perspective, the fundamental shift from nitrate to copper, to a 
significant extent, was an outcome of the combination of structural 
constraints – the volatile conditions of the world economy and the limited 
possibilities for diversification of primary commodities – and the strategic 
response of actors – the introduction of technological innovation by 
American capital in copper mining and the reconstitution of elite concessions 
that shifted labour management from repression to labour incorporation. In 
short, the historical configuration of structure and agency explains the 
critical juncture – the 1929 Great Crash – that brought the demise of the 
nitrate export economy. In the next section, I discuss the political economy of 
Chilean copper between 1930 and 1973.  
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4.2.2 Copper politics and state-led development  
 
The transition to copper was facilitated by the demise of the nitrate export 
economy. When Arturo Alessandri failed to gain political support from an 
obstructive Congress, it triggered dissatisfaction from all sides, whether the 
military, the labour movement, or his allies. The deadlock in power was 
broken by the armed forces, eventually installing General Carlos Ibañez as 
president. As a believer of economic nationalism, he sought to implement a 
large-scale programme of public works funded by the last years of the nitrate 
boom, ranging from roads, drain, bridges, barracks, prisons, airfield, port 
facilities, and railways. Equally, Ibañez strengthened the state by creating the 
new Contraloría General in 1927 whose primary purpose was to become a 
watchdog of fiscal spending and bureaucratic behaviour. He founded two 
development banks – Caja de Crédito Agrario (Agrarian Credit Bank) and 
Caja de Crédito Minero (Mining Credit Bank). Whilst the former offered 
access to capital through low interest loans and inexpensive fertiliser, seeds, 
and livestock for farmers with limited collateral, the latter provided funds for 
small-scale mining operations to boost Chilean domestic capability to extract 
minerals. The price to pay for this ambitious modernisation project was very 
high. By 1930 Chile owed American, British and Swiss banks a total of £62 
million (Collier & Slater 2004: 216-220).  
 
In the end, General Ibañez’s downfall was plotted not by political forces but 
the market itself. Chile’s economic fortunes dramatically changed after the 
US stock market crash of 1929.26 As Figure 4.1 shows, copper and nitrate 
prices went on a free fall. Unemployment, already affected by technological 
                                                   
 
26 In the context of falling prices and new technological developments in making synthetic 
nitrate, the Guggenheim family (who introduced refrigeration technique to speed up the 
extraction of nitrate) argued that the state needed to remove the levy in nitrate 
production to compete in the world economy. With the government view of nitrate as a 
source of revenue and employment, Ibañez struck a deal with the Guggenheims and 
formed the Compañia de Salitre de Chile (COSACH) – half state-owned, half corporation 
– which had the monopoly over refining and processing of the commodity. In exchange of 
the abandonment of the export taxes, the Chilean government was to receive US$80 
million over a four-year period and the firm had to retain 80% Chilean workforce. This 
was evidently inadequate as a preventative measure in a highly dependent export 
economy (Collier & Slater 2004: 216-220). 
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change, rose precipitously causing a massive exodus of workers from the 
North towards the Central Valley and South. Between 1925 and 1932, the 
labour force in the nitrate economy plummeted from 60,800 down to 8,500 
workers (Collier & Slater 2004: 218). The arduous return to party politics 
came afterwards during which Alessandri was re-elected for the second time, 
although Ibañez’s political career was certainly not yet over. Though not fully 
developed, Chilean political parties had already been consolidated. Several 
attempts by the executive and military at centralising power did not weaken 
the party system; Congress remained a fundamental arena of policy-making. 
The political crisis of the 1920s was marked by the attempts of Chilean 
political classes to incorporate labour in mass democracy, wherein the goal 
was to create a legalised and institutionalised labour movement that was at 
the same time depoliticised, controlled and penetrated by the state. The 
Chilean state constantly used repression and coercion to suppress workers’ 
protests whenever the legal tactics to control labour were deemed as failing 
(Collier & Collier 2002; DeShazo 1983). At this point, a clear delineation 
existed between the left, right, and centrist forces, which reflected the 
tradition of class mobilisation and institutionalised pactmaking in the 
preceding three decades.  
 
Figure 4.1 International prices of key exports in Chile, 1925-1940 
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 Source: Braun-Llona et. al. 2000 (Adapted), 132. 
 Note: There were no available data in 1933-1936. 
 
Copper politics must be placed within the broader context of Chile’s 
industrial impulse between 1930 and 1970 to explicate the reasons behind its 
enduring dependency on copper mining. Taxes on American copper firms 
were first imposed by Alessandri, which helped in the recovery of Chile from 
the Great Depression. By 1939, taxes stood at 33 percent – a move that 
increased earnings from 5 million pesos in 1938 to 25 million pesos in 1942. 
Unsurprisingly, national debates revolved around the taxation of copper 
mining, particularly because the taxpayers were foreigners and the 
government did not wrestle with local economic elites. During the interwar 
years, the United States increased its purchase of copper and nitrate. A new 
agreement on the US purchase of copper at a fixed price of 12 cents per 
pound was struck between the American and Chilean governments. 
Nevertheless, the question of copper nationalisation had been raised by some 
leaders (e.g. nacista Jorge González von Marees), as early as 1940 – a 
political slogan that was to gain momentum in the later years. By the 1940s 
and 1950s, copper had fully replaced nitrate as Chile’s principal export. Once 
again, its export economy was tied to a primary commodity subjected to the 
harsh, volatile flux of international prices and world demand. However, there 
exist two fundamental differences between nitrate and copper. First, 
although Chile’s economic fortunes still relied on foreign capital, copper was 
now under American capitalists’ hands. Second, unlike the labour-intensive 
production of nitrate, modern production of copper mining reduced the 
labour force, for example the mechanisation dropped employment from 
18,390 in 1940 down to 12,548 in 1960 (Collier & Slater 2004: 269). With 
urbanisation rapidly taking place and the countryside not offering any 
possibilities for employment, the solution was state-led industrialisation. 
 
In terms of state building, key state agencies were established to promote 
industrialisation. Under the short-lived Popular Frente government (1938-
1941), despite the hatred of the Liberals and Conservatives, Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda narrowly passed a legislative agenda that created a new development 
agency, Corporación de Fomente (CORFO), to oversee the reconstruction 
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process of ravaged communities after an earthquake hit the South in 1939. Its 
longer-term role expanded towards securing Chile’s energy needs and 
financing industrialisation through public infrastructure projects. It was also 
under Aguirre Cerda that the Marxist parties were finally integrated in the 
political system, which galvanised coalition building in Chilean democracy. 
Nevertheless, these were not substantial achievements. The reforms 
rewarded the middle classes through job employment in the burgeoning 
bureaucracy and granted them disproportionate share of social security 
compared to the needy. His greatest achievement is perhaps the 
institutionalisation of the Radical party as a formidable political force in 
Chile, evidently reflected in the successive election of left and centre parties 
between 1938 and 1952. 
 
The main legacy of centrist forces had to be the establishment of CORFO. The 
state agency was the engine of import substitution industrialisation in Chile 
by establishing state enterprises in key industries and financing private 
initiatives in manufacturing. In securing its energy needs, Empresa Nacional 
de Electricidad or ENDESA (National Electricity Enterprise) was established 
to generate low cost power and to develop hydroelectric plants. By 1965, the 
company succeeded in providing electricity across the national territory. In 
developing the discovered petroleum reserves in Magallanes, CORFO funded 
the creation of Empresa Nacional de Petróleo or ENAP (National Petroleum 
Enterprise) to which its core function was to coordinate the development of 
the oil industry and build a refinery in Con Con. Finally, Chile sought to 
develop an industrial complex through the establishment of national steel – 
Compañia de Acero del Pacífico or CAP (Pacific Steel Company) – which 
began its production in 1950. With respect to manufacturing, CORFO lent 
money to produce home appliances, copper tubes, alloys, and brass fixtures, 
as well as to other companies involved in wire, electrical goods, motors, 
radios, and automobile tires. As Collier & Slater (2004: 271) noted, CORFO 
did not ignore the countryside, as evidently shown in the establishment of 
Mechanised Agriculture Equipment Service (SEAM) – the company 
importing and then renting tractors to small-scale farmers. What must be 
underlined, however, was that the expanding reach of the state in economic 
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management was made possible through close alignment with the United 
States and the increasing fiscal importance of copper revenues (see Table 
4.2).  
 
Table 4.2 The Chilean economy 
 Export Revenues1 Import Expenditures2 Foreign Investment3 
1938 329 240 - 
1945 406 187 847 
1952 547 430 1,025 
Source: Drake 1993: 119. 
Notes: 
1. Figures in US$ million. 
2. Figures in US$ million. 
3. Figures in US$ million. Take note that nearly 70 percent of foreign investment was from the 
United States. 
 
At its initial phase, CORFO succeeded in creating employment in the 
manufacturing sector as exemplified by the jump from 16.9 percent in 1940 
to 19.1 percent in 1952. Production of new factories increasingly relied on 
local raw materials. However, by the early 1950s, the industrial base was over 
concentrated in furniture, food, clothing, textiles and footwear, which were 
produced at inefficient rates. They were more expensive than imported 
products from the United States or Latin America. Between 1953 and 1956, 
annual industrial growth fell by 60 percent as compared with the previous 
three-year period and never recovered the level of 1953 thereafter (Collier & 
Slater 2004: 276). With lacklustre economic growth rates, and a crisis in 
Chilean copper, the Radical government in power responded by expanding 
the public sector. Gabriel González Videla (1946-1952) realised that foreign 
borrowing and copper taxes were insufficient to pay for the costly 
industrialisation project, even so the continuously expanding operations of 
the state. Chile was caught up in a cycle of government deficits with 
inevitable inflationary consequences whilst economic growth had slackened 
off.   
 
The country became dependent on copper and American capital. Whilst the 
US government mounted strong pressures to retain control over the 
Northern mines, the Chilean state failed consistently to strike a bargain with 
the workers and foreign capital. With the consequences of inflation still 
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battering the Chilean public, pressures to reform the tax system became 
imminent. Its two main sources – import taxes and exported copper 
revenues – were however subject to very high taxes already. For example, in 
1954, Los Andes Company (Anaconda) paid 92.2 percent of its profit to the 
government whilst Kennecott paid 79.7 percent. Not only were they unwilling 
to pay more, the companies also hesitated to modernise the mines – this was 
one of the contributing factors to Chile’s decline in international share and a 
source of tension in mining camps between workers and producers. 
Alongside domestic political-economic changes, the African copper mines 
also began to compete in the world market. The Second World War brought 
forth an expansion of copper production across the globe, particularly the 
Copper Belt in Africa in the post-war period (Collier & Slater 2004; Vergara 
2008).   
 
In this context, the election of Carlos Ibañez for the second time (1952-1958) 
was a reaction to the shortcomings of the Radical government. Ibañez issued 
El Nuevo Trato (New Treaty) through Decreto Ley 11.828, which defined the 
relationship between the Chilean state and foreign copper companies 
between 1955 and 1964. In this treaty, a new tax on large-scale mining was 
imposed which consisted of 50 percent tax based on profit and 25 percent 
adjustable according to investment and production. It also eliminated 
exchange rate regulations and government control over pricing and 
marketing. Ibañez created the Department of Copper under the control of the 
Ministry of Mining (created itself only in 1953), which had the duty of 
making studies on copper policies, international prices, and mechanisms for 
foreign companies to outsource their supplies locally (Vergara 2008: 94). As 
Moran (1977) explains, the department trained a new generation of 
professional bureaucrats who played a critical role in the Chileanización 
(1964-1970) and nationalisation (1971) of copper. In sum, the Nuevo Trato 
was an attempt to solve the limitations of import substitution and 
industrialisation by increasing state revenues and private investment. At a 
time when copper production and investment were declining, the American 
copper companies were mounting sustained pressures to the state to create a 
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more favourable environment as well as to eliminate state control of price 
and commercialisation (Vergara 2008: 95). 
 
Ibañez attempted to address domestic taxation knowing full well that copper 
revenues could not sustain the reforms; this too had failed to materialise. The  
costs of living jumped by 50 percent in 1953, the year after by 58 percent, and 
in 1955 by 88 percent. The GNP likewise plummeted by 8 percent (Collier & 
Slater 2004: 278). As a defensive strategy, workers waged sustained protests 
as unemployment figures doubled. This was evidently strong in the copper 
mines in the North. Copper workers demanded their right to maintain and 
protect their standard of living, the recognition of the unique characteristics 
of large-scale copper mining, and a share of benefits from the new copper 
prosperity (Vergara 2008: 100). Such activism of the newly founded 
Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre or CTC (Copper Workers 
Confederation) organised in 1951 was a stark contrast to the conciliatory 
position of the Chilean government with foreign capital. The radicalism of 
copper unions reflected the political nature of the labour movement at a 
national scale. Their rejection of the Nuevo Trato was an articulation of their 
demands to revise existing copper legislation, a readjustment of the salary to 
close the gap between blue-collar and white-collar workers, and a new 
legislation to manage the copper sector.  
 
As a compromise, Ibañez enacted the Statute of Copper Workers – a labour 
deal that recognised the distinctive and influential position of copper workers 
and consequently reframed labour relations in the copper industry. It 
shortened the bargaining period, strengthened power of local unions by 
ensuring cooperation between permanent and professional unions, and 
reinforced the role of the state in mediating labour conflicts. In labour 
negotiations, the state guaranteed the participation of the Minister of Labour 
and Mining in the special arbitration board alongside the legalisation of CTC 
as the official union – it served as a bridge between l0cal unions and national 
authorities across the three large mines (Chuquicamata, El Teniente, and 
Portrerillos). The Chilean state viewed the deal as a means of decreasing 
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conflict in the copper mines and incorporating the organised working class 
into a controlled system of labour relations.  
 
In the time Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) was in power, the question of 
nationalisation of copper became more prominent. Labour tensions 
continued to escalate in the copper mines. Alessandri sought to retain the 
political alliance of the state with foreign capital. Copper politics and labour 
relations were shaped, to a significant degree, by foreign ownership in the 
mining industry. In the context of escalating nationalism and labour 
tensions, Anaconda brought Chile its fourth largest mine – El Salvador – in 
its effort to modernise operations as a competitive strategy in the world 
economy. The company introduced two aspects of corporate restructuring. 
With respect to productivity, Anaconda sought to improve production 
processes through cost reduction by way of building new facilities and 
introducing technology in several phases of the operations. With respect to 
the rationalisation of the administration of mining camps, Anaconda 
replaced or introduced new machines alongside increase in subcontracting as 
a response to the changing labour structure of the world economy. 
Ultimately, intermediate companies emerged to provide contract workers 
and services (Vergara 2008: 138-140). Whilst these changes had been 
assessed to have negative consequences for workers (Barrera 1973; Petras 
1969), one positive outcome was the installation of copper refinery facility in 
Potrerillos that had given Chile higher earnings.27 In addition, there were 
increased hiring of Chilean professionals in replacement of foreign staff, 
clearly showing signs of domestic capacity in production processes. In the 
end, Alessandri had a hands-off approach in the copper nationalisation 
debate, which had to be dealt with the Christian Democratic Party under 
Eduardo Frei Sr. (1964-1970). 
 
                                                   
 
27 The price for refined copper was higher than that of unrefined which affected state 
revenues and balance of payments. Equally, it was more costly for Chile to process 
unrefined copper to the United States and then send to Europe (Vergara 2008: 142). 
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In this tumultuous context of escalating tensions in the copper mines and 
countryside, the question of agrarian reform and copper nationalisation 
became very politicised. The three American companies – Kennecott, Phelps 
Dodge and Anaconda – owned and produced most of Chile’s copper. Their 
ownership of Gran Minería – now expanded to four mines: El Salvador, El 
Teniente, Andina, and Chuquicamata – shaped worker dissatisfaction as well 
as national mood towards foreign capital. Frei Sr. was elected under a social 
reform agenda, which did not necessarily win the hearts of the labour 
movement, particularly the copper workers. Lacking a tradition within the 
union movement, Frei Sr. had sought to gain political support from the non- 
or less organised sectors of society leading to popular mobilisation of the 
urban poor, women and peasants. Indeed, his last three years were marked 
by wage and stabilisation programmes alongside mano dura (hard hand) 
policy against labour and popular sectors (Vergara 2008: 146).  
 
Nevertheless, Frei Sr. approved DL 16.425, or the Chileanización del Cobre 
(Chileanisation of copper), in January 1966 promising copper companies that 
copper policies would remain stable for the following twenty years. 
Negotiations took place in order for the state to acquire 51 percent of control 
in large-scale copper mines, with a promise of improved living conditions in 
copper mines, better health and safety measures, and increased state 
participation in copper production. This outcome was brought about by 
intensifying pressuress from below, especially organised mining unions, to 
alter the framework of resource management. However, Chileanisation did 
not resolve escalating labour conflicts and social polarisation that were 
characteristic of the late 1960s. In copper mines, the intensity and length of 
labour conflicts – e.g. solidarity and industry wide strikes – ignored legal 
frameworks. The CTC protested against the law and demanded an 
improvement in workers’ legal and economic status. Similar to their 
demands in negotiating Nuevo Trato between 1951 and 1955, CTC sought for 
the nationalisation of copper as the only solution to foreign dependency. Frei 
portrayed the workers as unreasonably demanding higher wages beyond the 
capacity of the country and industry. At the national level, the Left and 
national union Central Única de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT) strongly 
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supported the demands of copper workers and opposed the copper 
agreements. 28  In sum, the limitations of the national economy, the 
shortcomings of copper policy, and the rapidly escalating tensions between 
foreign capital and labour unions prevented the creation of stable labour 
relations – all of which contributed to the nationalisation of copper. 
 
With escalating tensions as the backdrop, Salvador Allende and his 
government coalition, Unidad Popular or UP (Popular Unity), was elected 
with a radical proposal of income redistribution, reallocation of public 
investment, and the reorganisation of the national economy. The 
construction of a new economy was centred on the nationalisation of natural 
resources. In 11 July 1971, for the first time, a cross-party agreement was 
reached transferring 100 percent state ownership of Gran Minería without 
any form of compensation to foreign companies.29 Vergara (2008: 157-158) 
argues that this was a product of the historical battle to decrease the control 
of multinational capital in Chile, wherein the state depended almost 
completely from copper mining for its economic fortunes. For copper 
workers, nationalisation was the realisation of their long-standing demand 
for political autonomy, rooted in the lived experiences of workers and 
policies of segregation imposed by US management in the copper mines. The 
nationalisation required restructuring the copper economy both in terms of 
corporate governance (and how it fit in the state) and of labour management 
(particularly the role, involvement and participation of workers). With 
respect to the organisation of production, the creation of CODELCO and 
Empresa Nacional de Minería or ENAMI (National Mining Enterprise) 
meant the state would directly participate in the economy through the 
                                                   
 
28 Central Única de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT) functioned from 1953 to 1973 but the 
national union was dissolved after the fall of Allende. The union was re-founded as 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT) in September 1988 as representative of 
labour in the opposition movement against the Pinochet dictatorship. CUT was legally 
recognised after the transition via Ley N° 19.049. As a result, CUT sat in tripartite 
negotiations to discuss labour issues, including minimum wage, with the Concertación 
government and big business. 
29 Nationalisation without compensation was a break from the past policies of negotiation 
between the state and multinational capital. As such, American companies specifically 
Kennecott launched a serious campaign to damage the reputation of Chilean copper 
(Vergara 2008: 158). 
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Ministry of Mines’ decision-making powers. As regards labour management, 
workers were given the right to participate in the Board of Directors, General 
Workers’ Assembly, and in several production councils. A massive training 
program was necessary to effectively integrate workers within the 
administrative structure of the state companies. This also meant giving the 
‘worker’ an autonomous entity as opposed to unions. The success of the 
programme had been debated, specifically the extent to which participation 
brought about economic benefits rather than productivity in the copper 
mines (see Barrera 1981; Petras 1972; Zapata 1975). Nevertheless 
nationalisation was the pinnacle of class conflicts in Chile, wherein the 
dominance of foreign capital in the export economy was consequential for the 
exacerbation of conflicts in an ideologically divided society.  
 
The nationalisation as a central policy of development generated 
contradictory responses from all sides. Allende’s political alliance with labour 
unions did not prevent the explosion of conflicts that eventually transformed 
into a legitimacy crisis and a crisis of democracy itself. The long strike in El 
Teniente between April-June 1973 had been conceived as key to his downfall. 
Labour conflicts were a result of wage policies, internal political strife, and a 
traditional pattern of conflicts in an industry marked by high rates of 
absenteeism, labour turnover and illegal work stoppages (Vergara 2008: 171). 
The copper mines became the political battlefield which the opposition 
utilised to challenge the legitimacy of the UP government. These took place 
within the broader failure of Allende’s economic strategy of providing 
employment through nationalised enterprises and public sector works. 
 
Unlike in other epochs, the periodic failure of centrist parties to 
accommodate the radicalisation of the left came to a critical point during the 
Allende government, which led to the breakdown of the party system itself. 
With the support of the Right parties and the US government, the military 
launched a bloody coup d’etat in 11 September 1973 which not only ended the 
 125 
socialist experiment but also broke the tradition of party politics.30 As Collier 
& Slater (2004: 359) describes it, El Once or ‘the eleventh’, represented the 
worst political breakdown in Chilean history. General Augusto Pinochet 
Ugarte (1973-1989) held the record for length of tenure among Chilean 
leaders since 1540. He consolidated his power base and took over as dictator. 
Under his 17-year rule, a new development model unravelled in Chile – one 
that would embed depoliticised, technocratic governance in economic 
management. The historical institutionalist emphasis on political conflicts 
and critical juncture best explains the eventual breakdown of Chilean 
democracy and the rise of a reactionary policy against Allende’s socialist 
project. The military government’s neoliberal project was the embodiment of 
a new political economy – a critical juncture that would set the pace of path 
dependent (neoliberal) economic governance in post-dictatorial Chile. 
 
4.2.3 Neoliberalism under the military dictatorship 
 
Pinochet drew his economic strategy from a group of conservative 
economists educated in the University of Chicago who experimented on 
monetarism and unrestrained laissez faire economics. The ‘Chicago Boys’, 
who moved in the state planning agency ODEPLAN, aimed to reverse all of 
Allende’s economic policies, particularly the nationalisation of key industries, 
universal welfare systems, and excessive protectionism through tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions. The neoliberal programme privatised more than 
400 state-owned, state-controlled, or intervened companies since 1974 whilst 
those firms considered as ‘strategic’ were left under state hands with the 
military men running the state enterprises. This, unsurprisingly, included the 
                                                   
 
30 In particular, Valenzuela (1978) argues that the key to the coup is the failure of centrist 
forces to incorporate themselves in the Allende government: the deliberate sabotage of 
the Right and Centre of Popular Unidad government’s economic programmes, the 
breakdown of the coalition between the Christian Democrats and Government in 
Congress, increased polarisation in a context of intensified popular mobilisation (a result 
of Frei’s social programmes), and the constitutional crisis due to the failure of the 
Christian Democrats to compromise that led to the crisis of democracy. For other 
references, see Garretón 2003; Taylor 2006. 
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mining state enterprises CODELCO and ENAMI. Kurtz (2001) explains that 
the Chilean state reoriented economic production by withdrawing the state 
from direct management, for instance, by allowing the collapse of existing 
industries like textile and traditional agriculture and aligning Chile’s 
investment policy towards natural resources with which it has comparative 
advantages. The state played a neutral role as regulator implementing the law 
to let the market forces decide on production and maintained ‘liberal 
neutrality’ in its import and export regimes.   
 
In 01 April 1976 through DL 1.349 and DL 1.350, the state consolidated the 
administration of copper production by creating a unified CODELCO 
operating across four mines. In historical institutionalist terms, mining 
policy reflected institutional layering, in which old rules were maintained 
alongside new ones in an attempt to effect political behaviour. Pinochet kept 
CODELCO under state hands as a way of managing tensions and conflicts 
within the military regime. In particular, the nationalist faction viewed the 
privatisation of copper as a form of betrayal to the country due to the long-
standing association of patrimony and identity with copper. With their 
relative importance in the balance of power, Pinochet did not expropriate 
Gran Minería back to foreign hands. Equally, Pinochet appropriated a law 
transferring 10 percent of CODELCO’s profits automatically to the armed 
forces’ budget with the explicit goal of modernising the armed forces.  
 
Alongside CODELCO, new laws were created to attract foreign investment in 
the Chilean mines. Pinochet changed the tax regime to bring back investor 
confidence in the mining sector. This strategy involved two key reforms. With 
respect to taxation, the Foreign Investment Statute (DL 600) was issued, 
promising generous tax rebates to foreign capital by way of deducting 15 
percent of their corporate taxes (at 35 percent rate) and adjusting for the 
depreciation of imports defined as ‘investments’ in the mining sector. The 
second component institutionalised private property in natural resource. The 
Mining Code of 1982 recognises equal rights of foreigners and Chilean 
miners to acquire property in Chile, effectively signalling the individual’s 
absolute right to own mining concessions. For business elites, the process 
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was an opportunity for Chileans (mainly national economic elites) to take 
advantage of the new laws in mining (Carlos Guajardo 2009, Interview with 
the author). On a final note, consistent with the neoliberal logic of 
depoliticisation, the Mining Code sets out clear rules on the process of 
acquiring mining concessions and licence to operate, in which the judiciary 
and not the executive holds the decision-making power to grant concessions.  
 
Equally, the labour question had to be addressed by the dictatorship. As a 
result of labour radicalism, Pinochet decisively delegitimised and fragmented 
the trade union movement through repression, demobilisation, and a change 
in labour relations. Between 1979 and 1982, Minister José Piñera instituted a 
series of labour legislations called Plan Laboral. The core consequences of 
this pro-business labour code include the creation of state controls over 
collective rights, delimiting collective bargaining to wages, and depriving 
workers of the right to strike and access information from employers. What 
was to be described later as ‘modern capital-labour relations’ was in fact a 
stable labour management scheme, in which conflicts were resolved between 
employers and workers with minimal state intervention. This situation 
demonstrates, quite ironically, immense state capacity to put labour in its 
place (Biglaiser 2003; Teichman 2001).  
 
Despite the near collapse of the Chilean economy in the 1982 crisis and the 
eruption of union-led social protests between 1983 and 1984, the Chilean 
state remained strong in diffusing opposition. What legitimated the 
repression and demobilisation was, in fact, the miraculous recovery of the 
Chilean economy. In specific reference to the copper sector, CODELCO 
survived in spite of the clear lack of state interest from investing capital for 
exploration projects. However, as Figure 4.2 details, private capital began to 
play its role as the new engine of growth. With a generous taxation regime 
and a highly repressive managerial state to contain labour unrest, public 
mining divested whilst foreign capital gradually increased its investment in 
the mining industry. In 1976, public investment was at 111 US$ million and 
foreign capital contributed merely 2 US$ million. Upon the return of 
democracy in 1990, investment in CODELCO and ENAMI stagnated to 386 
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US$ million whilst foreign investment soared as high as 762 US$ million. 
Worth mentioning is the investment made by Minera Escondida, operated by 
BHP Billiton, in 1989, which today is considered as the second biggest 
mining firm in Chile after CODELCO. 
 
Figure 4.2 Public and private mining investment under Pinochet 
government 
 
 Source: COCHILCO Annual Statistics 2009 (Adapted), Table 30. 
 
In this context, Francisco González (2008) argues that the 
‘institutionalisation of the authoritarian regime’ is crucial in explaining the 
high degree of control exerted by the dictatorship in the transition process. 
Nevertheless, democratization in Chile is certainly the victory of demands 
from below and new articulations of political rights in defiance to the ruling 
military. With the economy back on track in 1985 and the plebiscite coming 
shortly, political parties reconstituted themselves with a strategy of defeating 
the dictatorship on its own terms (Garréton, 2003). Political mobilisation 
against the military regime showed its first signs in the world of labour 
among the mining union leaders whose lives were in constant threat from the 
military. When the workers began to assume a greater role in the movement 
to challenge Pinochet, political parties received the support needed to engage 
with the military regime in the process of transition. Pinochet was defeated in 
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1990. With democratisation came the promise of rebuilding the trust 
between the state and labour unions, which broke down after the 
dictatorship. There is extensive literature that deals with the uniqueness of 
Chile’s smooth transition to democracy. On the one hand, Pinochet 
successfully embedded the neoliberal model to give the Right parties and 
business class de facto veto power and the intentional changes in strategic 
actions of the Chilean left to guarantee social peace (González 2008; Vergara 
1985). On the other hand, the political system is marked by the return of 
main parties as key actors, technocratic governance, and political exclusion 
of the popular sectors in the economic model (Angell 2006; Paley 2001; Silva 
2009, 2004, 1999). The political legacies of neoliberal economics, as 
Chapters 5 and 6 argue, have lasting effects that lock in political choices 
towards marketised democracy. Hence, institutional change away from the 
free market model has only been possible through an incremental pathway, 
in which the political legacies of the dictatorship and the power of neoliberal 
narratives have been difficult (though not impossible) to overcome. 
 
4.3 The politics of natural resource governance in Brazil 
 
Whilst Brazil’s vast natural resources are well documented, its importance 
has been relatively understated by scholars. Perhaps this is rooted in the 
relatively successful industrial strategy of Brazil compared to other Latin 
American countries, or maybe resources have always been seen as less 
politicised (though this is counter intuitive if one looks at historical record). 
Nevertheless the analysis of the state and resource management – 
particularly of Brazil’s contemporary political economy – remains lacklustre 
(however, see Nem Singh & Massi Forthcoming; Triner 2007, 2011; Wolford 
2010). Through the lens of critical political economy and historical 
institutionalism, I trace the emergent political role of petroleum within the 
context of import substitution industrialisation – a crucial backdrop in the 
return of oil politics at the turn of the millennium. This complements quite 
well the historical account of Chilean political economy of nitrate and copper 
mining.  
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4.3.1 Cycles of resource extraction under exports-led growth 
model 
 
Without a doubt, Brazil’s export economy was built through cycles of 
extracting and producing primary commodities for the world economy. The 
Portuguese colonisation was marked by the exploitation of pau-brasil 
(redwood) along the coast in the first half of the sixteenth century. At this 
time, minerals were the main export of Latin American colonies, which at the 
beginning was not found in Brazil. By the late sixteenth century, sugar 
production began in the country’s northeast as a way of defending the colony. 
More complex production began to develop thanks to the need for 
transportation and food in the sugar industry, which also paved way for the 
growth of the cattle industry. Throughout the seventeenth century, the 
Brazilian colony held monopoly over sugar production, which had resulted to 
chronic dependence on this single commodity for about 150 years (Machado 
& Figueiroa, 2001: 9). However, rising competition from Central America 
and the Caribbean caused sugar prices to fall, and consequently the decline of 
the sugar industry in Brazil – a process that painfully led to prolonged 
economic stagnation. The colonial economy was revived by the discovery of 
alluvial deposits of gold and diamonds in the southeast and south regions in 
the early eighteenth century, which brought about a period of local economic 
boom and prosperity for the Portuguese crown. The growth pole formed by 
the gold- and diamond-producing regions was to have considerable effect in 
the development of the Brazilian economy. Large-scale mining operations 
meant the necessity for workers, which led to migration en masse to the 
mining regions at a far greater scale than in the past. The São Francisco River 
linked the northeast sugar plantations, vast gold in the mining regions, and 
the cattle industry in Southern Brazil (Furtado 1970: 16). Nevertheless, 
despite contributing to the expansion of the borders and further development 
of agriculture and cattle production, gold mining did not establish the 
foundations for economic expansion particularly because Portugal restricted 
the establishment of manufacturing in the colony. As gold mining waned, 
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Brazil once again experienced prolonged stagnation and regression until the 
late eighteenth century. Economic dynamism was revived only after cotton 
producers began to export to Great Britain as a result of the disruptions 
caused by the American War of Independence (Bulmer-Thomas 1994; 
Hudson 1997; Kohli 2004: 131). 
 
After acquiring independence, Brazil had to wrestle with the dual challenge 
of economic and political development. The combination of centralising and 
decentralising political forces – the conflict between a homogenous political 
elite with mercantilist traditions and land-owning groups with financial 
resources in regional territories – ultimately constrained the development of 
the state, specifically its bureaucracy (Carvalho 1996). 31 During this time, 
coffee production had begun to play a salient role in Brazil’s insertion in the 
world economy. Whilst production initially concentrated in the mountainous 
regions of the state of Rio de Janeiro, the emerging domestic political classes 
who benefited during the mining boom sought to expand the economies of 
scale – with the support of the state –throughout Rio de Janeiro and 
subsequently Sao Paulo (Hudson 1997; Machado & Figueiroa 2001: 10). By 
the early twentieth century, Brazil’s coffee exports provided four-fifths of the 
total supply in the world market. This meant that any fluctuation in the 
Brazilian crop significantly impacted coffee prices. Circumstances in harvest, 
such as a forecast of bumper crop or frost, had consequences, which then 
subjected coffee under the regulation of stocks. Under the First Republic 
(1890-1930), the country’s balance of trade was favourable and there was no 
decade in which the median annual trade surplus was less than 15 percent of 
imports. The exchange of trade took place in the ports which could easily be 
taxed by the federal government (Evans 1979: 57). Nevertheless, classical 
dependence had its limitations. Its key shortcoming rests on the fact that 
agricultural commodities – mainly coffee, sugar and cocoa – constituted 
almost 95 percent of exports, which essentially signified the vulnerability of 
                                                   
 
31 Carvalho (1996) notes, however, that the state exercised limited autonomy to enact certain 
laws, for example the abolition of slavery.  
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Brazil’s economic fortunes to volatile international prices. However, as long 
as demands for coffee kept expanding, fluctuating prices could still be offset.  
 
The import/export economy constituted unfavourable economic relations, as 
manifested by the lack of a local industry. Brazil faced two problems: first, 
income disparities which were created by a highly segmented primary export 
economy; and second, the concentration of profits towards the British 
capitalists who introduced railroads and controlled trade and Brazilian 
shipping. The oligarchic state composed of coffee elites had ‘incidental’ 
involvement in directing the economy. At best, it offered passive support for 
foreign and local economic groups by granting private capital concessions to 
operate public utilities. To address dependency, Brazilian coffee planters met 
in Taubaté, São Paulo and signed an agreement to withdraw surpluses from 
the market and finance production through loans negotiated from abroad. 
This was not entirely successful. As Furtado (1963, 1970) argues, the coffee 
policy backfired because of rising competition from other Latin American 
producing countries. The agreement likewise assumed a stronger role for the 
state in terms of discouraging production and rapid expansion of coffee 
plantation. The second point is relevant to the discussion. Throughout the 
rule of the monarchy (1822-1889), Brazil’s political institutions were at best 
continuities of colonial administration with a ‘weak sense of national 
purpose’ (Kohli 2004: 133). Under the First Republic, the persistent difficulty 
of strengthening the federal government vis-à-vis the regional elites in key 
states hindered not simply the establishment of effective governance to 
cushion the impacts of price volatility but also in reforming state institutions 
(Kohli 2004; Guimarães 2003: Chapter 3).32 In these circumstances, two 
attempted coup d’état in 1922 and 1924 were launched against the oligarchic 
democracy, and this signalled the dissatisfaction of the military to the failing 
state. The opposition discourse that mobilised various sectors of society was 
                                                   
 
32 The system was characterised as coronelism, in which the governors of states maintain 
political control by giving local land owners, the coroneís, access to public posts and arms 
in exchange of electoral support. This pattern would be sustained in periods of electoral 
democracies in Brazil (Hagopian 1994, 1996). 
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advocating for a strong state in direct contravention to the liberal export 
economy model based on primary commodities. In the highly contested 
election of 1930, the pattern of alliances between political forces was finally 
broken when the military supported Getúlio Vargas from Rio Grande do Sul 
as leader of the provisional government.  
 
4.3.2 Political continuity between Estado Novo and Military 
Government 
 
The liberal exports-based model around coffee and primary commodities was 
unravelling for several reasons, namely disintegrating elite cohesion, 
emerging challenge from a new economic elite based on industrial 
production, and inadequate response to the Great Depression (Kohli 2004; 
Guimarães 2003). Vargas conceived of his ‘revolution’ as legitimated by 
society writ large who saw himself as a ‘candidate of a country in protest 
rather than a candidate of a segment of dissident oligarchies’ (Faoro 1998: 
692). With the backing of the military, he felt more capable of pushing 
reforms beyond what the oligarchs envisaged. The Vargas government is the 
foundation of Brazil’s modern state – Estado Novo (New State) – the critical 
juncture that brought forth a clean break from the past oligarchic democracy.  
 
The emergence of a new state took place in the backdrop of favourable 
economic and political conditions. Firstly, the state elite filled in the political 
vacuum left by the weakened agrarian elites and industrial bourgeoisie in the 
aftermath of the Great Depression. Equally, social pressures from below – 
mainly labour and urban middle classes – sought for a new political 
arrangement that accommodated societal demands. Secondly, strengthening 
state autonomy was favoured by the characteristics of national political 
culture and the ideology of political elites. The Great Depression was a 
positive structuring condition for statist developmentalism particularly 
among peripheral states, wherein an indigenously inspired, populist-
flavoured, autonomous direction to development was seen as the new 
antidote to the vicissitudes of a narrowly redistributive, exports-led growth 
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model. Finally, natural resources were conceived by Vargas and the military 
as a key pillar of national security, which meant dispossessing ownership of 
the private sector in mining and reserving ultimate sub-soil rights to the 
federal government. Mining policy received renewed attention where the 
thrust was to shift subsoil rights from surface owners to the state (Triner 
2011). 33  The 1934 Constitution, Article 119, §4, explicitly states the 
“progressive nationalisation of mines, mineral veins and waterfalls or other 
sources of hydroelectric energy deemed basic or essential for national 
economic or military defence of the country”.34 This meant transferring the 
power to the federal government to authorise private companies to search for 
and develop mineral resources although oil distribution remained in private 
hands (Randall 1993: 9). This was followed by the nationalisation of 
petroleum in 1937. General Horta Barbosa sought to resolve Brazil’s lack of 
petroleum and created the Conselho Nacional do Petróleo or CNP (National 
Petroleum Council) in 1938.35 Despite the lack of capital and technological 
capacity of local entrepreneurs to explore oil blocks, nationalist restrictions 
to any foreign exploration of petroleum development in the country were still 
put in place (Guimarães 2003: Chapter 4; Wirth 1970). Most importantly, the 
military was satisfied with the close linkages between national security and 
the need to make steel and petroleum locally available for industrialisation by 
way of nationalising the petroleum industry and confining the ownership of 
refineries to Brazilian nationals. 
 
Between 1938 and 1945 Vargas concentrated his efforts at building 
institutional capacity, economic expertise, and political autonomy from 
traditional elites. In 1938 he expanded state functions by creating specialised 
agencies to foster groups of highly trained professionals and technocrats. 
                                                   
 
33 See Constituição da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, Article 72, 1891. The Old 
Republic Constitution of 1891 changed mining rights, which then passed from the Federal 
government (or from the Imperial crown) to landowners. The Constitution further 
allowed foreigners the right to mine in Brazilian soil. 
34 See Constituição da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, Article 119, §4, 1934.  
35 Incidentally, the CNP was inspired by Argentina’s state-owned oil company (YPF), though 
Barbosa thought petroleum was better suited to be a state enterprise that was not to be 
entrusted to anyone, including the Brazilian industrialists (Smith 1976, Wirth 1970). 
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This was aimed at controlling sectors and increasing the coordination and 
regulation of the economy. For example, Vargas funded the National Coffee 
Council to conduct studies on marketing and production of coffee to bring 
back the prices at competitive levels. He raised the tariff levels, devalued 
exchange rates, and sought for controls in imports as a way of supporting 
industrialisation programme. By the end of the 1930s, available financing for 
industrial investments increased alongside the creation of Carteira de 
Crédito Agrícola e Industrial do Banco do Brasil or CREAI (Bureau of 
Agrarian and Industrial Credit of the Bank of Brazil). Vargas centralised 
power towards the Federal Government and curbed the economic, political, 
and military autonomy of regional states. This policy entailed, above all, the 
creation of state enterprises, or at least the opening of the debate to establish 
them, in steel, mining, and petroleum. With economic and security interests 
intertwined in lieu of the outbreak of the Second World War, the state sought 
to create a national steel industry complemented by a self-sufficient oil 
sector. In response, he commissioned and created the Companhia 
Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) located in Volta Redonda in 1946 to foster the 
‘big steel industry’. To complement steel production, the Companhia Vale do 
Rio Doce (CVRD) was created in 1942 in Minas Gerais, during which the 
company immediately became responsible for 80 percent of Brazilian iron 
ore exports. His strategy was to create ‘policy spaces’ between state 
regulatory agencies and economic groups to be able to discuss and lobby 
their interests, thereby, institutionalising access of private capital to 
economic decision-making (Fonseca 1989; Guimarães 2003: 94-105; Wirth 
1970).36  
 
                                                   
 
36 As Guimarães (2003: 98) points out, many of these organisations were aimed at regulating 
and intervening in the economy. These included the Ministerio do Trabalho, Indústria e 
Comércio (Ministry of Labour, Industry and Trade - 1931), The Conselho Nacional do 
Petróleo (National Petroleum Council - 1938), the Conselho de Águas e Energia Elétrica 
(Council of Water and Electrical Energy - 1938), the Conselho Nacional de Minas e 
Metalurgia (National Council of Mining and Metallurgy – 1940), Comissão Executiva do 
Plano Siderúrgico Nacional (Executive Commission of the National Steel Plan – 1940), 
the Comissão Executiva Têxtil (Textile Executive Commission – 1942) and the Comissão 
de Mobilização Econômica (Commission of Economic Mobilisation - 1943). 
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Equally, the strong state was reflected in the establishment of corporatist 
patterns of political inclusion as a way of controlling the militancy of 
organised labour. Corporatism in Latin America was conceived by state elites 
as a viable solution to the challenges mounted against narrow democratic 
regimes without resorting to state repression (Cardoso & Faletto 1979: 32; 
Skidmore 1973: 37). The potential threat from the popular classes prior to 
industrialisation necessitated a strategy that would incorporate, demobilise 
and depoliticise organised labour. Aimed at curtailing the autonomy of the 
labour movement, state crafting involved restrictions such as recognising one 
trade union per sector, creating regulatory organs and agencies linked to the 
Ministry of Labour, and financing the unions through taxes (imposto 
sindical). In exchange, Vargas created a pension system incorporating 
workers, fixing the working hours to eight hours, and structuring the 
organisation of business associations (Collier & Collier 2002; Schneider 
2004a). In short, Vargas’ dictatorship was a critical juncture both in terms of 
reorienting the state in economic management, private representation in 
policy-making, and crafting mechanisms of political inclusion.  
 
By the time democracy was reinstalled in 1946, petroleum had become a 
central issue intricately woven to the question of endogenous national 
industrialisation. In April 1947 the military was involved in deciphering 
whether foreign participation in oil development was consistent to national 
security or not. On the one hand, General Juarez Távora advocated for the 
participation of foreign companies to secure Brazil’s energy needs, in which 
concessions were seen as a way of funding oil exploration led by the 
government. On the other hand, Barbosa argued for state monopoly on 
national security grounds. Although the military was deeply divided as 
regards the oil issue, there could be no doubt that Horta’s position had won 
significant sections of the military. The nationalist position consolidated the 
military which had been finding its way to return to politics shortly after the 
Estado Novo was replaced by democratic politics. It was viewed that if the 
campaign won, it would provide the military with something to control and 
give extra political resource to strengthen its position towards moving in the 
centre of political decision-making. An interesting alliance that was formed 
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in this campaign, which was historically famous as O Petróleo é Nosso (The 
Petroleum is Ours) in 1947-1953, was between the military, students, the 
press, and the Communist Party (Philip 1982: 235-236). 
 
Oil exploration, then, had three policy alternatives: first, through a 
government monopoly with no Brazilian or foreign capital participation; 
second, through monopoly exploration including minority shareholding 
participation of Brazilian and foreign capital; or third, concurrent oil 
development by government and private enterprise though preference was to 
be accorded to Brazilian firms. It was not until the fall of Eurico Gaspar 
Dutra (1946-1950) and the successful re-election of Vargas as president with 
a platform in favour of state-led industrialisation that the debate would be 
resolved.37 Under Dutra, the SALTE Plan brought about the expansion of 
Mataripe refinery, construction of Cubatão refinery, the expansion of two 
more private refineries, and the creation of oil tankers – National Tanker 
Fleet or FRONAPE – under the administration of CNP (Randall 1993). In 
finding the resolution for the oil question, Vargas needed to manoeuvre 
between the ESG,38 his own left wing supporters, and the civilians which 
made the debate more ideological rather than economic. In the end, he 
sought for a technocratic solution to the oil question. He set up a commission 
composed of technocrats and headed by Rómulo de Almeida to come up with 
a proposal. The model reflected the nationalisation project in steelworks – 
i.e. Volta Redonda project – in which a government holding company rather 
than state monopoly with broad powers of discretion to seek foreign 
financing and technology to support oil development. His proposed bill in 
                                                   
 
37 By the end of 1945, Dutra came to power with an explicitly liberal creed as a reaction to 
Vargas dictatorship. He faced several economic problems: deficiencies in energy and 
transport, low productivity of the economy, regional and sectoral imbalances, and 
disarticulation of the financial system. Politically, the return of democracy constrained 
state building because clientelism persisted, particularly the power of Congress to allocate 
state budget –a major source of politicians’ patronage. Without a clear industrialisation 
plan, Dutra struggled with Congress and despite economic growth; problems on 
infrastructure investment and sectoral coordination remained at the end of his 
government (Guimarães 2003: 125-129). 
38 The Escola Superior de Guerra or ESG (Superior School of War) was an influential 
institution responsible for defining national security and in educating the military. 
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Congress proposed the creation of 51 percent government-owned holding 
company – later to be called PETROBRAS – for oil development and refining 
in which private capital could play a large role in subsidiaries and associated 
enterprises. PETROBRAS would be financed by the transfer of existing state 
property, by selling 49 percent of the shares to private sector, and by a set of 
earmarked taxes on certain luxury goods. The proposal took into account the 
expensive costs of building capital of the state company and the lack of 
private interest to invest in the oil sector. Apart from this, a publicly-owned 
trading company would be freed from congressional approval should it 
decide to conduct overseas oil exploration (Philip 1982: 237-241; Randall 
1993:9-11). 
 
However, the Petróleo é Nosso Campaign evidently rejected the proposal who 
wanted a tighter solution to prevent ‘backdoor dealing’ with foreign 
companies – a typical situation in oil producing states. The technocratic 
solution was not palatable politically. Instead, they advocated for nationalist 
restrictions to foreign capital in petroleum exploration in the country. In the 
end, Decreto Lei 2.004 was instituted in October 1953, which accorded the 
state absolute monopoly over oil exploration and refining through 
PETROBRAS. In April 1954, PETROBRAS inherited government oil holding 
and assets which until then was managed by CNP, valued at US$ 165 million 
and included two refineries in Mataripe (Bahia) and Cubatão (São Paolo), a 
certain amount of drilling equipment, and a tanker fleet (Evans 1979: 90-92; 
Randall 1993: 9-12). However, PETROBRAS’ ownership structure was 
divided between the domestic private shareholders (49 percent) and the 
federal government (51 percent), which was enshrined in the constitution. 
 
The real significance of the oil debate was political. For one, the PETROBRAS 
campaign was forged through an impossible alliance between the military 
and Communist Party, which was later to unravel as a result of the pro-US 
position of the Brazilian army. In this context, the real winner of the oil 
debate was the military, which had asserted its control over petroleum, 
mining and steelworks by defining them as key pillars of national security. 
Secondly, one can think of this period as the ‘slow-moving process’ (Pierson 
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2004) of entrenching the different means by which the state was 
incorporating business and labour in the industrialisation plan. Under 
Vargas, he established Comissão de Desenvolvimento Industrial or CDI 
(Commission of Industrial Development) in which its goal was to increase the 
interactions and coordination in economic policy-making between business 
and public agencies. Vargas also established O Banco Nacional do 
Desenvolvimento or BNDE (Brazilian Economic Development Bank) in 1952 
which was an investment bank autonomously managed with its own 
resources, administrative structure, and internal statute; its role was to 
finance long term loans for the allocation of investments and a central agent 
for coordination of economic management (Sikkink 1993).39 This contributes 
to the argument around the gradual reconstitution of institutional capacity of 
the Brazilian state to manage complex processes of economic policy-making 
– clearly a political legacy of Getúlio Vargas (Guimarães 2005; Schneider 
1999; Sikkink 1991).  Beyond setting up the oil industry itself, the Vargas 
presidency is undoubtedly the most important historical moment in Brazilian 
state-making, whether in terms of labour incorporation or the creation of the 
old developmentalist state. 
 
The succession of João Café Filho (1954-1955) and Juscelino Kubitschek 
(1956-1961) marked the intense politicisation of PETROBRAS management. 
Its successful profitability in the first eight years certainly cannot be regarded 
simply as earnings from operations but was largely an outcome of supportive 
public policies. To ease financial uncertainties, the government increased 
domestic prices. Between 1955 and 1959, 39.4 percent of PETROBRAS funds 
came from tax exemptions and earmarked sources of revenue. In 1959 over 
40 percent of its profits stemmed from direct government protection of the 
refining sector (Philip 1982: 368-369). As Table 4.3 show, the profitability of 
PETROBRAS had gradually increased. Despite the resolute tactics of 
politicians to control PETROBRAS, profitability as a central objective of the 
company helped secure its autonomy from the criticisms launched by 
                                                   
 
39 BNDE was renamed as Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social or 
BNDES (Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank). 
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Congress. PETROBRAS used its financial independence to assert corporate 
autonomy by way of emphasising human capital development through 
policies in training staff and hiring foreign experts. In 1954 PETROBRAS 
signed a contract with Creole – Jersey subsidiary in Venezuela – to provide 
support in its operational and technical training fields.  
 
Table 4.3 Financing in PETROBRAS (in million cruzeiros) 
 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Sales income (less costs) 1,021 2,817 4,705 7,766 13,333 15,477 
Reinvested profits 1 n.a. 166 1,577 3,492 4,687 7,522 
Earmarked taxes 936 1,300 2,557 3,042 4,575 6,118 
Vehicle levy 446 472 416 7 11 2 
Total 2,403 4,755 9,255 14,307 22,606 29,119 
Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 1960 in Philip 1982: 369. 
Note:  
(1) Previous year. 
 
PETROBRAS’ discretion in hiring and appointing foreign experts was 
exercised, yet one major controversy was when Walter Link, an employee of 
Jersey Standard, was appointed as consultant geologist at a sum of US$ 
100,000 a year. Link was given absolute autonomy in setting up the 
exploration department, which he organised in geographical terms to assess 
the potential for oil exploration in every region of Brazil. Before the 
politicisation of PETROBRAS, the company had a clear goal of setting up 
refineries and to use some of the money to pay for the costly oil exploration 
in Brazil. Although PETROBRAS was given the right to enter the 
petrochemicals industry in 1957, the state enterprise did not go towards this 
direction until the 1960s. PETROBRAS was basically producing more oil but 
not sufficient enough to meet the growing demands of an industrialising 
economy. Whilst the company raised production from 2,721 barrels per day 
(b/d) in 1954 to 80,910 b/d in 1960, the consumption was at an astounding 
263,844 b/d (Philip 1982: 372). Although difficult to publicly admit, Brazil 
might not really have oil after all (Smith 1976). The decision of PETROBRAS 
President Janari Nunes (1956-1958) to focus oil exploration in the Amazon 
instead of the northeast regions of Bahia and Sergipe was a cause of concern 
for Walter Link. In the Link Report, he stated that only in three regions in 
Brazil was oil found and if PETROBRAS really wanted to find more oil, it 
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should look offshore and overseas. For another decade, foreign company 
interest to explore oil reserves in Brazil disappeared. Compared to Chile, 
Brazil, having no commercially viable oil reserves, had developed a fairly 
insulated oil industry. Whilst petroleum was not subjected to foreign control, 
its challenges were very different to Chile and necessitated a radically 
different commercial strategy. 
 
Between 1960 and 1964, the firm faced two major problems. On one hand, 
Brazil’s oil dependence had constrained the import substitution model; oil 
accounted for one fifth of its imports in 1954 and oil price increases had 
debilitating effect to economic growth. There was undoubtedly mounting 
pressure to find ways to sufficiently address the growing consumption 
demand for oil to support industrialisation; this clearly meant devising a 
strategy beyond the extraction and production of crude oil. On the other 
hand, PETROBRAS’s involvement in politics was rapidly intensifying. Whilst 
PETROBRAS was a response to political and technocratic pressures and the 
appointment of its president had been confined to conservatives under 
Vargas and Café Filho, Kubitshek’s appointment of Colonel Janari Nunes 
began the politicisation of the state enterprise. In the context of growing 
economic nationalism, corporatist mechanisms were used to control labour 
unrest – including in PETROBRAS – which at the time of the Cuban 
Revolution was becoming more difficult to maintain. But as Philip (1982: 374) 
argues, the political right, i.e. the military, had the veto and indirect influence 
all throughout the democratic period and therefore any form of control 
exerted against a militant labour movement was subject to the politicisation 
of the military. As the decisions of President Goulart (1961-1964) 
demonstrate, it became necessary to make political appointments in state 
enterprises to replace technocratic modes of leadership in order to build 
political coalitions. This, in turn, led to the search of PETROBRAS managers 
and workers for a political base outside of the organisation as a weapon in the 
internal conflicts that were transpiring in the state enterprise (Randall 1993: 
27-29).  
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Economic nationalism brought forth two key tensions in the oil industry. 
Firstly, only two private refineries existed in Brazil, which were then 
subjected to government pressures by way of setting oil prices by CNP 
favourable to PETROBRAS. In hindsight, political intervention caused 
friction between PETROBRAS and the private sector. Secondly, labour 
unions increased their control over some operations and regional efforts to 
obtain investments became subjected to political rather than strict economic 
criterion. The question became who can control PETROBRAS rather than 
allow the firm to decide what was good for the firm. The departure of foreign 
advisers in 1961 further weakened technocratic management and 
appointments became political battlefields between the Left and the 
politicians who wanted to gain control of PETROBRAS management 
(Randall 1993; Smith 1976). The extreme nationalists sought for 
PETROBRAS to expand its core businesses to other areas. George Philip 
(1982: 376) succinctly summarises this point: 
 
It is… likely that the pressure for the expansion of PETROBRAS’ 
activities, the move into distribution, the expropriation of two 
small existing private refineries and the development of 
exploration in the Amazon came from the organisation itself – 
certainly from the trade unions and their largely Communist 
leadership, and perhaps also from their technical staff… the 
pressure within PETROBRAS for diversification remained well 
after these political conflicts were resolved and the expansionists 
had a far wider constituency than the PETROBRAS unions and the 
radical left. 
 
In this context, PETROBRAS became the political arena between technocrats 
and trade unions, which was only resolved when the military revolutionary 
(1964-1985) ended the chaos ensuing as a result of polarisation and 
reoriented the state towards a more pragmatic stance that sealed the deal to 
allow domestic business and foreign capital in the oil industry albeit still to a 
limited extent (Schmitter 1972; Stepan 1971, 1973).40 Nevertheless one should 
                                                   
 
40 Such congruence between the state and capital is neither a natural nor static process. The 
changing conception of the military of national security and the role of Brazil in the 
international system was shaped largely by the international context. The ‘Doctrine of 
National Security’, as promoted by the influential ESG was particularly not quite 
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take into account that both technocrats and unions had the same position as 
regards the expansion of PETROBRAS. Hector Lima Rocha, Finance Director 
of PETROBRAS until 1962 and a known conservative technocrat, had 
suggested for the internationalisation of PETROBRAS – clearly a response to 
the Link Report – and the setting up of joint ventures and associated 
industries with foreign capital in the petrochemicals sector (Philip 1982: 
376). 
 
PETROBRAS enjoyed monopoly and autonomy under the military 
revolutionary. The first government under Castelo Branco eliminated labour 
resistance, eased foreign exchange controls, and maintained state monopoly 
in the oil industry. PETROBRAS continued to expand by creating 
PETROQUISA in 1967 and further increased its reach beginning 1969. This is 
by no means consensual as the military government swung between liberal 
and nationalist ideas on how to manage PETROBRAS. In the end, 
PETROQUISA constituted 51 percent government-owned and 49 percent 
private interests. With the need to secure access to raw materials, the firm 
inherited the rubber and fertilizer factories of PETROBRAS. Its expansion 
was facilitated by further buying PETROQUIMICA UNIAO, COPENE, 
COPESUL, and NORQUISA (Randall 1993: 32). Equally, there was continuity 
in terms of PETROBRAS’ emphasis on human capital development. The 
Board of Directors in 1963 decided to set up the company’s centre for human 
resource training and development, the Centre of Oil Upgrade and Studies 
(CENAP, known today as CENPES), which was a specialised institute that 
developed research and development within the oil sector. Such autonomy in 
managing its workforce had consequences for technological advancement 
and the gradual replacement of foreign specialists by Brazilian professionals. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
antithetical against giving private sector (including foreign capital) important roles into 
strategic industries. The ESG did not advocate for a full monopoly of oil exploration and 
accepted the participation of domestic and foreign capital, which reflected the peculiar 
beliefs of this faction in power vis-à-vis the large segment of the military (Stepan 1971: 
246). From the position of conceiving the production of basic goods – e.g. steel, oil and 
coal – as crucial elements of national security, the military leadership altered its 
perspective after the Second World War towards further engagement with the Western 
World and participation in the international system (Guimarães 2003: 185). 
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The major transformation in PETROBRAS, however, took place between 
1969 and 1973, when General Ernesto Geisel was appointed by General 
Medici as president of PETROBRAS. He accepted the position under the 
agreement that he would be autonomous from the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. Armed with independent decision-making, he reorganised the 
Directorate to strengthen PETROBRAS’ capacity to internally finance its 
expansion. In hindsight, three major factors conditioned the success of his 
strategy. First, the more modern and larger refineries of PETROBRAS 
benefited from substantial market share – one of PETROBRAS’ source of 
profitability. Second, the world oil market was in oversupply yet a reduction 
in the posted price of oil was impossible. Consequently, international oil 
companies offered discounts on posted prices, which combined with 
PETROBRAS’ oil import monopoly had forced import prices to go down. 
With the North African and Middle East entering the world oil market, Brazil 
was freed from its dependence on traditional suppliers like Venezuela. Third, 
Giesel expanded PETROBRAS’ participation in downstream activities, 
wherein government agencies became PETROBRAS’ consumers of oil 
derivatives. This move likewise benefited the private sector who was unhappy 
with the delayed payments of government agencies. PETROBRAS created its 
subsidiary Distribuidora in 1971 both on the grounds of national security and 
profitability in the downstream sector of the oil commodity chain. What 
facilitated this was the modification of DL 2.004 in 1968, which allowed 
PETROBRAS to set up subsidiaries that had budgets beyond the oversight of 
Congress and were given rights to establish partnerships with foreign and 
domestic oil companies. Its most important effect was to compel 
PETROBRAS subsidiaries to focus on costs and profit. The strategy proved so 
successful that PETROBRAS’ final market share jumped from 10.4 percent in 
1965 to 15.2 percent in 1970, 22.1 percent in 1971, and 27.5 percent in 1973 
(Philip 1982: 381; Randall 1993: 31-32). 
 
The most controversial decision during Giesel presidency in PETROBRAS 
was in oil exploration. By 1970 the Brazilian government was aware of its 
increasing dependency upon the Middle East for its oil resources. Dias Leite, 
then Minister of Mines and Energy, proposed that foreign investment was 
 145 
necessary and PETROBRAS should sign service contracts with foreign oil 
companies for exploration within Brazil. However, Giesel blocked the 
proposal and maintained oil exploration as strictly Brazilian affair. As a 
compromise, in 1972 PETROBRAS set up an overseas exploration subsidiary, 
BRASPETRO, to find oil importation into Brazil particularly in the Middle 
East. The creation of BRASPETRO was controversial to say the least because 
it implied the acceptance of the Link Report’s findings: that Brazil had 
abandoned its objective of making Brazil self-sufficient in oil. PETROBRAS, 
originally set up to refine oil as a way of generating funds for achieving self-
sufficiency and therefore played a central role in import substitution, now 
had to change its objectives in light of low oil prices. If PETROBRAS had to 
move downstream and diversify to marketing, petrochemicals, and overseas 
exploration, then it needed a new criterion and a new purpose. Profitability, 
then, became more important in judging its economic performance. 
Following the recommendation of the Link Report, PETROBRAS began its 
investment in the technology of offshore oil production after 1967 although 
this clearly required high capital that could only be financed by PETROBRAS 
itself rather than the government. Nevertheless BRASPETRO successfully 
found oil in Colombia, Iraq, and Algeria though it failed to secure supply of 
oil in terms of initial contracts. Under a 1972 contract with Iraq, 
PETROBRAS operated upon the discovered oilfields in Majnoon in 1976 and 
Nahr Umr-North in 1978 (Randall 1993: 33). In 1979 however Iraq abrogated 
the initial agreement with Brazil. BRASPETRO’s losses had to be absorbed by 
PETROBRAS to maintain the viability of the subsidiary. Despite the financial 
weakness of the affiliate, BRASPETRO had acquired technical and 
commercial experience in its global operations which helped in formulating 
risk contracts. In sum, exploration within Brazil was neglected but this was 
ultimately a decision based on economic, technical and bureaucratic logics of 
the state enterprise. The expansion of PETROBRAS was encouraged by the 
government after its relatively long period of stable economic growth, what is 
referred as the ‘Brazilian miracle’ (1969-1974). But what underpinned the 
success of this commercial strategy was the political autonomy of 
PETROBRAS, which was inherited from Vargas and was kept intact all 
throughout the military government. 
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There were two major changes under Ernesto Geisel (1974-1978). Firstly, in 
terms of corporate governance, PETROBRAS had already replaced the 
military officers in the management by civilian technical specialists. This was 
clearly a step towards strengthening Brazilian administrative capacity – a key 
requirement for every successful interventionist state. Secondly, the 
developmentalist ideology further encouraged the expansion of 
PETROBRAS, which only halted in 1979 upon the contraction of the 
economy. The Segundo Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (PND II) was 
formulated in response to the oil shock; the government hoped to address the 
deficiencies of the industrial structure through the petroleum industry.41 In 
1976, PETROBRAS extended to the fertiliser industry to address shortage in 
domestically produced mineral fertilisers. In the same year, PETROBRAS 
Commercial International SA (INTERBRAS) was created in response to the 
rise of national oil companies in the Middle East; it was aimed at obtaining 
improved trade deals with oil-producing states which Brazil had been 
importing crude oil. PETROMÍN (later called PETROMISA) was set up in 
1977 to address the need to develop market minerals (Randall 1993: 34). 
Ostensibly, we can see that the emerging model of growth is one based on a 
developmentalist state where PETROBRAS is situated at the centre of its 
policy programme. 
 
As oil price hikes pressured PETROBRAS to boost domestic production, in 
1976 PETROBRAS found petroleum reserves in the coasts of Rio de Janeiro 
and Espiritu Santo states, now known as the Campos basin, with an area of 
100,000 square kilometres and drilled at the depth of 100 metres and more 
fields were found hitherto. This oil bloc now constitutes 80% of petroleum 
supply in Brazil and is also the location of the newly discovered pre-salt oil 
                                                   
 
41 The deficiencies in Brazil’s industrial structure was attributed to the fragility of the heavy 
industry, backward linkages provided by the other sectors and simultaneous expansion of 
the economy through high rates of economic growth which induced excessive imports 
(Guimarães 2003: 213). 
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reserves.42 In addition, PETROBRAS began the production of lubricants, 
which were used in the automotive, industrial, aviation, railway and 
maritime industries. The oil industry would remain under state hands even 
after the end of the military dictatorship despite the bottlenecks associated 
with import substitution model. Hence, PETROBRAS operated across 
different sections of the oil industry, in particular in the upstream and 
downstream activities. 
 
To sum up, the political economy of oil reflected the broader developmental 
state ideology, in which the state intervened in three broad areas. Firstly, 
public ownership was dominant in the provision of public services by taking 
over existing private enterprises, for example in telecommunications, 
electricity, water and sanitation, railways, and urban transport.  This was 
justified along the lines of economies of scale and scope, capital market 
imperfections, and information asymmetries making public ownership more 
efficient than regulation of privately owned natural monopolies. Secondly, 
the state had exclusive rights for the exploitation and exploration of non-
renewable natural resources, such as petroleum and iron ore, in which 
private, most often foreign, ownership was deemed undesirable for strategic 
reasons. Finally, the Brazilian governments decided to intervene directly in 
developing manufacturing industries in situations where private capitalists 
were unwilling or incapable to invest, such as in steel in 1940s, 
petrochemicals in 1960s, and aeronautics and electronics in 1970s (Goldstein 
1999: 675; Sikkink 1991). In Evan’s terms (1979), the state sought to establish 
a triple alliance (or tripe) with multinational capital and domestic firms as a 
way of inducing public and private investments in financing the 
industrialisation programme.  
 
Taking into account the political legacies of desenvolvimentismo, for most 
Brazilians, any attack against PETROBRAS was tantamount to anti-
                                                   
 
42 The discussion here is based on PETROBRAS’ own account of its corporate history. It was 
accessed online on 26 January 2011 at http://petrobras.com.br/en/about-us/our-
history/. 
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nationalism. The 1988 Constitution indicated strong preference for the oil 
monopoly and guaranteed the exclusion of foreign capital in oil exploration. 
The Ministry of Mines and Energy was given the power to control the energy 
policy – consisting of petroleum, natural gas, power, and renewable energy – 
and this effectively meant reserving agenda setting powers to the federal 
government. As the next section discusses, the economic crisis and the new 
rules of the game under the return of democratic politics seemed at face value 
a dramatic restructuring of the political economy. There was, in short, an 
attempt to change the nature of the state in Brazil.  
 
4.3.3 The prelude to market opening: Crisis and restructuring 
 
During the 1980s, macroeconomic instability deepened whilst the 
contribution of SOEs to fixed capital formation declined; the latter was 
perceived by the civilian government as significantly contributing to the 
increase in government deficits. It must be pointed out that privatisation did 
not play a pivotal role immediately as a post-crisis strategy of 
macroeconomic management. However, the failure of the 1986 Cruzado Plan 
to address the capital transfers and fiscal imbalances was a critical factor in 
the more drastic macroeconomic stabilisation strategy under the 1987 
Bresser Plan. This involved rebalancing relative prices and restoring the 
soundness of fiscal accounts, which for the first time mentioned privatisation 
as a crisis management strategy. However, the constitution maintained some 
rigidities in the management of SOEs whilst decentralising powers to the 
regional and local levels (Goldstein 1999: 678). In the case of petroleum, 
Laura Randall (1993) argues that PETROBRAS – despite the necessity to 
contract its business activities – is without qualifications a success story. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate this achievement quite well: Brazil had 
steadily increased its crude oil production and refining capacity in the whole 
existence of PETROBRAS.43 Equally, the amount of recoverable reserves 
since the post war years had dramatically risen, which was punctuated by the 
                                                   
 
43 For further data on PETROBRAS’ performance, please see Appendix 2. 
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discovery of the pre-salt reserves in 2007. This success was attributed to the 
specific circumstances of PETROBRAS, namely the absence of readily 
exploitable oil reserves in Brazil and the need to rely on technological 
advancement as a way of tapping the overseas market. The major problems 
of the state company stemmed from the politicisation of its management, 
which was tied to the nature of capital ownership. In March 1992, 
PETROBRAS announced a reorganisation amounting to a reduction of levels 
of hierarchy and streamlining its business activities back to oil production 
and processing. The move cut costs from US$ 4.2 billion to US$ 3.2 billion.  
 
Figure 4.3 PETROBRAS performance in refining sector, 1954-1990 
 
Source: PETROBRAS Annual Reports in Randall 1993 (Adapted), 13. 
 
In 1991 PETROBRAS was controlled by the Ministry of Infrastructure, which 
guided the hiring and firing of its personnel, general audits with special 
reference to labour costs, and salaries of state enterprises. Labour conditions 
were regulated both by laws overseeing employee relations in the private 
sector and Federal Law 5.811 regulating the labour conditions in the oil 
industry. In this context, PETROBRAS was either to be privatised to 
guarantee the efficiency of its operations or some of its subsidiaries 
abolished. In April 1992 PETROBRAS President Ernesto Weber announced 
the company’s 10-year strategic plan, which envisaged the end of the 
monopoly in transport, refining, and imports. The financial and commercial 
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directors were also replaced by individuals with extensive experience with 
private sector and international operations – all of which were anticipating 
the further internationalisation of PETROBRAS through corporate 
restructuring. Under President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992), he 
proposed to sell assets of PETROBRAS and leave the state enterprise with 
operations in oil production, distribution, fertiliser and overseas oil 
exploration. Congress voted to sell INTERBRAS and PETROMISA whilst 
PETROFERTIL and PETROQUISA were then subject to partial privatisation. 
However, the management and workers resisted the privatisation and 
negotiations had to be struck to reorganise these companies to make them 
competitive. In the end, PETROBRAS System consisted of PETROBRAS and 
its subsidiaries, BRASPETRO, PETROQUISA (subsidiaries were privatised) 
and PETROFERTIL (subsidiaries were privatised). PETROBRAS likewise 
have minority ownership of the naval repair firm Empresa Brasileira de 
Reparos Navais (RENAVE) (Randall 1993: 42-46). One must understand the 
reforms within the broader context of crisis and change in Brazilian political 
economy. Neoliberal reforms were the immediate antidote to macroeconomic 
instability and fiscal crisis, which were outcomes of the exhaustion of import 
substitution and over extension of the state. However, the extent to which the 
Brazilian elites have embarked on market opening reforms based on 
ideological motivations have recently been questioned by some scholars 
(Kingstone 1999; Montero 1998; Pinheiro et. al. 2004). The Brazilian 
chapters will pursue this argument on pragmatism by examining the 
limitations of gradual reforms in the petroleum sector. The final section of 
this chapter will justify the comparative perspective on state and natural 
resource politics; it will also specify the analytical themes that the proceeding 
chapters will develop. 
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Figure 4.4 PETROBRAS performance in upstream activities, 1954-
1990 
 
Source: PETROBRAS Annual Reports in Randall 1993: 13 (Adapted).  
 
4.4 Comparative strategy in resource politics: Brazil and Chile 
 
Theoretically, my thesis is based on the idea that scholars can gain some key 
insights through a comparison of strategic commodities in contemporary 
Brazil and Chile. Firstly, these countries have long histories of commodity 
production and they are deemed as successful cases of resource-based 
development. Brazil has achieved a diversified economic structure owing to 
centuries of extraction beginning from minerals, sugar, rubber, and coffee in 
the twentieth century, during which a dramatic shift towards import 
industrialisation strategy was attempted. Finding petroleum reserves in this 
vast territory, however, remained a political aspiration until 2007. 
PETROBRAS’ discovery of the oil reserves beneath the salt layer (hence the 
name pre-salt reserves) is really politically and economically important in 
captivating public imaginaries. Brazil is expected to join the exclusive club of 
oil-exporting states with its proven reserves of at least 28.467 billion barrels. 
However, its success in the oil industry is not the possession of massive 
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petroleum reserves but rather the ability of a pragmatic state to build a 
competitive petroleum industry by engaging in risky overseas oil exploration, 
refining imported crude oil, exporting oil derivatives, and simultaneously 
developing offshore drilling technology (Brainard & Martinez-Diaz 2009; 
Nem Singh & Massi Forthcoming; Randall 1993; Schneider 2009b; Ubiraci 
Sennes & Narciso 2009). As Section 4.3 shows, the success of creating an oil 
industry in Brazil is hinged on refining, processing, and adding value to 
imported crude oil. 
 
On the other hand, the Chilean economy relied historically on nitrate and 
guano (bird dung) in the nineteenth century, which was replaced by copper 
in 1930 after the unfortunate collapse of the fertiliser market. Since then, 
Chile’s economic fate became intertwined with the global copper economy, 
which meant that national politics was – and remains – concerned with 
finding ways to reduce its vulnerability from sudden flux in international 
demand, price volatility, and external shocks. For example, the contribution 
of copper mining registered as high as 8 percent of the GDP and 55 percent of 
export earnings in 2009 exhibiting almost the same levels of dependency as it 
was in the 1960s and 1970s (COCHILCO Annual Statistics 2009). With 
copper prices reaching its peak in early 2010, Chile’s formidable position as 
top supplier with price-making powers (35 percent control of global market) 
puts the country comfortably in an enviable position for other mineral-
producing states.  
 
In this thesis, I argue that neoliberalism has shaped states and resource 
management of strategic commodities. However, national states produce 
differing models of natural resource governance, in which neoliberalism is 
embedded but not completely defining the reforms. The case studies, viewed 
from the lens of historical institutionalism and critical political economy 
perspectives, offer a corrective to the literature on resource politics and 
development studies that have adopted highly economistic and depoliticised 
perspectives on resource management. Whilst copper mining is the most 
important (and politicised) sector that has undergone considerable change in 
terms of its management, petroleum reflects not simply the historical 
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importance of oil in the national political economy but it also symbolises the 
success of Brazil’s strategy of blending state and market mechanisms in 
developing the oil industry.  
 
Secondly, these cases posit the differing ways of state engagement with big 
business and organised labour in the context of neoliberal globalisation. 
Their contemporary governance models demonstrate the difficulty of moving 
away from ‘market friendly’ approaches to macroeconomic management. 
These are countries exhibiting political continuity with changes. However, a 
longer-term view focussing on political legacies, contingency, and structural 
constraints reveal a complex picture of Brazil and Chile. As Chapters 5 and 6 
argue, there is a stark contrast between the logic of neoliberalism and its 
practice in the resource sector in Chile. As post-dictatorial governments 
embraced the logic of global competitiveness, they strategically sought to 
maintain the institutional framework inherited from the military 
dictatorship. Yet the reforms undertaken under Concertación governments 
were a mixture of depoliticised, technocratic copper governance and highly 
contentious, politicised management of CODELCO. The reforms, if anything, 
reject the assumption of absolute depoliticisation of economic management 
under neoliberalism. Furthermore, Chapters 7 and 8 show that Brazil’s long 
tradition of state intervention in the economy meant that efforts at selling the 
assets of PETROBRAS were not easy to implement. At best, the petroleum 
industry was opened to foreign capital whilst PETROBRAS remains as the 
dominant economic actor across the commodity chain. In short, both case 
studies challenge the idea that neoliberalism produces convergence towards 
unfettered liberalisation of markets.   
 
Finally, beyond the question of state transformation, the case studies offer 
contemporary analysis of how state enterprises have been managed under 
conditions of neoliberalism and democratisation. As the preceding sections 
showed, Brazil and Chile have built state-owned companies that played 
important roles in state-led development projects. However, narratives of 
neoliberalism depict the state as excessive, and therefore, reforms were 
aimed at dismantling state enterprises and depoliticising the management of 
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workers. As the four analytical chapters elucidate, the state enterprises are 
deemed relatively successful international companies paving way for limited 
reforms after early phases of corporate restructuring. This was of course 
further underpinned by the commodity boom which facilitated the transfer of 
resource rents towards state treasuries. The findings contribute empirically 
and theoretically to debates about resource dependency, political autonomy 
of the state in a globalised economy, and emerging strategies cohering 
around the idea of neo-developmentalism by way of analysing the 
relationships among national elites, state managers, and organised workers. 
 
4.4.1 Analytical themes in the succeeding chapters 
 
In this chapter, I have thus far provided an extensive background on the 
politics of copper mining and petroleum in Chile and Brazil respectively. My 
main justification for examining oil and copper is simply that these are key 
commodities that have shaped the political economy of development 
strategies in these two middle-income countries. I likewise show how 
historical conflicts determine the political choices of elites when inviting 
foreign capital in the sectors deemed as strategically important to national 
development. The democratic and military governments throughout the 
twentieth century faced persistent conflicts between using resources for 
national income and interests of foreign capitalists to secure access to these 
important resources. 44  State enterprises are thus expressions of overt 
economic nationalism and technocratic impulse to exploit resources for 
economic growth. This has implications to the argument of the thesis when 
analysing contemporary mining reforms. Although neoliberal reforms were 
attempted to be the transformative force to ‘free market and politics’ from 
the shackles of the state, its actual consequences across economic sectors and 
groups in society are considerably uneven and complex. As this chapter 
                                                   
 
44 However, Jenkins (1984) shows that state interests and the commercial goals of foreign 
companies are not always incompatible and they do not necessarily have to be mutually 
exclusive. Evans (1979) also demonstrates this point very well in the case of Brazil in the 
manufacturing sector. 
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shows, the resource sector has been subjected to multiple interventions by 
states and tensions between capital and labour persisted. My analysis of 
contemporary resource governance, mainly covering late 1980s until 2011, is 
guided by three key analytical themes – regulatory institutional frameworks, 
corporate governance, and labour management. 
 
A. Regulatory institutional frameworks 
 
I wish to examine the extent to which legacies of the military dictatorship in 
Brazil and Chile – statist developmentalism and neoliberalism – were 
embedded, renegotiated, and reconstituted in response to pressures of global 
competitiveness in the resource sector. On the one hand, the Chilean 
economy was – and remains – dependent on copper mining; its governance 
has changed considerably particularly after the success of Pinochet in 
profoundly shaping the direction of economic management. Chapters 5 and 6 
will demonstrate the extent of continuity and change in CODELCO 
governance and degree of state intervention in the hegemonic context of 
neoliberalism. On the other hand, the legacy of the military government in 
Brazil was to successfully create an oil company that based its profitability in 
refining, development of offshore technology, and overseas exploration. 
PETROBRAS had been restructured as part of the post-crisis recovery 
strategy by the civilian governments. What is particularly interesting, 
however, is that the discovery of pre-salt reserves has made the dream of 
Brazil to be self-sufficient come true. In fact, Brazil is set to become a new 
player in the global oil industry if it succeeds in extracting and producing 
crude oil alongside its traditionally strong refining and distribution sectors. 
As Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate, the reconstitution of state-market relations 
and corporate management are outcomes of a mixture of political legacies, 
contingent choices, and structural constraints at the global and national 
levels.  
 
Within the broader global context, both states deployed discourses and 
reforms of establishing regulatory agencies to manage the process of 
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breaking monopolies and introducing competition with private capital. 
However, the succeeding analytical chapters argue against the core 
presumptions of neoliberal theory, namely depoliticisation of economic 
management through technocratic managerial governance, demobilisation of 
labour, and dismantling of state ownership in resource sectors. As HI 
approach shows, policy reforms, and indeed the development of the state, 
can be explained through gradual institutional changes that have been 
transformed by neoliberal and developmentalist policies. In short, we are not 
seeing any convergence towards neoliberal political economy in Brazil and 
Chile.  
 
B. Restructuring state enterprises 
 
One way of understanding the role of the state is to delineate the actions of 
states and state enterprises in resource sectors. Whilst most assume they are 
one and the same – if one equates the withdrawal of state and the 
dismantling of state enterprises – in fact there appears some tensions 
between the state technocrats and the managers of state enterprises. Equally, 
in Brazil and Chile, state enterprises have successfully reformed their 
corporate practices by following the standards applied by private firms in 
their operations. In Chapters 6 and 8 specifically, I examine the different 
reforms in corporate governance and their consequences to the 
competitiveness of CODELCO and PETROBRAS as well as their ways of 
managing labour. In so doing, SOEs reflect the entrepreneurial roles of states 
and at the same time they develop autonomous decision-making powers as a 
competitive strategy. They also have differing relationships with foreign and 
domestic capital, which in both cases meant forging joint ventures in order to 
learn from the experiences of private sector. What underlines the 
restructuring process, however, is the institutional contextualisation of the 
reforms. In sum, the analytical chapters explain what are the successes and 
failures of the individual SOEs in transforming the extractive industries into 
competitive markets and in contributing to the overall economic 
development of Brazil and Chile.  
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C. Managing labour demands 
 
The final analytical theme is the extent to which unions have been integrated 
in corporate management. I examine how states manage demands from 
labour in strategic sectors, and what kind of responses political elites offer by 
way of compensating these demands. Unlike the workers in manufacturing 
and industrial sectors, the petroleum and mining workers of Brazil and Chile 
are considered as labour aristocrats who have played some role in national 
politics. Indeed, their outstanding salaries and benefits even raise questions 
whether they really belong to the same social classes as the poorer organised 
workers in the urban centres. The focus of my thesis as regards labour is the 
process of labour incorporation and rights-claiming in the context of labour 
flexibility and globalised open markets. If CODELCO and PETROBRAS have 
been internationalising their operations (CODELCO is less successful on this 
front), the main question is how far these state enterprises have succeeded in 
guaranteeing stable labour relations. Crucially, whether it still makes sense to 
talk about unions (instead of just workers) is an equally valid question. In 
Chapters 6 and 8, I explore how corporate governance reforms have taken 
into account labour unions in their quest to modernise the state enterprises 
into leading, competitive firms in copper mining and petroleum industries.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I offered an extensive historical overview of the political 
economy of natural resources in Brazil and Chile. I argued that natural 
resource governance throughout the twentieth century was shaped by the 
contradictions of the nature of commodity exports and attempts at 
autonomous direction of growth strategy. There were centralising and 
decentralising tendencies which permitted the rise of import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) as a strategy to counter export dependence – elite 
cohesion, favourable international order, and ‘ideological supply’ – in which 
political conflicts were the main driving engine of institutional and economic 
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transformation. Equally, the success of inward looking development strategy 
had significant consequences to the latter years of reforms in Brazil and 
Chile. Whilst Chile’s social and political polarisation led to a seventeen year 
military dictatorship that imposed neoliberalism (although more contested 
by copper workers), in Brazil the state adopted quite pragmatically a mixture 
of state-led and market-led mechanisms to make PETROBRAS achieve its 
goal of profitability. On the one hand, this points to the importance of 
political legacies and historical conflicts in shaping future agential choices. 
On the other hand, critical political economy perspectives show that the rise 
of neoliberalism as a global hegemonic project is in fact institutionally 
contextualised and has its roots in the domestic sphere. In Chile most 
spectacularly, the military government viewed market reforms as a social 
reengineering project to reverse the socialist legacies of Allende as well as a 
method of silencing the labour movement. In Brazil, however, neoliberalism 
emerged as an alternative crisis management strategy to the increasingly 
defunct old developmentalist model. In both cases, elites introduced 
neoliberalism as a critical juncture to reorganises markets and politics in 
extractive industries although this was highly contested and driven by class 
conflicts.  I likewise introduced three key analytical themes – regulatory 
institutional framework, corporate restructuring of state enterprises, and 
labour management – which the succeeding four chapters will interrogate. In 
the succeeding four chapters, I analyse the management of strategic natural 
resources under what Eduardo Gudynas (2010) calls the era of ‘new 
extractivism’ or the intensive and extensive exploitation of natural resources 
under Left governments in Latin America. This new context of resource 
extraction differs from the old modes of resource exploitation in three major 
ways: firstly, there exists far more state regulation and in some cases direct 
participation of the state in economic management; secondly, governments 
have established more direct linkages between commodity production and 
social developmental and finally, competitiveness and global market 
integration are now embedded in the structural context (if not constraint) of 
growth strategies of developing states (Gudynas 2010, 2011a, 2011b). Within 
this broader regional context of the turn to the Left, I begin my analysis of 
Chilean copper politics between 1990 and 2011 in Chapter 5. The chapter 
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focuses on how neoliberal reforms were sustained alongside marginal 
changes to regulate the copper industry as a domestic adjustment strategy of 
Concertación governments against the backdrop of the seemingly inexorable 
hegemony of neoliberalism. I explore how far neoliberalism has been 
embedded in Chile, and whether we can talk about a steering state rather 
than a neoliberal state in managing conflicts and tensions between states, 
markets, and labour in its strategic industry. 
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Chapter 5  
POLITICS OF COPPER MINING IN CHILE, 1990-2011 
 
 
Whilst many Latin American political economies began to adopt neoliberal 
reforms between 1980s and 1990s, Chile was exceptional primarily for the 
staggering pace and scope of economic liberalisation in production, finance 
and social welfare provision under General Pinochet (1973-1989). Chile’s 
economic governance under Concertación government (1990-2009) has 
often been characterised as neoliberal, and this model is underpinned by a 
historically capable state delivering coherent structural reforms and 
consensual politics which has mitigated social conflicts through piecemeal 
compensatory reforms in various socioeconomic areas (Alexander 2009; 
Taylor 2006). In this context, the chapter offers a more nuanced account of 
Chilean state governance by analysing recent economic reforms in the most 
strategic industry – copper mining – and the extent to which the neoliberal 
narrative of private sector-driven growth has been reified and maintained by 
Concertación government. Whilst Chile’s neoliberal model was embraced by 
the governing left and centre coalition in the early days of the transition, 
significant reforms were advanced to repoliticise mining governance in 
Concertación’s second decade of rule. This is exemplified in highly 
contentious debates to impose a new mining royalty in 2006 and to re-
regulate labour practices in the context of subcontracting. Although by no 
means do these reforms indicate dramatic paradigm change, nevertheless 
political elites have consciously engineered growth strategies that respond to 
the challenge of global competitiveness. This, inevitably, questions the extent 
to which one can claim Chile as unabashedly neoliberal.  
 
The chapter contributes to the disparate literatures on resource governance 
and political economy of neoliberalism by explicating the scope and phases of 
economic restructuring in the resource sector. It interrogates the place of 
resource extraction in national development strategies specifically the global, 
national, and sector-specific constraints in moving beyond privatisation of 
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natural resources as Chile’s main growth strategy. The argument is as 
follows. The export-led growth model under Concertación government 
reflects institutional continuity of Pinochet’s neoliberal mining governance, 
which privileges private (foreign) capital as the driving forces of economic 
growth and advocates for a minimalist role for the state in economic 
governance. However, neoliberalism as a political project has undergone 
different phases of change, in which the initial consensus around marketised 
governance began to unravel through incremental endeavours at increasing 
the regulatory powers of the Chilean state. Nevertheless the reforms towards 
greater state control over copper industry have been very difficult to sustain 
as a result of long standing political legacies of the dictatorship, structural 
constraints of the global economy, and the relative strength of the neoliberal 
narrative in persuading both national elites and the public to maintain the 
private sector-led growth model. In this context, attempts at reforming the 
state through neo-structuralism as a competitive strategy have been limited 
(Kirby 2009; Leiva 2008).  
 
The chapter offers a narrative of the ideational construction, implementation, 
and recalibration of neoliberalism in the resource sector. Mining governance 
has undoubtedly been re-politicised through the introduction of contentious 
reforms in revenue management and labour relations. Taken together with 
Chapter 6, which examines CODELCO’s corporate restructuring and labour 
management, I show the simultaneous processes of deregulation and 
reregulation in the resource sector, which imply that perhaps neoliberalism 
and developmentalism are phases of capitalist modernisation, in which 
Chile’s competitive strategies are responses to exogenous pressures from the 
global economy. The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.1, I analyse the 
reasons behind Concertación government’s decision to embrace institutional 
continuity in the first decade, and the emerging tensions in the second 
decade leading to the new wave of reforms to increase state intervention in 
the economy. In particular, I examine the shifting discourses in mining 
management and the institutional environment upon which narratives of 
policy change have been filtered under Concertación governments. Section 
5.2 then explores the motivations and outcomes of introducing the reforms in 
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the mining sector, particularly in revenue management in the context of a 
commodity boom and in capital-labour relations in the context of labour 
flexibilisation. Finally, in Section 5.3, I move forward the discussion by 
examining the significance of these reforms for competitive strategies, and 
more broadly, to debates on post-neoliberalism.   
 
5.1 Embracing continuity under Concertación government, 1990-
1999 
 
The compromised transition to democracy was shaped by the political and 
economic rules of the dictatorship writ large, which meant that structural 
constraints for a new development model had domestic rather than 
international origins. In delineating the difference between Pinochet and 
Concertación policies in copper mining, the starting point is to define 
primarily what kinds of political and economic institutions have survived in 
the post-dictatorial years. This constitutes the basis of my argument on 
institutional layering and self-reinforcing processes of path dependent 
reforms. Economically, the role of the state in development has not 
fundamentally changed. Broadly speaking, Pinochet’s rules in mining 
management were embraced by Concertación, in which private property 
rights were held sacred, foreign investment seen as the new engine of growth, 
and big business acquiescence conceived as necessary to manage social 
tensions. Firstly, the 1974 Foreign Investment Statute (DL 600) sets out the 
rights and responsibilities of foreign investors through a special foreign 
contract. DL 600 offers generous tax rebates by allowing foreign firms to 
deduct 15 percent in their corporate taxes (at 35 percent rate) to adjust for 
the depreciation of imports declared by companies as investments. The 
Concertación’s strong commitment to continuity is exemplified by the 
inability (or unwillingness) to repeal DL 600 even after a royalty tax law was 
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put into effect in 2006, which means that negotiating a higher rate of royalty 
fees in the future has become politically infeasible.45  
 
Secondly, the 1983 Mining Code and DL 18.097 institutionalised private 
property rights in natural resources by according equal rights for Chilean and 
foreign firms to apply for licences to exploit, develop, and produce in mining. 
Whilst the Chilean state remains the ultimate owner of sub-soil rights with 
the right to revoke mining concessions,46 this was not exercised in practice. 
The rationale behind this rests on a fear that excessive and unjustified state 
interference can send the wrong signal to investors, which constitutes a 
breach of Chilean commitment to tax and political stability – something 
Chilean professionals widely perceive as the source of its success in the 
mining industry.47 However, we should also take note that the 1983 Mining 
Code is part of a series of laws known as leyes organicas, or organic laws, 
which are special legislations issued by Pinochet requiring a quorum of four-
sevenths (4/7) of the acting members of Congress in order to be enacted, 
modified, or even discussed.48 Under Concertación government, this was 
almost impossible to achieve because of the ‘binomial system’ – an electoral 
mechanism that has made it difficult for the creation of legislative majorities 
and gave the Right several veto points, including an outright majority in the 
Senate (González 2008: 109-110, 152-156). In some ways, formal rules 
enshrined in the 1980 Constitution remained unchanged after the political 
transition, which effectively serve as key constraints to any paradigm shifts. 
However, I disagree with rational choice institutionalism’s view of formal 
                                                   
 
45 As will be discussed later, the tax clauses in DL 600 would be the basis of the new royalty 
law, particularly the option to stay within the DL 600 fixed taxation scheme or 
progressively apply a new variable tax rate. See Guajardo 2008, 2012; Libertad y 
Desarollo 2002, 2004, 2005; Riesco 2005, 2008 for the technical and political 
discussions of the royalty law.  
46 The 1983 Mining Code Article 4 states: “Should the State consider it necessary to retain 
the exclusive right to explore or to exploit substances subject to concessions, it shall act 
through companies and enterprises in which it holds an interest and said companies shall 
create or acquire corresponding concessions, provided they are empowered to act, under 
constitutional provisions, in said manner”. 
47 Author interviews with Juan Carlos Guajardo, Executive Director, CESCO, October 2009; 
Carlos Gajardo Roberts, Sociedad Nacional de Minería (SONAMI), 14 September 2009. 
48 For a detailed explanation, see http://www.law.edu/ComparativeLaw/Chile/.  
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institutions as the constraint itself (see Weyland 2002). Instead, institutions 
– both formal and informal rules of gaining access to the state – are 
historically and materially ‘emergent’, that is, they were outcomes of concrete 
political struggles which continues from the past to the present (Bell 2011). 
All throughout twenty years in power, Concertación government effectively 
legitimised the role of private sector in Chile’s national development strategy 
by their lack of political will and capacity to alter DL 600 and Mining Code.  
 
Finally, the state has maintained its dual and rather contradictory roles as 
regulator and producer in the mining industry. For example, the specific 
state agency Comision Chileno del Cobre or COCHILCO (National Chilean 
Commission) has the political mandate spanning both public and private 
sectors. On one hand, COCHILCO audits the state enterprise CODELCO to 
make sure it is subjected to private sector standards of efficiency and 
transparency, hence, performing a clear role as direct participant in the 
economy. On the other hand, COCHILCO is responsible for the issuance of 
foreign contracts and checks all licenses to operate of mining firms to ensure 
compliance with Chilean laws. COCHILCO likewise has an oversight function 
in determining copper prices at which profits and sales of private firms are 
calculated for tax purposes. Whilst one can surmise a political role for the 
state agency, COCHILCO has clearly taken a highly technical position in 
defining its functions, and this has important consequences in public 
debates. For example, the organisation conducts key studies in the mining 
sector, and subsequently its position serves as signalling point for further 
government actions. In the height of the royalty debate in 2004, for example, 
COCHILCO’s decision to dismiss contentious claims of critical organisations 
such as CENDA and ARCIS regarding tax evasion and other business 
practices of mining companies in Chile – specifically Minera Escondida – has 
had ramifications in the brewing debate in Congress on whether to impose 
additional taxes to capture ground rent in non-renewable sectors (Riesco 
2005). Overall, these rules have shaped state-market relations and at the 
same time they have served as structural constraints for CODELCO to 
become competitive given its complete reliance on state financing for 
investment and technological upgrading.  
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These rules were supported by big business in Chile, who emerged as the 
clear winners of neoliberal restructuring under Pinochet and, therefore, has 
sought to maintain the status quo. From big business’ perspective, continuity 
in economic rules reproduced Concertación’s credible commitment for 
stability in the tax system, on property rights, and depoliticisation by way of 
giving more power to the judiciary.49 By not introducing new legislations on 
mining, the centre-led Concertación government cemented its commitment 
to neoliberalism in the 1990s. This strategy was legitimated by the 
overwhelming influx of foreign investment in the mining sector – an 
indicator of success of Concertación’s mining policy – at least at the 
beginning of the decade. As Figure 5.1 shows, DL 600 brought in 762 US$ 
million in 1990 (as opposed to public investment in CODELCO and ENAMI 
of 386 US$ million). By 1999, private investment jumped up to 1,337 US$ 
million whilst public mining was at 369 US$ million. However, what is 
evident, and is ironically underplayed in political and academic debates, is 
that CODELCO suffered from underinvestment from the Chilean state. Given 
the lack of access to financial capital to invest on expansion projects, the 
ideological commitment of Concertación to maintain marketised resource 
governance has severely affected the competitiveness of CODELCO. 
However, under Michelle Bachelet, public mining has accumulated and 
successfully surpassed foreign investment during the commodity boom (see 
Figure 5.1). In 2009, public investment is at 1,704 US$ million and private 
mining via DL 600 is at 1,011 US$ million (COCHILCO 2010).  
 
                                                   
 
49 Author interviews with Javier Cox, Secretary General, Consejo Minero, October 2009; 
Carlos Gajardo Roberts, SONAMI, September 2009.  
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of public and private mining investment 
 
 Source: COCHILCO Annual Statistics 2010 (Adapted), Table 30.  
 
Evidently, the external environment played a vital role for foreign firms in 
decisively favouring Chile on their investment strategy – low copper prices 
during the 1990s. As Figure 5.2 shows, the decade of complex reforms was 
also a period of low copper prices – and according to then CODELCO 
President Juan Villarzú (2005) – a critical moment for the state enterprise 
during which CODELCO was perceived as uncompetitive and required 
drastic reorientation. The narrative of the efficacy of private sector won 
important support across the political spectrum, and in this context, 
Concertación government deepened the privatisation of natural resources, or 
at least this was the view from the labour unions.50 At the international level, 
Chile was increasingly viewed as the success story of neoliberal exports-led 
growth. Combined with a credible promise of tax and political stability, its 
open arms policy to foreign capital was seen as the way to achieve high 
growth in the era of globalisation. For example, several studies sponsored by 
international institutions on taxation in mineral-rich states hail Chile’s 
mining industry as a success story of resource-based development, 
particularly its strategy of taxing the mining sector the same as all other 
companies to avoid special pleads and lobbying by big business to the state 
                                                   
 
50 Author interviews with labour unions, Antofagasta, November 2009. 
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(ICMM 2009: 48; IIED 2002: 180; Otto et. al. 2006). As a ‘best practice’ for 
revenue management, Chile’s stabilisation fund is applauded as a counter-
cyclical measure to manage fiscal expenditure during an export bonanza.51 
Finally, most studies highlight the fact that Chile like some other countries – 
e.g. Mexico, Sweden, and Zimbabwe – has not put in place any royalty fees to 
pay for ‘resource use’. A widely held view is that resource-rich states have no 
leverage during bust period and Chile’s economic strategy was deemed the 
appropriate path in attracting foreign capital. Ironically, Chile is considered 
as a ‘world class mine’, which refers to countries with exceptionally high 
quality mines that fall in the upper decile of discounted value for all mines of 
a specific deposit type (Otto et. al. 2006: 117). Because not all mining 
countries can export high-grade ore minerals, it goes without saying that 
international mining companies will flock in the country regardless of an 
imposition of special taxes on mining. And several countries do take 
advantage of this situation by imposing royalty taxes, with Australia, Canada, 
and United States as leading examples of cases in which separate royalty 
agreements are negotiated with private firms to take into account the 
environmental and social costs of natural resource use. As such, economic 
imperatives predominantly shaped the trajectory of mining policy 
throughout the 1990s, and this was shown by the rejection of royalty bill in 
the mid-1990s for fear of a mass exodus of capital, if not for government’s 
apprehension of generating conflict with private mining companies (Riesco 
2008: 7-10, 2005: 26-28).  
 
Most importantly, the Chilean government deployed the neoliberal discourse 
in specific reference to its capacity to influence copper prices in the global 
market. Despite the fact that Chilean copper constitutes around 34 percent of 
world copper production throughout 1990s and 2000s, COCHILCO has 
consistently argued that it is not a price maker, and therefore, could not 
reverse low copper prices (Riesco 2005: 13). Despite the capacity of 
CODELCO to end the crisis of overproduction by contracting the global 
                                                   
 
51 Section 5.2 offers an extensive discussion on the role of stabilisation funds as a counter-
cyclical policy to boom and bust in commodity prices.  
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copper supply, COCHILCO was adamant not to interfere in the markets. It 
was not until CODELCO and Minera Escondida jointly decided to severely 
limit production as a way of ‘defending copper prices’ that the bottlenecks 
began to ease. It was, in fact, an ideological decision not to interfere in the 
economy for fear of a backlash, indeed punishment, by markets against any 
form of state intervention. 
 
Figure 5.2 Evolution of copper prices 
 
 Source: COCHILCO Online Statistics 2012.52 
 
In Coxian terms, hegemony emerges from the combination of coercion and 
cooptation. To acquire consensus in support of an economic paradigm, the 
focal point is the construction of narratives and embedding of discourses 
within institutional frameworks. Chile’s dependence on copper for export and 
the traumatic conflict with foreign capital until 1973 shaped quite clearly the 
policy imperatives and pathways of reforms in the copper sector under the 
democratic governments. Neoliberalism in the 1990s was embraced in two 
distinctive ways. At the institutional level, political continuity of rules in 
economic governance was perceived as the only competitive strategy 
available for export-dependent states like Chile. At the ideational level, policy 
                                                   
 
52 The data is accessible at 
http://www.cochilco.cl/english/productos/grafico_ingreso.asp?tipo_metal=1. Author 
accessed data online on 21 May 2012. 
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elites have embraced the neoliberal narrative to guide their economic 
decisions. The combination of unfavourable economic environment for 
exports and growing success of the free market strategy through open 
regionalism have led Concertación elites – particularly the centrist forces – to 
fully embrace the ‘rationality of markets’ (Grugel 1999). Tellingly, narratives 
of exports-led growth and open regionalism as the appropriate national 
development strategies during 1990s have had endogenous and exogenous 
political support (Fernández Jilberto 1996; Grugel & Hout 1999; Phillips 
2004). It cohered around the idea of a strengthened state facilitating the 
smooth functioning of markets, thereby, leaving market failures to be 
corrected by the law of supply and demand rather than the state. The Head of 
Foreign Investment Committee in COCHILCO succinctly makes this point 
clear in the mining sector: 
 
There is an argument around why the state did not do the mining 
itself. I think there are two reasons. One, the state simply had no 
money to do it, to invest. If the government invests in mining, you 
cannot invest in education, healthcare and other things. On the 
other hand, the role of the state in Chile is to regulate, promote 
and take care of the poorest section of society, and not to do the 
business by themselves. The role in Chile… is subsidiary. By 
definition, the country made this definition. The state is not going 
to conduct business where the private sector can do it.53 
 
Politically, Pinochet’s 17-year dictatorship had not led to the disintegration of 
the strong party system in Chile. In fact, the political transition to democracy 
was to a significant extent managed through party politics as centrist and left 
forces reconstituted their pacts in challenging the military government’s hold 
to power. As mining union leader Agustin de la Torre describes it, intense 
social protests led by labour unions against the dictatorship between 1981 
and 1983 gave way for smooth transition among the political classes by 
extending labour support for the renovated Left and Centre parties and 
                                                   
 
53  Author interviews with Marco Fluckiger, Head of Foreign Investment Department, 
Comisión Chileno del Cobre (COCHILCO), October 2009.  
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accepting the plebiscite as the mode of democratic transition.54 In many 
ways, the return of party politics is indicative of the strength of Chile’s 
democratic tradition of grassroots collective organising along party lines. 
However, it also reflects the very conservative nature of consensus building 
among elites and the extent of elite control over popular sectors as a result of 
the compromised democratic transition (Alexander 2009; Barton 2002; 
Heiss & Navia 2007; Oxhorn 1996). Above all, political constraints were 
imposed on Chile’s new democracy through constitutional rigidities, for 
example by giving Right parties automatic majority to veto any reforms in 
military affairs and immunity from prosecution of the armed forces in post-
transition politics. The 10 percent automatic transfer of CODELCO profits 
prior to taxation for the modernisation of the armed forces was also retained 
all throughout the Concertación days. These political legacies to protect the 
military and right parties under the coalition of left and centre parties 
constitute what are referred as ‘authoritarian enclaves’ in the political system 
(Garréton 2003). Most importantly, Chile’s left parties have made a 
conscious decision to move towards the centre by transforming into 
professionalised catchall parties (Handlin & Collier 2011). To maintain 
credibility in governing, Concertación deployed technocratic approaches in 
economic management (P Silva 2009). And in appealing to mass voters, left 
parties have deliberately distanced themselves from social movements and 
gradually weakened their historically strong linkages with labour unions (and 
Chapter 6 offers evidence here). The emphasis on compromise and 
consensus watered down policy reform agendas in 1990s, to which scholars 
have time and again referred Chile as tutelary democracy or estado de 
compromiso (compromising state) (Barton 2002; González 2008; Heiss & 
Navia 2007). What is perhaps striking is not simply the continuity in the 
institutional features of economic management but rather the ideational 
constructions and policy practices of Concertación governments in governing 
resources. To conclude briefly, economic continuity was partly due to 
structural constraints of the global copper market but it was also because 
                                                   
 
54 Author interviews with Augustin Segundo Latorre Risso, Labour Union Leader, XSTRATA, 
Member Federación Minera de Chile (FMC), 4 November 2009.  
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political elites quite successfully sold the market reforms as the only logical 
way of responding to exogenous constraints in the global economy. Whilst 
institutional context matters, ideological discourses pertaining to neoliberal 
economics have had material consequences by constraining elites to 
formulate alternative ideas of managing the copper industry. 
 
5.1.1 Contradictions between neoliberal discourses and 
practices 
 
To assume that Chile is an intrinsically neoliberal state defies the well-
documented empirical work on the highly politicised, if contested, economic 
reforms both under the military and democratic governments. The hegemony 
of neoliberalism was always contested in Chile. Before proceeding to discuss 
institutional reforms in mineral management that constitute these challenges 
to neoliberalism, it is worth bearing in mind that there exist stark 
contradictions to the basic propositions of neoliberalism that have been 
practised in Chile. I specifically raise four tensions within Chile’s neoliberal 
model, which are considerably important sources of change and continuity. 
 
Firstly, even under the dictatorship Chile failed to achieve absolute 
depoliticisation in copper politics. As Chapter 4 showed, copper 
nationalisation was a political decision made across the political spectrum as 
a way of addressing the long-term vulnerability of Chile from the debilitating 
effects of the flux in commodity prices. Pinochet’s market-based development 
is in sharp contradiction to statist governance, and therefore, the rationale 
for CODELCO’s existence as a state enterprise was fully political rather than 
economic. Upon its creation, it was devised cunningly as the milsch (‘milking 
cow’) of the state by giving those in the top echelons of the military the key 
decision-making powers over CODELCO’s corporate management and using 
its profits to pay for the modernisation of the armed forces. In historical 
institutionalist terms, the framework guiding state’s productive functions in 
the economy has changed through institutional conversion – ‘the 
redeployment of old institutions to new purposes’ (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 
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31) – wherein the state enterprise initially created under the statist logic was 
now utilised to maintain, if not expand, the privatisation of mining. Whilst 
Pinochet was privatising almost all state enterprises in the economy, he 
retained state control over mineral extraction and simultaneously altered its 
logic of existence. Above all, the persistence of state ownership – an 
intrinsically political act – goes against the grain of neoliberal economics.  
 
Secondly, the neo-structuralist state of Concertación failed to eradicate the 
vestiges of the dictatorship in the management of resource revenues. This 
was embodied in Ley Reserva del Cobre, which automatically gives the 
armed forces automatic 10 percent of CODELCO’s profits for arms purchases 
and its modernisation program. What is striking is that only in October 2009 
did Congress decide to take up the issue of reforming the law, which until 
recently has yet to be passed into law. This was clearly political. One simply 
needs to remember that President Aylwin’s major challenge was to strike a 
delicate balance between civilian and military elites in policy making. In 
some instances, the military flexed its muscles by sending troops in the 
streets of Santiago whenever there were political debates in Congress to 
repeal the constitutionally-enshrined protection accorded to the military by 
the dictatorship (González 2008). In the post-dictatorial years, the military 
continues to be a key veto player for any change in the institutional 
framework that may affect their corporate interests. As right parties 
represent their interests in Congress, Concertación parties have faced 
difficulties in dismantling the old system of patronage built under Pinochet. 
This once again points to the historical institutionalist arguments of political 
legacies and stable power relations between actors that slow down the 
process of institutional change. 
 
Economically, Pinochet’s legacy to maintain the power of big business stayed 
in the course of post-dictatorial politics, if not becoming more entrenched in 
the democratic political game. The wider access of organised private interests 
in state policy-making, most notably grupos económicos, and in mining, the 
Consejo Minero (Mining Council) and Sociedad Nacional de Minería 
(SONAMI), has been far more institutionalised under Concertación’s 
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governance style.55 One stark example of this relationship between the state 
and big business is the approval of National Service Customs Resolution No. 
2757, which established that it is compulsory to certify the weight and quality 
of all copper concentrates leaving national ports, and a range of maximum 
acceptable variations was established regarding the content levels present in 
concentrate upon arrival at destination.56 The resolution was the result of a 
joint effort by the Ministerio de Minería (Ministry of Mining), the National 
Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service and COCHILCO, with the 
technical collaboration of Consejo Minero (Ministry of Mining et al. 2002 in 
Lagos & Lima 2005: 51). Crucially, the interests of the mining business 
community were protected under Concertación by according a cloak of 
legitimacy to the discourses of economic efficiency and productivity. The key, 
of course, is that the neoliberal paradigm makes apparent what is possible 
(and impossible) in terms of policy choices for the left-centre coalition. By 
embracing directly the logic of productivism, progressive forces in the 
coalition were caught within the power structure as Renovated Socialists in 
Concertación negotiated a political settlement with the Christian Democrats 
and with the Right in Congress as a whole. The power-centred, distributional 
explanations of historical institutionalism (HI) shed light to this dilemma for 
Concertación parties: that their strategic interests need not be defined 
according to rational calculus of a priori sets of preferences. Instead, the 
governing coalition had a more long-term interest of establishing political 
stability and consensual decision-making to avoid the repeat of the 
breakdown of Chilean democracy in 1973. Because the Right holds the 
stronger veto, Concertación played by the rules of the game established by 
                                                   
 
55 Consejo Minero represents the interests of big mining firms; its membership includes the 
foreign companies operating in La Gran Mineria, and CODELCO is part of the council. 
CODELCO’s interest clearly runs against other firms since the former aims to produce for 
the state whilst the latter is simply for profit. This was demonstrated in the royalty debate 
where CODELCO threatened to withdraw in the Council due to conflicts of interests. 
SONAMI is the national grouping of miners in Chile; the organisation goes back as far as 
1883 and has therefore long been engaged in policy consultations.   
56 If the levels in an operation fall outside of this range, the National Customs Service adjusts 
the figures regarding the contents actually present in the concentrate and reports this to 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (in Chilean, SII), which takes the relevant action to 
correct and fine the violating party. 
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Pinochet, in which mining reforms were only possible through incremental 
routes of change. 
 
Finally, and related to the point about party politics, the perceived necessity 
for pact making with more centre and right forces has, thus far, generated 
internal disputes between the Socialists and Christian Democrats, eventually 
weakening the coalition’s parliamentary control and feeding into the decision 
of minor parties (Radical Social Democracy and Party for Democracy) to run 
independently in municipal elections (Vacs 2010: 216). And despite losing in 
the 2009 presidential elections, the strife between the major left and centre 
parties remains wide and seemingly irresolvable as the Socialist Party 
publicly declared the possibility of reuniting with the more radical 
communist parties in Chile in response to the continuing unpopularity of 
mainstream parties in the light of the 2011 student protests – a situation with 
a potentially disruptive effect to the future of Concertación coalition.57 In 
these circumstances, the decisive move towards the centre of the renovated 
Left to accommodate business interests and to incorporate private capitalists 
in the state apparatus has threatened the consensus and has spiralled into 
what seems to be a crisis of the coalition. Some point to the weakening of 
ideological delineations between political parties, which has paved the way 
for convergence towards neoliberal policies in Chile and the rest of Latin 
America (Dávila & Fuentes 2002; Stokes 2001).  
 
But even if the main normative framework that guides economic decision-
making has been shaped by neoliberalism, it is misleading to say that no 
changes occurred under the neostructuralist state. There have been 
important steps undertaken by Concertación, such as the implementation of 
a new special royalty tax in mining, the strengthening of financial regulations 
over copper profits via sovereignty wealth funds, and the re-regulation of the 
working conditions across sectors through Subcontracting Law in 2007. 
                                                   
 
57 For an overview of the implications of the student movement to the wider Chilean party 
system and contemporary political configurations, see newspaper archives detailing the 
debates in light of the 2011 protests, e.g. El Mercurio 2011, 2012; Ramírez 2013. 
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However, as the next section details, innovative strategies to ‘bring back’ the 
state have clear limitations. The taxation debate raised a fundamental issue 
regarding the extent markets trump state regulations by seeking consensus to 
establish a special royalty tax for mining in a period of remarkably high 
prices. Equally, the logic of competitiveness makes apparent the difficulty for 
the state to step in once again to re-regulate the lax institutional framework 
on labour relations. The Chilean state and indeed the public have deemed 
private sector demands as legitimate – that an increase in tax rates would 
undermine Chilean competitiveness in the world market and that third party 
contracting is a legitimate business practice. Fundamentally, neo-
structuralism remains committed to economic development that is inclusive, 
with emphases on building export capacity of smaller firms, broader social 
protection mechanisms especially for the poor, and recognition of social 
cohesion and citizenship rights as fundamental to achieve growth with equity 
(Álvarez 2004; Bielschowsky 2009; Calderón 2008; Infante & Sunkel 2009). 
In the next section, I explore the institutional innovations under difficult 
circumstances fought by Concertación governments under Ricardo Lagos 
(2001-2005) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2009). 
 
5.2 Institutional change in broader patterns of continuity, 2001-
2009 
 
The practice of depoliticisation, which has been embedded historically under 
Pinochet’s neoliberal economics and political demobilisation, has placed 
more emphasis on growth strategies and less on politicised issues in mining 
policy. For key policy-makers in COCHILCO, CODELCO, and Ministry of 
Finance and Mining, what constitute mining policy are strictly those which 
foster stable macroeconomic conditions for investment, ways in which 
CODELCO investment projects can be financed, promotion of export 
capacities especially by private sector, and ‘sound management’ of the state 
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enterprise.58 More critical and politicised issues have been left outside of 
institutional channels in mining governance or were watered down upon 
arriving in National Congress. Nevertheless unlike the exclusionary politics 
during the dictatorship, representative democracy has altered the rules and 
policy environment that bear upon the policy ideas and practices of 
Concertación elites. The main difference is the ability of Cepalista 
technocrats and those outside of the party and state apparatus to repoliticise 
copper policy debates by introducing new proposals to manage mining 
beyond the strict neoliberal paradigm. To empirically demonstrate this, two 
key legislations were passed under the third and fourth presidencies of 
Concertación: the Royalty Law in 2005, which imposed a special tax in 
mining to pay for innovation and social development in Chile; and the 
Subcontracting Law in 2007 that re-regulated labour relations in contexts of 
flexible labour markets. By analysing these two legislations, I depart from 
arguments on excessive continuity and stability of Chilean political economy 
under Concertación. If hegemony is constituted through the use of coercion 
and consent (Cox 1981), then the dissatisfaction – if not cautious rejection – 
of Chilean technocrats and labour unions of neoliberal ideas as the 
foundation of its growth strategy indicates the gradual breakdown of this 
consensus on competitiveness over social development. Indeed, policy 
choices were made under Lagos and Bachelet with the explicit attempt to 
ameliorate market excesses so as to ‘make mining contribute for Chile’s 
development’.59  
 
5.2.1 Institutional change in taxation 
 
The move to increase taxation in Chile’s mining sector was a major revision 
in the neoliberal mining framework. As early as mid-1990s, Cepalista 
economists like Ricardo Ffrench Davis proposed the idea of a royalty tax but 
                                                   
 
58 Author interviews with Marco Fluckiger, COCHILCO, October 2009; Gustavo Lagos, 
Consultant, November 2009; Nicolas Majluf, CODELCO, October 2009. 
59 The quote is from the Superintendente of Antofagasta in 2001. See the discussion on 
royalty tax later. 
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this was immediately rejected. The discourses of global competitiveness and 
comparative advantage were powerful arguments to dissuade Frei Jr.’s 
government to make any changes in the inherited neoliberal model. Policy 
reform to assert greater state involvement in the economy was not within the 
realm of possibilities for the centre-led Concertación government. But what 
strengthened the pro-business discourse in Chile was the unfavourable 
external environment, namely low commodity prices between 1980s and 
2002. With no alternative ‘institutional supply’ for policy change, the debate 
did not even take off and the agenda faltered for another five years.60 It was 
not until the Superintendente of Antofagasta publicly argued that ‘mining 
can and should contribute more in Chile’s development’ in 2001 that the 
issue would be revived. In 19 June 2001, a new legislation was introduced, 
Ley de Evasión y Elusión (Ley Nº 19.738), to address different forms of 
business practices to avoid paying taxes in Chile. One principal change was to 
amend the laws to give more powers to tax agencies to seek ways on 
penalising both legal (tax avoidance) and illegal (tax evasion) forms of 
skirting around tax payments. This was, in hindsight, a precursor of the 
larger debate on changing the taxation regime that was to transpire in the 
following years.  
 
In a major gathering of mining elites and state agencies, Expomin in April 
2002, the Ministry of Mining expressed quite clearly its position regarding 
the different ways for the mining industry to contribute more substantively to 
Chile’s economy. It proposed to strengthen the ‘Cluster’ and create a 
Sustainability Fund to address questions of research, innovation, and 
sustainability of the Chilean growth model. This was taking place in the 
context of an increasingly politicised climate, during which business practices 
of mining firms on tax payments have attracted significant attention (Forum 
on Royalty, Cluster and Innovation 2005; Punto Minero 2005: 6-7). What 
became the tipping point, however, was the controversial case of Exxon’s 
attempted sale of its subsidiary Disputada de Las Condes to Anglo American 
                                                   
 
60 Author interview with Ricardo Ffrench Davis, Concertación technocrat & Independent 
Consultant, August 2009.  
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outside of Chile in order to avoid paying capital taxes. This sparked intense 
political discussions on the effectiveness of the taxation regime vis-à-vis the 
scope of freedom of (mining) companies operating in Chile (Riesco 2005; 
Punto Minero 2005). This resuscitated, above all, the question of how far 
private mining has contributed to Chile’s economic development. 
Parliamentarians across the political spectrum began to openly discuss the 
idea of applying royalty taxes for the exploitation of non-renewable 
resources. The Lagos government through the study sponsored by the 
Ministry of Mining finally affirmed its position to push for a new legislative 
project to introduce taxes specifically in the mining industry. The Senate 
decided to establish a special commission to study taxation in Gran Minería. 
Between the mid-2003 and early 2004, Finance Minister Nicolás Eyzaguirre 
raised the issue of mining firms to voluntarily give up some of the benefits 
established in DL 600 (Punto Minero 2005: 7). 
 
In this context, it was then not surprising when Ricardo Lagos announced the 
royalty legislative project in Expomin in 19 April 2004, which was aimed at 
establishing royalty charges in metal and non-metal mining activities with 
the end goal of financing initiatives to expand technological and innovation 
capacity of the country. Finally, in 5 July 2004, the new legislative agenda 
was introduced creating an Ad Valorem mining royalty and establishing the 
Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad. Whilst the proposal generated 
some support, for example from Santiago Mayor Joaquín Lavín, in the end it 
boiled down to a numbers game in Congress. In 21 July 2004, the vote split 
was 61 in favour and 41 against the bill. Despite the majority vote, the 
required four-sevenths vote in Congress to pass the law was not achieved. In 
response, Lagos used his special presidential powers (so-called facultad 
presidencial) to insist on the urgency of the legislative agenda, and therefore, 
compelling Congress to retake the initiative. The senate, with an opposition 
majority thanks to the 1980 constitutional clauses, essentially rejected the 
presidential initiative to take up the royalty bill in 10 August 2004 (Punto 
Minero 2005: 7). This vividly demonstrates the effects of Pinochet’s binomial 
system, wherein inter-coalitional conflicts, though not occurring quite often, 
remains to be in the upper hand of the right coalition. The institutional 
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rigidities inherited from the dictatorship were left unreformed in the first 
decade of democracy, which has become an effective constraint to 
Concertación’s economic agenda. 
 
Despite losing the political battle, President Ricardo Lagos announced he 
would insist on passing the legislation to enhance the contribution of the 
mining sector to Chilean development. In 14 December 2004, after intense 
negotiations with parliamentarians, Lagos reintroduced a new royalty bill, 
now called Royalty II or the Specific Tax on Mining (Impuesto Específico a 
la Minería), immediately after the municipal elections. Finally, in 2005, the 
Cámara de Diputados passed the new proposal with an overwhelming 
majority – 86 in favour and 14 against the bill – which was then taken up by 
Senate for voting. In the end, it was approved by the senators with 28 votes 
in favour of Royalty II, 5 against it, and 6 abstentions (Senate Press 2005). 
The revisions in the law, detailed below, addressed the reservations of the 
opposition, such as giving mining firms under DL 600 the freedom to choose 
which tax rates they want to follow after the legislative changes. What must 
be noted, however, was that the public campaign in favour of the royalty law 
was particularly huge to the extent that SONAMI director Alfredo Ovalle 
argued that President Lagos’ decision to use his presidential powers to 
reintroduce a second bill was politically motivated, especially in the context 
of an election that had just transpired (Senate Press 2004). Overall, the core 
issues in discussed in the Senate included the necessity to guarantee 
resources to support other regions in an effective way, the protection of small 
and medium mining firms, the importance of re-evaluating taxation in iron 
and non-metal mining, the need to close loopholes in the tax system, the 
concerns of right senators from UDI to advance a system of mining patents to 
ensure competitiveness, and finally, the decision on the percentage of royalty 
fees to be distributed in the mining regions (Senate Press 2005). Whilst the 
politics of reforming taxation and royalty fees exemplify the specific nature of 
coalition bargaining and the political economy of mineral management in 
resource-rich states, it should be emphasised that the structural conditions 
which were the foundations of the neoliberal mining model were gradually 
eroding, thereby, paving the way for new political discourses to emerge. As 
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Figure 5.3 shows, global markets for copper have substantially changed as 
prices soared. The sustained demand for primary commodities by China has 
facilitated a public discourse affirming the royalty tax law and allowing the 
Chilean state to further increase its profit intake from large-scale mining. In 
short, the changing global context has ended the discourse of austerity, fiscal 
conservatism, and the need for the publics to sacrifice. Chile was, in short, 
entering a period of growth and a ‘time of plenty’.  
 
Figure 5.3 Copper production-price relations under 'Left-led' 
Concertación 
 
Source: SERNAGEOMIN 2010. 
 
The passage of the law in 2005 is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, 
Concertación’s success in passing the legislation disproves the long-held view 
about Chile’s staunchly neoliberal style of economic management, wherein 
national elites have constructed and sustained a growth strategy based on 
low taxes as a way of boosting competitiveness and attracting investment 
projects. From the perspective of big business and Right parties, an increase 
in tax rates – especially a specific tax law just for mining – can hamper 
Chile’s competitiveness as decisions of long term, expensive private 
investment are based on cost calculations. Figure 5.4 exemplifies the 
historical dependence of Chile on large-scale mineral extraction for its 
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financial stability, in which the direct impacts on any changes in taxation law 
are likely to affect their profits. As mentioned above, there was a clear 
emphasis on protecting small and medium mining companies, and therefore, 
the additional tax struck large-scale mining (foreign) firms operating in 
Chile. For Concertación economists, royalty taxes are counter measures 
against the flux in commodity prices, external shocks, and investment 
strategy to reduce Chile’s century-old dependence on a single commodity. 
Cepalista Ricardo Ffrench Davis (2009) recounted the intense debate in 
Congress: 
 
Canada and Australia have had royalty taxes, yet the Canadian and 
Australian firms in Chile did not have to pay any royalty, why not? 
That was quite a strong argument. The firms argued that “if you 
tax me or put royalty, I will go away.” But where do you go? Will 
you go back to Canada or Australia? The old mines? These are rich 
mines, we can charge.  And we can charge more than we are 
charging because they are very profitable in Chile. And that is the 
role of the law, to collect for the royal, the royal is the society. 
 
After the initial rejection of Royalty I proposal, what was achieved is a 
slightly less optimal outcome for the state but nonetheless a watershed in 
taxation of the mining industry. Royalty II Law stipulates that mining firms 
with annual sales more than 50,000 metric tons of fine copper are subjected 
to a maximum of 5 percent. Those firms with sales of equal or below 50,000 
metric tons but more than 12,000 metric tons are taxed at a variable rate 
from 0.5 to 4.5 percent. All firms producing equal or less than 12,000 metric 
tons are in equal measure exempted from the additional taxation. As Figure 
5.4 shows, the law directly impacts on the profits of the group of mining 
elites (also known as GMT-10). This also reflects the historical trend in Latin 
America of states taxing foreign capital rather than the more resistant 
domestic business class. The Chilean government gradually modified the law, 
which later have made three major modifications: (a) requiring taxes to be 
paid in Chile in the case of sales of foreign companies which directly or 
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indirectly control more than 10 percent of Chilean companies; 61  (b) 
elimination of accelerated depreciation for the purposes of additional 
taxation; and (c) royalty taxes. The passage of the royalty law, however, 
created incompatibility between the statutory goals and existing business 
practices. The Specific Tax on Mining (or IEM) subjects mining companies 
producing more than 12,000 metric tons to a minimum of 0.5 percent tax 
rate (large-scale companies pay the maximum fee of 5 percent). To offer tax 
predictability, Pinochet’s Foreign Investment Law (DL 600) protects 
companies through tax invariability for 10 years as the project starts and 20 
years for mining or industrial projects requiring capital equal to or greater 
than US$ 50 million. The law recognises the binding nature of contracts, and 
therefore, the legislature offered companies some financial incentives to 
change the invariability regime in exchange of moving towards the new tax 
system. Mining companies can become subjected to IEM from January 2006 
with certain guarantees, for example, by lowering the tax rate for large-scale 
companies to 4 percent until 2017 instead of 5 percent as stipulated in the 
law (Mir 2010). Some firms have retained their privileges under DL 600 by 
specifying clauses for operators to avoid the additional taxes. These include 
firms whose annual sales have been equal or less than 8,000 annual tax 
units, those who have signed up previously foreign investment contracts, and 
those who see more onerous the specific tax already paid by the law of tax 
income. 
 
                                                   
 
61 This was a specific response to the controversy on corporate malpractices of mining firms 
to avoid tax payments in sales in 2001. 
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Figure 5.4 Production share of mining companies in Chile, 2004-
2010 
 
Source: SERNAGEOMIN 2010 (Adapted).62  
 
Because of this specific clause exempting companies by deducting further 8 
percent of the operational costs, the Internal Revenue Service can contest 
copper prices that have been used to calculate the annual sales of companies. 
COCHILCO, the watchdog of the state in the mining industry, has the 
ultimate right to determine referent copper prices to make sure that firms do 
not sell fine copper at undervalued prices for the sake of tax evasion.63 
Nevertheless the legislation is indicative of the view that Chile’s neoliberal 
model could only succeed by promoting the mining sector through an export-
intensive, low tax rate strategy. More broadly, international attention has 
increasingly viewed the positive role that mineral rents can contribute to 
social development by way of financing social policy without losing sight of 
the resource curse (Hinojosa et. al. 2010; Hujo & McClanahan 2009; Rosser 
2009). We are therefore seeing new policy practices that go beyond the 
                                                   
 
62  SERNAGEOMIN Statistics. Accessed online on 03 February 2011 at 
http://www.sernageomin.cl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=201&Itemi
d=276.  
63 Specifically, COCHILCO is the special agency in charge of supervising and inspecting full 
and correct compliance with laws, regulations and norms regarding procedures that are 
specifically applicable to the mining sector and to the relevant companies in public and 
private sectors (Lagos & Lima 2005: 50).  
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prescriptions of neoliberal resource management, as espoused by the World 
Bank and resource curse experts.   
 
The second component of any effective resource governance model is the 
management of resource rents. In Chile, this is done in two ways. Firstly, a 
separate law was created to establish the copper stabilisation fund through 
the Ley de Fiscal Reserva or Law on Fiscal Responsibility. Whilst this is not 
entirely new as Chile had a stabilisation fund in the 1960s, the new law sets 
out formal procedures and clear division of labour between the Ministry of 
Finance and the Treasury. Secondly, a percentage of the funds of the royalty 
fees will go directly to the Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad in 
order to redistribute resource wealth both to mining and non-mining regions 
of Chile. Under the Ley de Fiscal Reserva created in 2005, the Ministry of 
Finance has divided sovereign wealth funds into two schemes, namely the 
Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones or PRF (Pension Reserve Fund) and Fondo 
de Estabilización Ecónomica or FEES (Economic and Social Stabilisation 
Fund). The FEES has more market value because it inherited the funds from 
the Copper Stabilisation Fund also managed by the Ministry of Finance 
before 2005. What I want to point out is that the Law on Fiscal 
Responsibility creates the link between the fiscal powers and resource 
management functions of these financial institutions by according both 
agencies direct control over decision-making in sovereign wealth fund 
management. Following a typically Chilean practice in policy-making, the 
Ministry of Finance issued Supreme Decree No. 621 to establish a Finance 
Committee (FC) in charge of advising the Finance Minister on the analysis 
and design of the investment strategy of the PRF and FEES. As expected, FC 
is an external body consisting of professional experts with vast experience in 
economic and financial matters (Ministerio de Hacienda 2010: 19-23). 
Although this may indicate a strong tendency to consolidate the neoliberal 
ideology predominant in the ministry, this was not a concession at all for 
Concertación economists because they view the extensive role of highly 
trained bureaucrats as a crucial element of ‘efficient’ technocratic 
governance. This would have been the political compromise in any case to 
persuade the Right and business groups to accept changes in taxation. As 
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Concertación economist Ffrench Davis argues, it is better to have had this 
money than nothing at all.64 As Figure 5.5 shows, the global commodity boom 
has allowed the Chilean state to accumulate substantial reserves which can 
be used in times of price downturns or unexpected events. The market value 
of FRP and FEES in 2009 reached a total of US$ 14,706 million. Put simply, 
its logic is to collect and save taxes through sovereign wealth funds during 
periods of high commodity prices to accumulate enough reserves to cushion 
the effects of low copper prices.65 
 
Figure 5.5 Copper revenues as SWFs in Chile, 2006-2010 
 
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda 2010 (Adapted), 9. 
 
In recognising the vulnerability of Chile’s mining-based economy, the royalty 
law aims to directly link copper profits and public-private initiatives to 
enhance national competitiveness. As stipulated in the law, part of the 
accrued royalty taxes are reserved towards financing the National Innovation 
Fund, wherein 25 percent of the fund is distributed across all regions in Chile 
                                                   
 
64 Author interview with Ricardo Ffrench Davis, August 2009. 
65 This is, in fact, stated directly in Ley de Responsibilidad Fiscal. Several research on 
resource revenue management in Chile likewise support this view regarding the prudent 
exercise of fiscal powers, for example, ICMM 2009; IIED 2002; Otto et. al. 2006; Ruiz-
Dana 2007. 
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and the remaining 75 percent are utilised to develop research and 
development through a competition of the best innovation projects in mining 
and beyond. This is quite an exceptional and sophisticated method of 
resource allocation of natural resource taxes that is comparable to the highly 
centralised innovation systems of countries like Sweden and United 
Kingdom. Above all, this innovation system requires a complex set of 
institutions and highly coordinated responses across state agencies in various 
policy sectors. In other words, the institutional framework requires 
strengthening the bureaucratic capacity of the Chilean state to avoid possible 
duplication of responsibilities and hierarchical relationships among 
ministries and specialised agencies. Although World Bank’s assessment of 
the innovation system in Chile is far from perfect, especially with respect to 
the fragmented institutional architecture of innovation policy and need for 
greater coordination among different agencies (CNIC 2010), national 
innovation and competition policy in Chile is swiftly moving forward towards 
further centralisation and better coordination. In the most recent report, its 
strategy involves emphasising the role of local economic capacity to enhance 
economic growth, the consolidation and coordination of a policy network, 
and the greater (informal) role of CNIC as a policy advisor to overlook the 
direction of Chilean policy towards competitiveness and economic 
productivity across different sectors of the economy.  
 
The novelty of the law is to emphasise the need for inter-sectoral linkages 
rather than concentrating all state efforts at ruthlessly taxing the mining 
sector. In this sense, the Chilean strategy to global competitiveness goes 
beyond entrenching dependency on copper exports. Across all parties, there 
is recognition of the challenges to diversify the export base to other natural 
resources (a path similar to Brazil) and to build human capital as a way of 
enhancing overall worker productivity and economic efficiency. For example, 
debates in Senate have revolved around determining how much should go to 
mining regions – Antofagasta and Copiapo – and how other non-mining 
regions can utilise copper funds to develop new ideas (Senate Press 2009a, 
2010). The vote in Congress to create the National Innovation Fund – 26 in 
favour and 3 against it – was clearly indicative of the consensus around the 
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need for economic diversification, which copper rents can (and should) 
facilitate. The new financial resources that the Chilean state acquires through 
the royalty taxes are supplementing the deficiencies of copper policy by 
Pinochet and first two Concertación governments, which have been described 
as essentially rentista (rentist) in character. Upon distributing 35 percent 
among regions and 65 percent at the national level, the Senate emphasised 
the need to utilise the new financial instruments as a way of creating 
alternative economic activities in mining regions (Senate Press 2009b; 
Boletin N° 3.588-08 2009). Whilst at the national level the discourse of 
competitiveness prevails, for Senator Isabel Allende, representative of 
Atacama, the question is one of compensation and more appropriate 
redistribution of the bundle of ‘environmental goods and bads’ associated 
with mineral extraction: 
 
The Atacama region, contributing its great quantity of resources 
and for [economic] change, bears the enormous social problems, 
environmental liabilities, contamination and very little social 
investment. Therefore, we raise the issue to the Ministry [of 
Mining] that part of the new Specific Tax should be bound for the 
mining regions to compensate for the environmental ills of 
mining.66 
 
The Concertación government, on their second decade of rule, recognised the 
difficulties of export diversification particularly because rising copper prices 
can lock in resource-rich states to focus the economy on commodities as a 
growth strategy. Equally, they also delinked social policies and revenue 
management by managing copper rents in a highly institutionalised 
regulatory framework – a move that goes against the trend in Latin America 
(see Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; Hogenboom 2012).  Nevertheless the 
management of resources, though technocratic and highly institutionalised in 
Chile, has been heavily politicised. The royalty debate and the underlying 
political arguments to justify its passage clearly exemplify the invariably 
political nature of managing resources. But perhaps what best exemplifies 
                                                   
 
66 Senate Press (2010) ‘Comisión de Minería Estimó que Parte de los Recursos del Aumento 
del Royalty debe ir a Regiones Mineras’, June 4.   
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the supremacy of politics over economics is the ways in which the state 
attempted to manage labour conflicts by grafting a new subcontracting law – 
a move to silence once again the powerful mining unions in Chile.   
 
5.2.2 State responses to labour flexibility 
 
The left-led Concertación governments have performed excellently in 
addressing poverty reduction and expanding opportunities for the poor 
without challenging the consensus around market orthodoxy. In terms of 
people living in poverty, Chile ranks as the second best performer with 20.2 
percent in 2002 and remarkably further decreasing to 13.7 percent in 2008; 
its poverty rate went down from 13.7 percent in 2006 to 11.5 percent in 2009 
(ECLAC 2010a). However, the state failed to address social inequality, in 
which ordinary people across the economy have been exposed to profoundly 
varied working conditions and social benefits. In this context, the widening 
gulf between mining workers and other working classes as well as between 
those with permanent and temporary contracts have affected the capacity of 
workers to claim rights under conditions of neoliberalism. Although I shall 
discuss in extensive detail the contemporary role of mining unions in the 
copper industry in the next chapter, it is important to take note of the state 
responses to global economic restructuring in extractive industries and 
labour relations. As shown in Chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the Chilean labour 
movement had developed in a highly repressive environment wherein labour 
incorporation was motivated by state attempts at maintaining social peace 
and depoliticising the movement. If there is one clear policy of continuity 
between Pinochet and Concertación, it is certainly in labour policy in which 
any serious discussions to reverse the pro-business labour code were left out 
of the political agenda in the first decade of democratic rule. By attempting to 
push Chilean exports to become globally competitive, for example through 
free trade arrangements and diversification of agricultural exports, the 
labour question was once again swept under the carpet. The Concertación 
efforts focussed on two core changes: restoration of traditional labour rights 
eliminated by the dictatorship and modernisation of labour relations. The 
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Chilean state has had to manage the fragile relationships with trade unions 
which were undermined under the dictatorship, one that strikes a balance 
between employers’ demands for maximum flexibility in the labour market – 
contracts, rules in hiring and firing, working hours – and the attempts of 
workers and unions to recuperate their economic gains prior to the 
dictatorship. Concertación’s decision of economic continuity with marginal 
changes from neoliberalism is reflected in the shortcomings of the labour 
reforms in the twenty years of democratic rule (Cook 2007; Frank 2004; 
2002; Vergara 2008: 190-193; Winn 2004).  
 
The specific features of the copper industry have shaped the contemporary 
organisational structure and mobilisational capacity of the labour movement. 
On one hand, the mining sector does not generate mass employment even 
during periods of rapid expansion in production due to the technological 
requirements of modernisation of copper mines. On the other hand, Pinochet 
sought to win the support of Chilean copper workers because of their long 
history of militancy and the disastrous effects of long strikes for the Chilean 
economy (Vergara 2008). Together with high wages, generous social 
benefits, and relatively coherent political identity in mining communities, 
there is a widely held (and sometimes misinterpreted) image of miners as a 
labour aristocracy in Chile. This imagery is very powerful and emotionally 
captivating in a country that relied on the red metal for its salary, hence the 
phrase el sueldo de Chile. Nevertheless, neoliberal labour relations have 
affected the working conditions, employment security, and overall class 
identity of Chilean workers, which clearly includes the miners of the North. 
But what kept the coherence of their political identity really had more to do 
with the specific lifestyle in the Northern mines. Just like the nitrate workers, 
copper miners enjoy better wages and social benefits; they are in equal 
measure exposed to the harsh realities of risky living conditions in the copper 
mines. Whilst it is very easy to have a negative view of copper workers as 
being aristocratic, the fact remains that they deliver the radical critique to 
Pinochet’s neoliberal model and Concertación’s neostructuralist policies. 
Whilst CUT and sectoral workers have always had a more militant position 
than miners, it is certainly the case that copper workers command the 
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electoral votes and have more decisive influence over the broader fate of the 
labour movement in Chile (Nem Singh 2012).  
 
In these circumstances, the mobilisation of private mining workers in 2006 
against Minera Escondida, Chile’s largest private mining firm and second 
copper exporter in the world, was consequential to national political debates. 
In post-dictatorial Chile, the responsibility falls within the Ministry of Labour 
and its inspecting body Dirección del Trabajo to guarantee the compliance of 
both principal and subcontracting companies as regards working conditions, 
salaries, and working hours of non-permanent workers. The dynamics in the 
mining industry does not fully represent the bigger picture in Chile since 
business practices in seasonal agriculture, services, and retail sectors are 
worse (Silva 2007; Villarroel Bloomfield 2007; Winn 2004). However, they 
give us an idea of the extent to which neoliberal ideas have been entrenched 
among state agencies and big business in order to manage tensions and 
labour conflicts. Whilst labour is and should be part of copper policy simply 
because production processes cannot take place without the workers, it is a 
struggle to think labour relations as part of mining policy. For example, the 
Ministry of Mining and COCHILCO have no specialists on labour relations 
and human capital development despite the fact that this is the most 
important industry in Chile. One is easily persuaded to think that the 
politicisation of labour issues occurs (and should be left) in the judiciary and 
labour ministry. This may be true in other national contexts. However, the 
historical significance of labour incorporation and the workers’ construction 
of an autonomous political identity in opposition to the liberal ideas of 
political classes in Chile (see Chapter 4.2.) reflect the contentious politics of 
industrial relations. The Concertación governments’ depoliticisation of 
labour issues are continuities of historically constituted practices of 
managing labour conflicts across mining, service, and production sectors 
under Pinochet’s neoliberal authoritarianism (Nem Singh 2012; Winn 2004). 
As Chapter 4.2.3 details, Pinochet neutralised labour conflicts through 
outright repression followed by the institutionalisation of Plan Laboral. What 
Concertación inherited was a system of labour relations, wherein collective 
rights were restricted, controlled, and determined by the state and 
 191 
employers. The political transition may have been smooth but the task of 
rebuilding political relations between parties and unions was formidable. 
Concertación faced the difficult situation of reinstalling collective labour 
rights and better individual working conditions in a neoliberal policy 
environment. Labour reforms were almost avoided by the Aylwin and Frei Jr. 
governments because any radical package can reignite conflicts between 
employers and employees, and break consensual politics that was so carefully 
grafted by the political classes in neoliberal democracy. Despite the series of 
tripartite negotiations between the government, big business, and national 
union CUT, labour reforms were never settled until 2001 when Ricardo 
Lagos initiated a full labour reform agenda in Congress (Cook 2007; Frank 
2002, 2004; Winn 2004). I would therefore claim that labour politics, being 
inherently politicised, was treated as an issue outside of what constitutes 
copper policy. 
 
Subcontracting is practised extensively though not exclusively in the mining 
sector and it is a trend that occurs worldwide rather than in Chile alone (Silva 
2007; Villarroel Bloomfield 2007). It is worth noting, however, that Chilean 
companies’ use of third party contracts increased from 43 percent in 1999 to 
50.5 percent in 2005 – a seven point jump in a short span of time (Ministerio 
del Trabajo 2006: 7). Part of the discourse of global competitiveness is a 
flexible labour market that can respond to the changing demands of firms in 
a highly globalised value chains. The role of the state has been reduced to 
regulatory functions in which conflicts between employers and employees are 
mediated at the enterprise level with governments stepping out of its 
traditional corporatist role (Murillo et. al. 2011; Standing 1997; Weller 2009). 
Whilst this was not really fully functional in Latin America and unions were 
representative of a small sector of urban workers, it was nonetheless the 
means by which workers were incorporated in models of political inclusion. 
From this perspective, large-scale mining requires cost adjustments by 
keeping a small number of highly skilled, better paid labour force, which can 
allow private capitalists to manage their businesses in concentrating in 
mineral extraction whilst acquiring goods and services for other related tasks 
from third party companies. For example, it is standard practice to exclude 
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industrial cleaning, maintenance of mining camps, and transportation in the 
‘core business’ practice of firms. This reflects the business model adapted by 
multinational corporations operating at a global scale, including large-scale 
mining companies in Chile. 67  However, the debate is the degree of 
outsourcing and the levels of accountability of hiring firms. It is useful to 
make a distinction between the contractor and subcontractor. Contractors 
directly negotiate and sign agreements with the principal company, and in 
this case, the parent firm has access to information about their goods, 
services, and perhaps even labour practices. Subcontractors, on the other 
hand, are hired by the contractors and therefore have no direct working 
relationship with the principal firm. This is where the problem of 
subcontracting lies in Chile. Because large firms have no control over the 
regulatory standards and business practices of smaller companies, 
accountability to workers’ rights and minimum standards of welfare 
provisions are lost. The law, as discussed below, attempts to clarify the lines 
of responsibility among hiring firms. As Chapter 4 already demonstrated, 
labour conflicts are at the heart of the Chilean state’s social reengineering 
project and therefore the resolution of subcontracting in copper mining – its 
main industry – affects the plight of workers across the economy. 
 
Whilst working conditions and situation of subcontracting differ across 
sectors and between public and private mining, the similar outcome is that 
workers have had to suffer the consequences of multiple layers of service 
contracting and making collective action through unionisation difficult to 
achieve. Those with the capacity to mobilise and organise strikes – mainly 
mining unions – challenged the dominance of this economic logic in 
managing capital-labour relations with some degree of success. As Chapter 6 
will demonstrate, and as supported by Chilean academic research, this is not 
a uniform process: distinctive positions of workers within the commodity 
chains and the degree of accountability if firms are decisive factors that 
structure the ability of mining unions to become politically salient actors 
                                                   
 
67  Author interviews with Javier Cox, Consejo Minero, October 2009; Juan Saldivia, 
Independent Consultant, August 2009.  
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(Leiva Gómez 2009; Pérez & Villalobos 2010). In short, the power of copper 
workers to collectively strike, organise, or participate in national debates are 
conditioned by the broader changes in the global economy and the response 
of states in terms of protecting union rights, or the lack of it. 
 
Taking the case of CODELCO, one can surmise the difficult situation for the 
state to respond to the issue. Whilst its goal is to make sure CODELCO 
achieves productivity and efficiency in its business operations, the state is 
also pressured to respond to social demands for worker protection in 
situations of excessive flexibility. CODELCO’s modernisation plan under 
Concertación involves accepting third party outsourcing as a legitimate 
business strategy to enable the firm to become more competitive though this 
is far more complex as Chapter 6 will elucidate. As Table 5.1 shows, 
CODELCO’s subcontracting grew over the years. Those without permanent 
contracts constitute more than double of the total workforce in the company. 
According to consultants and mining experts, the trend is indicative of the 
difficulties in company management and competitive pressures faced by 
CODELCO vis-à-vis the private sector. Because subcontracted workers are 
paid cheaper with less individual plans for social and family benefits, 
CODELCO could keep on hiring workers on an ad hoc basis whilst 
maintaining a core set of permanent workers. For example, there are 41,241 
contracted and 19,347 permanent workers in 2010, which is in fact an 
improvement from 2007 after the implementation of the Subcontracting Law 
(43,289 contracted workforce and 18,211 permanent workers) (CODELCO 
2010). If neo-structuralism argues for change, labour politics is certainly not 
part of the reform project. The organisational structure of mining today is 
one where a principal company performs core tasks with chains of contracted 
firms to offer services. Labour flexibilisation, inevitably, constitutes one of 
the defining features of Chile’s resource governance model. 
 
Table 5.1 Permanent and subcontracted workforce in CODELCO 
 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Company Personnel1 19,753 18,258 17,166 16,778 18,211 19,347 
Operating Contractors2 8,913 9,206 13,773 19,929 26,210 23,138 
Investment Contractors3 4,720 6,307 5,346 8,683 17,079 18,103 
Source: CODELCO Annual Reports 
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Notes:  
All figures are calculated as of December 31st of every year. 
(1) Company personnel are defined as those included in the company payroll.  
(2) Operating contractors represent the personnel used by subcontractors support normal 
operations for example mining work. 
(3) Investment contractors are personnel employed by subcontractors as part of new 
investments, for example investments to develop underground mining in Chuquicamata and 
many others. 
 
One can easily imagine that subcontracting would be a focal rallying point of 
union solidarity that has divided Chile’s weakened labour movement (see 
Chapter 6), in fact there are divided opinions regarding how to handle the 
issue. For national union CUT, the permanent unions in CODELCO, the 
Federación de los Trabajadores del Cobre or FTC (Copper Workers’ 
Federation), have not expressed their full support of the demands of 
subcontracted workers’ unions. Indeed, there is simply no interest for FTC to 
wholeheartedly join other workers in solidarity.68 This brings us back to the 
central issue of workers’ political identity: subcontracting, which constitutes 
labour flexibilisation under neoliberalism, has not only broken down the 
traditional relationship between the principal company and the worker, it has 
also produced fragmentation, tensions, and conflicts between unions and 
workers who are at different positions in the structure of production (Nem 
Singh 2012). 
 
Additionally, big business has sought to further flexibilise the labour market 
to enhance the efficiency of business operations. Subcontracting makes sense 
because “companies buy goods and services from third parties, and labour is 
the primary responsibility of contracting firms”.69 This is especially even 
more complicated in the case of CODELCO because the firm is state-owned 
and political interference from the state influences its labour management 
practices. Equally, the labour question in CODELCO is probably 
representative of the broader tensions between economic continuity and 
promotion of labour rights. Although CODELCO gives voice to the workers 
through their veto power in the governing board of directors, the company 
                                                   
 
68 Author interview with Lariza Palma, CUT, October 2009. 
69 Author interview with Javier Cox, Consejo Minero, 2009. 
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faces a constant dilemma of addressing subcontracted workers – who have 
received support from other unions like CUT and private sector mining.70 
Whilst permanent unions have a direct voice in CODELCO, there appear no 
institutional channels for subcontracted workers. However, the real political 
battle took place when mining workers in Minera Escondida decided to reject 
the company’s offer in the collective bargaining in 2006. The strike had 
significant consequences in that unions won a generous offer in the next 
collective bargaining in 2009, which includes 5 percent increase in salary, a 
bonus, and health and education plans for workers’ families. In response, 
Concertación introduced a bill turned into a law in 2007, which regulates the 
standards being followed by third party companies when being hired. 
According to DL 20.123, principal companies are expected to follow 
standards that would pressure subcontracting firms to comply with labour 
standards set on subcontracting law. In the words of former Labour Minister 
Ovaldo Andrade, the new law aims to protect the worker of their rights and 
minimum benefits and its immediate effect will directly benefit “more than 
one million and a half workers who are under a subcontracting regime”.71  
 
Whilst the law does not prohibit subcontracting as a legitimate practice, the 
subcontracting law establishes clear conditions that bear upon the principal 
and contracting firms to merit the employee to sue their employers in court. 
To put it simply, the principal firm can be held accountable in two ways. 
Firstly, there can be situations where an employee can use subsidiary 
liability to obtain labour justice. This is exercised when the parent company 
is compelled to respond when the subcontracting firm or contractor is 
appropriately found to fail in complying with the labour and social 
obligations towards their workers. The employee must sue the contractor, or 
the appropriate subcontractor, and in the instance they fail to respond, the 
employee can directly sue the principal company. Secondly, the employee can 
                                                   
 
70  CODELCO’s Board of Directors consists of ministers, professionals, and two 
representatives from unions and engineers’ association. 
71 For a general overview, see http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/w3-article-93827.html. Accessed 15 
February  2012. 
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use joint liability in situations when the parent firm cannot access its right to 
information (as in when the levels of subcontracting are at third, fourth or 
even fifth levels). In this situation, the parent company meets jointly with the 
contractor or subcontractor, as appropriate, to discuss their labour and social 
security obligations to the workers. To enforce joint liability, the worker must 
file suit against their direct employer and against all those who can answer 
their grievances and rights. 
 
One can imagine the difficulty of passing the law and the intensity of 
negotiation in Congress. What is evident is that national union CUT played a 
significant role in bringing together the different sectors to discuss the 
common problems regarding this business practice. Though unions differ in 
their history, interests, and mobilisational capacity, we are reminded that 
organised labour’s indispensible role in capitalist production has, historically 
speaking, remained their only defence from attempts at depoliticising, 
demobilising, and sometimes fragmenting the workers’ movement (Collier & 
Collier 2002: 41). Concertación government adopted Pinochet’s labour code, 
struggled to make peace with unions, and strengthened worker protection at 
the expense of collective rights (Leiva Gómez 2009; Ugarte Cataldo 2006; 
Winn 2004). The subcontracting law is vital yet a reactionary policy towards 
excessive labour flexibilisation. Its core feature really is finding ways to 
reduce costs for businesses to operate by pacifying an uneasy working class.  
 
5.3 Neostructuralism as a competitive strategy 
 
In this final section, I examine the implications of institutional continuities 
and changes in thinking about national development strategies of resource-
rich states in the global economy. The so-called neo-structuralist state 
coheres around the rise of a policy paradigm aimed at engaging with the 
global economy through the logic of international competitiveness (Kirby 
2010; Leiva 2008, 2006; Taylor 2010). In the Chilean case, one can surmise 
that the overarching principle of the exports-led growth model is 
productivism, or the discourse of global competitiveness and private sector 
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notions of efficiency.72 Ultimately, neoliberal ideas have won the political 
playing field in Chile’s democratic polity, although as I argued all throughout, 
neoliberal reforms were designed and recalibrated within the specific 
national context. There are attempts at conforming to the neoliberal idea of 
depoliticisation and technocratic governance. But there have been moves to 
address not just the costs of economic restructuring but also to strengthen 
the capacity of the Chilean state to ameliorate the effects of resource 
dependency in the context of economic liberalisation. As such, there is 
something new in the Chilean model – it attempts to address both the 
problem of economic growth and sustainability of the export-led model. 
Overall, the productivist discourse abandons the traditional statist 
developmentalist elements of managing production and gives priority to 
entrepreneurial initiatives as the driving force of economic growth. This is 
exemplified in economic projects enhancing ‘public-private partnerships’, for 
example, the ‘clusters’ concept where state-financed private sector projects 
are seen as the more efficient way to use fiscal policy towards economic 
growth. The state role was defined by creating the Consejo Nacional de 
Innovación para la Competitividad or CNIC (National Council of Innovation 
for Competitiveness) to enhance public-private initiatives through direct 
access to state funds of private firms. In the recent evaluation report on 
Chile’s national innovation strategy, it was noted that: 
 
Returning to high levels of economic growth is a critical policy 
concern for Chile. Since 1998, growth rates have been only half of 
the seven point one percent (7.1%) achieved from 1984–97… 
Despite a favourable environment and significant investment, 
Chile has not succeeded in diversifying its economy or becoming 
an innovation driven competitor. Its competitiveness has 
stagnated recently. Improving business innovation in private 
sector firms in the short and medium term is a central challenge. 
Policy options exist that could provide a significant stimulus to 
business innovation. Major government investments in 
innovative capacity through such agencies as CORFO, CONICYT, 
and through the tertiary education sector have yielded some 
progress, but are hampered by significant coordination failures 
                                                   
 
72 See Appendix 3 for a detailed summary. 
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and weaknesses in institutional capacity (CNIC 2010: 3, 
Emphasis in original text). 
 
Innovation policy is particularly critical in wealth accumulation due to its 
direct relationship with expanding the export profile of Chile. Taking into 
account the state capacity debate, state effectiveness can be understood as a 
mixture of strategies. The state keeps control of the strategic industry 
through CODELCO but simultaneously promotes private sector-driven 
initiatives of technological innovation. Weiss (1998) calls this the 
transformative capacity of the state where governing elites are able to 
manage the process of economic change via state-business alliances. Whilst 
in East Asian states this materialised in the form of supportive industrial 
policy, such as export subsidies, credit allocations, and effective tax support, 
Chile’s post-neoliberal political economy is characterised by a synergy 
between public agencies and private firms but where the latter takes a 
leading role. The state acts as the financier of private initiatives due to the 
overwhelming belief on the productivity and efficiency of the private sector to 
deliver economic wealth. Yet one can just think of several reasons why this is 
not true. For example, private capitalists possess the same predatory and 
rent-seeking behaviour as state agency. One simply needs to think of the 
different ways big business captured the state during privatisation – and this 
includes Chile in the list (Teichman 2001). In addition, the creation of a ‘free 
market’ to enhance competition and avoid market failure simply does not 
hold true because the state has typically stepped in when markets fail. The 
financial crisis in UK, US and Europe is nothing but a glaring example. 
Finally, private sector has a tendency, indeed a desire, to monopolise markets 
to achieve price-making powers – all of which reveal the internal tensions 
within neoliberal theory (Chang 2002, 2011). 
 
The institutional reconfiguration of Chilean mining policy informs my 
analysis of the bigger picture. The competitive strategy of Concertación 
government was really oriented towards internationalising the economy 
through a foreign investment-led mining environment with new policies 
aimed at capturing more copper revenues and directly subsidising private 
initiatives. And as shown in Section 3.2.1, the state has begun to support 
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small and medium enterprises with the view that developing domestic 
capacity of private sector can be financed through resource rents. 
Nevertheless, in the assessment report of the Ministry of Mining (2000: 13), 
mining policy has privileged international insertion in the global economy 
which strengthened Chile’s presence not only as the biggest copper producer 
in the world but also to enhance its ties with other countries in developing 
the metal mining market by enhancing competitiveness, advocating for 
sustainabiility, and expanding commercial exchange and international 
cooperation. What this implies, in reality, is to bind Chile in a series of trade 
agreements and international treaties particularly with APEC, NAFTA, and 
Mercosur. With the untrammelled demand for copper by China and India, 
the commodity price boom that began in 2002 further accelerated Chile’s 
dependency in copper at the expense of agriculture and productive sectors 
(Barton 2009a, 2009b). Such orientation in foreign trade relations is 
underpinned by the belief on Chile’s small internal market as incapable of 
adapting to globalisation via policies of self-sufficiency. Policy elites have 
constructed the myth of Chilean vulnerability if it does not open its copper 
market to Chinese FDI. Today there is significant Chinese presence in the 
new copper mines in the North either through direct investment of Chinese 
SOEs or through joint ventures. 
 
Notwithstanding copper mining as a successful resource extractive industry 
in the developing world, Chile has locked itself in a natural resource-based 
economy. The Chilean exports – copper, gold, molybdenum, wine, salmon, 
cash crops, export fruits, forestry – remain to be primary commodities whose 
privatised governance generates uneven economic development and 
environmental degradation. That Chile remains to be one of the most 
unequal societies in Latin America is not a coincidence to its governance 
model: the role of the state has been to promote private interests alongside 
diminished regulatory capacity in monitoring environmental externalities 
and mitigating the consequences of resource exploitation. In addition, 
Chilean trade relations with China – the new actor shaping the political 
economy of Latin America – has focused on copper mining and Chinese 
SOEs directly exploring new mining projects writ large (Barton 2009a, 
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2009b, 2006). Figure 5.6 shows a detailed comparison of the key importing 
countries of copper, and clearly Asia Pacific is the new market destination for 
metal mining. China’s share of global copper imports jumped from 11.4 
percent in 2000 to 36 percent in 2009 whilst the United States’ global share 
dropped from 11.1 percent in 2000 to 5.1 percent in 2009. And although 
Japan’s share declined from 14.4 percent in 2000 to 9.7 percent, it remains 
to be the second largest importer followed by Germany and South Korea 
(COCHILCO 2010). In many ways, the figures legitimise the strategic shift of 
Chile’s trade policy to focus on bilateral relations with its key market 
destinations rather than building regional ties in Latin America. 
 
Figure 5.6 Global copper importers, 2000-2009 
 
Source: COCHILCO Annual Statistics 2010 (Adapted), Table 92. 
 
In this context, the royalty law should be interpreted as a way of regulating 
the excesses of the market, not so much to curtail the voluntary conduct of 
private capital but simply to run the market smoothly. Managing resource 
rents, therefore, involves competitive strategies that respond both to political 
and economic imperatives. In the political realm, the royalty law originated 
from the series of publications arguing that big mining firms have exploited 
the taxation system through DL 600, in which “private capital took over 70 
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percent of Chilean nationalised copper minerals without paying any taxes at 
all, even worse they had accumulated billions in tax credits” (Riesco 2005). 
In what became a technical debate that caught international attention 
through UNRISD’s Pay Your Taxes Debate, Riesco (2008, 2005) argued that 
big mining firms – specifically Minera Escondida – have been undervaluing 
copper prices, overpricing refining services paid, and underestimating the 
value of by-products contained in the concentrates being shipped by mining 
firms. However, some argued the CENDA publications as methodologically 
unsound and simplistically ideological (Lagos & Lima 2005: 61-63). 73 The 
establishment of royalty taxes emerged from public scrutiny of the gulf 
between the idealised and actual business practices of private mining firms, 
which signifies a challenge to the apolitical view of mineral management.  
 
The economic logic of the royalty taxes played on the idea of 
institutionalising the stabilisation fund to decrease Chilean economy’s 
vulnerability from international fluctuations and external shocks. The fund 
was directly aimed at resolving the ‘resource curse’ effects, which include the 
appreciation of currency that weakens the competitiveness of manufacturing 
and industrial sectors (also known as Dutch Disease), the difficulty in 
designing long-term budget plans as a result of volatile international 
commodity prices, and the need to avoid pro-cyclical policies which lead to 
overheated economies, increased deficits, and unsustainable fiscal positions 
(Bagattini 2011; Ross 1999). Additionally, rent-seeking behaviour of 
politicians and organised interest groups weaken the institutional capacity of 
the state to reform and manage effectively the windfall of revenues in the 
state treasuries, which overall creates unequal access to the fruits of natural 
resources for society (Karl 1997; Ross 2001a, 2001b). The copper 
stabilisation fund corrects these two problems directly. With respect to the 
                                                   
 
73 See the Pay Your Taxes Debate in UNRISD for the exchange between Chilean experts 
regarding the details of the mining rents debate, available online at 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpPublications)/D0911BEE223DF74EC
12570AC0032E4E2?OpenDocument. This was followed through by another series of 
exchange on mineral rents and social development between Manuel Riesco and Juan 
Carlos Guajardo. See Guajardo 2008; Riesco 2008. 
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imbalance in the budget, the ‘sterilisation’ of revenues by saving profits 
during high prices compels the state to work within the limits of its budget. 
This approach works as if savings do not exist at all. By making access to 
resource rents difficult, such as by limiting access to the Ministry of Finance 
and requiring bureaucratic approval for the release of funds, budget accounts 
are kept at fiscally sound levels. During bust periods, the Ministry can inject 
financial resources in the economy to cushion the effect of low prices, thereby 
protecting the economy from possible recession as a result of price and 
export downturn. In the Chilean case, the strict guidelines and 
institutionalised process of managing the sovereign wealth funds make a 
strong case for a highly disciplined state. The law is a testament of the 
capacity of states to use resource rents responsibly and therefore reject the 
‘politics without limits’ mentality observed by Karl (1997) and Ross (1999, 
2001b) in mining and oil-based economies. 
 
In this context, I argue that the fall of Concertación from power does not 
necessarily indicate any decisive shift in copper politics or public perceptions 
as regards their broader economic platform. The recent victory of the 
opposition Coalición por el Cambio (or Alianza) has been a product of the 
social reformist agenda against a perceived less innovative Concertación 
presidential candidate. Electoral machinery, imaginations of change, and the 
moderation of party differences due to the practice of consensual politics are 
more plausible explanations of the end of Concertación days. Though there 
are still ideological differences between the Right and Left in Chile (Dávila & 
Fuentes 2002), the expectation of change in the broader economic agenda 
should come with reservations. For example, the privatisation of CODELCO, 
fully or partially, was never taken up in the 2009 presidential debate. As a 
result of the need for reconstruction of major Southern cities in Chile after 
the destructive 8.8 magnitude earthquake in 27 February 2010, Piñera 
initiated the passage of a legislative amendment to increase the tax rate from 
five to eight percent and change the time period of invariable tax rate from 15 
to 12 years. This obviously was done amidst the publicly declared opposition 
of the Consejo Minero and SONAMI. The recent announcement of the new 
modernisation plan of CODELCO in July 2011 sparked the first major strike, 
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indicating both the breakdown of the Strategic Alliance and the power of 
unions to prevent a decisive move to privatise the state copper enterprise. As 
I hope to show in Chapter 6, the Piñera government’s formidable obstacles to 
reform are also outcomes of the long-term legacies of corporate practices and 
the militancy of mining unions.  
 
Through the lens of HI and critical IPE, I have shown the contested process 
of diffusing neoliberal ideas and legitimising the discourses as filtered by 
institutional environments. Whilst IPE scholars argue that political alliances 
are forged within transnational and domestic spaces (Gill & Law 1989; 
Robinson 2008; Sklair 2001), these are institutionally contextualised and 
reinterpreted by agencies. Changes in the regulatory framework are derived 
from compromises between actors, class configurations, and contingencies of 
history. These factors inform the broader competitive strategies of resource-
rich states like Chile. By examining the aspects of economic continuity and 
attempts at challenging the neoliberal orthodoxy, I showed the interactions 
between ideas and institutions, particularly how state structures and 
institutional legacies have constrained policy elites from absorbing new ideas 
as alternative paradigms to allow agencies to think what are the possibilities 
of institutional and economic transformations (Campbell 2001; Hay 2004a, 
2004b; Hay & Marsh 2000). There were explicit attempts by the 
Concertación coalition to construct narratives to fit demands of global 
competitiveness and productivism by explicitly recognising the need for 
growth to come before equity and the legitimisation of private sector logics of 
efficiency in the mining sector.  
 
5.4 Conclusions  
 
To sum up, the political choices in favour of political continuity in Chile is a 
combination of both economic fortunes of copper, the political legacies of the 
dictatorship, and the structural constraints of the global economy that all 
hinder Chile’s capability to diversify its exports. The soaring commodity 
prices are giving Chile the chance to save more resources without increasing 
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physical production. Its economic strategy of placing Chile within a complex 
web of free trade agreements to promote copper and other resource exports 
is currently working to its advantage. At the domestic level, this is currently 
sustained by the political discourse of neoliberal globalisation, which allows 
national elites to valorise copper mining, maintain ‘sound’ economic 
governance, and at the same time address the brewing tensions from below 
as reflected in the passage of taxation and subcontracting law. Without 
labouring the point any further, this approach to global competitiveness, as 
Robert Cox (1981) puts it, is a combination of consent and coercion that 
produces a seemingly coherent hegemonic paradigm of neoliberalism. In 
many ways, my distinction between neoliberal and neostructuralist policies 
may look superficial for some scholars. However, there have been genuine 
progress in several fronts and neoliberalism is not a totalising political 
experience that is simply about deregulation and depoliticisation. The 
Royalty II Law, although rejected under Aylwin and Frei Jr. in the 1990s and 
had to be refashioned as a tool for innovation for sustainable economic 
development, is at its core the same debate in the past. The taxation law is a 
readjustment to the complex political alliances between the state, foreign 
capitalists, and domestic mining groups though not as grand as the 
Washington Agreement in 1951 or the Nationalisation of Copper in 1971. And 
as in the past, the process was far from linear. For example, the media 
(controlled by Right parties) marginalised the position of Cepalista 
economists and radical groups at the beginning of the debate by taking a 
clear position as regards the perceived negative impacts of additional taxes to 
Chilean competitiveness and the possible harm to Chile’s image as a haven of 
tax and political stability (see Castañeda 2004; Cerda 2004; El Mercurio 
2010a, 2010b; Morandé 2004).  
 
The empirical evidence on state governance in Chile makes strong claims 
against the idea that neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism are starkly 
contrasting political economies. Thus far, I have examined in great detail the 
power of neoliberal ideas and policy practices as constraints to the 
reorientation of the state in managing the economy. I also examined how 
consensual decision-making has led to conservative reforms in the realms of 
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mining policy and labour relations. Based on this chapter, Chile is indeed a 
case of self-reinforcing path dependent sequencing of reforms, wherein the 
costs of exit and switch to a different pathway increases. In this vein, political 
continuities that ‘lock in’ political choices are partly ideological and partly a 
pragmatic response of the state to pressures of global competitiveness and 
hegemony of neoliberalism. It exhibits institutional change through gradual 
reforms without necessarily challenging the neoliberal framework. 
Concertación governments kept the rules in place by promising stable legal 
governance, technocratic management of copper policy, and emphasis on 
business initiatives in mining. Nevertheless, Chilean state governance seems 
to also posit a relatively successful strategy of global competitiveness.  
 
In the succeeding chapter, I further explore aspects of neoliberal reforms by 
focussing on the consequences of institutional changes to the state enterprise 
CODELCO, to private investment, and the fate of mining unions. If neoliberal 
democracy reflects institutional continuity in copper policy, in which modes 
of technification undermine extension of political participation of those 
excluded in the decision making arenas, then how state enterprises are 
managed and how labour unions in the copper industry organise themselves 
in response to privatisation are as politically salient as the debates on 
regulatory frameworks. These themes constitute the second order questions 
of resource governance and neoliberalism. I shall discuss the consequences of 
neoliberalism to corporate autonomy and labour management. In so doing, I 
hope to show the variegated effects of neoliberal reforms to different actors, 
thereby, exemplifying the complexity of domestic adjustment strategies to 
neoliberal globalisation. 
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Chapter 6  
CAPITAL-LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE CHILEAN 
COPPER SECTOR 
 
 
CODELCO is a strategic company for Chile. 
Overcoming extreme poverty and 
transforming the country in a modern and 
fair society depend to a large degree on the 
success of its management. This very reality 
imposes greater demand for efficiency and 
competitiveness.74 
 
Marcos Lima 
CODELCO President, 1994-2000 
 
 
CODELCO is more than just a state enterprise that produces copper on 
behalf of the state. As Marcos Lima himself acknowledges, the management 
of the state enterprise has consequences to Chile’s economic fate. The firm 
serves as buffer between private and public interests, and its reform project 
has far-reaching consequences in the copper industry. The politics of 
restructuring state enterprises in the most strategic sector of Chile is clearly 
one of the most contentious, if resistant, policy agenda under Concertación 
governments. Under the left-centre coalition, state enterprise restructuring – 
particularly labour management – was shaped by the discourse of global 
competitiveness. These policy ideas advocate for greater autonomy for 
CODELCO and for increased labour flexibility as a core strategy in 
modernising public enterprises. On the one hand, reformists within the 
governing coalition emphasised the need for CODELCO to ‘defend copper 
prices’. They also promised reforming corporate governance, investment 
strategy and labour policy within and outside the state company. On the 
                                                   
 
74 ‘Letter of the President’. CODELCO Annual Report 1999. Santiago de Chile: CODELCO, 
10. 
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other hand, mining business and right parties pressured Concertación 
governments to maintain its political commitment to tax and political 
stability. This has far reaching consequences to labour management in the 
copper industry.  
 
Theoretically, this chapter challenges the orthodox view of Chile as a simple 
case of self-reinforcing path dependence towards neoliberalism. In 
agreement with Mahoney & Thelen (2010), models of governance are not 
mere outcomes of actor rationality. Instead, gradual economic 
transformation takes place by way of contesting economic ideas, institutions, 
and policy practices as constitutive of models of development. Whilst the 
implementation of reforms suggests the hegemony of neoliberalism, 
conflicting interests and power relations mould political outcomes that do 
not necessarily conform to neoliberal ideas. Although actual reforms were 
implemented to modernise CODELCO through an overtly technocratic and 
depoliticised approach to its corporate management, reforms have not 
completely succeeded in achieving their goals. There are a variety of reasons 
for this. Firstly, political legacies left by the coup d’etat in 1973 have made 
any reforms in state ownership difficult to acquire a new cross-party 
consensus. Secondly, the fiscal impact of CODELCO implies that the state 
could not afford labour unrest, and therefore labour unions have used their 
veto powers quite effectively to prevent outright privatisation of the state 
enterprise. Finally, a stronger role for private capital in copper mining 
alongside public sector mining was a strategic compromise in the context of 
overwhelming dependence on a single commodity. By contextualising 
CODELCO’s reforms within the institutional dynamics in Chile, one can 
surmise the difficulties faced by the state enterprise in achieving its goal as a 
public firm and as a private entity. In many ways, we find distinctive path 
dependent, self-reinforcing processes between Pinochet and Concertación 
governments, which prevented radical reforms in privatising CODELCO, but 
that this should be understood within the context of institutional conflicts to 
adjust neoliberalism as an organising logic of development. In this chapter, I 
posit that corporate governance reforms in Chile – in terms of state 
ownership, limited privatisation, and politicised labour management – are 
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indicative of a hybrid model of resource governance that blends state and 
market mechanisms in managing political tensions and in maintaining 
Chile’s formidable position in the global copper industry.   
 
Whilst neoliberal reforms presuppose a specific role attributed to the state in 
economic management, we need to examine how this role is practised by the 
state in its constitutive relationship with the state company. CODELCO’s 
experience of reforming its corporate affairs has brought forth a difficult 
situation, wherein its international competitiveness and political autonomy 
from state and labour has been compromised. The permanent friction 
between private capital and mining unions reveal the tensions inherent in 
mining management. In publicly owned mines, the breakdown of Alianza 
Estrátegica between the state and workers indicate the contradictions of 
state ownership and private-led mining governance. In the private mines, 
workers have begun to seek for greater state support in defending their 
collective rights. The world of labour has been transformed radically by 
neoliberalism although not in ways predicated by advocates of neoliberalism. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.1 critically discusses the 
standard neoliberal narrative of corporate restructuring and the discourses of 
‘good governance’ in mineral extraction. This is followed in Section 6.2 of a 
detailed analysis of CODELCO’s role in the economy and attempts of state 
managers to reform the firm’s structure of ownership, investment strategy, 
and internationalisation plans. In Section 6.3 I explore the changing styles of 
managing labour conflicts in Chilean copper mining as constitutive of state 
management. Finally, I conclude by analysing what some calls Chile’s ‘Winter 
of Discontent’, which refers to the political storm that is smothering the 
presidency of Sebastian Piñera (2010-present). His attempts at reforming 
CODELCO has led to the rejection of Alianza Estratégica in the public mining 
sector and his failure to respond to the mining accident in San José mine 
resulted into the 31 miners suing the government and not the private mining 
firm for negligence. Most crucially, a series of strikes in CODELCO and 
Minera Escondida has paved the way for the breakdown of the pact between 
state and labour.  
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6.1 Pressuring for reforms: CODELCO and the Chilean economy 
 
The focus on state ownership and labour management in CODELCO as a way 
of understanding resource politics allows me to explore how state enterprises 
respond to watershed reforms like neoliberal restructuring. As Nicolas Majluf 
himself acknowledges, the main challenge for CODELCO to succeed as an 
effective public enterprise for Chilean society rests on the capacity of state 
managers to make strategic decisions in investment and international 
expansion on the one hand, and to establish stable yet democratic firm-
worker relations, on the other.75 In other words, these two goals though 
seemingly disparate economic issues are in fact intertwined and reconstitute 
each other. Without sound labour relations, workers have the bargaining 
power to go on strike (though seldom used during the Concertación days) 
and CODELCO cannot produce in the mines. But state managers are in equal 
measure responding to demands of competitiveness and need to make 
difficult decisions regarding operations and investments. In turn, 
employment security of mining workers is contingent on commodity 
production. Whilst this sounds quite simplistic, in fact, this relationship 
between production and labour has typically been understated. But also in 
CODELCO, state ownership shapes the range of available choices for state 
managers to respond to these challenges.  
 
It is not very difficult to explain why CODELCO was never privatised in any 
form. As I have shown in Chapter 4, Chile hardly benefitted from copper 
revenues until 1971 due to the difficult relationship between the state, foreign 
capital, and US government. The Washington Agreement in 1951 and 
Chileanización project in 1966 both failed to satisfy public outrage against the 
outflow of copper profits as a consequence of the direct control of American 
copper firms of Chile’s natural resources. In this context, the creation of 
CODELCO was a watershed economically and politically. By creating a state 
enterprise with 100 percent ownership, the Chilean state for the first time 
                                                   
 
75 Author interview with Nicolas Majluf, CODELCO, October 2009. 
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had direct access to mining revenues. Although this has precipitously bound 
Chile’s economic fate to the vicissitudes of global markets, copper revenues 
likewise proffered the state a new opportunity in directly using natural 
resources for economic development. This situation of dependency has not 
changed since then. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, state enterprises for large-scale 
mining CODELCO and small- and medium-scale mining ENAMI have 
contributed between 5 and 20 percent of Chile’s total fiscal revenue. Chile’s 
persistent vulnerability to external shocks and price fluctuations is also 
clearly reflected in this graph. During periods of high prices from 2004 to 
2009, its contribution was above 15 percent peaking at 22 percent in 2006 
(US$ 8,334 million out of US$ 37,830 million).  
 
Figure 6.1 Contribution of publicly-owned mining to fiscal revenue 
 
 Source: COCHILCO Annual Statistics 2010 (Adapted), 76-77. 
 
Given the long standing dependence on copper, we must understand 
attempts at reforming CODELCO by examining the company’s performance 
and the surrounding discourses deployed by Concertación governments to 
persuade Congress and indeed both state managers and workers to formulate 
a compromise in the name of competitiveness. It is undoubtedly the case that 
Chile’s economic performance has always been linked directly to CODELCO’s 
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levels of productivity, financial performance and cost effectiveness. The years 
of underinvestment and low copper prices combined with the politicisation of 
CODELCO management under the dictatorship placed severe constraints on 
the effectiveness of CODELCO as a state enterprise. In this context, the belief 
on private sector-led development is not without foundations. If one 
examines the share of private capital in copper production, it is clear that 
CODELCO has been left behind in terms of productivity. This is, of course, 
despite the fact that the state enterprise continued to expand its production 
and modernise its labour relations. As Figure 6.2 reveals, private capital has 
taken over Chilean copper production in aggregate terms as CODELCO’s 
share of production drops from 60 percent in 1991 down to 30 percent in 
2010 (take note of the increase in CODELCO’s performance). From 1991 on, 
private capital has steadily increased its production; new mines have been 
opened for mineral exploitation and profits have soared as the commodity 
boom has come off in 2003. What should also be pointed out is that Minera 
Escondida, operated by mining giant BHP Billiton, is solely responsible for 
the dramatic jump in private production vis-à-vis CODELCO. Between 1991 
and 2009, Escondida’s share of copper production jumped from 8.9 KMT to 
1,103.7 KMT or roughly 20 percent of Chile’s share of production in the 
global copper market. This contrasts to the modest increase of the biggest 
copper producer in the world, CODELCO, which gradually increased its 
production from 1,195.3 KMT in 1991 to 1,702 KMT in 2009 (COCHILCO 
Annual Statistics 2010: 18-19). 76  Not only has Escondida benefitted 
enormously from corporate freedom to make investment decisions, the 
multinational firm has also directly received generous tax rebates thanks to 
the Foreign Investment Law – a key point that sparked the move to impose a 
royalty tax in mining (see Chapter 5).  
 
                                                   
 
76 KMT is the unit of measurement for copper production, which is an abbreviation for 
thousand metric tons. 
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Figure 6.2 Copper production in Chile, 1990-2010 
 
 Source: COCHILCO Annual Report 2010 (Adapted), 18-19. 
 
What is particularly striking is the ways in which Concertación governments 
have acknowledged and legitimated the role of private capital – most 
importantly foreign mining firms – as the new engine of economic 
development in Chile. There are two important indications of this strategy. 
Firstly, the yardstick to measure CODELCO’s productivity is the efficiency of 
private sector. Using different metrics of performance in the copper industry 
– workforce productivity, cash cost reduction, corporate social responsibility, 
etc – CODELCO is compared incessantly to private enterprises. The 
anticipated outcome was the widely held ideological view of private firms as 
inherently productive whilst public enterprises were seen as wasteful and 
uncompetitive, especially from the Right and Centre parties within 
Concertación. The key evidence often deployed by Chilean technocrats to 
justify such argument is the concentration of foreign investment in the 
copper sector. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the share of mining (mainly copper) 
in actual foreign direct investment (FDI) under DL 600. All throughout 
Pinochet and Concertación years, copper mining attracted as much as US$ 
24,549 million out of US$ 74,901.6 million, or 32.8 percent of total foreign 
investment in Chile. By venerating the role of foreign capital, Chile’s 
neoliberal regime institutionalised its pro-investment strategy of 
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globalisation in which mining is placed at the core of its comparative 
advantage. 
 
Figure 6.3 Foreign capital in Chile, 1974-2009 
 
 Source: COCHILCO Annual Statistics 2010 (Adapted). 
 
Secondly, by recognising the vulnerability of Chile to the price cycle that 
drops and lasts for years, political elites converge towards a shared view that 
the copper industry must undergo a very difficult adjustment phase – one 
that includes temporary or permanent closures, technological changes, and 
mergers, among other corporate strategies. These reforms were seen as 
necessary. In periods of negative growth, “price levels necessitate additional 
efforts from CODELCO that affects its future investment strategies” 
(CODELCO Annual Report 1998). As a result, CODELCO successfully 
reversed its costs since 1993 that would have registered losses for 1998.  
 
The growth strategy is underpinned by the extent of labour unions’ 
acquiescence towards these reforms. Under the leadership of Juan Villarzú 
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through technological innovations in mineral extraction, industrial 
processes, and data processing.77 Whilst he sought to cut workforce quantity, 
his plan was to maintain job stability and quality of life in Northern mines 
through the adoption of Alianza Estrátegica (or Strategic Alliance) in 1994 – 
a series of agreements between management and permanent workers. The 
ability of CODELCO managers to make autonomous decisions regarding its 
labour force exemplifies the unique situation of the copper industry in Chile. 
More specifically, it shows the divergent pathways of labour management 
between public and private mining and between the copper and productive 
sectors of the economy. One prominent discourse justifying Alianza 
Estratégica for twenty years was the outcome of the reforms in terms of 
workforce productivity. CODELCO’s workforce productivity index is lower 
than private capital though its labour relations policy has always been 
deemed to be better equipped in dealing with labour conflicts. As Table 6.1 
reveals, CODELCO did not obtain the lowest score across large-scale mining 
companies. As I will argue in Section 6.3, labour relations is in fact more 
stable in comparison to private capital and a healthier management-worker 
relations have existed – a striking feature given the commonly held belief by 
neoliberal theory regarding the inefficiency and negative consequences of 
politicisation in public enterprise management. 
 
                                                   
 
77 Juan Villarzú was appointed as President of CODELCO once again between 11 March 2000 
and 11 March 2006. 
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Table 6.1 Own workforce productivity index, GMT-10 + CODELCO 
Workforce Productivity Index1 
Baseline 2005=100 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Escondida 100 97.1 111.6 87.9 75.6 
Collahuasi 100 97.1 83.0 63.4 60.9 
Pelambres 100 96.5 79.0 85.5 76.6 
Anglo American Chile 100 95.6 90.8 81.5 N/D 
Candelaria 100 101.3 105.5 92.2 70.9 
El Abra 100 102.6 75.3 64.3 56.6 
Zaldívar 100 119.1 110.8 98.4 98.2 
Cerro Colorado 100 120.4 100.4 93.4 N/D 
Quebrada Blanca 100 100.3 97.0 88.0 107.3 
GMP-10 100 98.9 97.8 82.6 N/D 
CODELCO 100 93.8 87.9 78.4 88.3 
GMP-10 + CODELCO2 100 97.1 95.6 83.8 N/D 
Source: COCHILCO Annual Statistics 2010, 91. 
Notes:  
(1) Based on mine copper production (refined content) to own workforce average ratio. Save for 
Los Pelambres and Quebrada Blanca, workforce average is based on year-end payroll. 
(2) Ten largest copper producers operating per FDI contracts granted under Decree-Law 600. 
 
  
What I have done thus far is to problematise the coherence of the model from 
the perspective of corporate management. It is certainly the case that 
Concertación governments have used neoliberal discourses to manage 
tensions and social conflicts in the mining industry and beyond. There exist 
several contradictions regarding the ideational and actual performance of 
state enterprises. Nevertheless the competitiveness agenda was used as a way 
of pushing CODELCO to act like a private entity without recognising the 
distinctive history and role of state enterprises in its national political 
economy. Credible commitment to economic continuity has been justified 
through the material consequences of neoliberalism – actual FDI inflows in 
mining, higher production in private sector, and perceived better workforce 
productivity in private large-scale mining. Yet we still need to explicate the 
consequences of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ in corporate restructuring 
and place these materially constituted policy practices within broader 
debates of natural resource governance. To do so, I demonstrate in Section 
6.2 the very different ways and processes of compelling CODELCO to 
modernise its operations and manage labour relations. The twin challenge of 
competitiveness and labour stability has been at the core of political debates 
in Chilean copper industry for decades. Under Concertación governments, 
economic continuity significantly restrained the space for manoeuvre for 
greater regulation in the industry. Nevertheless, CODELCO is an interesting 
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case of non-autonomy in which a staunchly neoliberal state maintained 
control in several key areas of decision-making, hence, blurring the 
distinction between its public and private roles. 
 
6.2 Demystifying corporate governance in CODELCO 
 
Whilst the public discourse has often been sceptical of CODELCO’s ability to 
catch up with private sector, the reforms at the same time sought to avoid 
selling off assets at artificially depressed prices or to destroy the consensus 
achieved by Alianza Estrátegica. In the next two sections, I intend to show 
the difficulties of modernising CODELCO along the lines of a private 
enterprise. Whilst neoliberalism was a critical juncture with respect to 
opening the copper industry for capital accumulation, economic reforms 
failed to completely reverse the legacies of the past, mainly the prevailing 
view of CODELCO as a company for the Chilean society. Upon the return of 
democracy, the division between CODELCO’s public role of producing 
minerals for the state and private role of competing directly against large-
scale mining firms has become noticeable. Whilst the political transition was 
in no way tumultuous, Concertación was left with the responsibility of 
maintaining a delicate balance between deepening the economic model and 
ameliorating the social costs of neoliberal reforms. As I show in the 
proceeding sections, the contradictions in reforming CODELCO is best 
exemplified first, in terms of the persistence of state ownership under 
Concertación’s state-managed neoliberalism, and second, with regard to 
CODELCO’s investment and internationalisation strategy. 
 
6.2.1 Persistence of state ownership in copper industry 
 
Immediately after the first civilian government took power, it was clear that 
CODELCO would remain under state control though reforms were certainly 
foreseen to enhance its competitiveness. On the one hand, Concertación 
immediately removed the military generals in the governing Board of 
Directors through DN 146 which was approved in 1991. This was in line with 
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Concertación’s technocratic governance. On the other hand, the state 
retained 100 percent ownership of the company with ministers sitting in the 
board and making economic decisions on behalf of the state. The outcome is 
to initiate reforms to make CODELCO competitive without giving up state 
ownership. DL 19.137 was approved in May 1992, also known as CODELCO 
Law, which complemented the existing copper nationalisation law. 
CODELCO Law stipulated the newly acquired freedom for CODELCO to sign 
joint ventures with third parties in exploring and developing new mines. This 
law has been an effective strategy in expanding its mining activities in Brazil 
and Ecuador as well as its international trading and commercial efforts in the 
international market (CODELCO Annual Report 2010).  
 
One salient feature of the reforms is the lack of political commitment among 
Concertación elites to pursue the privatisation agenda despite their long grip 
in power. Not surprisingly, Chile’s persistent state ownership is an outcome 
of the difficulty in grafting a new consensus on how to best enhance the 
competitiveness of CODELCO. For example, partial ownership of its shares 
was never approved in Congress although CODELCO was made accountable 
to both executive and legislative branches. Pinochet’s neoliberal strategies 
have left an indelible mark in the Chilean publics. CODELCO stands as the 
last remaining economic organisation reflecting the long history of 
nationalist struggles against foreign capital since the consolidation of export 
dependency in 1930. As such, despite the depth and pace of privatisation in 
social provision, health and education (Brooks 2009; Taylor 2006), as well as 
the deregulation of service and labour markets (Alemán 2010; Haagh 2002; 
Silva 2007), state control over the copper industry has been exercised in the 
traditional sense of state ownership. By this, I mean that the shareholders are 
the Chileans and the society writ large, in which state elites – i.e. ministers – 
are given decisive powers in making strategic investments and overall 
direction of CODELCO in the governing board. In the context of financial 
globalisation, this is particularly striking especially for a state generally 
perceived as totally neoliberal. Most countries described as ‘state capitalism’ 
– those which attempt to meld the powers of the state with the powers of 
capitalism – exercise tight control over state enterprises through their 
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ownership of shares. Either states take majority (51 percent and above) or 
minority (through ‘golden shares’) share of capital (The Economist 2012). 
The Brazilian case follows this trend of wielding state enterprises with vast 
decision-making powers as a competitiveness strategy, as Chapter 8 will 
argue. In Chile, however, the state retains full ownership of CODELCO, 
which has created problems regarding its autonomy in decision-making. 
Whilst the dominant discourse was indeed neoliberal, the state could not put 
itself to give up control in the state enterprise, and instead, opted for state-
managed neoliberalism by simultaneously performing as regulator of 
markets and as direct producer through CODELCO. 
 
There are competing interpretations regarding the consequences of state 
ownership for Chilean economic development. From the vantage point of 
business, CODELCO’s incapacity to exploit rich and vast mining reserves (a 
result of copper nationalisation) is indication of being wasteful because the 
private sector is more dynamic and capable of increasing copper production, 
evidently shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.78 This contrasts quite well with the 
labour unions who assess Concertación governance as one which effectively 
deepened neoliberalism and entrenched profound contradictions in the role 
of the state in economic management.79 And quite interestingly, key Chilean 
officials’ position is one of tactical neutrality, wherein the state is perceived 
as capable of performing its dual role without any problem. By embracing 
foreign investment as crucial element in Chile’s development strategy in the 
era of integrated global markets, they successfully weave coherent narratives 
of the role of the state in economic management. Marco Fluckiger of 
COCHILCO describes the role of CODELCO during and after the 
dictatorship: 
 
                                                   
 
78 Author interview with Javier Cox, Consejo Minero, October 2009. 
79 Author interviews with Pedro Marin, President of Federación Minera de Chile (FMC), 4 
November 2009; Mario Plazo, Gold Meridian, November 2009; Agustin de La Torre, 
XSTRATA, November 2009. 
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For many years, CODELCO was milked like a cow. There was not 
enough interest in making CODELCO competitive against private 
companies. In the 1970s and 1980s the country needed all money 
they could get from CODELCO. The state did not invest on [the 
firm]; there was no money available for investment, only the 
minor things to keep it going. The country had no budget. Now 
they have enough money. That is why they called for foreign 
investment, and [the law] worked. [But] it is the combination of 
the circumstances. On one hand, they had no money, and they did 
not want an extremely competitive CODELCO. Having a large 
CODELCO means you are dependent on one company. If you 
make CODELCO too big, there would be no space for other firms 
to come and invest in Chile, what was the sense [of the law]? This 
fear brought Chile to diversify its exports from copper to wood, 
pulp, fish, salmon, wine, agriculture, etc. Being very dependent on 
CODELCO is bad, copper prices are cyclical. You have a few good 
years and many years of bust. Today Chile has attracted the big 
companies; there is sufficient private production. Mining has 
become diversified. The logic of the policy is reversed again. Now 
they want CODELCO to grow [and become more competitive after 
years of underinvestment]. 80 
 
The coherence in the model of governance has been applied in CODELCO by 
way of adhering to technocratic governance. In November 2009, CODELCO 
Law was passed based on the recommendations of former CODELCO 
President Marcos Lima to reorganise its organisational structure and 
corporate governance. Under DL 20.392, ministers were eliminated from the 
board to be replaced by independent directors who are elected in transparent 
and competitive processes. It also effectively subjected CODELCO to the 
same requirements as private firms. As Table 6.2 illustrates, this is a marked 
change in terms of reducing the politicisation of decision-making in 
CODELCO although, as Nicolas Majluf notes, this is hardly a watershed with 
respect to improving the performance of CODELCO.81 For example, members 
of the board are now liable to their actions by making possible to file civil and 
criminal charges against them. The change in the terms of office by the board 
of director likewise breaks the link between electoral cycles and corporate 
management. In many ways, these reforms respond to contemporary 
                                                   
 
80 Author interview with Marco Fluckiger, COCHILCO, October 2009. 
81 Author interview with Nicolas Majluf, CODELCO, October 2009. 
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challenges of competitiveness imposed by neoliberal globalisation regarding 
the role of states and the exercise of discretion over the management of 
strategic enterprises. Nevertheless, there is clear path dependence on what is 
achievable in reforms and what is not. Whilst the law has now formally given 
shareholder accountability to the Ministry of Mining and Finance, it is 
certainly the case that the state remains the shareholder and therefore the 
conflict of its role as principal and agent stays in the governance structure. 
This, of course, contrasts the Brazilian experience of state enterprise 
management whose political autonomy and the need to act as private entity 
have been recognised by the military government since the 1970s (see 
Chapter 8).  
 
Table 6.2 Key changes in CODELCO corporate governance 
 CODELCO Law Prior to Changes (1990-2009) 
New Aspects of CODELCO Law/DL 
20.392 (2009-present) 
Board Structure 
No formal shareholder role Shareholder represented by Finance 
and Mining Ministers 
Seven directors 
- Mining Minister (Chair) 
- Finance Minister 
- 2 Representatives of the President 
of the Republic 
- 1 Representative of the President 
of the Republic (member of the 
Armed Forces) 
- 2 Union Representatives 
Nine directors 
- 4 directors selected by the Council 
of Senior Public Management 
- 3 Representatives of the President 
of the Republic 
- 2 Workers’ Representatives 
 
Term 
Presidential period 4 years rotating with partial renewal of 
the members 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
- Set general policies 
- Approval of investments above 
US$ 50 million 
- No civil nor criminal 
responsibilities for their actions 
- CODELCO is not subject to 
Corporations Law 
- Appoints and dismisses the CEO 
- Approval of Three Year Business 
Plan, investments, and main 
contracts 
- Civil and criminal responsibilities 
for their actions 
- Faculties established in 
Corporations  Law 
- Obligations set under Corporation 
Law 
Source: Bande 2011, CODELCO’s New Corporate Governance: 18 Months After (Adapted), 6. 
 
Nevertheless, my core argument really is that Chile’s attempt at depoliticising 
corporate management in CODELCO has failed. The ‘neoliberal’ state 
continues to make the important decisions in the strategic and day-to-day 
management of the company despite a clear conflict of interest for being both 
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regulator and producer in the market.82 Since the copper industry remains 
under state hands through 100 percent ownership of CODELCO instead of 
flexible assets and shareholding schemes, the state is accorded some political 
roles, which are difficult to avoid. For example, the President of the Republic 
is given particular duties and responsibilities such as appointing the board, 
naming the Chair of the Board, and approving and modifying the corporate 
by-laws. These decision-making powers are typically accorded to 
shareholders of the corporation; therefore, with the state as a shareholder, a 
conflict of interest arises between its role as principal and agent. In addition, 
the modernisation of CODELCO did not involve stripping off the rights and 
privileges of organised labour in arenas of decision-making because the 
union of permanent workers, Federación de los Trabajadores del Cobre 
(FTC), has managed to retain its seat in the board. The situation effectively 
keeps the veto power of unions in management reforms. On the one hand, 
this guarantees financial benefits, pensions, and employment security of the 
now ageing workers of CODELCO. Whilst this is generally found in some 
other state enterprises, what we must bear in mind is that the role of labour 
has always been politicised and contested publicly in Chile. The new 
structure of corporate governance is still viewed as an obstacle to global 
competitiveness and some advocate further depoliticisation by not only 
taking out the ministers but also the workers in the board.83 These political 
conflicts in delivering reforms and adapting a globalised strategy of 
extraction are evidently shaping institutional transformation taking place in 
the industry. What we are witnessing is simultaneous institutional 
displacement and layering in an attempt to strike a compromise between 
conflicting interests between state managers, big business and organised 
labour. On one hand, CODELCO’s highest decision-making body has had 
complete replacement of existing rules with new ones signifying radical shifts 
                                                   
 
82  See the summary of the Code of Corporate Governance in CODELCO at 
www.codelco.com/english/la_corporacion/fr_organizacion.html (accessed on April 21, 
2011).  
83 Author interviews with Nicolas Majluf, October 2009; Gustavo Lagos, November 2009; 
and Marcos Lima, November 2009. For an overview of the reforms, see OECD 2011: 42-
47. 
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in institutional contexts either abruptly or in slow moving way. On the other 
hand, political legacies and historical conflicts shape the extent of reform, 
such that these new rules in place are adapted alongside old ones – that is to 
say that labour unions have retained their veto power in the new structure of 
the governing board.  
 
Whilst tempting to think of CODELCO’s governing structure as the exception 
rather than the rule, in fact, state control over companies that play strategic 
roles in the economy is prevalent in neoliberal Chile – ENAMI, ENAP, and 
Banco Estado.84 Worker representatives likewise serve on the boards of 
many SOEs, including the largest ones notably the four cases mentioned 
above. Whilst in many cases workers have the right to speak, CODELCO and 
Banco Estado accord workers some voting rights. More compellingly, the 
state view on ENAMI is that the state enterprise has a developmental role of 
promoting the production of copper by small mining producers by buying, 
processing and selling copper, thereby protecting them from the effects of 
boom and bust cycles in copper prices. This political logic also justifies the 
presence of two representatives of the National Mining Association 
(SONAMI) on the board with the aim of building a consensus in ENAMI to 
policies impacting local miners (OECD 2011: 51).  
 
Overall, despite the speed and pace of privatisation of state enterprises, there 
exist thirty-two SOEs which are under the supervision of the Public 
Enterprise System (SEP), twenty-six of which are fully state-owned while 
others possess private shareholders. In four cases involving water and 
sewerage utilities, the state own minority shares (29-45 percent), but also 
owns what is called ‘golden share rights’, which are rights allowing the state-
elected board members to veto the transfer of ownership of water rights and 
drinking water and sewerage concessions of these companies – a safeguard 
                                                   
 
84 ENAMI is a minerals processor with a developmental mission of supporting small and 
medium enterprises. ENAP is the state firm in charge of oil exploration, refining and 
production of natural gas for Chile’s energy security. Banco Estado is the national 
development bank. 
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created in the height of second stage reforms (privatisation) in the 1990s to 
ensure drinking water services will continue in all instances (OECD 2011: 
36). Far from the orthodox market-conforming prescription of neoclassical 
economics to developing countries, the Chilean state has in fact followed 
pragmatic neoliberalism, as exemplified by the reform pathway of Chile’s 
extractive industries and the broader regulatory framework on corporate 
governance of SOEs. 
6.2.2 Competitive strategies of CODELCO 
 
I have already argued that political legacies and the specific role of copper 
mining in Chilean development are the main reasons behind the persistence 
of state ownership. Since limited privatisation follows a more political rather 
than economic rationale, competitiveness has been the cognitive framework 
of reformists. As a corporate strategy, CODELCO managers have sought to 
enhance the profitability of the company through a combination of 
investment in existing mines, developing new technology to expand the use 
of copper, and internationalising their operations. The success of this 
approach, however, required a compromise between the managers and 
workers, which was encapsulated in a series of agreement called Alianza 
Estratégica (Strategic Alliance). Contrary to the widely held view that the 
pact is simply about moderating labour demands, it is in fact about the 
profitability of CODELCO.  
 
In Table 6.4 (next section), I will discuss the agreements between the state, 
CODELCO, and its workers to achieve the productivity targets through 
Alianza Estratégica. At its core is the perceived need to speed up the process 
of turning investments in the mines into profits. The strategic alliance was 
evidently the compromise between maintaining 100 percent state ownership 
and modernisation of the company. Globally, traditional mechanisms of state 
control in ownership structure and control over decision-making have rarely 
been adopted as a competitive strategy. As explained earlier, state capitalism 
in countries like Brazil, China, India and Russia has responded to pressures 
exerted by economic globalisation by way of reducing political intervention 
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through ownership of majority/minority shareholder assets rather than 
direct 100 percent intervention (The Economist 2012). In contrast, Chile’s 
state ownership signifies the politicised nature of decision-making in 
corporate governance. It is very difficult to separate the company from the 
political establishment. One irony is that Brazil’s internationalisation 
strategy has worked effectively because PETROBRAS has always exercised its 
political autonomy from the military government in 1960s and 1970s. In 
contrast, CODELCO’s unique historical circumstances – that of being a state 
enterprise in a period of radical market reform in 1970s – the tight 
relationship between CODELCO and national governments has prevented 
the company from taking risky investments to expand its operations beyond 
the Chilean territories. This holds true even after Pinochet was replaced by 
the left-centre government in the 1990s. Alianza Estratégica was established 
in the context of a competitiveness crisis, in which CODELCO was perceived 
as losing competitiveness, credibility (as a result of politicised decisions such 
as the failed renegotiation of Abra mine), and growing scepticism within the 
company regarding the value of public management. Overall, the state 
enterprise was seen as a company without a vision (Villarzú 2005).  
 
Its competitiveness agenda was tied to the political process. CODELCO 
remains subjected to public enquiries – in Congress and media – which 
makes corporate decisions (such as cutting labour costs) quite difficult to ‘sell 
in society’. Such reforms do not necessarily favour competitiveness. One 
example here is the mounting public pressure for CODELCO to absorb the 
subcontracted workforce in 2007 in response to the perceived unfair 
practices, which as pointed by experts, would be counterproductive to the 
company’s cost reduction strategy since 1994. On the one hand, private 
companies escaped the criticisms of excessively using third party contracting 
as a legitimate business practice even if roughly 70 percent of mining-related 
jobs are practically handed to third parties for servicing. On the other hand, 
CODELCO took the hit as pressures compelled the company to integrate 
around 5,000 workers in the face of lagging performance of the state 
enterprise. Whilst the decision to subcontract is subject to various economic 
factors, including copper prices, pressures to bring down the costs, and size 
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of the firms (Pérez and Villalobos 2010), CODELCO’s responses were more 
political than economic at the end of the day. 
 
Nevertheless, CODELCO’s competitive strategy can be distinctively identified 
as taking two pathways. On the one hand, within Chile and through the 
blessing of the government controlling the board of directors, CODELCO has 
gradually participated in many companies and joint ventures associated with 
the mining industry. With roughly 49 subsidiaries and workforce of 1,149 
(CODELCO 2010: 64), the state enterprise has continually sought to expand 
business opportunities through mergers, acquisitions, and public-private 
partnerships in different parts of the commodity chain. This is 
complemented by the more limited attempts at internationalisation of 
CODELCO operations by way of expanding mining investments and 
operations in Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador. But whilst PETROBRAS sought to 
extend its reach into overseas markets, CODELCO has yet to establish a clear 
strategy to internationalise its operations. There are two reasons here. 
Firstly, in terms of copper reserves, Chile remains to be the best place to 
extract high grade ores and many other countries have only developed 
processing facilities, which CODELCO is equally investing on. Secondly, 
there are still political issues for the state enterprise, as mentioned above, 
which prohibit CODELCO from any ambitious exploration outside of the 
Chilean mines. But one primary constraint is the inability of CODELCO to 
have greater freedom to find ways in increasing its access to capital to make 
overseas operations viable.85 Whilst an aggressive investment plan is on its 
way to allow the state enterprise to find financing outside of the state, it 
remains to be seen whether this will be a stable state rather than a 
government policy.86 Nevertheless, CODELCO explicitly behaves as a private 
entity despite the clear constraints imposed by state ownership to its 
investment strategy.  
                                                   
 
85 Author interview with Jorge Bande, Member Board of Director, CODELCO, April 2012.   
86 The difference is that government policies reflect the policy orientation of the current 
political forces in power whilst state policies exhibit longevity and continuity in its policy 
commitment. 
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On the other hand, CODELCO has made clear the argument to Concertación 
governments on the necessity for technological innovation and research 
development to realise CODELCO’s ambitious mining projects in order to 
grow and sustain itself in a fiercely competitive, resource scarce global 
economy (CODELCO 2012; 2010: 39-54). Thanks to years of financing 
investment under Concertación, the older mines in Gran Minería have now 
become more productive. In addition, new mining projects in copper, 
molybdenum and even sulphur extraction have been developed between 
2001 and 2011, which vindicated the position of CODELCO to take radical 
steps in financing expensive projects that would have otherwise been funded 
under a very conservative Finance Minister and Treasury. There was a strong 
discourse within CODELCO on the need for a modernisation plan that 
addresses the competitive, risky, and quite costly business strategy envisaged 
by the company leadership.87 Some benefits of the policy include the increase 
in export share over time and the development of technologically 
sophisticated methods in extracting copper cathodes. On a final point, one 
must take into account the broader politico-economic context of Chile at the 
turn of the millennium. The adoption of the modernisation plan was possible 
only because of the commodity boom which led to higher prices without an 
increase in actual production since 2002. The Concertación government 
gradually supported an aggressive plan of investment to expand the 
operations of CODELCO. What is evident, however, is that the success of 
Alianza Estratégica rests on the ability of state managers to drive the 
technocratic reforms within the enterprise forward through a balancing act 
between CODELCO, national government, and labour unions. Whilst there 
exist political interests in the government to gain as much profits as possible 
and in some cases political intervention in decision making, the economic 
demands of labour unions create a highly politicised climate that makes 
labour management far more difficult in the public sector. Although the 
Chilean state believes in the free market logic, the fact of the matter is that 
                                                   
 
87  Author interviews with Marcos Lima, CODELCO, November 2009; Nicolas Majluf, 
CODELCO, October 2009. 
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the state company was politically managed. It has, in short, served as a buffer 
between public and private interests.  
 
6.3 Managing labour demands in copper industry 
 
In the first two sections, I have thus far illustrated the complex process of 
managing production functions in the state enterprise. In this section, I move 
away from managerial perspective of corporate reforms towards the politics 
of labour management in mining sector as evidence of contestation of 
resource governance models through the lenses of organised labour. The 
success of reforms aimed at enhancing productivity is by all means 
dependent on labour acquiescence, which signifies gradual institutional 
evolution of how the Chilean state manages labour unrest and demands from 
below. But before I discuss the effects of the privatised governance model in 
mining to actual practices of managing social tensions and labour unrest, it is 
important to note that the tradition of strong and independent unionism in 
Chile remains significant even in the context of strong elite preference for 
neoliberalism and its anti-union legacy. In recent surveys, labour unions 
have been perceived as necessary in a political system characterised as 
neoliberal democracy. As Table 6.3 vividly demonstrates, dominant parties 
across the political spectrum still consider unions as a key political actor 
when making policy choices to ameliorate the social costs of neoliberal 
restructuring. Although the centre and left parties (PPD, PDS and PDC) give 
more importance to the labour movement than the right parties (UDI, RN), 
the expectation of waning party-union relationship seems more complex 
than just forging coalitions between unions and parties for electoral 
purposes.  
 
Table 6.3 Legitimacy of unions from political parties’ perspectives 
 
Unions are obsolete 
Unions are not 
obsolete No response 
UDI 24 67 9 
RN 17 64 19 
PDC 6 85 10 
PPD 9 86 5 
PS 9 84 7 
Others 23 75 2 
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Source: Barómetro de la Política, May 2011 (Adapted), 24. 
Poll Question:  
There are distinct opinions about unions. Some say that unionism is an obsolete 
institution in defending workers' rights. Others think that unions are necessary in 
defending workers' rights. Which of the following positions do you think express your 
opinion? (1) Unions are obsolete; (2) Unions are not obsolete. 
 
This has implications for arguments on neo-corporatism and pact-making in 
Latin America. Many scholars have indicated the decline of trade unions as 
well as the disarticulation of labour politics brought about by the shift 
towards contentious politics across the region (Burdick et. al. 2009; Cook 
2007; Haarstad 2009a, 2009b). However, some degree of institutionalisation 
of democracy has taken place in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (Levitsky & 
Roberts 2011). At the same time, political parties also have reconstituted 
their political relationships with class-based groups in striking political 
compromises to facilitate neoliberal orientated policies. In neoliberal Chile, 
dominant parties still accord unions a certain degree of autonomy 
(traditionally asserted by mining unions) and importance in their role as 
political actor in contemporary democracy. As the proceeding section 
explains, labour unions – particularly the highly organised miners’ unions – 
have retained political autonomy from CODELCO and private capitalists. 
This suggests some similarities with Argentina, in which corporatist ties with 
labour unions were necessary to deliver market reforms (Murillo 2001) as 
well as the reconstitution of class politics through ‘segmented neo-
corporatism’ in post-crisis political economy (Etchemendy & Collier 2007; 
Wylde 2011). 
 
In contrast, the tradition of class-based mobilisation has not dissipated. This 
is supported by public opinion polls affirming the long-held legitimacy of 
unions as the fulcrum of political mobilisation in neoliberal Chile. Figure 6.4 
indicates public consensus around the necessity of unions in collective 
bargaining to represent workers’ interests. As such, this demystifies the myth 
behind the absolute decline of collective mobilisation around class politics as 
a political organisation in the context of neoliberal democracy in Chile. We 
should consider this in the context of increasing subcontracting, expanding 
informal sector and the legitimisation of labour flexibility as a way of 
managing capital-labour relations in Chile and across the developing world. 
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Figure 6.4 Public opinion on legitimacy of unions 
 
 Source: BARÓMETROS CERC, 1998/2007/2011 (Adapted), 23. 
Poll Question: There are distinct opinions about unions. Some say that unionism is an 
obsolete institution in defending workers' rights. Others think that unions are 
necessary in defending workers' rights. Which of the following positions do you think 
express your opinion? (1) Unions are obsolete; (2) Unions are not obsolete. 
 
On the one hand, neoliberal reforms have significantly affected copper 
workers as a consequence of attempts at modernising CODELCO and 
exposing the industry to foreign competition and multinational production. 
Indeed, labour flexibility became the organising logic of capital-labour 
relations in the mining industry, which brought forth succeeding efforts to 
reorganise production by way of closing mines temporarily or permanently 
and through mergers and joint ventures among private firms (Nem Singh 
2012, 2010; Vergara 2008). On the other hand, the fate of unions was not left 
in the invisible hands of the market. The power of labour, which developed 
through decades of concrete social struggles against foreign capitalists, 
signifies the highly contentious process of neoliberalisation of the mining 
sector. Natural resource unions have launched a counter-offensive to 
modernisation plans principally through their bargaining power in the sites 
of commodity production. By using the right to strike in the heartland of 
Chile’s economy, mining unions have not suffered the same debilitating 
effects as the other trade unions in production and services sectors. But more 
crucially, mining unions’ qualified support to Concertación provided the 
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veneer of legitimacy in electoral politics and policy-making domains. The 
labour pact in mining – though very fragile and contentious – is critical in 
explaining the success of Concertación elites in managing social tensions and 
moderating demands from below. As Section 6.4 will show later on, 
Sebastian Piñera’s governance style is the opposite case as he continually 
faces a crisis of legitimacy and governmentality in the midst of civil society 
protests. In this section, I aim to discuss the similarities and differences 
between the corporatist style of labour management in CODELCO and the 
mix of coercive and corporatist approaches in private mining enterprises.  
 
6.3.1 Alianza Estratégica as a pact between state and labour 
 
As mentioned in Section 6.2, Alianza Estratégica was as much as a political 
compromise in achieving social peace as it was a technocratic solution for 
modernisation. In 1994, CODELCO President Juan Villarzú established 
Alianza Estratégica, which consisted of a series of productivity targets and 
compromises between CODELCO and permanent workers, as represented by 
FTC in response to the perceived loss of credibility of CODELCO as a state 
enterprise. Beyond the mining sector, the labour movement participated in 
tripartite negotiations with big business and state, which was spearheaded by 
the centrist forces in the coalition. States and workers had patently sought a 
compromise to bring back formal labour rights and more power for workers 
in collective bargaining albeit in the context of institutionalised labour 
flexibility in capital-labour relations. In its early days, Alianza Estratégica 
was a technocratic attempt at guaranteeing stable labour relations to avoid 
further losses in productivity in the mining industry, which was then still 
largely controlled by public enterprises. Whilst retaining 100 percent 
ownership was a political imperative for Concertación to retain popular 
appeal, state managers were pressured to exert reforms within the 
management of the company. A neo-corporatist form of relationship was 
necessary if Concertación elites were to succeed in pursuing its discursive 
commitment to free market orthodoxy in the mining sector. Effectively, 
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modernisation implied the closure of mines, laying off workers, and further 
outsourcing of services to third parties.  
 
From a business perspective, the first 10 years of Alianza Estratégica is 
considered successful. Based on the agreements and the results in Table 6.4, 
CODELCO increased its production, lowered direct cash costs, and boosted 
productivity by 84 percent between 1994 and 1999. During its second phase, 
CODELCO doubled its value and generated an increase in surplus for the 
Chilean state by 100 percent – from US$ 5,900 million in 1994-1999 to US$ 
10,400 million in 2000-2005. In many ways, the strategic compromise 
between the owner – Chilean state via CODELCO – and the workers was 
successful. Not only was CODELCO retained as 100 percent state-owned, it 
has achieved labour stability without compromising competitiveness and 
profitability. However, Phase III of the strategic alliance had encountered 
serious tensions and pressures, which had affected its success. What was 
transpiring, then, was uneasiness between state managers and workers as a 
result of the profits generated by the commodity boom. Whilst in private 
mining this was only resolved through militant action such as the infamous 
strike in Minera Escondida in 2006, in CODELCO the paternalistic 
relationship constrained any possible illegal action that workers could take. 
But the tensions were nevertheless brewing as successive victories of miners 
in private mining to win wage increase and bonuses (to end conflicts) 
between 2006 and 2009 raised CODELCO workers’ expectations to the 
management of meeting their economic demands. This was perceived by the 
management as unreasonable, perhaps quite expectedly, because they were 
more concerned with costs in production, productivity, and large-scale 
investments in order for CODELCO to perform economically at par with big 
transnational mining companies.88 It does not help either that CODELCO is 
politically constrained by the state to make independent decisions regarding 
labour management and investment strategies.   
 
                                                   
 
88 Author interview with Nicolas Majluf, CODELCO, October 2009. 
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Table 6.4 Alianza Estratégica under Concertación government 
 Phase I (1994-1999) Phase II (2000-2006) 
Business 
Strategy 
Modernisation of CODELCO Common Project of State enterprise 
Objectives 
Recover competitiveness, profitability 
and credibility of CODELCO 
Maximise economic value and profits 
(dividends) to the state 
Goals and 
agreements 
♦ Reduce real costs to at least 10 cents 
per pound; 
♦ Increase production up to 500,000 
tonnes; and 
♦ Enhance productivity by 50 percent. 
♦ Double the (economic) value of 
CODELCO; and 
Generate surplus for the State. 
Results 
♦ Reduced real costs to at least 24 cents 
per pound; 
♦ Increased production up to 368,000 
tonnes; and 
♦ Enhanced productivity by 84 percent. 
♦ Completed (preliminary results); 
Increased surplus from US$ 5,900 
million in 1994-1999 to US$ 10,400 
million (projected) in 2000-2005 
Source: Alianza Estratégica. Fase III; Villarzú 2005 (Adapted). 
Note: 
See Appendix 4 for detailed discussions of the key aspects of Alianza Estratégica Phase III. 
  
Nevertheless Alianza Estratégica is an explicit attempt of the state to 
reconstitute ties with labour within the state enterprise by according the 
miners a social status above other members of the workforce. Like the 
Washington Agreement in 1951, the Concertación government recognises the 
strategic and historical importance of copper workers and the state 
enterprise CODELCO in Chile’s pathway of economic development. What 
underpins this technocratic solution is the ability of state managers and 
political elites to acquire workers’ support by way of reducing labour unrest 
and conflicts. As a measure of success, the index of conflictivity waned from 
3.3 between 1990 and 1993 to 1.4 between 1994 and 2005. There was also a 
decline in the frequency of accidents from an average of seven per 106 
hectares in 1993 to 5 per 106 hectares in 2005, which signifies the improving 
standards of health and safety measures in large-scale mining operations 
(Villarzú 2005: 10-12). CODELCO’s staff development and human capital 
training programme is also considered to be one of the best in the country. 
The statistics are backed up by several interviews among mining unions and 
state managers in CODELCO. One can easily have a sense of the existing 
relationship between CODELCO and its permanent workers. We can 
characterise state-labour relations in mining industry as neo-corporatist: 
corporatist simply because the pact does not really divert from traditional 
tools of cooptation used by state managers to prevent labour conflicts and 
social tensions, for example through higher wages, better benefit and 
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retirement plans, and expensive bonuses to avoid strikes; neo because the 
instruments in acquiring workers’ support are deployed in the neoliberal 
context wherein state intervention in labour conflicts is deemed obsolete or 
unnecessary. Equally, managing the state enterprise is counter-intuitive to 
the presumed logics of neoliberalism, which involves the depoliticisation of 
economic governance via technocratic mining management and the 
demobilisation of labour by disenfranchising their veto power. In CODELCO, 
these logics clearly do not conform to the actual practice of resource 
governance. 
 
One way of consolidating neo-corporatism is through political pacts between 
mining unions and presidential candidates of Concertación coalition. 
Through social dialogue, a formal agreement serves to bind the party and 
unions towards common goals and strategies in the copper industry. In the 
FTC National Proposal (2006:), prior to the electoral victory of Michelle 
Bachelet, the meeting between Concertación and FTC in November 17, 2005 
laid down in detail the policy programme of Bachelet backed by FTC 
regarding the future of CODELCO (such as investment plan, labour rights, 
and detailed national proposal on key management issues), social welfare 
and pension reforms, and the social pact for Chile’s development through 
collective bargaining. Whilst FTC makes clear its position on various 
management issues, what is expressed ominously in the document is the 
unions’ commitment to retain CODELCO as 100 percent state owned, and 
from thereon, compromises and agreements would have to be negotiated 
(FTC 2005: 9-11). If compared to the CODELCO proposal, the common 
thread is the emphasis on labour stability, competitiveness, and profitability 
with attempts at controlling negotiating labour conflicts and making 
collective bargaining work to avoid costly illegal strikes. This is quite 
exceptional in neoliberal Chile wherein collective negotiations fail as a result 
of power imbalances between employers and workers as well as lack of strong 
institutional framework to promote labour rights protection (Barrera 1998; 
Cook 2007; Espinosa 1996; OECD 2009; Winn 2004). But as Palacio-
Valladeres (2010) notes, the weakening of labour movement after three 
decades of sustained decline in trade unionism makes collection action 
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difficult but by no means impossible. Instead, union strategies combined 
with clientelist tactics of firms have allowed for limited recuperation of 
labour protection at the firm level. 
 
Nevertheless the neo-corporatist arrangement is only applicable to the 
privileged workers who have acquired permanent contracts in CODELCO. As 
foreign mining companies deepen their involvement in local spaces of 
extractive activities through long-term investments, an emergent model of 
business management has influenced governance styles of state enterprises. 
This business practice, encapsulated in discourses of competitiveness and 
innovation, has coincided with state reforms questioning the place of state 
enterprises in the global economy. Transnational business firms aimed at 
growth and productivity were driven by technological innovation and 
economic imperatives to extract in new landscapes, produce and add value to 
goods, and transport minerals and raw materials in places previously beyond 
the reach of multinational business. This clearly implies finding ways to gain 
access to cheaper labour and to lower production costs. In some cases, 
perhaps less but definitely still taking place in Chile, workers’ solidarity 
historically built in tightly knit mining communities have been broken down 
by the ‘race to the bottom’ in securing resources (Bunker & Ciccantell 2005). 
Notwithstanding the highly complex nature of global resource economy, 
neoliberal mining reforms aimed at responding to downward pressures of 
cost reduction and demands for labour productivity have systematically 
allowed for the precipitous fragmentation of workers between those with 
permanent contracts (called trabajadores de planta) and those with 
temporary contracts (called trabajadores contratistas). As subcontracting 
becomes a pervasive business practice in CODELCO and in private mining, 
new categories of workers have been formed whose main roles are to 
complement, if not substitute, the functions of permanent workers. But 
unlike the paternalistic relationship between state managers and permanent 
workers, contratistas’ salaries, benefit plans, and general working conditions 
are substandard compared to permanent workers. CODELCO was exposed to 
globalised business practices in mining. Consequentially, the company has 
emulated labour management styles in private sector mining. As Table 5.1 in 
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Chapter 5 demonstrated, CODELCO has outsourced most of its workforce 
and this has been taking place despite the strong and historically militant 
tradition of unionism.  
 
To sum up, the absence of any major strike in the last twenty years in 
CODELCO patently shows the success of state strategy in managing labour 
unrest and taming the militancy of organised labour in public copper 
industry. This was achieved through a highly politicised model of governing 
labour relations, which consisted of giving workers a seat in the board of 
directors, a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to labour militancy, and indirectly 
fragmenting labour solidarity through third party subcontracting. At the 
same time, by championing depoliticised and technocratic management in 
CODELCO, the government had escaped the arduous task of quelling 
potentially debilitating effects of labour resistance to the modernisation plan. 
Concertación elites did so by taking the politics out of economic decisions on 
the grounds that such choices are rational par excellence. This was also 
possible because of political legacies and crucial past choices, such as the 
decision to maintain CODELCO as 100 percent state-owned and develop 
paternalistic ties between state and workers. But although the Chilean state 
under Concertación government successfully acquired conditional labour 
support in electoral politics and modernisation plan, it should not be 
forgotten that labour has always taken a weaker position in the negotiating 
table with the state. Nothing better demonstrates this than the conflictual 
labour relations in the private sector in neoliberal Chile. 
 
6.3.2 Conflicts in private mining 
 
In private mining, the paternalistic relationship between state managers and 
permanent workers in CODELCO was never consolidated. Instead, firm-
worker relations in private mining are characterised by ephemeral 
tranquillity and permanent friction as exemplified by the frequency of 
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workers’ strikes compared to CODELCO. 89  Collective negotiations have 
constantly failed to achieve social peace between the militant and highly 
organised miners on the one hand and profit-seeking mining firms on the 
other. From labour’s perspective, the patrones (employers) have a ‘mountain 
of faculties to negotiate whilst workers possess no means to confront them’.90 
From business’ point of view, private firms follow the rules and requirements 
on subcontracting as established in the labour code, but they concede that 
the main problem really is the minimal and pro-employer nature of the law.91 
This situation reflects the broader pattern of historical conflicts between 
foreign firms and mining workers in Chilean mining communities, which 
consolidated the political identity of workers to form unions and mobilise 
miners and peasants against the political classes (Klubock, 1998; Petras and 
Zeitlin, 1967; Vergara, 2008).  
 
The determining factors regarding labour conflicts in private mining are 
structural and agential. On one hand, globalisation as a structural context 
creates a double bind between the state and labour movement in negotiating 
labour conflicts. Whilst labour flexibility is engendered in the strategy of 
competitiveness, pressures mounted by organised unions in defence of 
economic demands become untenable in the neoliberal environment. In this 
context, the state serves as intermediary between capital and labour by way 
of moderating labour demands and compelling business firms to set 
standards on working conditions, wages and social benefits. This, inevitably, 
generates contradictions as states do not necessarily remain neutral in 
conflicts between firms and workers. In the Chilean case, this is evidently 
reflected in the problems with recuperating collective rights, for example in 
empowering workers in individual negotiations with employers or the 
understaffing of Dirección del Trabajo, which is in charge of investigating 
                                                   
 
89 Note that CODELCO workers have not rejected collective bargaining agreements with 
CODELCO between 1994 and 2007. 
90 Author interviews with Agustin Segundo Latorre Risso, X-Strata Copper Alto Norte and 
FMC; Pedro Marin, FMC, November 2009.  
91  Author interviews with Javier Cox, Consejo Minero, October 2009; Carlos Gajardo 
Roberts, SONAMI, September 2009. 
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labour abuses across sectors. In short, these are political legacies both of 
Pinochet’s labour assault and structural constraints imposed by the global 
political economy in managing labour rights (Klubock 2004). On the other 
hand, conscious political choices have been made to promote private capital 
in mining and beyond, with an implicit assumption on the productive and 
efficient nature of private capital vis-à-vis public mining enterprises. Within 
the governing coalition, there exists a plethora of contradictory interests. 
Situations arose where legislators closely allied with the business sector 
within the block deliberately went against further reform of labour 
legislations. It was not only the Right-wing parties, then, which resisted 
labour reforms in Congress to redress labour flexibility. Whilst labour unions 
have no other choice but to work with labour-friendly parties within 
Concertación, the governing coalition have sought to expand its appeal to an 
increasingly depoliticised public (Silva, 2008). After twenty years of social 
pacts between the state, big business, and organised labour, the latter’s 
ultimate view of the state of labour reforms had been negative. CUT National 
Secretary Esteban Maturana claims, 
 
With respect to the major pillars that built their programmes, 
inspired by democracy [to achieve] more social justice, greater 
equity (...) in these three categories, Concertación governments 
delivered [in] the debit, negative figures, leaving a balance in the 
red (Palma, 2010). 
  
In these circumstances, perhaps it is not surprising that demands from 
subcontracting workers to re-regulate labour standards and working 
conditions took the form of intense, quite costly union strikes in Minera 
Escondida, the biggest private mining company in Chile and second largest 
copper producer after CODELCO. In 2006, FMC decided to reject the offer in 
collective negotiations and went on strike. Above all, attention focussed on 
subcontracting in private sector as an illegitimate exercise of the power of big 
business with the clear aim of reducing costs rather than business 
specialisation. Before I explain the significance of the strike, one must 
remember the powerful role of miners despite the absence of the state in 
mediating labour conflicts in post-dictatorial Chile. The mining industry 
stands out from other sectors for its high levels of unionisation (around 
  238 
90%), thereby, justifying the term labour aristocrats frequently applied to 
mining workers in comparison to the representative confederation of poor 
workers, Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT). In terms of their 
clout in commanding strikes, mining workers clearly have the ability to halt 
production and make a credible threat to both state and private firms. In this 
context, the mining strike of permanent workers in Escondida Mine 
compelled the company to offer a generous package of wages, bonuses and 
social benefits to avoid labour conflicts in October 2009 (Vial 2009). Yet this 
is not an achievement for all the workers. As expressed by Pedro Marin, the 
president of Federación Minera del Chile, 92  the division between the 
permanent and subcontracted workers has consequences for the uneven 
distribution of labour rights and worker protection schemes within sectors 
and between working classes:  
 
Collective negotiations in private mining are very hard... CODELCO 
has a good paternalistic administration and in the private sector 
things are different… the only form of advancing... [causes] with the 
lack of social benefits [as a result of subcontracting] is through 
collective negotiations. The contract we have achieved is the best in 
both public and private mining but not for all, Escondida has 2,253 
unionised workers, it cannot advance in the same manner… It 
depends on the organisational capacity of unions… it has only been 
possible to advance our interests through tough protests… We were 
on a twenty-five-day strike and I led them and we won through 
force.93 
 
The recognition of the different worlds of permanent and subcontracted 
workers is a crucial indicator of the widely held view on the impact of 
neoliberalism to labour movements across the developing world: the 
systematic fragmentation and atomisation of working class solidarity and the 
decline of labour politics as fulcrum of social mobilisation and 
                                                   
 
92 The Mining Federation of Chile or FMC is the confederation of twenty one mining unions 
in private sector. One must remember that it is very unusual in Chile to find organised 
workers beyond the firm level, and therefore, the power of organised miners has 
historically remained the same. This is backed up by interviews with representatives of 
SONAMI and Consejo Minero who view mining workers as highly unionised, powerful 
labour aristocrats.  
93 Author interview with Pedro Marin, FMC, November 2009. 
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democratisation. Equally, the importance of this union strike in its 
contemporary context is worth mentioning. In the past, collective action 
takes place in periods of economic crisis and hyperinflation in which 
organised protests are defensive strategies against economic and social 
dislocations. Labour unrest, above all, indicates the vulnerability of states in 
times of political uncertainty. In the 1990s, political classes justified their 
refusal to change labour protection laws on the basis that it was a period of 
austerity, crisis, and political instability. The easy justification of elites, then, 
became untenable. The labour strike transpired in a ‘time of plenty’ when 
copper prices were high and growth was unprecedented in Chile. The use of 
subcontracting in the name of global competitiveness failed to resonate 
strongly amongst Chilean publics upon the changed global environment for 
copper. With the rise in copper prices and an exodus of new Chinese-led 
mining investments in Chile, we witnessed the unravelling of the consensual 
discourse regarding ‘saving and spending’, which was reflected in the ways 
demands from below were articulated by labour unions in political debates. 
Whilst mining unions are far from representative of working class politics, 
the new law created in 2007 has the overall effect of expanding the range of 
collective rights and responsibilities of business firms. Through the 
Subcontracting Law in 2007, there exist more stringent rules on outsourcing, 
and depending on the knowledge of principal companies, the worker has the 
right to seek redress from the principal and subcontracting firms. In 
addition, the successful negotiation of Minera Escondida workers in October 
2009 led workers in Chuquicamata (CODELCO’s biggest mining operation) 
to vote against CODECLO’s offer. This is really the first time a strike took 
place in the public copper industry, hence, the breakdown of Alianza 
Estratégica. This would further unravel under the leadership of Sebastian 
Piñera. But what remains clear is the failure of the institutional framework to 
respond to the demands for social equity among workers. Tellingly, the world 
of labour is plagued with divisiveness and fragmentation and the victory of 
the strike is nothing but piecemeal in the grand scheme of things.  
 
The repoliticisation of labour demands, in which mining firms have been 
threatened by production stoppage and mass walkouts in the mines, should 
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be understood within the broader political context in Chile. The power of 
union strikes – historically remembered as key to the fall of Allende in 
September 1973 – has been utilised during a commodity boom when 
production stoppage would be far more costly than negotiating with unions 
through bonuses and salary increase. Since 2002, Chilean mining firms have 
reaped the benefits of high copper prices, in which profits skyrocketed 
without having to increase actual exports. This naturally generated more 
unreasonable demands for higher wages. In 2010, Concertación coalition lost 
against the coalition of right parties led by UDI and RN, called Alianza, as a 
combined result of a weakening labour movement (one of Concertación’s 
source of electoral support), public apathy, loss of credibility of the coalition, 
the lack of any political alternative to remedy the parochial party system of 
Chile, and the initial popular appeal of Sebastian Piñera (Angell 2010).  
 
To sum up, Section 6.3 analysed the fragile bases of labour support of 
Concertación government, which was partially the reason behind the 
contentious reform process in the mining sector as well as their eventual loss 
in elections. In the state enterprise, the gulf in interests between the state 
managers and workers (mainly subcontracted workers) paved the way for the 
breakdown of Alianza Estratégica. Combined with the repoliticisation of 
labour issues in private mining, we have witnessed the unravelling of the 
state-labour compact towards the end of Concertación government. Whilst 
economic imperatives are the driving forces behind the technocratic 
approach of CODELCO, the collision between private mining firms and 
workers was mainly a result of clashing interests. Taking into account the 
configuration of political relationships between political parties, CODELCO, 
private capital, and organised workers, it is unsurprising that pact-making 
and consensual politics have faltered under the Right government in power. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
The key question to be asked about capital-labour relations in contemporary 
Chile is whether existing models of corporate governance and modes of 
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controlling labour conflicts will continue to produce stable growth. The 
question also links back to Chapter 5, which is whether the state has any 
responsibility in the context of privatised models of resource governance. The 
difficulties of balancing economic objectives and democratic responsibilities 
constrain states from taking more expansive roles. The crude emphasis on 
growth is already taking its toll, as exemplified by the insurmountable 
challenge to Alianza government (2010-present) launched by labour unions 
and civil society actors. After less than two years in office, Piñera has faced 
the gravest challenges. With respect to labour mobilisation, union strikes 
decisively taken by permanent and subcontracted workers across the copper 
industry in July 2011 is the first time really that we are witnessing workers’ 
solidarity. It is unprecedented in two ways. In CODELCO, permanent 
workers have conventionally acceded to management decisions in the name 
of Alianza Estratégica. On the 40th anniversary of the nationalisation of 
copper, the union leadership in CODELCO decided to reject the offer and 
went on strike. The 24-hour stoppage of 15,000 permanent and 30,000 
subcontracted workers completely paralysed CODELCO amounting to a loss 
of US$41 million (El Mostrador 2011b). The planned modernisation of 
CODELCO, which was interpreted as steps towards the privatisation of the 
state enterprise, was at the core of this historic protest. Despite claims by 
Minister of Mines and Energy Laurence Golborne of the illegality of the strike 
and that the state is ‘strengthening CODELCO through its investment 
programme’, the union leadership has promised to continue fighting against 
any moves by the Right-wing government to privatise the firm (El Mostrador 
2011a, 2011c). What is notable is that the strike was preceded by the rejection 
by the FTC of the renewal of Alianza Estratégica following the breakdown of 
collective negotiations in early 2010.  
 
The mining strike in Minera Escondida in July 2011, according to the unions, 
was a difficult decision but was justified due to the inability of the mining 
firm to honour the agreement in October 2009. The decision to reject 
collective bargaining agreements is still a difficult choice in Chile. The labour 
law accords employers the right to fire workers on strike, contentious 
political actions are indicative of the stronger calls for state regulation to go 
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beyond minimal compliance with the law. Mining unions are increasingly 
seeking the state to defend workplace demands and expand institutional 
channels to guarantee labour rights. Nothing exemplifies this trend better 
than the outcome of the mining accident in Chile. The global attention in the 
mining accident generated popular pressures directed at the president to 
save the 33 miners trapped underground for 70 days in the San José mine in 
Copiapo (El Mostrador 2010). One year after the accident, 31 out of the 33 
miners sought justice by filing a lawsuit against the Chilean state (and not the 
mining firm) for its failure to carry out proper inspections of the mine’s 
safety and working conditions. The Chilean government has constantly and 
iteratively applied minimal standards, the miners argue, which makes it 
hardly surprising that two further deaths were incurred in 2005 and 2007 
even before this tragedy came to pass.94 After many years of silence, workers 
in the private sector are now calling on the state to guarantee labour rights. 
 
The tensions between the state and labour unions, as signified to a greater 
extent by the strike in CODELCO and to a lesser degree by the workers in the 
biggest private mining firm in Chile, are taking place in a recurring fashion. 
The strike demonstrates quite vividly the historically constituted 
organisational strength of mining workers; the relevance of the labour 
movement is underlined by their decision to challenge the neoliberal model 
and the reforms being introduced by the Right. Whether Piñera can 
modernise the copper sector, especially CODELCO, without resorting to 
complete marginalisation of unions will be very critical in terms of the future 
of industrial relations. Labour management will remain the most important 
challenge CODELCO’s corporate governance. Without a sound relationship 
between the state enterprise and its workers, we will most probably witness 
persistent tensions that may escalate depending on how the Right 
government responds. In the private sector, the state must respond to the 
breakdown of labour stability and recalibrate, once again, the balance of 
rights and growth in order to maintain Chile’s competitive position in the 
                                                   
 
94 They are requesting a total of CLP 7.7 million or CLP 250,000 for each miner as 
compensation (La Nación 2011).  
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global political economy. Overall, the mining sector has in the last five years 
repoliticised debates about resource ownership, labour rights protection, and 
the position of the state with respect to conflicts between capital and labour. 
In short, the reforms in the mining industry are now bringing back the 
‘labour question’ in contemporary Chile. 
 
In this chapter, I have shown the complexity of corporate governance and 
labour reforms undertaken by CODELCO managers as well as the distinctive 
dynamics of capital-labour relations in the globalised mining industry. 
Consistent with historical institutionalist and political economy perspectives, 
I have argued that neoliberalism has had variegated effects to the state, 
CODELCO, and to the wider labour movement in Chile. This, above all, 
informs us of the complex processes of neoliberal reforms. Whilst standard 
neoliberal narratives predict the decline of public enterprises and the 
depoliticisation of corporate governance, what I have shown in the chapter is 
the opposite effect. I have demonstrated how CODELCO managers 
internalised the logic of competitiveness by way of adapting globalised 
business practices, including corporate governance reforms and adaptation 
of third party outsourcing, but that the state has remained dominant as an 
actor in the copper industry. Through CODELCO, the state has maintained 
what unions have historically fought in Chile: the right to own resources and 
generate a bigger share of resource rents that could be spent for social 
development. This was done, inevitably, by alluding to the discourse of 
globalisation. And so, whilst successive post-dictatorial Chilean governments 
have sustained laws to attract foreign capital and generate a degree of 
legitimacy for private sector, the management of CODELCO has remained 
highly politicised. Labour conflicts, as I have shown in Section 4.3, are also 
managed through varying degrees of political intervention, such as the 
adoption of neo-corporatist tools and sometimes the use of overt coercion in 
private mines (Palma 2009).95 
 
                                                   
 
95 Author interview with Lariza Palma, CUT, October 2009. 
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In the end, what I hope to have shown in both chapters is the following: (a) 
that Chilean mining policy is far from the standard neoliberal narrative of 
depoliticised, technocratic governance because of the political role of 
CODELCO and the historically strong power of mining unions; (b) that the 
corporate governance reforms in CODELCO have conformed to the ‘best 
practices’ shared among international mining companies but these are also 
subject to political interventions by the state; and (c) that labour conflicts 
have remained prevalent in post-dictatorial Chile as a result of the 
incompatibility between democratic ideals of labour rights protection and 
neoliberal concepts of labour flexibility. Whilst the Chile’s resource sector 
adheres to some of the theoretical axioms laid down by neoliberalism, the 
actual praxis of policy-making and political relations between the state, 
parties, workers’ unions, private capital and CODELCO deem it necessary to 
revise our expectations regarding how actors will behave. In the next chapter, 
I will begin the discussion on the institutional transformation of petroleum 
governance in Brazil to support my claims on the variegated effects of 
neoliberalism in states, state enterprises, and workers. This, in turn, 
generates insights as regards the transformation of resource management in 
Latin America. 
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Chapter 7  
PETROLEUM GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL, 1990-2011 
 
 
This chapter examines the political economy of oil in Brazil. Its main 
argument is that economic governance in strategic resource sectors has been 
determined largely by political continuities with the country’s statist 
developmentalist past. Whilst many political economy scholars have treated 
neoliberalism as a critical juncture that paved the way for the reconfiguration 
of the triangular social relations between states, firms, and organised labour 
(Murillo 2001; Phillips 2004), I offer a more nuanced argument regarding 
the role of political legacies, historical conflicts and institutional complexities 
as mediating the adoption of neoliberalism. In other words, we should 
understand the incomplete (and contradictory) nature of neoliberal reforms 
in the oil industry, and the subsequent return of state capitalism in Brazil, in 
terms of national development strategies in pragmatically responding to the 
changing external environment. This growth strategy coheres around the 
idea of neo-developmentalism, which combines market incentives and state 
control over the oil industry by securing greater state share of oil rents as well 
as directly participating in the economy through state enterprises. But whilst 
a stronger role for the state in economic governance has been asserted by the 
Left government in power (2003-2014), the enactment of strategic 
governance choices have been achieved in the context of favourable 
structural conditions. The PT government elites, in short, have perceived an 
opportunity for incremental institutional transformation in favour of a 
stronger, activist state.    
 
Whilst Chile offers a story of self-reinforcing path dependent choices, Brazil 
exhibits what Mahoney (2010) calls reactive sequences, or the chains of 
temporally ordered and causally connected events generated as backlash 
reactions to antecedent political choices. Whilst neoliberal reforms have been 
introduced, and its main consequence was the restructuring of the oil 
industry writ large, nevertheless macroeconomic adjustment policies are 
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invariably part of a longer history of state management. Put differently, the 
(still emerging) neo-developmentalist strategy of the PT government is an 
outcome of the Left’s historical commitment to the construction of a 
developmentalist state aimed at achieving both growth and social equality, 
which was of course altered by the gradual embrace of competitiveness and 
private sector logic of efficiency. In other words, the ideological commitment 
of the PT that may have been directing its policy choices was in fact also 
reshaped by neoliberalism. So although neoliberalism as a paradigm of 
development has failed to achieve its promise of economic growth under 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), it was quite difficult for PT under 
the first term of Lula Ignacio da Silva (2003-2006) to discard the policy 
paradigm completely. Instead, policy change towards a neo-developmental 
growth strategy can be observed under the second term of Lula da Silva 
(2006-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014). The puzzle really is not so 
much why greater state involvement in the economy returned in the policy 
agenda, but why it has become sustainable as an alternative to free market 
orthodoxy. In this chapter, the explanation rests on how favourable 
structural conditions – self-sufficiency in oil, a marked period of growth, and 
discovery of pre-salt – have given the Left government the ideological and 
material resources for the articulation of a new developmental discourse. 
 
In the Brazilian oil industry, it was not neoliberalism per se but rather the 
discovery of pre-salt oil reserves, which serves as critical juncture for shifts in 
institutional arrangements. Firstly, it opens up a new phase of development 
in the Brazilian petroleum industry, which has developed historically by 
refining and processing crude oil. The newfound oil wealth has altered the 
political mentality of actors, in which the old model of relying on foreign 
investments for economic dynamism in the oil sector was deemed obsolete. 
This is reflected in the change in petroleum governance, underpinned by the 
new regulatory framework introduced since 2010. Secondly, and in contrast 
to expectations of radical change, the Workers’ Party (PT), now in its third 
term in office, has combined policies geared towards selective protectionism 
and autonomy for state-controlled enterprises as a development strategy. 
Equally, its emphasis on the role of oil wealth in social redistribution is novel 
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compared to previous governments in power. Overall, neo-developmentalism 
implies a hybrid strategy of growth with a stronger role for the state in 
guiding the economy without necessarily disregarding the role of 
competitiveness and market incentives as a way of generating profitability. 
The chapter is structured in two main sections. In Section 7.1, I examine the 
rationale behind Cardoso’s neoliberal reforms and its impacts in the oil 
industry by focussing on the introduction of foreign participation and 
creations of new regulatory agencies. Section 7.2 analyses changing 
continuities under Lula da Silva, particularly the ways in which he sought to 
strengthen the role of state and state enterprises under favourable external 
conditions.  
 
7.1 Political legacies of neoliberalism in petroleum sector 
 
The nationalisation of petroleum, steel and mining was fundamental to the 
old developmentalist model, in which a strong state directly participated in 
the national economy as a consequence of an incapable, unwilling private 
sector (Trebat 1983; Triner 2011). The oil industry was considered vital for 
industrialisation. PETROBRAS emerged as a technocratic-political solution 
to balance the need for foreign investment and national protectionism of 
resources. General Horta Barbosa made clear in 1938 that refining imported 
crude oil was the only way to secure Brazil’s growing energy consumption 
and to eventually finance investments in the Exploration & Production (E&P) 
sector. However, PETROBRAS faced multiple challenges in achieving this 
goal: the expanding energy requirements of producing heavy capital goods, 
the need to integrate transport, shipping and railroad systems to policy of 
energy consumption, and the development of petrochemicals sector that can 
both support productive industries and develop the oil industry through 
crude oil production (Randall 1993). Whilst such tasks were complex and 
indeed technical, PETROBRAS’ role in Brazilian political economy is 
intrinsically political. As a state enterprise necessary for industrial 
development, PETROBRAS was given greater political autonomy from the 
state. As existing onshore reserves declined, PETROBRAS intensified its 
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exploration activities in offshore continental shelf leading to the discovery of 
Guaricema field in 1968, the Northeast fields, and then Campos Basin in 
1974. Whilst the government sought to secure Brazil’s energy needs as a 
result of high oil prices and balance of payments problems caused by the 
1973 oil crisis, international oil companies were focussed at developing 
research in onshore activities leaving PETROBRAS with no choice but to 
invest on deep water drilling technology during the late 1970s and early 
1980s (Dantas & Bell 2009; Furtado 1995). PETROBRAS’ expansion thus 
came together with Brazil’s state-led model of development, which meant 
that the exhaustion of this economic strategy also affected the performance of 
the state enterprise. 
 
To understand more clearly the effects of market opening, we need to first 
take into account the sector-specific characteristics and the particularities of 
the Brazilian oil industry. Unlike Mexico or Venezuela, Brazil had no oil 
reserves for exports during the twentieth century, therefore, the volatility of 
oil prices had a different effect for its economy as a rapidly growing oil 
consumer. With no prospective oil reserves inland (as stipulated in the Link 
Report), PETROBRAS was forced to compete internationally by tapping 
foreign oil reserves through BRASPETRO and refining imported crude oil. 
This policy worked quite effectively in meeting domestic consumption but 
was not sufficient to achieve its long-term goal of securing domestic oil 
reserves within the Brazilian territory. PETROBRAS sought to expand 
market control in energy-related sectors by way of operating as a highly 
specialised, vertically integrated energy firm with activities spanning oil, 
natural gas, and energy sectors in Brazil and overseas. Within the petroleum 
industry, PETROBRAS sought to diversify its operations from refining and 
processing imported crude oil towards exploration and production, which 
was underpinned by an aggressive investment policy in the E&P sector (see 
Chapter 8). The petroleum commodity chain involves three major areas: oil 
exploration, development, and production, also known as upstream; in 
refining, transportation, and marketing, also known as mid-stream; and in 
petrochemical, oil product distribution, and natural gas, energy, and biofuels 
segments, also known as downstream. As such, neoliberal reforms were 
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geared towards the participation of foreign capital in upstream activities, 
primarily because the midstream and downstream sectors had already been 
exposed to private capital.  
 
The return of democracy went hand in hand with the unravelling of the 
developmental state. In the petroleum industry, the retreat of the state was 
felt by PETROBRAS as its reach and scope of activities dramatically eclipsed, 
which was reflected in the reorganisation of the public company. This, above 
all, meant selling some of the non-performing subsidiaries of PETROBRAS 
ranging from fertiliser, mining, and international trading whilst 
simultaneously refocusing its activities back to oil production, refining, and 
exports of petrochemicals. In 1992, PETROBRAS announced the planned 
company restructuring under Fernando Collor de Melo (1990-1992), during 
which operating costs were reduced from US$ 4.2 billion to US$ 3.2 billion 
by decentralising administrative tasks, offering incentive programs for 
retirement to reduce the labour force, and selecting subsidiaries to extinguish 
or privatise (Randall 1993: 41-46). The National Congress decisively voted to 
eliminate INTERBRAS and PETROMISA as well as to privatise the 
subsidiary companies controlled by PETROQUISA, all of which were justified 
as poorly performing subsidiaries of the state enterprise.96 However, there 
                                                   
 
96 After the coup d’etat in 1964, PETROBRAS began to expand its activities across the 
hydrocarbons commodity chain through the creation of subsidiaries: (a) in 
petrochemicals, PETROQUISA took over PETROBRAS’ rubber factory and fertiliser 
factory in 1967 and bought COPENE, COPESUL, and NORQUIS; (b) in distribution, 
PETROBRAS expanded its activities by establishing its subsidiary PETROBRAS BR in 
1971 though it did not have monopoly in this part of the chain because international oil 
companies whom PETROBRAS worked with in overseas exploration demanded 
competition; (c) government’s doubts that sufficient oil can be found in Brazil led to the 
creation of BRASPETRO in 1972 for overseas exploration to join consortiums abroad in 
Colombia, Iraq, and Algeria tough it focussed its activities in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Norway, Angola, Libya, Colombia, Ecuador and Argentina beginning 1988;  (d) 
PETROBRÁS also moved towards acquiring improved trade deals with nations which it 
purchased huge quantity of crude oil by creating INTERBRÁS in 1976; (e) eventually, 
PETROQUISA’s specialisation in petrochemical development led to the creation of 
PETROFERTIL in March 1976 to make fertilizers based on phosphates – a result of the 
exorbitantly priced imported fertilizers and disinterest from private entrepreneurs to 
establish a fertilizer industry; and (f) finally, mining company PETROMISA was created 
in 1977 to take advantage of PETROBRAS’ knowledge of Brazilian geology. Although no 
further subsidiaries were created thereafter, PETROBRAS was involved in other oil-
related activities such as alcohol production (Randall 1993: 29-36). Therefore, the 
expansion of the oil industry is in essence the history of PETROBRÁS.  
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was neither a consensus to fully privatise PETROBRAS nor to open the oil 
market to foreign capitalists, not yet during this time at least. Whilst Collor 
de Melo successfully implemented the restructuring of PETROBRAS, it was 
nevertheless a contentious process. Labour unions occupied factories to 
protest privatisation of various subsidiaries. Facts about the complex 
privatisation process of PETROQUISA were also contested, in which 
inefficiencies and bottlenecks for productivity were blamed not so much on 
PETROBRAS’ performance per se but in the ways the petrochemical industry 
was organised. As Randall (1993: 44) shows in detail, the absence of 
economies of scale, the lack of critical mass to generate research for the 
development of the oil industry, and duplication of administrative expense all 
made it difficult to achieve competitiveness and efficiency in production. By 
April 1991, the PETROBRAS system was composed of the consolidated 
PETROBRAS holding, BRASPETRO, PETROBRAS BR, PETROQUISA, and 
PETROFERTIL (smaller firms within the latter two subsidiaries were 
privatised). Collor’s plans were halted by his impeachment in Congress that 
effectively removed him and replaced by Itamar Franco (1992-1994).  
 
However, the initial changes under the short-lived Collor de Melo 
government were the beginning of a more systematic attempt to challenge 
the developmentalist orientation of the Brazilian state. Cardoso who was 
Finance Minister under Itamar Franco at that time designed the 1994 Real 
Plan to stabilise the economy through a dual strategy of maintaining inflation 
and controlling wages. With the success in bringing down inflation, Cardoso 
secured the presidency and reoriented his policy towards the privatisation of 
state enterprises, including steel, petroleum, and mining, as a central plank 
of economic recovery plan. Whilst a common recipe was envisaged, the actual 
application of resource sector privatisation was conducted at varying degrees 
and scope, such that majority ownership of state enterprises were transferred 
to private capital in the mining and steel sectors whilst the state retained 51 
percent voting capital in PETROBRAS. 97  Nevertheless, Cardoso’s market 
                                                   
 
97 The distinction between privatisation of state assets and market opening of the industry 
should be carefully made. Timing and pacing had to do with the successful privatisation 
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opening policy seemed unstoppable despite the relatively good performance 
of state enterprises and the outright challenge posed by the Workers’ Party in 
Congress (Hunter 2010).98 But the years prior to the enactment of the new 
petroleum law was highly contentious. Oil workers defended the state 
enterprise system against privatisation, which at face value was conceived as 
the only way to save PETROBRAS from complete collapse. In particular, the 
Federação Única dos Petroleiros (FUP), the largest and most organised 
labour union affiliated with the national-based Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores (CUT), mobilised to retain state ownership of 
NITROFERTIL, which was eventually incorporated in the PETROBRAS 
system as Fábrica de Fertilizantes Nitrogenados (FAFEN) (FUP 2010). As 
Chapter 6 details, anti-privatisation strikes and social protests were 
consistently called by petroleum workers with support from CUT and other 
rural workers. The peak of this tension between the reformist government 
and combative unions was the 1995 strike in which Cardoso called for 
military troops to enforce law and order in the streets (FUP 2011).  
 
Market opening reforms occurred in two phases. At the onset, Congress 
initially ratified Constitutional Ammendment No. 5, which broke the 
monopoly of PETROBRAS across the hydrocarbon commodity chain. This 
was then followed by the 1997 Petroleum Law (Lei 9.478) approved in 6 
August 1997, which established the concessions regime to allow private firms 
to compete freely with PETROBRAS. The privatisation of mining was highly 
contested, including a legal battle regarding the sales of CVRD, which have 
generated mixed reactions from the public. Another wave of reforms 
targeting PETROBRAS would have been received less positively. However, an 
alternative explanation lies on the differences between mining and petroleum 
industries in Brazil. Whilst PETROBRAS developed the necessary 
                                                                                                                                               
 
programme in mining and steel. However, the potential for profits in the oil industry as 
well as the technological achievements of PETROBRAS effectively shielded the company 
from complete privatisation (see Nem Singh & Massi forthcoming). 
98 For a balanced critique on privatisation and the strategic direction of the PND during 
1990s, see the following newspaper articles: Damasceno 1995; Folha de Sao Paulo 2003; 
Landau 1995. 
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technological advancement in offshore drilling to move up in the global value 
chains as a competitive player, CVRD was not able to develop the same 
competitive advantage in the mining industry. As such, from the 
government’s viewpoint, CVRD had less capacity to develop internationally 
through state support than PETROBRAS.99 Although PETROBRAS remained 
under state control, the industry was opened to private competition, 
specifically to foreign participation. The chapter now focuses on the process 
of transforming the industry by way of establishing a concession grants 
model and re-forming the state through new regulatory organisations. 
 
7.1.1 Changing the market structure of the Brazilian oil industry 
 
The Petroleum Law, Cardoso’s most important piece of legislation with 
regard to petroleum governance, had two important effects in the oil 
industry. Firstly, it radically changed the structure of risk sharing between 
private capital and the Brazilian state. As Table 7.1 shows, there are different 
forms upon which states can regulate the oil industry, specifically the very 
lucrative yet highly risky exploration and production (E&P) sector. The 
various models of risk sharing reflect partially the willingness of the host 
state to allow foreign capital to invest (and be rewarded) in the oil sector, and 
partially the choice of contract model determines the range of incentives and 
risks available for the state. Cardoso’s neoliberal orientation sought for lower 
risks in oil exploration and development but the cost of which was very 
limited reward for the state. Whilst the high sunk costs of exploration are 
shouldered by private capital, they equally reap greater benefits in situations 
where oil reserves are to be found. This model offers very minimal rent for 
the state – mainly through corporate taxes and royalty fees – but it reduces 
the risk for the state to invest in situations of high uncertainty. From the 
Cardoso government’s perspective, the high risks (and costs) involved in oil 
                                                   
 
99 Author interview with Deputy Secretary Nogueira da Costa Jr., Secretariat of Geology, 
Mining and Mineral Processing, Ministry of Mines and Energy, September 2011. It was 
conducted by Eliza Massi in the context of the co-authored piece (Nem Singh & Massi 
forthcoming). 
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exploration at a time of austerity, stagnant growth, and high levels of fiscal 
constraints required a more active private sector. Like in Chile, there was an 
astoundingly strong belief on the productive nature of private capital, 
particularly foreign oil firms, in generating economic dynamism in the 
petroleum sector. The view on the growth-inducing effects of foreign capital 
challenges the historically strong role of the state in directing the oil sector 
and the industrialisation programme more generally. And despite decades of 
resistance against foreign ownership, Cardoso successfully gained significant 
support in Congress to continue with his pursuit of introducing greater space 
for oil firms to operate in Brazil. This was of course a general trend in 
Brazilian political economy. As observed in the telecommunications and 
electricity sectors, a combination of ownership change, liberalisation, and 
better regulatory designs were viewed to potentially contribute to large 
efficiency gains. Privatisation then changed the market structure by 
introducing competition in a market characterised by high degrees of 
protection and the exercise of market power of state-owned enterprises 
(Goldstein 1999: 694). 
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Table 7.1 Risks and rewards in different E&P models 
Contract Type Oil Company State Description 
Concession  
All risk and high 
reward 
No risk and low reward 
Oil company holds exclusive rights to explore, develop, sell and export 
oil and minerals extracted from a specified area within a fixed period of 
time. The successful bidder takes all the risks of exploring and 
developing oil fields. 
Production-
sharing 
All risk and low 
reward 
No risk and high 
reward 
Ownership of natural resources rests on the state but permits foreign 
corporations to manage and operate the development of oil fields. 
Foreign capital takes the risks of developing oil fields and the model 
typically works when a national state-owned and/or private company 
join the consortium as interest holders. Often the state has the cost of its 
initial contribution carried by the other companies, which would be 
repaid from the state's future profits. Intense negotiations between the 
sharing of costs and capital exist here. Contracts play a critical role here 
because the legal system is the only guarantee that the state will not 
renounce its previous commitment. It is also in this system that the state 
is at its most conflictual role because it acts both as profit maximiser and 
as enforcer of the rule of law. 
Pure Service 
Contract 
No risk and low 
reward 
All risk and high 
reward 
Under this contractual arrangement, the oil company is engaged by the 
regulatory authority or state owned company as state representative to 
conduct petroleum exploration for a fee or a share of production. It can 
either be pure service contract or risk service contract. The oil company 
neither has any exploration or production title nor ownership of 
petroleum produced at any stage of the commodity chain.  
Joint Venture 
Share in risk and 
reward 
Share in risk and 
reward 
By definition, it refers to an arrangement where two or more parties wish 
to pursue a joint undertaking of oil exploration and development. 
However, there is a long list of issues that need to resolved before any 
joint venture can be negotiated, especially as regards risk, costs, 
potential liabilities (e.g. in cases of accidents or environmental damage). 
The state is directly responsible in resource extraction. 
Sources: Lima 2009a, 2009b; Radon 2005 (Adapted). 
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Secondly, the Petroleum Law, in equal measure, confronts the conventional 
view among policy elites in Brazil regarding the competitiveness of 
PETROBRAS, and state enterprises en toto, in sustaining a growth model 
based on state-led development. In congressional debates, PT as opposition 
vehemently challenged the Cardoso government regarding the privatisation 
of state enterprises between 1995 and 1997 (Hunter 2010). The initial 
restructuring of the PETROBRAS system (1990-1994) painted a very 
different image of state enterprises – one that seemingly showed SOEs as 
inefficient and uncompetitive after years of state protectionism. The post-ISI 
fatigue and the rise of neoliberalism provided the structural context upon 
which the discourse of no alternative to privatisation was embedded. The 
Programa Nacional de Desestatização (PND) approved under Collor de 
Melo and subsequently intensified during the Franco government was aimed 
at redefining the role of the federal government, reducing the scope of public 
sector, and strengthening the market for local capitalists. The BNDES which 
had oversight over the privatisation process completely restructured the 
petrochemical sector by selling off 27 state enterprises at a total value of US$ 
3.7 billion including transfer dividends of US$ 1 billion between 1992 and 
1996 (Montenegro 2003).100 As Table 7.2 details, privatisation of state assets 
as a way of securing fiscal stability had the net effect of generating short term 
income for the Cardoso government but at the expense of damaging the 
prospect of long term industrial strategies to recover from the crisis.  
 
Table 7.2 Sales from privatisation in petrochemical sector, 1992-
1996 
Year Amount (in US$ million) 
1992 1,330.3 
1993-1994 551.8 
1995 604.04 
1996 212.9 
TOTAL 2,699.04 
Source: BNDES data (adapted) from Montenegro 2003. 
 
                                                   
 
100 The petrochemical sector is part of the downstream activities of the PETROBRAS system. 
No reforms were introduced in this sector except the company reorganisation and the 
sector was not directly affected by the Petroleum Law, which focused on generating more 
investment in the upstream activities. 
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Nevertheless the financial and economic performance of state enterprises, 
particularly of PETROBRAS and CVRD, were far from how they were 
depicted (Nem Singh & Massi forthcoming). As I will demonstrate in Chapter 
8, PETROBRAS was far from inefficient compared to other state enterprises, 
and this was primarily driven by technological advancement in offshore 
technology and its culture of innovation. In these circumstances, Cardoso’s 
law has changed the terms of bargaining between the state, state enterprise, 
and private capital, although in a rather limited way, or at least not to the 
extent that initial optimists of reforms had envisaged. For instance, the 
Brazilian state had retained subsoil rights in order to maintain permanent 
control over its natural resources regardless of the availability of oil reserves 
and this was tied to the long held principle of oil as key to industrialisation.101 
Equally, the extent private capitalists were willing and capable of generating 
economic dynamism in the oil industry remained questionable especially 
after 1997. Beyond the market risks common across sectors, there are specific 
risks in the petroleum industry which do not guarantee private investments. 
In economic terms, the exploration risks resulting from the possible absence 
of economically viable resources despite massive capital inflows in research 
and exploration make the Brazilian market far less attractive compared to 
countries with proven oil reserves (Postali 2002a: 226). Since long-term 
investments do not materialise quickly enough for private capital to profit, 
the investment risk in Brazil was very high as a result of fears that any 
changes in government or policy can endanger the oil contracts with previous 
governments. Finally, the law may have had limited impact to PETROBRAS 
and the goal of weakening the state enterprise to attract foreign investments 
was unachievable. As I will show in Chapter 8, PETROBRAS’ 
internationalisation strategy by operating in overseas markets has not been 
affected by the change in the institutional framework. Most importantly, the 
royalty fees are rather limited and incomparable to oil-producing states 
                                                   
 
101 For a detailed discussion of subsoil rights – or the ownership of the state of its resources – 
as a fundamental indicator of state capacity to obstruct the ability of capital, both foreign 
and domestic, to access the subsoil in the Venezuela in comparative context, see Hellinger 
2012, 2008, 2006. 
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making the reforms less far reaching in scope compared to reforms in public 
services. 
 
We should note that the concessions grant model was replicated in the 
mining sector, with far greater effects to the industry in terms of state 
withdrawal due to the privatisation of CVRD (Lima 2010; Nem Singh & 
Massi forthcoming). Although tempting to claim that this was a highly 
ideological decision, privatisation of state enterprises in Brazil has been 
partly political and partly pragmatic to respond to short-term macro-
economic problems arising from the disarray of national fiscal accounts and 
endogenous pressures generated by domestic politics (Pinheiro 2002). 
Almeida & Moya (1997) describe market reforms in Brazil as negotiations 
among veto players, in which different configurations of power are formed 
among actors at various stages of decision-making, namely at the moment 
legislative projects on privatisation are debated and during the 
implementation stage (see also Almeida 1996). In a rather more positive take, 
Alfredo Montero (1998) argues that neither the hegemonic dominance of 
neoliberalism nor the profoundly politicised process in policy-making have 
been the reason for privatisation in Brazil. Instead, he insists on privatization 
of steel as a deliberate strategy to implement a recalibrated industrial policy 
that recognises the fundamental changes in the external environment bearing 
upon the developmental state. This was, above all, a form of recognition of 
the limited development space for the state, which was the driving force 
behind the new political alliances with domestic business and labour unions 
in order to satisfy state interests in restructuring public steel firms. Put 
somewhat differently, during the post-stabilisation period (post-1995), the 
nature of policy-making in Brazil has increasingly become less coherent and 
was in fact fragmented and largely incomplete as a result of divergent 
interests between state and business elites (Kingstone 1999; Pinheiro et. al. 
2004; Schneider 2009b, 2004). It was inherently difficult to gain consensus, 
and therefore although the reformist coalition in favour of privatisation 
existed, it was rather reactionary as a response to the changing (exogenous) 
context rather than a programmatic policy that served as a critical juncture in 
state-market and state-society relations. 
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7.1.2 Re-forming the developmental state  
 
The breakdown of state monopoly necessarily involved two inter-related 
policy changes with respect to the recalibrated role of the state. Firstly, the 
state had to project credibility in its reform and it did so by way of 
establishing an independent regulatory agency. Secondly, the Brazilian state 
wanted to maintain some form of control over the industry, which was 
reflected in its attempt to create a council of ministers in charge of linking 
petroleum and other related sectors – mining, steel and renewable resources 
– to coordinate ‘energy matrix’ as a way of asserting some form of direction 
in energy governance.  
 
As part of the privatisation programme, the Petroleum Law established the 
Agência Nacional do Petróleo (National Petroleum Agency or ANP), which 
was created as an independent agency to regulate the bidding process of 
contracts for oil exploration, implement environmental rules and social 
licenses, and raise labour practices on health and safety at international 
standards. It was, in short, a technocratic agency aimed at facilitating the 
entry of foreign capital in oil production (rather than as financial investors) 
whilst providing domestic capitalists equal opportunities to invest in the E&P 
sector. However, the task is rather complex, and equally very political, as it 
requires weakening market control in the oil industry and influence of 
PETROBRAS over state planning – both of which were central to 
PETROBRAS’ powers as a state enterprise thanks to state monopoly in the 
domestic market (Randall 1993; Trebat 1983).102 For big business, ANP was 
initially conceived as guarantor for private sector on the commitment of the 
fledging Brazilian government to deliver substantive reforms to make the 
investment environment attractive for Brazilian and foreign oil firms.103 In 
                                                   
 
102 Author interview with a Former Senior Officer, ANP, August 2010.  
103 Author interviews with Three Senior Officers, Instituto Brasileiro de Petróleo, Gás, e 
Biocombustíveis (IBP), August 2010. 
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this context, the emerging consensus between the government and private 
sector was that the state should retreat from directly intervening in the 
market by way of reducing drastically the influence of PETROBRAS in 
political decision-making. One concrete way of curbing its excessive powers 
was to create an oil regulatory agency that would manage the transition from 
single firm monopoly towards a highly competitive market. The first ANP 
director, David Zylberstajn, justified the reforms in the following manner:  
 
We had reforms [in the oil sector] because of the need for 
investment from other oil companies… The constitutional 
amendment stipulated that the Union retains its ownership of the 
reserves but that the sector must be opened for operators… We had 
to break the monopoly of PETROBRAS, create strategies to make 
the [oil] market more competitive, and instil a culture of 
independent regulation… Our greatest achievement as a regulator 
is to bring in new companies, consolidate a sector with new 
players, and develop expertise and independence of people outside 
of PETROBRAS.104 
 
Technocratic governance was envisaged by the Cardoso government through 
an impartial agency capable of overseeing the auction and licensing 
processes, in which PETROBRAS would not be given special treatment. One 
widely recognised fact was that PETROBRAS commanded political support 
within the state apparatus as a result of its strong role in human capital 
formation. Practically, everyone working in the petroleum sector was trained 
by PETROBRAS. ANP then sought to develop its own technical team in order 
to reduce the loyalty of PETROBRAS-trained staff to the company and create 
a new culture of independent regulation by educating them through the ANP 
system. Through agreements with 36 universities, ANP successfully 
contributed in training labour – geologists, engineers, lawyers, and 
economists – to conduct research in the oil, gas, and biofuel sectors. Between 
2006 and 2008, the concurso trained 800 technocrats to become regulators 
whilst around 4,000 students benefited from the research funding directed at 
universities (ANP Annual Report 2011). The regulatory body grafted its own 
                                                   
 
104 Author interview with David Zylberstajn, Former Executive Director, ANP, July 2010. 
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postgraduate training schemes, systems of public procurement and 
regulations in energy sector – all aimed at consolidating technical capacity as 
a way to assert its organisational autonomy from the state and from 
PETROBRAS.105 
 
But as Andrea Goldstein (1999: 679) puts it, “the challenge of privatisation is 
the design of a new ‘compact’ to regulate the interactions between markets, 
states, and politics”. On one hand, there exist varying patterns of state 
divesture which are consequential to national policy-making. Tripartite 
negotiations with unions and state managers are levers at the disposal of 
elites for resolving conflicts generated by the separation of ownership and 
control as well as in cushioning the impacts of market opening and 
competition regulations.106 On the other hand, the state has invariably not 
faded away in delivering the reforms. For example, Margaret Thatcher’s 
privatisation retained special voting rights called golden shares in previously 
state owned companies whilst Chile sought to keep CODELCO firmly under 
public ownership. Market reforms require, above all, a strong state to contain 
social tensions and political relationships to deliver the restructuring 
programme across all phases. But in Brazil state ownership had coincided 
practically with monopoly power and concentration of ownership and control 
in the hands of the government. It was therefore imperative for ANP to assert 
its autonomy as regulator from the Brazilian state as well as establish an 
organisational identity from that of PETROBRAS to appear credible in the 
eyes of the Brazilian and international investors. As neoliberal reforms 
purported, the rise of unelected bureaucratic agencies with technocratic 
credentials (Burnham 1999) was perceived as some form of insurance for 
business investment that government changes or shifts in policy priorities 
                                                   
 
105 Author interviews with Victor Martin Souza, Executive Director, ANP, August 2010; 
Former Senior Officer, ANP, August 2010.   
106 Some countries have designed privatisation as grand strategies to recast economic 
relations and the role of the state, for example in the United Kingdom and Chile; others 
have sought privatisation as a gradualist strategy to delineate incoming governments 
from previous administrations, such as in France; and still others have used privatisation 
as a macroeconomic management strategy to deal with a crisis, as in Italy and Argentina 
(Goldstein 1999: 679). 
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will not affect the overall economic climate. At the beginning of abertura in 
the petroleum sector, there existed significant expectations for a powerful, 
independent agency able to control excessive state intervention in an 
industry that was long dominated by one state enterprise. The Petroleum 
Law was then conceived as a critical juncture that would weaken 
PETROBRAS’ power in the market and in the state apparatus. In many ways, 
the ANP was not just a technocratic agency but a highly politicised institution 
created to slowly erode the developmentalist ideology pervasive among the 
Brazilian elites. A former Director of ANP recognises the political and 
technical aspect of the agency: 
 
The oil business represents 10 percent of the GDP [and] 
PETROBRAS is responsible for 90% of oil production… [in] all the 
reserves, infrastructure of refining and processing of petroleum 
and gas… During the opening process, there was only one SOE 
which was also at the heart of the people. Twelve years have 
passed. The relationship between ANP and PETROBRAS has been 
very good; PETROBRAS understands the role of ANP. In my four 
years as Director, [I observed] it is not a problem anymore [and] 
there is respect. The biggest challenge now is about how to make 
ANP more and more independent as an agency… The oil industry 
[is] related to political power... the level of state interference differs 
from each place and circumstances. The best strategy to deal with 
this is to have more technical staff to reduce the politicisation of 
the job; but I understand the political nature of this situation… You 
cannot be independent and not give any concessions. It is part of 
the game. But I believe on the technical person with a sense of 
political skills. He will work better than a politician who is trying to 
acquire technical skills/understanding.107 
 
This is consistent with the literature on technocratic politics (Burnham 1999; 
Domingues 1994; Silva 2009), in which new regulatory institutions have 
been established to manage resistance to market reforms by way of deploying 
technocratic credentials, professionalisation of knowledge, and 
depoliticisation of decision-making by shifting powers towards unelected 
institutions. However, as insights from path dependency and incrementalism 
show, political legacies and structural constraints shape political outcomes by 
                                                   
 
107 Author interview with Former Senior Officer, ANP, August 2010. 
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rendering certain choices more viable than others. Unlike in Chile where path 
dependent processes have been self-reinforcing, in Brazil the long gestation 
of state capitalism and the enormous role of public enterprises in 
industrialisation have created difficulties to construct political consensus on 
neoliberal economic governance. Cardoso’s justification for his privatisation 
programme was the inability of the Brazilian government to financially 
support the industrialisation programme due to fiscal constraints and 
changing global context. SOEs were then expected to perform better by being 
exposed to private firms (via market opening), and if things should fail, state 
divestiture was a necessary solution in redressing the state’s fiscal accounts. 
These reforms were justified (and accepted) at a time of austerity and lack of 
growth. I will return to the changing external environment which 
restructured the conditions upon which political agency was exercised in 
Section 7.2.  
 
Whilst the state established ANP to facilitate market opening, the Petroleum 
Law likewise sought to incorporate different aspects of energy governance in 
Brazil. The Conselho Nacional de Politíca Energética (National Council for 
Energy Policy or CNPE) came into existence to set the agenda by way of 
providing proposals to the President regarding national energy policy and 
specific measures to address the energy needs of the federal and state 
governments. The CNPE draws from technical expertise of other state 
agencies – mainly Empresa de Pesquisa Energética or EPE and ANP – in 
making its proposals, including submission of legislative bills in Congress for 
subsidies for regions requiring federal support to finance energy 
consumption (Chapter 2, Article 2, 1997 DL 9.478). But whilst ANP draws its 
legitimacy from technocratic expertise, CNPE is undoubtedly a political 
entity from its very inception. The body is composed of ministers and its 
functioning and regulation are conducted by presidential decree rather than 
set in legislation, as opposed to ANP where its functions are specifically 
written in the Petroleum Law. CNPE is in charge of energy policy more 
generally, which includes the coordination of petroleum and natural gas, 
alcohol, coal, thermonuclear, and power, with the political mandate of 
guaranteeing the protection of consumers, promotion of free competition, 
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and internationalisation of energy sector (Chapter 1, Article 1, 1997 DL 
9.478). Theoretically, the state can exert some degree of control, for example, 
through the use of subsidies for consumption or to support the needs of 
industrial and manufacturing sectors. However, the establishment of CNPE 
coincided with Cardoso’ drive for privatisation and market competition in the 
energy industry, in which the goals of CNPE were directed towards reducing 
the power of PETROBRAS and its subsidiaries in energy planning. For 
example, PETROBRAS had been responsible for research and development, 
pricing and distribution of gasoline, LPG, etc, and training professionals in 
the sector. But more crucially, CNPE was caught up in regulating the power 
sector between 1997 and 2007, wherein market opening process was more 
complex and competing interests (and potential for corruption) were 
pervasive.108 Although CNPE was expected to coordinate different policy 
areas in the energy sector, petroleum received very little attention compared 
to the power sector. From the policymakers and PETROBRAS’ viewpoints, 
CNPE was perceived less important in the context of the market opening 
process and expectations for setting the new rules of the game were pinned at 
ANP.109  
 
                                                   
 
108 The power sector was more politicised and subjected to more corruption than the 
petroleum sector. While all business interests have to deal with only one state company in 
petroleum, there is competition among domestic and foreign firms in the power sector 
during the sales of several state enterprises. In petroleum, the only source of corruption 
was the distribution of refining plants in the country because the auction in E&P was 
fairly transparent, and the distribution/sales of petroleum was already operating in a 
competitive market (though monopolised by five companies). The opposite case applies 
to power. The privatisation of electricity and building hydroelectric dams held entrenched 
interests in Congress and therefore CNPE was subjected to this political debate. This only 
makes sense if we take into account the power shortages in Brazil during Cardoso’s 
second term, in which the privatisation was partially blamed for his failure to respond to 
the energy crisis. In the 1997 Petroleum Law, Chapter 2 Article 2 Section VI introduced 
through Law 10.858/2004 specifically states that CNPE is given the power “to propose 
the adoption of measures to guarantee that the national electricity demand is met… at all 
times giving due regard to strategic effects and public interest… [to] ensure optimum 
compatibility between tariff rate and reliability of the electrical system.” Author interview 
with Roberto Schaeffer, Academic Consultant, UFRJ, July 2010. 
109  Author interviews with Ildo Sauer, PETROBRAS, August 2010; Roberto Schaeffer, 
Academic Consultant, UFRJ, July 2010; David Zylberstajn, ANP, July 2010; Former 
Senior Officer, ANP, August 2010. 
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Finally, in line with Thomas Trebat’s (1983) distinction between the 
regulatory and entrepreneurial functions of the state, the Brazilian state has 
in fact retained its economic role in the oil industry by maintaining its 
relationship at arms-length with state enterprises. However, the fundamental 
change is that its role shifted from being owner of productive capital 
towards provider of finance capital. This was achieved chiefly by owning 
voting capital stocks in previously state-run enterprises, most emblematically 
in PETROBRAS, CVRD and CSN. In PETROBRAS, as Chapter 8 details, the 
Brazilian state simply retained the already existing majority shareholder 
ownership in the company. However, in steel and mining after full-fledged 
privatisation, the state retained control through golden shares. These are 
special voting rights that accord the majority shareholder, in this case the 
Brazilian state, some veto power over any significant changes in corporate 
governance, such as changes in the company’s name and purpose, 
headquarters’ location, liquidation, and closure or sale of major operations 
(Schneider 2009a, 2009b). In the case of Vale, apart from owning golden 
shares, the state maintains a 6.7% interest in the company (as of March 31, 
2011) through BNDESPAR, which is a subsidiary of the state-owned 
development bank, BNDES. Vale’s controlling shareholder, however, is 
Valespar consortium, which was organised and incorporated with the sole 
purpose of holding an interest in the company.110 In short, this privately run 
enterprise is controlled by government pension funds whose chief executive 
officers are appointed by the government and sit at the company’s board of 
directors, giving the state the capacity to exert indirect influence in the 
company’s affairs (Nem Singh & Massi forthcoming). In CSN, a complex and 
messy process of privatisation took place, in which domestic business groups 
were given privileged in acquiring assets of this state enterprise leading to 
concentrated ownership or ‘block holding’ among state-controlled investors 
and grupos econômicos (Amman et. al. 2004; Doring & Santos forthcoming; 
                                                   
 
110 As of March 31, 2011, the Valepar consortium held 52.7% of Vale’s common shares (Vale 
Annual Report 2010). However, the government pension fund Previ of Banco do Brasil 
and FUNCEF of the Caixa Economica Federal (both state-owned financial institutions) 
hold the majority of the shares of Valepar (“Get to Know Vale,” 22 Sep. 2011). 
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Montero 1998).111 This illustrates not just how access by foreign capital was 
barred by the Brazilian state’s gate keeping in extractive markets, it also 
demonstrates concentration of wealth either in the hands of the state or 
domestic business. This clearly challenges Peter Evan’s (1979) earlier 
depiction of a weak domestic business class in the tripartite relationship; it 
likewise supports Ben Schneider’s (2009a, 2009b, 2008) argument 
regarding the benefits accrued by grupos in the post-privatisation period. 
One key point to make, then, is that the Brazilian state has developed a 
complex relationship with capitalists, in which the dominance of the state or 
domestic capital is undeniable in more strategic areas of the economy.  
 
To conclude, Cardoso progressed quite successfully in his state divestiture 
programme by breaking the monopoly of PETROBRAS in the E&P sector and 
created a new institution to regulate the bidding, licensing, and general 
oversight of the petroleum, natural gas, and bio-combustible sectors. Whilst 
there was an attempt to put in place a high-level coordinating agency directly 
tied to the Presidential Office, CNPE served a limited purpose after the 
market reforms. Most crucially, the Brazilian government has kept arms-
length relationship with domestic capital by way of policing foreign access to 
markets and asserting its role as provider of finance capital. The next section 
deals with a preliminary evaluation of the Petroleum Law prior to the change 
of the institutional framework in December 2010. 
 
                                                   
 
111 Until 1993, CSN was controlled by Siderurgia Brasileira SA – a state-owned holding 
company dissolved in 1990 – and the Federal Treasury (90,8%), and by Caixa 
Beneficiente dos Empregados da CSN (CBS) (9,2%), the pension fund of the company’s 
employees. A companies’ consortium, led by CVRD, through Navegação Vale do Rio Doce 
SA (9,4%), and Vicunha Group (9,2%), but also comprising Banco Bamerindus SA111 
(9,1%) and Banco Bradesco SA (7,7%), among others, was successful in acquiring CSN for 
U$ 1,495.3 billion. The company acquired U$ 532.9 billion in debts, raising the total cost 
up to U$ 2,028.2 billion. CBS raised its participation up to 9,8% (Pereira, 2007: 14). 
However, the complex web of ownership structure is far from simple. For example, the 
newly privatised CSN became a shareholder in CVRD when it was de-nationalised in 
1997. In addition, BNDES, the national development bank, was central in the process 
through the preparation of the bid documents as well as the provision of loans to 
interested national groups, given the capital mobilisation requirements. BNDES also 
joined as a partner in some of these business initiatives shortly after privatisation, 
through its subsidiary BNDESPar (Doring & Santos forthcoming). 
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7.1.3 Evaluating the impacts of reforms 
 
Has Cardoso then succeeded in generating new economic dynamism in the 
petroleum industry? Whilst it is difficult to link the reforms and outcomes 
directly, there are some indicators of the positive and negative effects of the 
Petroleum Law. Firstly, we can assess whether market barriers for entry of 
private capital in the oil market were reduced to facilitate investments. The 
positive effect includes the apparent credibility of the reforms, which is 
reflected in the amount of private investments, both foreign and domestic, in 
the E&P sector. As the bidding rounds took place, more companies have 
become interested in the oil industry, hence, enhancing the competitive 
environment for PETROBRAS. Tellingly, the E&P sector heavily benefited 
from Cardoso’s abertura project. This is an achievement since no private 
sector was willing to invest in the 1930s and 1940s, during which the state 
had to fill in the ‘vacuous spaces’ in the economy through public financing of 
the oil sector (Randall 1993; Trebat 1983).  
 
During the first round of bidding in 1999, ANP auctioned a total of 27 oil 
blocs, where eleven companies were granted twelve blocs and six of them 
were new operators. This was equivalent to 54,660 square kilometres, all of 
which were offshore explorations. Consistent with the aim of the Petroleum 
Law to increase domestic capacity, there was 25 percent local content in the 
exploration phase and 27 percent in the production and development 
phase.112 In terms of the financial rewards for the government, the state 
received signature bonus of US$ 181 million and a minimum investment in 
the first exploration phase amounting to US$ 65 million (ANP Annual Report 
2011: 190).113 As Table 7.3 shows, a total of 765 blocs were auctioned by ANP 
after nine rounds of bidding between 1999 and 2008 (excluding a failed 
bidding process in 2006). And all throughout the process, domestic content 
                                                   
 
112 Local content refers to the requirement that certain percentage of supplies must be 
produced domestically. 
113 As will be explained later on, signature bonus is one of the four types of taxes to be paid by 
oil firms immediately upon winning oil contracts in Brazil.  
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increased steadily and more private companies participated in the process. 
To this extent, one can clearly see the market opening reform as successful in 
attracting private investment in the oil industry whilst maintaining some 
income for the federal government. And one should not underestimate this 
because the risky but most rewarding part of oil extraction lies in upstream 
activities. In many ways, ANP had achieved its goal of establishing a credible 
reform process in a highly protected market.  
 
Table 7.3 Results of bidding in E&P sector under 1997 Petroleum 
Law 
Number of rounds 
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Ninth Tenth 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 
Auctioned blocs 27 
23 
53 54 
908 913 1,134 271 130 
Granted blocs 12 21 34 21 101 
154 
251 
117 
54 
Onshore granted blocs 0 9 7 10 
20 
89 210 
65 
54 
Offshore granted blocs 12 12 27 11 
81 
65 41 52 0 
Area granted (km2)  
54,660 
48,074 
48,629 
46,266 21,951 39,657 194,651 45,614 48,030 
Area granted onshore 
(km2) 
54,660 37,847 
25,289 14,669 21,254 36,811 7,735 13,419 0 
Number of winning 
companies 
11 
16 22 14 6 19 30 36 17 
New operators 
6 
6 8 5 1 1 6 11 2 
Local content 
(exploration) 
25% 
42% 28% 39% 79% 86% 74% 69% 79% 
Local content 
(development and 
production) 
27% 48% 40% 54% 86% 89% 81% 77% 84% 
Signature bonus (US$ 
million) 
181 262 241 34 9 222 485 1,141 38 
Minimum investment in 
the first exploration 
period (US$ million in 
three years) 
65 60 51 29 121 681 829 739 259 
Source: ANP Annual Report 2011, Table 5.1 (Adapted), 190. 
 
On the negative side, the Petroleum Law did not have any substantial 
impacts in expanding private investment in the refining and distribution 
sectors. For example, 12 out of 16 national refineries operating in Brazil are 
owned by PETROBRAS, which is equivalent to 98.1 percent of total refining 
capacity of the country (ANP Annual Report 2011: 97). Equally, in the 
distribution sector, there are only three companies dominating in the sales of 
major oil derivatives, such as diesel oil, gasoline, and combustible oil – 
PETROBRAS BR Distribuidora, Ipiranga, and Shell (See ANP Annual Report 
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2011: 135-145). It is worth noting that BR dominates across all these 
products, as I summarise in Table 7.4. Whilst the market power of 
PETROBRAS in midstream and downstream activities can be interpreted as 
the success of PETROBRAS and a direct outcome of state monopoly, and 
indeed both reasons are true, one should also think that oil companies are 
interested only in areas of the hydrocarbons chain that guarantee high rates 
of returns for investment. In this case, the exploration and exploitation sector 
has attracted companies in terms of investment. 
 
Table 7.4 Participation share in Brazilian distribution sector, 2010 
 Diesel oil (1) Gasoline C (2) Combustible oil (3) 
BR Distribuidora 40.63 % 29.67 % 79.64 % 
Ipiranga 22.35 % 19.60 % 5.82 % 
Shell 9.66 % 11.21 % 13.01 % 
Cosan 5.75 % 6.70 % 0.76 % 
Alesat 2.98 % 5.75 % --(4) 
Source: ANP Annual Report 2011 (Adapted), 137, 140, 145. 
Notes: 
(1) Total of 127 distributors 
(2) Total of 140 distributors 
(3) Total of 20 distributors 
(4) Alesat does not have any share in combustible oil. Simeira ranks fifth with 0.12 % share. 
 
Secondly, another measure of success is to observe the gains accrued by the 
state in the liberalisation of the oil and gas sectors. The Brazilian government 
has clearly managed to procure oil rents from market opening through 
royalty fees, corporate taxes, and required minimum investments in the 
exploration phase, all of which are stipulated in the Petroleum Law. More 
importantly, perhaps as a result of Brazilian elites’ concern regarding the 
possibility of foreign firms becoming dominant without any return for the 
industry, the Petroleum Law sought to increase its domestic capacity by 
compelling oil firms to use local contents in their operations. As Table 7.3 
details in the previous section, companies using local contents in operations 
in the exploration phase jumped from 25 percent in 1999 to 79 percent in 
2008. In the production and exploitation segment, local content improved 
from 27 percent in 1999 to an astounding 84 percent in 2008. This can be 
attributed to the overwhelming presence of the state enterprise across the 
commodity chains. In many ways, this validates the arguments regarding the 
role of PETROBRAS on national industrial development. 
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Finally, it is inevitable to ask whether PETROBRAS became competitive 
because of the 1997 Petroleum Law or, as Ildo Sauer puts it, the state 
enterprise was already competitive despite of the reforms.114 I will discuss this 
extensively in Chapter 8 when I analyse the performance of PETROBRAS and 
how its key competitive strategies – internationalisation of operations, 
technological innovation, and human capital formation – facilitated the 
strengthening of the company and the expansion of its operations beyond oil 
sector. It is difficult to say that PETROBRAS was positively affected directly 
by the market opening process. The logic of the reform was admittedly to 
weaken the market power of PETROBRAS in order to create ‘fair 
competition’ between PETROBRAS and private oil companies, during which 
ANP was conceived as a counter weight to the Brazilian state to ensure 
independence and transparency in the bidding process.115 In this context, it is 
interesting to note that refining capacity has progressively improved since 
PETROBRAS began processing imported crude oil by doubling its capacity 
from 164,200 m3d/o in 1974 to 332,703 m3d/o in 2010. As Figure 7.1 reveals, 
refining capacity in Brazil has steadily improved – an outcome of 
PETROBRAS’ investment in mid-stream activities. The enhanced 
competitiveness of PETROBRAS points to what scholars call bolsos de 
eficiência or ‘pockets of efficiencies’ (Evans 1979, 1995) in the Brazilian state 
apparatus, which refers to segments of the state exerting high levels of 
efficiency and competence. But equally important is the role of ideas in 
shaping policy paradigms.  
 
                                                   
 
114 Author interview with Ildo Sauer, PETROBRAS, August 2010. 
115 Author interviews with David Zylberstajn, ANP, July 2010; Former Senior Officer, ANP, 
August 2010; Senior Official, IBP, August 2010.  
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Figure 7.1 National refining capacity 
 
Source: Empresa de Pesquisa Energética 2011, Table 1.3 (Adapted), 160. 
Note:  d/o refers to dias de operação (operating days) 
 
Despite the fuzzy relationship between market reform and competitiveness, 
the private sector believes on the positive impact of the Petroleum Law by 
way of generating competition in contexts of high concentration of market 
power. As argued by Felipe Dias, the Executive Secretary of IBP – the 
business organisation representing mostly all domestic and foreign energy 
firms operating in Brazil: 
 
PETROBRAS remains to be a major player and almost the only 
producer in the oil sector but the presence of private companies 
has changed its behaviour, it is very clear, it will be very difficult to 
defend the position that it has not benefited from private sector 
competition. From the operation itself, the production and 
exploration, the [competitive] environment has pushed 
PETROBRAS to be more efficient, our participation has had 
[positive] consequences.116 
 
The economistic argument behind this is that PETROBRAS’ exposure to 
foreign companies generates a form of ‘social learning’ in which international 
experience of big oil companies in terms of research and development are 
transferred indirectly through joint ventures with PETROBRAS. This 
                                                   
 
116 Author interview with Felipe Dias, Executive Secretary, IBP, August 2010. 
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argument, however, rests on the assumption that PETROBRAS had less 
opportunity to work together with other international oil firms in the past. 
What is evident, in fact, after several rounds of bidding was that international 
oil companies decided to work with PETROBRAS due to its unparalleled 
knowledge of the Brazilian geology – a comparative advantage that was 
utilised quite effectively by the state enterprise. As Table 7.5 details, by 2010 
PETROBRAS remains the dominant actor in the E&P sector. International oil 
companies have sought for joint ventures with PETROBRAS either as 
majority, minority, or fifty-fifty participation share. However, we should note 
that participation share of private capital is quite notable in exploration 
activities (43.3 percent in 2010). 
 
  272 
Table 7.5 PETROBRAS' ownership of oil concessions, 2010 
 
PETROBRAS 
as 100% 
Concession 
Owner 
PETROBRAS 
as 50% Joint 
Partner 
PETROBRAS 
as Minority 
Partner (1%-
49%) 
PETROBRAS 
as Majority 
Partner (51%-
99%) 
Private 
Capital as 
100% 
Concession 
Owner 
Blocks in Exploration 
phase 
113 31 29 56 175 
Percentage of the Total 
(404) 
28.0% 7.7% 7.2% 13.9% 43.3% 
Fields under Development 36 3 8 4 10 
Percentage of the Total 
(61) 
59.0% 4.9% 13.1% 6.6% 16.4% 
Producing Fields 254 2 11 3 41 
Percentage of the Total 
(311) 
81.7% 0.6% 3.5% 1.0% 13.2% 
Source: ANP Annual Report 2010 (Adapted), 16-27. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis represent total number of oil blocks in exploration, fields under development, and 
producing fields as of December 31, 2009. 
 
So whilst we can interpret this as the market becoming more competitive and 
making the investment environment more conducive, one can also see this as 
a testament of the ability of PETROBRAS to work in conduit with the state to 
develop expertise and knowledge in a highly strategic sector. The Brazilian 
petroleum industry is often referred as ‘contestable markets’, in which there 
is a dominant player with high concentration of ownership, capital, and 
productive capacity in the sector but the player acts as if it operates in a 
competitive market (Bridgman et. al. 2008). The effect of the law, in short, 
was to induce exogenous pressures of competition, however, imagined 
competition was. Whilst in Chile the state has successfully introduced private 
participation in the mining industry that also threatened the very survival of 
CODELCO, in Brazil the state enterprise remained the key player in the 
petroleum sector. To briefly summarise, what I have shown thus far is that 
the developmental state model as applied in the petroleum industry worked 
out quite effectively and survived the neoliberal assault. But more crucially, 
market opening seemed to have strategically proven the capacity of state 
enterprises to compete globally, given certain conditions. Although one 
cannot say that the neoliberal reforms have been pragmatic, we can indeed 
conclude that there have been some benefits for the Brazilian state, whether 
intended or not. Taking into account the data I have presented here, the next 
section provides a detailed analysis of the new institutional framework in 
Brazil adopted by Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. 
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7.2 From continuity to change: Novo desenvolvimentismo in 
Brazil 
 
This section discusses the motivations behind the changes in the institutional 
framework to regulate the petroleum industry. Whilst it can be assumed that 
the discovery of pre-salt oil reserves in 2007 was a fundamental structuring 
condition, as the Chilean case showed, a stronger role for the state is not 
necessarily the automatic policy choice. The return of state capitalism, 
understood in terms of novo desenvolvimentismo or neo-developmentalism 
(Bresser-Pereira 2006; Sicsú et. al. 2007; Veiga 2006), can be explained 
through a focus on how political agency is exercised under favourable 
structural conditions by the PT government. Its starting point is the 
contestation of neoliberalism as a way of reconfiguring the triangular social 
relations between states, markets and labour. The lack of a credible political 
pact between the state and organised labour under Cardoso meant that 
unions were aggressively in opposition to his policy, which subsequently 
gives more leverage for the Workers’ Party to graft a new corporatist 
framework (see Chapter 8). Whilst Cardoso succeeded in introducing new 
economic ideas based on competitive markets, privatisation faced immense 
political and labour resistance.117 The privatisation of strategic assets in 
CVRD generated political controversy because the premise of the reform was 
the uncompetitive nature of state enterprises, which was underestimating the 
efficiency and market power of CVRD and PETROBRAS (see Goldstein 2010, 
1999). Cardoso confronted supporters of the old developmentalist ideology, 
in particular the petistas in Congress (Hunter 2010; Montero 1998; Pinheiro 
2002, 1994; Pinheiro et. al. 2004).  
 
Secondly, we need to take into account the nuances between Cardoso’s 
centre-right government and Lula’s centre-left opposition turned 
                                                   
 
117 This was also observed in economic restructuring of public service provision, for example 
telecommunications and electricity, as well as in strategic resource-based sectors, most 
notably petrochemicals, steel and mining. See Döring & Santos forthcoming; Goldstein 
1999; Montero 1998; Randall 1993.  
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government coalition. Whilst Lula had intensified Cardoso’s reforms 
especially in macroeconomic management, his electoral victory relied quite 
strongly from a discontented public, and therefore it generated higher 
expectations from workers, social movements, and the popular sectors 
(Bourne 2008; Branford et. al. 2005; Love & Baer 2009). Cardoso, on the 
other hand, drew his legitimacy from macroeconomic reforms which sought 
to bring down inflation and invite foreign participation in the economy. 
Lula’s market reforms were underpinned by his commitment to retain 
Cardoso’s macroeconomic framework and expansion of state involvement in 
addressing poverty and social inequality.118 Nevertheless, his commitment for 
continuity in Cardoso’s reforms was not as firmly rooted as Concertación 
government in Chile, which effectively implies the failure of neoliberalism to 
become embedded. As Kingstone (1999) argues, support for Cardoso’s 
reformist coalition is premised upon the potential contingent benefits of 
economic restructuring. In the public sphere, opinion polls regarding 
neoliberal globalisation invariably differ among the broader populace. Whilst 
there was support for free trade and positive belief on effects of globalisation 
to consumers, reforms aimed at privatisation were very contentious and 
highly controversial (Baker 2009, 2003). Compared to Argentina, Chile, and 
Mexico (Murillo 2001; Teichman 2001), state-society bargaining was far 
more fragmented and less consolidated, which explains the patchy and 
fragmented nature of reforms.119  
 
In this context, political agency is crucial as an explanation to institutional 
transformation of the neo-developmental state in Brazil. Whilst I will discuss 
the broader significance of this concept to the Brazilian political economy in 
Section 7.3, neo-developmentalism consists of a fusion of market incentives 
to generate competitiveness and new forms of regulatory powers exercised by 
the state in the economy. With respect to oil politics, there are three key 
                                                   
 
118 His achievements are subject to debate. Whilst Lula certainly expanded coverage and 
scope of social policies, around 43 percent of public expenditure remained in pension 
contributions rather than policies aimed at reducing poverty and inequality. See Amann 
& Baer 2009. 
119 See Kingstone 1999; Pinheiro et. al. 2004; Schneider 2009a, 2009b, 2004a, 2004b. 
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changes which I discuss below: The introduction of production-sharing 
regime to manage the newly discovered pre-salt reserves; the new roles of 
state agencies and state enterprises; and the explicit linkage between oil 
wealth and social development. By examining these key changes, I argue that 
favourable structural conditions and political agency interacted to produce a 
reconfiguration of politico-economic relationships between states and 
markets. Consistent with historical institutionalist analysis, Lula’s uneasiness 
with economic restructuring even during his first term had the effect of 
creating uncertain policy direction in which he followed Cardoso’s broad 
macroeconomic strategies. In his second term, Lula’s policy in oil 
management indicates greater confidence to challenge market orthodoxy, 
thereby, signifying a more concrete attempt to deal with the backlash of 
neoliberalism (or what Mahoney 2010 refers as reactive sequencing).  
 
7.2.1 Continuity in petroleum governance between Cardoso and 
Lula 
 
The shift in presidency in Brazil created a situation of uncertainty and 
tension in the sphere of regulation, infrastructure, and in the economy more 
generally. Lula da Silva, who ran for office unsuccessfully three times had 
finally won, and whilst his radical discourse of statism was reduced, his 
victory shook the confidence of market actors as exemplified by the jump of 
Brazil’s country risk prior to his elections (Mueller & Rossi de Oliveira 2009). 
Upon taking power in 2003, Lula adopted a conservative set of policies 
marked by stringent fiscal policy to obtain budget surplus, inflation targeting, 
and maintenance of high interest rates (Artestis & Saad Filho 2007; Amann & 
Baer 2009). In the petroleum sector, Lula contemplated to discuss an 
alternative model – production-sharing agreement – but this was not 
adopted in the end. This is perhaps understandable for two reasons. Firstly, 
there was no significant income coming from the oil sector and the bidding 
process had just started. There were no incentives for the state to increase its 
stakes at a period where the risks in oil were perceived to be high and costs of 
injecting state financing for capital would yield to uncertain results. Equally, 
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the backbone of the regulatory framework in the petroleum sector was 
written into law, which would have required a contentious reform proposal in 
National Congress in order to make sweeping changes. Secondly, it was not 
until 2002 that PETROBRAS had decided to drill beneath the salt layer 
3,000 metres below sea level, which also meant that investments in 
exploration were being financed by PETROBRAS alone. Without significant 
oil reserves, the more profitable operations concentrated in refining and 
distribution sectors. In terms of costs and benefits, a reform process was too 
risky for a president who was yet to prove his credibility to govern a complex 
massive economy as Brazil. 
 
More importantly, the immediate issue for Lula was to define the 
relationship between the state and its independent regulatory agencies. 
Privatisation set the pace in creating a series of new agencies aimed at 
regulating the transfer of economic activities from the public to private 
hands. The challenge was not exclusive in the petroleum sector between Lula 
da Silva and the ANP. It was also present in other national infrastructures 
privatised under Cardoso, such as electricity, telecommunications and service 
provision. The new president had difficulty understanding the importance of 
regulatory agencies and he used his presidential powers to impose 
constraints on their management by way of delays in appointments of higher 
officials and holding back agencies’ budget entitlements. Whilst under 
Cardoso the appointment delays were only between 2 and 4 days in 1997-
2002, the average length of vacancy in the board of directors in 2003 – Lula’s 
first year in office – was 29 days. This was still higher than the worst case of 
vacancy during Cardoso’s presidency, which was 26 days in 2001. In 2004, it 
jumped to 89 days, then went slightly down to 58 days in 2005 but 
skyrocketed again to 98 days in 2006 (Mueller & Rossi de Oliveira 2009: 98). 
In the petroleum sector, the role of the ANP was highly contested especially 
because the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and PETROBRAS had 
historically made economic decisions for the whole energy sector. Although 
Lula gradually changed his position vis-à-vis ANP, this was a difficult 
process, as ANP Executive Director Victor Martins Souza expressed in plain 
terms:  
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When Lula was elected, he saw that he could not appoint the 
directors because they had already been appointed. There was, in 
my personal assessment, a feeling that he had won the power, but 
he has not had the power over the [regulatory] agencies. It 
generated, and this is a personal evaluation, misunderstanding in 
the media that Lula and the PT were against the ANP. I think in 
reality it was a natural reaction, that is to say, “I had 50 million 
votes, I decisively won the election, and now I do not have 
anything.” But over time, President Lula and the PT were 
recognising the importance and relevance of regulatory agencies… 
One of the main problems of economic infrastructure was the need 
for a clear and stable regulatory environment with transparent 
rules in place. And then I believe that there was, in his second 
term, a reverse process of what occurred in the first term: 
strengthening environmental, regulatory, and controlling agencies. 
PT tackled Cardoso’s neoliberal policy by supporting these 
agencies despite PT being ideologically against it. Lula found that it 
was important not to weaken the agencies but rather give them 
more regulatory powers, and that occurred throughout [his] 
second term.120 
 
Given the discussion above, timing is the key to understand Lula’s shift in 
policy discourse. Through the changing external conditions of Brazil, Lula’s 
government was able to reshape the policy agenda after 2007. Firstly, thanks 
to PETROBRAS, Brazil achieved self-sufficiency in oil, which signifies it is no 
longer in a position of dependency to acquire petroleum resources externally 
for domestic consumption. In this ‘age of resource scarcity’ (Barbier 2011) 
and escalating requirements in securing energy for development, Brazil has 
managed to eliminate its external dependence in oil prior to the discovery of 
pre-salt reserves. Figure 7.2 shows quite clearly the success of PETROBRAS’ 
strategy in reducing oil dependency from external sources.121 Brazil reduced 
its rate of external dependence from 22.5 percent in 2001 (397 boe/day) 
down to -0.1 percent (-1 boe/day) in 2005. Net exports were observed from 
2006 to 2010. This also corresponds to the reduction of overall external 
dependence, wherein its total external dependence shrank from 21.1 percent 
                                                   
 
120 Author interview with Victor Martins Souza, ANP, August 2010. 
121 External dependence on energy is calculated as the difference between domestic energy 
demand (including losses in transformation, distribution and storage) and domestic 
production (EPE 2011: 30).  
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in 2001 down to 3.9 percent in 2009 then climbing back up to 7.8 percent in 
2010.122 
 
Figure 7.2 Brazil’s rate of external dependence on energy 
 
 Source: EPE 2011, Table 1.8 (Adapted), 30. 
 
Most crucially, institutional transformations take place during moments of 
critical junctures. In the context of petroleum, this occurred after 
PETROBRAS had declared the availability of commercially viable oil reserves 
beneath the salt layer near the coastline. In early 2002, PETROBRAS decided 
to drill oil beneath the salt layer knowing the technological challenges in 
reaching the reservoirs. The salt layer is about 2,000 metres thick and wells 
penetrate over 7,000 meters below sea level, in ultra-deep waters.123 In 2005, 
the Tupi bloc showed indications of oil in the pre-salt layer and in late 2006 
PETROBRAS estimated between 5 and 8 billion barrels of commercially 
viable oil. From early 2007 until 2011, scientific research on the wells drilled 
in the Campos and Espiritu Santo basins also showed oil contents. At 
                                                   
 
122 Whilst generally this is observable in electricity, Brazil remains dependent on coal from 
external sources. 
123 Using its years of geological information including data on the nature of rocks in the salt 
layer, PETROBRAS sought for a new version of Basin Simulator to accurately map the 
site of oil extraction – a task deemed difficult due to the distortions created by the salt. 
Equally, a new process had been developed to deal with the greater corrosiveness and 
instability of the salt (PETROBRAS Annual Report 2007: 4-5). 
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present, the pre-salt oil reservoir is approximately 800 kilometres long by 
200 kilometres wide, which runs along the southern and south-eastern 
coasts of Brazil from Santa Catarina to all the way to Espiritu Santo (see 
Figure 7.3).  
 
Overall, Brazil was experiencing gradual but certainly dramatic economic 
changes: it had achieved status as net exporter of crude oil after 2006 (see 
Figure 7.4); it had the capacity of PETROBRAS to refine petroleum and 
therefore take advantage of high valued petroleum exports; and the country 
is not affected by any economic crisis. The market conditions are now more 
conducive for a change in the institutional framework to increase the stake of 
the state in this highly prized sector. With no need for external support from 
IFIs and substantial amount of foreign reserves, the state is in a stronger 
position to take advantage of the commodity boom. Above all, national elites 
have not given up its goal of securing energy needs as a way of achieving 
industrialization, and this is far more entrenched in the PT government’s 
ideological predisposition. Not to labour the point further, political agency 
could be exercised as a result of the changing external context for Brazil. A 
new political discourse emerged as soon as PETROBRAS confirmed the 
presence of light hydrocarbons in the pre-salt reservoir.124  
                                                   
 
124 Technically, light hydrocarbons refer to 30° API oil, natural gas and condensate. 
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 Figure 7.3 Map of oil concessions in Brazil  
 
 Source: ANP website (www.anp.gov.br).  
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Figure 7.4 Petroleum production and consumption in Brazil 
 
Source: EPE 2011, Table 2.2 (Adapted), 40. 
 
7.2.2 Novo desenvolvimentismo in petroleum governance 
 
We can speak about institutional change in Brazil by way of focussing on 
institutional layering some new rules alongside the old ones in order to 
satisfy competing interests of different political actors. Whilst Lula embraced 
the rules of the game promoting macroeconomic management and foreign 
capital participation, he has introduced new rules in light of the discovery of 
pre-salt reserves. In particular, there were three key changes sought by Lula 
da Silva and his successor Dilma Rouseff: (a) change in the regulatory 
framework to increase the stake of the Brazilian state; (b) to redefine the 
relationships between state agencies and state enterprises by creating 
PETROSAL and strengthening CNPE; and (c) to explicitly link fiscal and oil 
regulations through the national social fund.   
 
A. Institutional layering in regulatory frameworks 
 
The pre-salt reservoir is transforming Brazil as a leading energy producer, 
and this condition allowed Lula’s government to introduce a change in state-
market relations in the oil industry. In the concessions grant model, high 
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uncertainty and risks prevent the state from investing in oil exploration 
activities. It also means lower rewards for the state by way of taxation. 
However, the perceived low risks and uncertainty in exploration activities as 
a result of the pre-salt reserves have changed the government position 
regarding public investment in the oil sector. Under the production-sharing 
arrangement (see Table 7.1 again), the state asserts its ownership of natural 
resources by retaining subsoil rights whilst permitting foreign corporations 
to operate in the development of oil fields as service contractors. The state 
maintains high rewards by establishing minimum participation share of 
national state-owned enterprises whilst allowing private capital to work 
together with PETROBRAS through consortium and joint ventures. In 
contrast to the concession grants model, participants in the consortium do 
not own mineral rights and only provide services to operate on behalf of the 
state (Lima 2009a, 2009b; Radon 2005). The contractor and not the Federal 
Government take the costs and risks of exploration activities.125   
 
Whilst the technocratic explanation of risks and rewards is a strong economic 
justification, the underpinning logic is more political. As Figure 7.5 
demonstrates, in contrast to other industries including mining, petroleum is 
a highly restrictive sector, in which the state historically played a decisively 
interventionist role. Out of 1.26 trillion barrels of oil (boe) global petroleum 
reserves, 77 percent have very limited access and are held in reserve for state-
run oil enterprises, 10 percent of reserves are accessible to state enterprises 
and private capital with medium access, 6 percent are exclusively kept for 
Russian state enterprises, and only 7 percent have free access for private 
capital. The private sector, which consists of the biggest international oil 
companies from traditionally oil-seeking countries, has had limited access to 
world oil reserves.  
 
                                                   
 
125 The national government can, upon discretion, participate in putting investments in 
exploration activities, evaluation, development and production in pre-salt reservoir, in 
which its financing can be covered by the Special Fund established through 1997 
Petroleum Law.  
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Figure 7.5 Access of state-controlled and private enterprises 
 
 Source: PFC Energy 2009 in MME 2010 (Adapted). 
 
The structure of the global oil industry is inherently favourable to direct state 
participation, which is reflected in the dominance of production-sharing 
arrangement, as shown in Figure 7.6, among oil-rich states. The major oil-
producing economies – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, UAE, 
Libya, Nigeria and Qatar – have adopted either production-sharing or service 
contracts. The remaining two key oil exporters – Russia and Kazakhstan – 
have adopted pure production-sharing contracts. From the 24 major oil 
producing countries, 16 have production-sharing and service contracts, six 
have mixed regimes, and only six have concessions grant model (MME 2010: 
17).126 The choice of ownership structures in the oil industry has broader 
consequences for state enterprise competitiveness and the degree of state 
control over private capital participation in the economy (Hertog 2010a, 
2010b; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010). In Brazil, the production-sharing 
arrangement allows for private participation in the economy without 
necessarily handing the state excessive control over the oil industry since 
private companies are not discriminated. State power is exercised through 
the ability of the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), directly or indirectly 
                                                   
 
126 In this survey, Brazil had a concessions grant model. 
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via ANP, to decide which blocs are considered ‘strategic’, and is therefore 
restricted from private explorations as opposed to ‘non-strategic’ blocs where 
the concessions grant model remains applicable.  
 
Figure 7.6 A global view of exploration models and oil production 
 
 Source: MME 2010 (Adapted). 
 Notes:   Red:  Production-sharing arrangement or service contracts 
   Yellow:  Pure production-sharing arrangement only 
   Blue:  Concessions grant model 
 
The state is increasing its stake by moving beyond taxation as a means of 
acquiring oil rents. Instead, the new law makes clear its preference for 
PETROBRAS as service contractor by giving the company what is called 
onerous assignment, in which the state controlled enterprise receives 
minimum participation share of 30 percent across exploration, development, 
and production activities in the upstream sector. Whilst the production-
sharing arrangement invariably heightens risks and costs for the state, it 
likewise strengthens its ability to reap more rewards by directly participating 
in oil activities via PETROBRAS. It stands in contrast to other Latin 
American states where state intervention has mostly taken place through 
renegotiation of contracts and re-taxation of the minerals sector 
(Hogenboom 2012; Kaup 2010). More recently, Cristina Kirchner’s efforts to 
re-nationalise the natural gas sector in Argentina by taking 51 percent 
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ownership of previously privatised YPF from Spanish Repsol were highly 
contentious to the extent that threats of capital outflow were astutely 
declared to challenge the governmental policy shift. Even after the new entry 
of China, there are persistent doubts about the capacity of Latin American 
state to reduce their dependency in natural resources. What is evident is the 
greater difficulty in crowding out the private sector in the sector even in 
situations where there are relatively effective public enterprises although the 
state can still exercise a certain degree of control. The change towards 
production-sharing arrangement in Brazil is one example of this strategy.  
  
B. Reorganising states and markets 
 
Under the new law, there are two important changes in terms of the 
reorganisation of state and market actors. Firstly, the state created a new 100 
percent state enterprise, PETROSAL SA, to represent state interests in 
negotiations of consortium and joint ventures. PETROBRAS is only 51 
percent state-owned, which means it cannot represent the Brazilian state 
during negotiations with private sector to decide the percentage of 
participation share of different firms. Whilst ANP is a regulatory agency 
independent of the state, CNPE is responsible for maintaining the strategic 
direction of energy policy. Whilst labour unions have supported the 
possibility of a traditional re-nationalisation of PETROBRAS (100 percent 
ownership), the state enterprise has exercised leverage on the basis of 
profitability. PETROBRAS was – and remains – a state-controlled rather 
than state-owned enterprise for this reason. Therefore, a new state enterprise 
was established with a specific role of representing the state in negotiations 
with foreign and domestic capital, and naturally was not duplicating the role 
of PETROBRAS as a service provider. PETROSAL is expected to ensure the 
profitability of oil fields and blocks where government participation shares 
exist. To clarify misconceptions, the ANP will still exist and will continue to 
take a state rather than a government view. PETROSAL then takes a view of 
the government in power today with the goal of maximising profitability in 
the fields and blocks.  
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Secondly, the state has begun to strengthen the CNPE in order to enhance 
the strategic interests of the state in the oil industry. In contrast to its past 
role of managing privatisation of the power sector, CNPE is conceived to play 
a far more central role in managing energy policy, which extends beyond the 
oil and gas sectors. Its direct connection with the president gives the political 
organisation stronger voice in policy making. Because it is composed of 
ministers, CNPE is an inherently political entity and its policy proposals draw 
from other agencies, such as EPE and ANP. Its mandate is to coordinate the 
different sectors associated with energy, taking a long term goal of securing 
self-sufficiency in Brazil’s energy. The council thus aims for a balanced 
energy policy in oil and natural gas, electricity, hydropower, and biofuels and 
other renewable energy. In this context, CNPE needs to take a state view in 
planning for Brazil’s future energy needs. However, the new law creates some 
potential contradictions between the roles of ANP and Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. In the 1997 Petroleum Law, the power to allocate concessions grants 
is bestowed to ANP as a regulatory agency. Under the new law, the ministry 
is formally taking the responsibility of delegating contracts but has the 
discretion to divest this task to the ANP. There are also questions about the 
veto power of PETROSAL (and by extension CNPE) during negotiations of 
consortia, which does pose a genuine question about the freedom of 
companies to negotiate contracts. Whilst these are still being debated in 
Congress, the fact is that state interference in economic transactions have 
been concerns of private competitors and ANP officials alike.127  
 
Although Lula had successfully campaigned in favour of regulatory changes, 
private competitors have contested their arguments in two ways. Firstly, 
government perception regarding the low levels of geological risks and 
uncertainties in finding oil has been challenged by IBP. These changes are 
motivated by political factors to increase the rewards and profits for the state 
rather than economic imperatives of competitiveness. Moreover, the taxation 
                                                   
 
127 Author interviews with Felipe Dias, IBP, August 2010; Former senior official of ANP, 
August 2010. 
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regime in Brazil is sufficiently flexible to take into account boom and bust 
cycles of primary commodities. Fiscal regimes can be readjusted in response 
to external conditions rather than altering the nature of contracts between 
states and private capital. From the IBP perspective, the state can maintain 
high levels of taxes during boom periods and reduce tax rates at price 
downturns. For investors, there is perhaps nothing more important than 
stability in taxation and sanctity of private property rights. Similarly, the 
Brazilian state justifies the proposed changes in the mining sector in 2011 on 
the basis of the need for a more flexible taxation regime.128 The difference, of 
course, is that the mining industry was privatised, which in turn reduces the 
capacity of the state to directly influence the minerals market through state 
enterprises. Secondly, as Brazil is transforming its institutional framework, 
there are concerns regarding the transparency of the new model. It is still 
unclear how negotiations to acquire social licenses can be guaranteed in a 
transparent manner. In comparison, the bidding rounds were open and 
transparent, in which private lobbying or direct negotiations between firms 
and government have been avoided all throughout.129 Nevertheless, these 
issues are more speculative than firmly grounded. The petroleum law was 
passed in Congress and is expected to take effect under Dilma Rousseff. 
 
C. Linking oil wealth and social policy 
 
One core contention in the resource curse literature is the direct 
subsidisation of social and anti-poverty policies through mineral rents during 
commodity booms. Whilst redistributive pressures generate higher 
expectations of export earnings, conventional academic and policy-making 
bodies have warned against ‘populist’ tendencies of governments in power.130 
                                                   
 
128 Author interview with MME Deputy Secretary Nogueira da Costa Jr., Secretariat of 
Geology, Mining and Mineral Processing, Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), 
September, 2011. 
129 Author interview with Felipe Dias, IBP, August 2010. 
130 Mineral rents are unreliable sources of income for three main reasons: the fluctuating 
value of produced resources, the variation of income over time in rates of extraction, and 
the variability in the timing of payments of royalties (Humphreys et. al. 2007). In other 
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This literature argues for fiscal prudence due to uncertainty of future 
financing of mega-development projects and difficulty of longer term 
planning. Lula da Silva departed from this trend only in 2010 when the law 
passed specific clauses to link social spending and oil wealth policy through 
the creation of the so-called national social fund. Whilst there exists fierce 
resistance especially from Rio de Janeiro to redistribute oil wealth more 
evenly to non-oil producing regions, Lula’s new policy heralds a potentially 
creative way of addressing growth and social inequality via neo-
developmentalism.  
 
To contextualise this, the fiscal regime under Cardoso and Lula until 2010 
levies four kinds of taxes: signature bonus, royalty, special participation, and 
fees for the occupation or retention of the area (Law 9478/1997, Article 45).131 
Whilst the signature bonus is paid immediately after the contract has been 
signed, the royalty is a monthly fee paid in local currency upon the start up of 
commercial production, which corresponds to 10 percent of petroleum and 
gas production and can be lowered by ANP down to 5 percent in lieu of 
geological risk, production expectations, among other factors. As Figure 5.7 
shows, rents from oil wealth have steadily increased from 939,600 BRL in 
1999 to 10,936,909 BRL in 2008. Although this can be interpreted as 
success, the share of the Federal government only expanded in absolute 
terms, signifying the stark inequality of oil rents between producing and non-
oil producing regions. Whilst oil producers concentrated in Rio de Janeiro 
have benefited at staggering rates, evaluations regarding the effects of oil 
rents to growth at the municipal level have been negative or neutral (Postali 
2009, 2002b). In contexts of failing growth despite steady inflows of rents, 
the national social fund was approved as a way of leveraging the distribution 
of resources across the country.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
words, export earnings are volatile because they are exposed to cycles of boom and bust, 
international shocks, and commodity futures speculation. 
131 See Appendix 5 for details of the regulatory framework in oil revenue management. 
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Lula envisaged the social fund to take a central role in achieving growth and 
equity by subsidising projects aimed at inducing economic diversification, 
sustaining competitiveness in the oil industry, and paying for social 
programmes. It does so in two significant ways. On one hand, it retains the 
restrictive guidelines set in Cardoso’s 1997 Petroleum Law regarding the use 
of royalty fees and special fund, for example, by specifically allocating 
resources for infrastructure building, technological innovation, and research 
and development aimed at mapping geological risks and planning complex 
energy systems. Its governance structure also follows a highly technocratic 
approach by creating a special committee in charge of monitoring and 
regulating oil funds.132 On the other, the balance of interests between regions 
is reconfigured by the explicit use of the Federal government’s share for 
national projects. There is a political logic in debating the structure of rent 
distribution. It is incontestable that oil-producing regions bear the 
environmental and social costs of extraction (Bebbington 2012; Sawyer 
2004). But equally, mineral rents are disproportionately concentrated in very 
few regions, which warrant the financing of social and anti-poverty policies. 
This policy acts as a corrective to historical asymmetries in Brazil, during 
which cycles of extraction and capital accumulation by the centralised state 
successively hollowed out resource-rich regions leading to intermittent 
moments of social revolts (Bunker 1985; Bunker & Ciccantell 2005; 
Foweraker 1981). Put somewhat differently, by transferring resource rents 
from the periphery to core regions of Brazil, the state replicated and 
institutionalised wealth inequality and power discrepancy.133  
 
                                                   
 
132 These are drawn from ‘successful’ cases, which refer to the Norwegian model of managing 
the oil industry ranging from revenue management, key institutional oversight, and 
distribution of market power between public and private competitors, to which Brazil is 
not an exception (Thurber et. al. 2011; Thurber & Istad 2011; Victor et. al. 2011). 
133 Brazil has been historically ruled by regional elites alternating from Sao Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. Quite understandably, some interpret the 
claims to retain high percentages of oil wealth in Rio de Janeiro as the exercise of power 
by economically and politically affluent states over other regions.   
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Figure 7.7 Oil wealth distribution in Brazil 
 
Source: ANP Annual Report 2009, Table 2.15 (Adapted), 78.  
 
Notwithstanding the on-going debate over the distribution of royalty between 
the Federal and state governments that is yet to be resolved in Congress, 
Chapters V, VI, & VII in Lula’s new oil policy (Law 12.351/2010) establishes 
the Fundo Social (Social Fund or FS). The FS is linked directly to the Office 
of the President to allow the executive direct control over the necessary 
resources for regional and social development. The financing of SF comes 
from the following: (a) share of the value of signature bonus from 
production-sharing contracts; (b) portion of the royalties from the Union as 
stipulated under the rules and coming from production-sharing contracts; (c) 
revenues arising from the sales of oil, natural gas and other hydrocarbon 
fluids; and (d) the royalties and the special participation of areas located in 
the pre-salt contracted under the concession scheme as administered by the 
Union, among others. The prospective projects to be financed include 
education, culture, sports, public health, science and technology, 
environment, and mitigation and adaptation to climate change.  
 
Some will judge the new law as vulnerable to corruption and rent-seeking. 
However, the new law clearly stipulates the strong role of the Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of State Planning, Budgeting and Management, and the 
President of Central Bank in regulating how oil rents will be spent and saved. 
With striking parallel to the Norwegian and Chilean revenue models, oil 
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wealth will be managed as financial investments abroad to avoid spending 
rents domestically. These ministries constitute the so-called Comitê de 
Gestão Financeira do Fundo Social (Social Fund Financial Management 
Committee or CGFFS).134 The controlling agency is therefore given some 
policy latitude to make independent decisions as regards investment of 
sovereignty wealth funds. In addition, CGFFS’ scope of powers is quite wide-
ranging as it is able to set (a) the amount to be recovered annually by the FS, 
thereby, ensuring its financial sustainability; (b) the minimum expected 
profitability; (c) the type and level of risks which the investments can be 
made and the conditions for which the level of risk is minimised; (d) the 
minimum and maximum percentage of resources to be invested overseas and 
in the country; and (e) the minimum capitalisation that can be reached. The 
payment of the share of the funds will be authorised through a Presidential 
decree in consultation with the committee.  
 
To sum up very briefly, the three main elements of the neo-developmental oil 
policy in Brazil attempt to restructure the relations of power between states 
and markets. What is striking is the renewed emphasis on the vital role of 
state enterprises in managing the economy. Whilst these reforms are 
certainly nascent, we can anticipate far reaching consequences not simply in 
terms of oil extraction but also in sustaining a more active role for the state. 
As I have hopefully shown in the chapter, the return of state capitalism in oil 
governance should not be seen as a critical juncture from neoliberalism. 
Instead, we should think of institutional evolution as phases of a longer 
history of state capitalism in Brazil, during which market restructuring is 
shaped predominantly by changing external circumstances in politics and 
economy. 
 
                                                   
 
134 One major observation is that the management of investment policy of oil revenues 
resembles exactly like the copper revenue management system in Chile stipulated in the 
Law on Fiscal Responsibility, which also involves the major ministries in charge of the 
country’s financial health status. 
  292 
7.3 Conclusions 
 
The main argument of the chapter is that market reforms in the oil sector 
have been incomplete and partial primarily because of an inherent tension 
between the long history of state management and the internalisation of 
neoliberalism. Under Cardoso and Lula, the developmentalist ideology has 
left political legacies, for example, the strength of state enterprises and the 
long-standing commitment to secure oil reserves for industrialisation. Both 
governments responded by combining market incentives and state capitalism 
to introduce dynamism and efficiency into economic sectors. But market 
reforms also failed to wholly dismantle the production system established 
throughout years of state intervention and ISI policies. Although market 
reforms represent a form of constrain in the state, the capacity of the 
Brazilian state to allocate and influence economic decisions has not withered. 
Instead, changing domestic and international environments characterised by 
the commodities boom, macroeconomic stability and stable growth, and the 
fact that oil and minerals are still considered strategic resources opened new 
opportunities for policy change during the 2000s, in which the Brazilian 
state is once again reasserting its role and capacity to influence national 
development strategies. In other words, neoliberalism in Brazil was not 
adopted in a blanket fashion. The state continues to exert significant 
influence over the economy as reflected in the return of state capitalism. The 
adoption of a hybrid strategy in the resources sector is achieved by melding 
market incentives and state capitalism. 
 
In this chapter, I discussed elite attempts at consolidating a growth model 
based on the principle of neo-developmentalism. This is characterised by a 
stronger role for the state in oil exploration and development as well as 
directly linking oil wealth and social policy. Chapter 8 subsequently deals 
with the question of restructuring state enterprises to take advantage of the 
changing economic environment. Whilst the state has facilitated the politico-
economic environment for growth, it is PETROBRAS and its capacity to 
compete with international energy firms that should be given credit for the 
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renewed confidence on state capitalism as a model of growth for Brazil. This 
is the theme I explore in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8  
CAPITAL-LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
 
 
Oil and natural gas production in Brazil has 
grown. Our additions to reserves have far 
outstripped the production rate and yet in 
December we set a new daily production 
record: 2 million barrels, a volume only 
achieved by eight companies worldwide.135 
 
José Sergio Gabrielli de Azevedo 
PETROBRAS CEO, 2005-2012 
 
 
The above statement was the main heading of the PETROBRAS Annual 
Report in 2007. The company likewise announced the discovery of huge 
reserves in ultra deep waters in the Tupi area, estimated between five and 
eight billion barrels off the coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro. That same 
year, PETROBRAS showcased its success in unparalleled technological 
excellence, to which Gabrielli claimed that “the company and Brazil… could 
now join the select group of oil exporting countries” (PETROBRAS 2007: 2). 
In this chapter, I explore the ways in which PETROBRAS has developed its 
competitive strategy to become a highly efficient, vertically integrated energy 
firm, and the extent to which the internationalisation of state-controlled 
enterprises constitutes a core element of the neo-developmental ideology in 
Brazil. My analytical strategy is to trace historically the exercise of political 
autonomy of PETROBRAS and how such autonomy translated into concrete 
comparative advantage during the restructuring period in the 1990s and 
2000s. I do this in two ways. Firstly, the chapter demystifies the assumption 
regarding the close relationship between states and state enterprises in the 
hydrocarbons sector. I show how the combinations of PETROBRAS’ 
ownership structure, its culture of innovation, and effects of 
                                                   
 
135  ‘Message from the CEO’, PETROBRAS Annual Report 2007. Rio de Janeiro: 
PETROBRAS, 2-3. 
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internationalisation have facilitated the strengthening of PETROBRAS in the 
energy sector. Secondly, it examines labour management strategies of 
PETROBRAS to maintain its competitive advantage and subsequently the 
responses of unions in the petroleum sector. One concrete point of conflict is 
the incoherence, if not contradiction, between union demands and 
managerial interests of PETROBRAS.  Whilst top-down projects of state 
corporatism have not really changed, and this is shown in the weakness of 
labour unions vis-à-vis the state and PETROBRAS, one can say that Lula da 
Silva has had a far more successful strategy of winning labour support. And 
unlike CODELCO, the challenge for PETROBRAS is not so much to regain 
corporate autonomy from the state or labour unions but how to use its 
acquired independence to maintain social peace in the work place.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 8.1, I analyse the role of 
PETROBRAS in the Brazilian economy and the extent to which we can speak 
of hybrid forms of managing state enterprises. It explains why PETROBRAS 
was already competitive prior to the market reforms in the 1990s and the 
consequent effects of market restructuring on the state enterprise. This is 
followed by Section 8.2 which explores the role of labour in resisting the 
privatisation of PETROBRAS and the ways in which unions and state 
managers have coordinated their activities to keep the energy firm efficient. 
Finally, in Section 8.3, I look at the immediate consequences of the new 
regulatory framework in PETROBRAS’ activities, in lieu of the favourable 
position given to PETROBRAS under Lula and Dilma’s new oil policy. In this 
section I conclude by speculating about the extent to which the neo-
developmentalist model can be sustained, especially through the role of 
PETROBRAS in the new industrialisation strategy under Dilma Rousseff. 
 
8.1 Explaining PETROBRAS’ competitiveness and efficiency 
 
Like state capacity or institutional resilience, efficiency and competitiveness 
of state enterprises are historically constituted and emerging from the 
combination of market incentives, political and institutional factors, and 
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structural conditions. The starting point then is to explain why some state-
owned companies become competitive whilst others lag behind. Before I 
analyse in detail the above mentioned variables, it is important to establish 
the status of PETROBRAS as an efficient state enterprise. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, PETROBRAS was a technocratic-political solution to the 
nationalisation debate between 1947 and 1953. PETROBRAS is a state-
controlled rather than state-owned company, in which the Federal 
Government retains 51 percent voting capital shares and therefore directly 
influences the firm in many ways. This ownership structure gave 
PETROBRAS a dual role in Brazil. On one hand, it is expected to protect 
public interests and the state maintains its regulatory influence over the 
company by exercising specific powers, such as the appointment of the 
President and the Board of Directors, and subsuming the personnel hiring 
and firing policy under the public enterprise system.136 On the other hand, 
PETROBRAS is free to make independent decisions on investment, access to 
capital, and overseas operations especially in the E&P sector. For example, 
BRASPETRO was created to continue searching for new destination markets 
for Brazil, which is reflected in the on-going international operations of 
PETROBRAS in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Since PETROBRAS is also 
accountable to its private shareholders, profitability is at the heart of its 
organisational, managerial, and investment decision-making processes. This 
overarching logic of efficiency and competitiveness remains true until today. 
In Table 8.1, I briefly offer an overview of PETROBRAS’ economic 
performance. We can measure the overall financial performance of the firm 
through market capitalisation and net equity. The state company has grown 
steadily in terms of its market value, which has bolstered greater confidence 
among international and domestic investors regarding the financial 
management of PETROBRAS. The figures show quite clearly the positive 
performance of the firm. By 2010, the state enterprise is considered the third 
largest energy firm in the world by market capitalisation (PFC Energy in 
PETROBRAS 2010). 
                                                   
 
136 For details, see PETROBRAS Corporate Governance By Laws. 
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Table 8.1 PETROBRAS' financial performance 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Consolidated Net Income 
(R$ million) 
17,795 16,887 23,725 25,919 21,512 32,988 30,051 35,189 
Market Capitalisation  
(R$ million) 
87 112 174 230 430 224 347 380 
Net Equity  
(R$ million) 
49 62 79 98 114 114 164 307 
Sources: PETROBRAS Annual Reports 2010, 2007. 
 
But whilst the above indicators are mainly for business groups and financial 
investors, we can also gauge PETROBRAS’ performance in terms of its 
success rate in drilling hydrocarbons in oil wells, mainly concentrated in 
ultra-deep waters. As Figure 8.1 details, PETROBRAS has been drilling oil 
wells quite successfully since 2002, which has led oil exports in Brazil to 
conclude that there is indeed commercially viable oil in the pre-salt reservoir. 
What is particularly striking is that Brazilian oil reserves are located offshore, 
which has compelled PETROBRAS to invest on research and development 
(R&D) in finding ways to extract oil in ultra-deep waters. 
 
Figure 8.1 Success rate of PETROBRAS in oil exploration 
 
 Sources: PETROBRAS Annual Reports 2010, 2007 (Adapted). 
 
As a result, Brazil has successively found new oil reserves in the pre-salt layer 
in the coast of Rio de Janeiro (see Figure 7.3 again for the map of oil 
concessions in Brazil). The discovery of pre-salt reserves is clearly one 
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indicator of the successful specialisation of PETROBRAS in deep sea drilling. 
We can also observe that the amount of proven oil, condensate and natural 
gas reserves in Brazil has soared from 9.65 billion barrels in 2000 to 15.283 
billion barrels in 2010. The figure is 8 percent up compared to 2009. The 
Ministry of Mines and Energy anticipate Brazil to become an oil exporter, 
moving its overall position from 16th up to 8th with the pre-salt reserves. 
Figure 8.2 shows the proven reserves owned by PETROBRAS in Brazil 
between 2000 and 2010; the figures closed at 15.958 billion barrels in 2010 
or 7.5 percent increase from 2009. It was primarily driven by further 
discoveries in the Lula and Cernambi fields in the pre-salt area. 
PETROBRAS’ reserve replacement ratio was 229 percent, i.e. for each boe 
produced, the firm added 2.29 boe to its reserves (PETROBRAS 2010: 6). 
This is a metric of the extent oil companies can replace oil reserves being 
extracted for production. In the case of PETROBRAS, it means the state 
enterprise can recuperate the reserves and is a good indication of the 
longevity of its operation in the fields. Beyond finding oil and gas reserves, 
PETROBRAS has steadily increased its oil and natural gas production. As 
Figure 8.3 details, in 2003 PETROBRAS produced 2,036 thousand barrels 
per day (1,701 thousand barrels of oil and 335 thousand barrels of natural 
gas), which then jumped to 2,583 thousand barrels per day (2,155 thousand 
barrels of oil and 428 thousand barrels of natural gas) in 2010. Since most of 
the extraction activities taking place in the pre-salt area are still in the 
exploration and development stages, we can anticipate the figures to go up 
quite substantially in the next five years.  
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Figure 8.2 Proven reserves of PETROBRAS in Brazil, 2000-2010 
 
 Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010, 2007 (Adapted).  
 
Figure 8.3 PETROBRAS' Oil and gas production, 2003-2010 
 
 Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010, 2007 (Adapted).  
 
Finally, PETROBRAS plays a crucial role in Brazilian national development 
of the oil industry through its substantial contribution in research and 
development. Through the Petroleum Law which requires obligatory 
investments in R&D, PETROBRAS as the dominant player means its 
contribution to scientific research is far greater than the private sector. With 
the new law in place, we can anticipate that PETROBRAS will retain its 
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position as innovator in the oil industry. Taking into account that oil 
exploration in Brazil is offshore, technological advancement is likely to take 
place in this research area. Whilst some companies have been investing in 
deep-sea engineering, for example BP, the production-sharing arrangement 
and minimum participation of PETROBRAS imply that technology can only 
be endogenously generated rather than be learned from foreign participants.  
 
Table 8.2 Obligatory investments in R&D by concessionaires, 
2001-2010 
Concessionaire 
Obligatory investments in R&D (mil R$) 10/09 
% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 127,274 263,537 323,300 403,201 508,812 616,389 616,503 860,858 638,882 743,693 16.41 
PETROBRAS 127,274 263,537 323,300 392,486 506,530 613,841 610,244 853,726 633,024 735,337 16.16 
Shell - - - 10,715.8 2,282 - - - - - .. 
Repsol - - - - - 2,548 6,259 7,132 4,339 4,236 -2.38 
Manati - - - - - - - - 1,052 2,853 171.26 
Brasoil Manati - - - - - - - - 234 634 171.26 
Rio das Contas - - - - - - - - 234 634 171.26 
Sources: ANP/SPG in ANP Annual Report 2010 Table 19 (Adapted). 
Note: Investments in Research and Development (R&D), in conformity to Chapter X of Article 8, Decree Law 9.478, of 6/8/1997. 
 
Overall, it is undeniable that PETROBRAS has grown steadily in the last 
decade, which is the period when market opening reforms were implemented 
in the oil industry. The crucial question is whether private competitors and 
ANP’s claims regarding the ‘competitive effects’ of domestic and foreign 
private capitalists make sense. Whilst the explanation is certainly true, it is 
far more complex than ideologues of market reforms would purport, as will 
be explained in the next section. I contextualise this argument by identifying 
the sources of efficiency of PETROBRAS: ownership structure, its culture of 
innovation, and effects of internationalisation. The focus on the specific form 
of state ownership and labour management style of PETROBRAS allows me 
to explore how state enterprises respond to watershed reforms like neoliberal 
restructuring. Whilst the state has been directly and indirectly important in 
facilitating competitiveness of state enterprises in the past, it is the changing 
relationship between PETROBRAS and its workers that has paved the way 
for efficiency, productivity, and human capital development to remain the 
core principles of its corporate governance strategy even at a time when the 
Brazilian government sought to restructure state owned enterprises. 
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8.1.1 Ownership structure of PETROBRAS 
 
The persistence of limited privatisation in the Brazilian oil industry was an 
outcome of the oil nationalization debate between 1947 and 1953, during 
which the outcome was a publicly listed company with 51 percent capital 
voting share owned by the Federal Government and 49 percent by private 
shareholders. In many ways, PETROBRAS exemplifies the exception rather 
than the rule for state enterprise ownership, wherein the state typically owns 
100 percent of the capital. But as mentioned already, this particular structure 
has paved way for PETROBRAS to seek access to capital in non-traditional 
ways, for example, by investing heavily on technological innovation to find its 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis the big oil firms as well as by operating 
overseas in the 1970s. During the high tide of neoliberalism in Brazil, 
privatisation was central to the reforms in CVRD and this has led to the 
dismantling of state ownership in the mining sector. In contrast, 
PETROBRAS was exposed to private capital participation early on and 
therefore the restructuring process focussed primarily on sales of non-
performing assets and re-investment in its core business – oil production.137 
Figure 6.4 provides a clear view regarding the ownership structure of 
PETROBRAS. The most important of which, voting capital, is clearly owned 
by the Federal Government through the capital shares of BNDESPAR, which 
is an entity controlled by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES). 
The Brazilian government also holds around 28 percent of non-capital voting 
share and 48.3 percent of capital stocks. These hybrid state-owned/private 
enterprises might surprise political scientists, but in fact, state enterprises in 
emerging markets like Russia, China and India, have adopted this ownership 
structure. This is particularly striking in the oil and gas sectors, in which the 
                                                   
 
137  PETROBRAS expanded its operations to other energy-related industries, including 
mining, fertiliser, ship building, and international trading. The company was restructured 
to emphasise PETROBRAS’ operations in upstream, midstream and downstream 
activities. See Randall 1993 for a historical account. 
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state has held more control over the industry.138 Additionally, state-owned 
enterprises represent the top 10 reserve holders internationally, and out of 
1,148 billion barrels of global proven oil reserves, 886 billion barrels or 77 
percent are controlled by national oil companies (NOCs) with no equity 
participation for foreign oil companies. This excludes 69 billion barrels of oil 
situated in Russia, or 6 percent of global reserves, which are exclusively 
allocated for Russian firms both state owned and private ones (James Baker 
III Institute for Public Policy 2007: 1). 
 
Figure 8.4 PETROBRAS’ ownership structure at the end of 2010 
 
 Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010 (Adapted), 4.  
 
                                                   
 
138 For discussions on the political and economic consequences of ownership structures in 
the hydrocarbons industry, see Jaffe & Soligo 2007; James Baker III Institute for Public 
Policy 2007; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010; Victor et. al 2011. 
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 Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010 (Adapted), 4. 
 
 
 Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010 (Adapted), 4.  
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been subjected to political bickering in Congress.139 The power of the state 
heightens in contexts of state monopoly or ‘contestable markets’. 140 
PETROBRAS has been rather successful in shielding its commercial interests 
by way of heeding to the pressures of private investors in the company. 
Secondly, ownership structure affects indirectly the capability of domestic 
firms to reconfigure their business models. Not only are hybrid state 
owned/privatised firms compelled to strictly monitor the business 
environment, they also combine operational excellence and structural 
flexibility to allocate resources during periods of uncertainty and 
restructuring (Wood & Caldas 2007). The capacity of PETROBRAS to 
compete is partially driven by commercial interests, but equally it reflects 
convergence of interests between the state and firm. Most notably, the 
Cardoso government scrapped its monopoly on oil-related activities, freed oil 
prices from state control, and opened the sector for international competition 
(Goldstein 2010: 101). One excellent indicator of how PETROBRAS performs 
its public and private roles is reflected in the requirement for foreign 
companies to use local contents and domestic suppliers in their activities. By 
locally outsourcing some of its supply, PETROBRAS can push productivity 
standards and outputs at par with international levels, which not only create 
domestic employment and income but also facilitate linkages between 
resource and productive sectors of the economy. Using this yardstick, 
PETROBRAS has performed very well by purchasing approximately US$ 28 
billion per year worth of Brazilian content. Table 8.2 provides a detailed 
breakdown of PETROBRAS’ investments, amount spent and percentage of 
domestic content. Across upstream, midstream and downstream activities, 
PETROBRAS has employed above 53 percent of Brazilian firms. This points 
out to possible mechanisms upon which industrial development can be 
achieved through the oil industry. It allows for innovation, local transfer of 
                                                   
 
139 Author interview with Roberto Schaeffer, Academic Consultant, UFRJ, July 2010. 
140 Contestable markets are situations in which a dominant player acts as if it operates in a 
competitive market even if it exercises market control. 
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knowledge, and above all, it taps the natural comparative advantage of the 
country.141  
 
Table 8.3 PETROBRAS’ capital expenditure on Brazil (US$ 
billions) 
Business Unit Investments in Brazil Purchased in Brazil Brazil Content (%) 
E&P 108.2 57.8 53% 
RTM and 
Petrochemicals 
78.6 62.8 80% 
Gas & Energy 17.6 14.4 82% 
Distribution 2.3 2.3 100% 
Biofuels 2.3 2.3 100% 
Corporate 3.3 2.6 80% 
Total 212.3 142.2 67% 
+ 
US$ 46.4 billion from Partners 
Source: PETROBRAS Business Plan 2010-2014: 11. 
 
Finally, ownership structure is complemented by Brazil’s long history of state 
management, during which PETROBRAS was able to expand operations in 
the hydrocarbons chain through technological advancement. Historically, 
most NOCs have concentrated their economic activities in E&P sector whilst 
international oil companies (IOCs) have captured the distribution markets 
(James Baker III Institute for Public Policy 2007). NOCs typically face the 
problem of vertical integration that would allow oil-rich states to capture 
greater market share. But in the case of PETROBRAS, the combined effects 
of state monopoly and foreign participation restriction facilitated economic 
control over the sector by the state enterprise. Upon the discovery of pre-salt 
reserves, PETROBRAS has managed to dominate both upstream and 
downstream activities. PETROBRAS has achieved the goal of many NOCs, 
which is to become a vertically integrated firm capable of operating across 
values chains. This is an outcome of a virtuous relationship between the state 
and state enterprise in strategically developing technology whilst restricting 
foreign participation in the domestic market. 
 
                                                   
 
141 This point on the role of domestic content as pathway to a successful national industrial 
plan discussed by PT. Author interview with PT Officer, Brasilia, August 2010.  
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By implication, despite neoliberal reforms PETROBRAS has remained under 
state control but its dual responsibility to public and private investors has 
brought forth optimal market outcomes. State monopoly also indirectly 
helped PETROBRAS to become vertically integrated capable of operating 
across the hydrocarbons chain, which was developed by combining 
technological advancement and state protection of the oil industry. We thus 
have a paradox. On one hand, in Chile the (neoliberal) state has controlled 
the copper industry by way of maintaining 100 percent ownership, but 
CODELCO likewise encounters several constraints on competitiveness. On 
the other hand, in the Brazilian oil sector PETROBRAS had successfully 
asserted its corporate autonomy from the state through its ownership 
structure. Similarly exhibiting the features of other NOCs, PETROBRAS is “a 
powerful organisation within the state apparatus that addresses a number of 
non-commercial aspirations (e.g. employment generation and price controls) 
but at the same time enjoys managerial autonomy and is expected to perform 
commercially” (Goldstein 2010: 100).142 
 
8.1.2 Culture of innovation  
 
According to business models, one major source of competitiveness is the 
development of a culture of innovation over time (Claver et. al. 1998; Zien & 
Buckler 1997). Whilst every firm faces distinctive sets of constraints for 
growth, the difficulty of promoting technological advancement and 
developing human capital within the industry are the most pressing 
challenges in which the firm can immediately respond through its internal 
resources. But like institutions, technological capacities involve trial and 
error, resources, and time before they become commercially viable. 
PETROBRAS’ drive for technological excellence for deep-water resources 
                                                   
 
142 Domestically, NOCs fulfil various social and economic functions that compete for capital 
budgets that might otherwise be allocated for commercial operations, such as reserve 
replacement and oil production. These noncore, non-commercial obligations have 
imposed costs on NOCs, and in some cases, dilute the incentive to maximise profits, 
hindering the NOCs’ ability to raise external capital and to compete at international 
standards (James Baker III Institute for Public Policy 2007: 2).   
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thus go far longer than the market reform period and should be understood 
as its response to several challenges. Firstly, as water depths increased after 
the discovery of the Campos Basin fields in 1974, PETROBRAS was required 
to find globally innovative technologies and therefore expanded its 
knowledge networks in its attempt to search for oil in Brazil. Unfortunately, 
there were no available technologies in the international market because the 
big companies had access to onshore reserves. The collapse of oil prices in 
1986 further narrowed the range of incentives for international capital to 
boost expenditures in quite complex megaprojects. PETROBRAS had to 
mobilise its resources – taking advantage of its oil monopoly – to finance 
deep-sea engineering systems via its knowledge production networks 
involving universities, research centres, and government agencies (Dantas & 
Bell 2009: 830-831). And secondly, there were political pressures from the 
outgoing military government in early 1980s to secure oil production as a 
result of the growing energy demands of the economy. With no prospects of 
oil inland, PETROBRAS could not wait for major oil companies and 
international suppliers to develop the necessary technology. As the Link 
Report suggested, Brazil had to find prospective oil reserves offshore, 
thereby, facilitating a ‘catch up’ process in the development of deep-water 
technologies through the accumulation of knowledge networks (Philips 
1982). The PETROBRAS system transformed from being a passive learning 
network (1960s-1984) towards a strategic innovation network (1997-present) 
that is capable of absorbing science and technology, and subsequently 
applying and transferring technology to partners (Dantas 2006; Dantas & 
Bell 2009, 2006). Taking this into account, PETROBRAS’ strategy reflects 
emphasis on building upon its existing niche in the global oil industry – 
technology in deep water resources. It does so in two ways: first, investment 
strategy backed by a flexible corporate governance structure; and second, a 
rewards-based system of human capital formation through labour 
management.143  
                                                   
 
143 Author interviews with Heitor Chagas de Oliviera, Former Human Resource Officer, 
PETROBRAS, July 2010; Ildo Sauer, PETROBRAS, August 2010; Roberto Schaeffer, 
Academic Consultant, UFRJ, July 2010. 
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In terms of investment strategy, PETROBRAS draws strength from its 
capacity to access capital for investments combined with flexibility in 
redirecting financial resources. To achieve growth targets, a total of US$ 224 
billion investments have been raised, in which US$ 212.3 billion are allocated 
to projects within Brazil and US$ 11.7 billion to foreign operations, chiefly in 
the United States, Latin America, and West Africa. Figure 6.5 offers an 
overview of PETROBRAS investments as stipulated in its Business Plan 
2010-2014. The lion’s share of investments of US$ 118.8 billion (53 percent) 
will be channelled onto E&P sector; approximately US$ 33 billion is allocated 
for the development of the pre-salt reservoir in anticipation of production of 
241,000 barrels per day. Equally, PETROBRAS is expanding its operations in 
mid-stream activities by increasing its refining capacity to guarantee 
domestic supply. The Refining, Transport, & Marketing segment will receive 
US$ 73.6 billion or 33 percent of total investments, which will push refining 
capacity to as high as 2.26 million barrels per day in 2014. Crucially, 
investment projects have a national content ratio of 67 percent, directing an 
average of US$ 28.4 billion per year towards Brazilian suppliers and creating 
1.46 million direct and indirect jobs (PETROBRAS 2010: 8-11).144 As will be 
explained in the next section, expected investment will allow PETROBRAS to 
expand aggressively in its overseas operations. 
 
                                                   
 
144  In funding investments, PETROBRAS draws from corporate financing, structured 
financing, and financing suppliers and clients. In 2010, banks, investors and official 
credit agencies (Export Credit Agencies of ECAs) have recognised its credit quality, which 
offered bank guarantees of US$ 8.8 billion to the company (PETROBRAS 2010: 18).  
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Figure 8.5 PETROBRAS investments across hydrocarbons chain 
 
Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010 (Adapted), 9.  
 
However, the ability of PETROBRAS to finance and allocate resources to 
maximise investments is only one part of the story. Another key aspect of its 
corporate management is the regulation of labour force through incentives 
and rewards on one hand, and training and professionalism on the other. 
PETROBRAS as a state controlled enterprise performs non-commercial roles, 
which has traditionally meant employment in the public sector. Whilst state 
enterprises typically suffered from productivity inefficiencies and 
politicisation of personnel system, PETROBRAS subsumed its hiring and 
firing policy within the public enterprise system without undermining its 
corporate autonomy (Trebat 1983). Over the years PETROBRAS has 
established a cadre of staff with the technical know-how of improving 
efficiency in its business operations.145 This did not take place in a short 
period of time but was built through years of developing human capital 
                                                   
 
145 Author interviews with Heitor Chagas de Oliviera, PETROBRAS, July 2010; Ildo Sauer, 
PETROBRAS, August 2010; Roberto Schaeffer, Academic Consultant, UFRJ, July 2010.  
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through technical programmes for PETROBRAS workers, PETROBRAS-
government partnership initiatives on education such as the National 
Training Scheme,146 and financial assistance to universities and research 
institutions across the country to build various research profiles in the oil and 
gas sectors. Within the company, PETROBRAS implemented a number of 
programmes that could ensure financial equilibrium and sustainability of 
workers’ pensions.147 In Figure 8.6, I show the distribution of PETROBRAS 
workers among the parent company, PETROBRAS abroad, and subsidiaries. 
Two observations can be made from the graph. Firstly, the company has 
steadily increased its labour force across the board, indicating growth in the 
company as well as in public sector employment. Between 2003 and 2010, its 
total workforce jumped from 48,798 up to 80,492 employees. This is 
impressive growth in employment figures taking into account that mining 
and oil companies (especially foreign owned) tend to be disconnected with 
the local economy. As expected in light of the investments in the pre-salt 
areas, the figures reflect the expansion of E&P sector, which in 2010 reached 
to 23,874 workers (PETROBRAS 2010: 20). Secondly, PETROBRAS based in 
Brazil is the segment that has been expanding quite steadily over the last few 
years. This affirms the strategic role of PETROBRAS not in terms of profit 
generation but in supporting employment in the economy. As oil extraction 
requires technological excellence, the increase in public employment 
corresponds to rising standards of domestic content and technical expertise 
of the workforce. PETROBRAS is, in fact, helping develop the knowledge 
base of Brazil by developing the technical know-how of local workers instead 
of hiring foreign professionals. As Ildo Sauer concurs, PETROBRAS has not 
                                                   
 
146 This is part of the wider Program to Mobilise the Brazilian Oil and Gas Industry or 
PROMINP. In 2007, PETROBRAS has invested R$ 40 million in this project 
(PETROBRAS 2007: 70). Equally, the Ministry of Science and Technology has poured in 
massive investments since 2000 to finance innovation projects at the university and 
company levels, particularly in the oil and gas sectors. The specific agency of the ministry, 
Financiadora de Estudos e Projectos or FINEP, aims to promote the development of 
science, technology and innovation through public funding in companies, universities, 
technological institutes, and other public and private organisations. For details, see 
http://www.finep.gov.br/. Author interviews with Paulo Krahe, FINEP, August 2010; 
Aparecida Neves, FINEP, August 2010.  
147 In 2010, the number of participants in the PETROBRAS Pension Plan has reached 80,000 
(PETROBRAS 2010). 
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fully resorted to subcontracting to respond to downward pressures of cost 
and worker productivity.148 This is a striking difference between PETROBRAS 
and CODELCO in their respective employment policy in response to global 
competitiveness.  
 
Figure 8.6 PETROBRAS’ workforce, 2003-2010 
 
Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010, 2007 (Adapted). 
 
In achieving its commercial goals, PETROBRAS combines its autonomy from 
the Brazilian government to make strategic investment decisions with its 
internal controls over the management of personnel. Through a balance 
between its public and private interests of maximising profit and developing 
national capacity, PETROBRAS is able to adjust in the changing market 
environment. But unlike CODELCO, PETROBRAS was also very successful in 
expanding its reach and scope of commercial activities outside of Brazil. As a 
result of the lack of proven oil reserves to meet domestic energy 
requirements, the energy firm through its specialised technology has sought 
                                                   
 
148 Author interview with Ildo Sauer, PETROBRAS, August 2010. 
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to pursue operations in West Africa, Latin America, and Asia. As part of its 
competitive strategy, PETROBRAS has developed an internationalisation 
policy to take advantage of the global oil industry. I discuss this in detail in 
the proceeding section. 
 
8.1.3 Internationalisation of PETROBRAS 
 
PETROBRAS managers have made strategic decisions to expand overseas 
operations in response to the massive changes in the minerals and 
hydrocarbons sectors in 1990s and 2000s. State managers took advantage of 
a new market environment to learn, innovate, and compete domestically and 
internationally. A significant element of this strategy is the 
internationalisation of PETROBRAS’ operations. This competitive strategy 
began as early as 1972 upon the creation of BRASPETRO. At a time when oil 
imports covered as much as 80 percent of domestic demand, the goal of 
PETROBRAS was to guarantee domestic oil supply through overseas 
operations. PETROBRAS commenced operations in Iraq, Colombia, Angola, 
and Gulf of Mexico in 1979, and then aggressively expanded its activities 
throughout 1990s (Goldstein 2010; Philips 1982; Randall 1993).  
 
The phenomenon of internationalisation as a competitive strategy is 
complex, and the economics and business literature are in better position to 
evaluate why companies undertake this despite high sunk costs and risks 
associated with operations in foreign markets (Dunning 1998; Eden 1991; 
Pitelis & Sugden 2000).149 But in PETROBRAS, this was driven primarily by 
the near absence of oil reserves onshore and the need for technological 
advancements in deep sea drilling in ultra-deep waters. PETROBRAS 
internationalisation is motivated by three goals. Firstly, it goes to markets 
                                                   
 
149 It must be noted that the literature has treated the internationalisation process as a 
general phenomena, and therefore, has thus far not distinguished the growing divergent 
experiences of OECD and emerging market firms. However, the recent literature 
increasingly recognises these nuances. For example see Gammeltoft et. al. 2010; 
Goldstein 2007; Ravi 2009; Ravi & Singh 2009. With regard to the specific case of Brazil, 
see Fleury & Fleury 2011; Goldstein 2010; Goldstein & Posterla 2010; Schneider 2009b. 
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where it can apply the technical and geo-scientific knowledge acquired in oil 
exploration to areas with similar characteristics and huge potential of oil 
reserves, such as West Africa and Gulf of Mexico. Secondly, PETROBRAS 
aims to open new markets, ensure growth in downstream activities, and align 
domestic portfolio with domestic segments. In particular, the linkage 
between exploration and oil development on the one hand, and refining, 
distribution and petrochemical sectors on the other, can only be achieved 
through vertical integration of its operations. Finally, PETROBRAS sought to 
internationalise to expand the natural gas business to complement the 
Brazilian market (PETROBRAS 2010: 51). Like other NOCs, PETROBRAS 
has successfully established global presence across the hydrocarbons chain, 
including the acquisition of new reserves in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and 
Oceania. As Table 8.3 details, PETROBRAS has strong presence and 
positioning in the E&P sector – the most commercially risky but with high 
rewards – but is also noticeable in the distribution and sales. These countries 
have similar geological features as Brazil, allowing PETROBRAS to apply 
deep sea technology. More strategically, it has set up representations in 
Europe, potentially opening new opportunities for Brazilian hydrocarbons 
derivatives to be marketed more effectively. In the refining sector, 
PETROBRAS now operates in Argentina, Brazil, United States, and Japan. In 
less than three decades, the state enterprise has been able to gradually 
expand operations overseas. In geographical scope, Brazil has strong 
presence in the hydrocarbons sector in Latin America, which signifies the 
existence of economic interests to further regional commercial activities in 
pursuit of its global strategy. If anything, the regional market is an attractive 
and complementary space upon which Brazil through PETROBRAS can 
exercise its political and economic clout. 
 
What does this tell us about competitive strategies of NOCs more generally? 
Firstly, NOCs in emerging markets have been exposed far more deeply in the 
internationalisation process. Whilst many state enterprises thrived as a result 
of domestic industrial protection from the state, national oil firms sought to 
find their niche in the global market by advancing specific roles in the 
globalised value chains. For PETROBRAS, the absence of oil reserves inland 
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had the net effect of seeking alternative strategies to meet domestic energy 
needs for industrialisation. Secondly, national industrial development is not 
necessarily antithetical to the expansion of state enterprises abroad. 
PETROBRAS is an exemplar of a state company engaging with public and 
private interests (Goldstein 2007). Whilst profitability and commercial goals 
drove PETROBRAS towards internationalisation, varying regulations of 
company management – including control over voting rights – ensure the 
delivery of its role as a state entity. After demonstrating the different aspects 
of corporate management in PETROBRAS, what we need to explain is how 
labour conflicts have been kept under the firm hands of the state and of 
PETROBRAS. As I argue in the thesis, the success of corporate governance 
reforms hinges primarily on the capacity of political elites and state 
managers to maintain forms of social control towards autonomous unions. 
Whilst in CODELCO neoliberal reforms have pushed conflicts between state 
managers and unions, the long gestation of state-controlled incorporation 
combined with the paternalistic patterns of PETROBRAS-labour relations 
have successfully facilitated the establishment of social peace in the oil 
industry. This is the main theme in the proceeding section. 
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Table 8.4 PETROBRAS' integrated expansion of international 
activities 
Country 
Activities 
Exploration 
& 
Production 
Gas & 
Power 
Refining / 
Petrochemicals 
Distribution 
/ Sales 
Representation 
The Americas      
Argentina √ √ √ √  
Bolivia √ √    
Brazil √ √ √ √ Headquarters 
Chile    √  
Colombia √   √  
Cuba √     
Curacao    √  
Ecuador  √     
USA √  √  √ 
Mexico √     
Paraguay      
Peru √     
Uruguay √ √    
Venezuela √     
Africa      
Angola √     
Libya √     
Namibia √     
Nigeria √     
Tanzania √     
Europe      
The Netherlands    √ √ 
United Kingdom     √ 
Portugal √     
Asia      
China     √ 
Singapore     √ 
India √     
Iran     √ 
Japan   √   
Turkey √     
Oceania      
Australia √     
New Zealand √     
Source: PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010: 52. 
 
8.2 Labour conflictivity in the oil industry 
 
In the previous section, I illustrated the complex process of managing 
production functions in the state enterprise. In this section, I shift from 
managerial perspectives of corporate reforms towards the politics of labour 
management in the oil industry. The success of reforming productive 
structures of the economy is by all means dependent on labour acquiescence. 
In Brazil the modernisation of the capitalist state under Getúlio Vargas 
(1937-1945) had the lasting effect of incorporating organised labour as a way 
of depoliticising and demobilising social sectors (Collier & Collier 2002; 
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Schmitter 1972). Historically, labour incorporation had been a successful 
strategy of political elites to contain social unrest in pursuit of economic 
development. The Brazilian workers, who paid the price of national projects 
of wealth creation in the developmentalist past (without exception), have 
been subjected to the authoritarianism of the state. Whilst there were 
differences between the Estado Novo and the military government, they were 
certainly identical in their view regarding the potentially disruptive character 
of organised labour, in which union protests were managed through consent 
and coercion. The Ministry of Labour maintained social peace through a 
highly restrictive union representation system and state control over funding 
of unions (Cook 2007; Ramalho 2007). The concrete social struggles of 
unions were thus defined by their desire for organisational autonomy from 
the state. By ensuring the existence of a state-approved confederation, 
monitoring the appointment of union leaders, and inability of unions to 
reduce their operational dependence to the state for example through 
imposed taxes (imposto sindical), political autonomy was difficult to achieve. 
In this context, it is appropriate to borrow Ben Schneider’s (2004a) depiction 
of Brazil as an example of ‘politicised capitalism’. Put simply, it refers to the 
exceptional capacity of the centralised state to exercise a high degree of 
political control over the organisation of interest groups. This fits quite neatly 
to the characterisation of Brazilian trade unionism by Collier & Collier 
(2002), who described state-labour relations as one where the weight of the 
state overwhelmingly foreshadowed the desire and capacity of workers to 
develop their own political identity. Whilst the general picture is indeed more 
complex when we move down to claims-making and union activities to assert 
workplace demands at the sectoral and regional levels, the starting point is to 
understand how political autonomy (and dependency) developed over time 
in the petroleum sector. The evolution of state-labour relations is, in fact, 
underpinned by the changing continuities of political alliances between 
petroleum workers, central unions, and left parties. In the following sections, 
I analyse the transformation of labour with respect to the institutional 
changes taking place in the oil industry. 
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8.2.1 Claiming labour autonomy prior to democratisation 
 
 
The stratification of the labour movement in Brazil is associated with the 
relative capacity of economic sectors to contribute to development. The 
workers in urban areas, specifically in banking, metallurgical, and petroleum, 
had played quite a central role in national politics as a result of labour 
leaders’ demands to increase the share of benefits for the workers in the 
process of industrialisation. Equally, the unions in key regional states have 
been part of political struggles for workplace demands, and to a limited 
extent, social citizenship rights. For example, the national confederations of 
workers in the metal-mining industry of São Paulo state radically articulated 
a discourse of democracy and worker autonomy, which fed into broader 
processes of transforming labour as a crucial political actor in national 
decision-making (Keck 1992; Matos 2009). The campaign to nationalise oil, 
O Petróleo é Nosso (Petroleum is Ours), between 1947 and 1953 was crucial 
in establishing unions in the refining sector. Their formation coincided with 
the expansion of oil operations in Brazil. Labour activism was born in the 
municipality of Lobato in Bahia, where oil was first discovered by General 
Barbosa.150 In 1957 four years after the creation of PETROBRAS, the first 
union was founded in Bahia, called Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na 
Indústria de Extração de Petróleo (Union of Workers in the Petroleum 
Extraction Industry or STIEP). Labour activism was crucial in putting 
pressure for the transfer of private refineries to PETROBRAS. In Capuava, 
petroleum workers of Refinaria de Petróleo União SA held a 15-day strike in 
October 1963; they sought for equality in rights and benefits among workers 
in PETROBRAS and private refineries. As such they wanted private refining 
factories to be absorbed by the state. This was achieved in 1974 when 
Refinaria União and COPAM were integrated in the PETROBRAS system 
(FUP 2010). This was a period of imminent crisis in the political system, 
                                                   
 
150 The Bahianos formed the first union of petroleum workers, which was called Associação 
Profissional de Trabalhadores na Indústria de Petróleo (Professional Association of 
Workers in the Petroleum Industry). 
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mainly as a result of the incapacity of the state to handle growing social 
tensions and excesses of populism under Vargas and his successors. In this 
context, social peace and rigid control over labour activism were priorities of 
the military government (especially General Castello Branco who was 
PETROBRAS President himself) and the managers in PETROBRAS. Under 
Vargas’ Labour Code, union representation was obligatory and therefore 
Departamento Nacional dos Petroleiros e Petroquímicos (DNPP) was 
established in 1977. 151  On one hand, the creation of PETROBRAS and 
imposition of state monopoly ended labour exploitation in the private 
spheres, which also meant that the system of hiring and firing, personnel 
benefits, and advancement of human capital were all managed through the 
public enterprise system. The PETROBRAS system was clearly the more 
desirable option for workers, given the nationalist inclination of unions. On 
the other hand, the relationship between the military government and 
workers was far from harmonious. At the heart of its labour policy was the 
goal of pacifying, if not ensuring absolute control, over the workforce. In this 
context, workers were determined to break free from the ‘old unionism’ 
created by the state and sought the formation of a genuine labour movement 
that was representative of workers’ interests. They perceived ‘new unionism’ 
as expressions of democratic rights of workers rather than the extension of 
the arms of the state in the public realm.  
 
We cannot separate democratisation in Brazil with the concomitant rise of 
highly centralised unions with multiple political identities. In the struggle to 
form a new labour movement, competition between state-sponsored and 
independent unions was very difficult. This was marked by the historic strike 
in July 1983 in direct defiance to the national security law of the military 
government. Workers in the refining factories of Paulínia, São Paulo and 
Mataripe, Bahia joined the other classes of workers in the ABC region in 
                                                   
 
151  DNPP was one of the sectoral unions affiliated with Confederação Nacional dos 
Trabalhadores da Indústria (CNTI), which was largely controlled by the military 
government. It should be noted that Vargas’ labour system was never changed 
significantly in either the democratic governments (1946-1963) or bureaucratic 
authoritarian regime (1964-1985). 
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protest against General João Batista Figuieredo and the unravelling of the 
statist developmentalist model.152 The military invaded the refineries and 
interceded in union activities, which led to the dismissal of 153 workers in 
Paulínia and 205 in Mataripe (FUP 2010). The affiliated union of petroleum 
workers to CUT, Sindicato Petroleiros (Sindipetro-Campinas), was totally 
destroyed by the military government, during which their leaders like Jacó 
Bittar and Antônio Carlos Spris were targeted by the state along with the 
leaders in metallurgical sector (Lula da Silva and Jair Meneguelli) and 
banking (Luís Gushiken and Olívio Dutra). Opposition unions from various 
working classes formed Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) in August 
1983, defending the concept of new unionism on the basis of its autonomy, 
grassroots collective action, and internal democratic structures. At the same 
time, petroleum workers underwent a process of renovation that brought 
forth the eventual defeat of the old union leadership. Lula da Silva was one of 
the founding fathers of CUT, which was increasingly defining itself in contra-
supposition to the old labour movement. As such, demands for the return of 
civilian democracy – Já Direita campaign seeking for direct elections of 
presidents – coincided with the internal restructuring of the labour 
movement. As Eva Dagnino (2005) puts it, social struggles in Brazil in 
reclaiming democratic rights came together with reorganisation of politics in 
adherence towards a broader notion of political and cultural autonomy. 
Workers’ endeavours for independence reflect the basic contestation of 
governance models which were conceived by the state and imposed on 
society.  
 
In strategic resource sectors, the turn towards neoliberal democracy 
presented two challenges for new unionism. Firstly, there was broad 
                                                   
 
152 For extensive discussions on the contemporary history of Brazilian labour movement, 
especially the formation of CUT and PT, see Drake 1996; Keck 1992; Ramalho 2007. For 
an updated discussion regarding the changing relationship between PT and labour 
movement, see Riethof 2004. For a broad view regarding the transformation of PT as a 
political actor from opposition to government, see Hunter 2010, 2008, 2007. For a 
general discussion of the sociology of labour and how we can understand different 
moments of thinking about Brazilian labour relations and industrialisation, see Santana 
& Braga 2009. 
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resistance against the acceptance of market opening reforms; unions were 
successful, at least at the beginning, in embedding labour protection clauses 
in the 1988 Constitution (Cook 2007). Nevertheless the emergent 
institutional forms and systems of (flexibilised) labour regulation after the 
transition effectively narrowed the spaces for contestation. In fact, labour 
unions found themselves defending the same mechanisms used by the state 
to control labour – namely imposto sindical and obligatory regional 
representation of unions – as a way of shielding workers from the deleterious 
effects of neoliberalism towards the capacities for labour mobilisation 
(Ramalho 2007). Secondly, the labour movement faced internal restructuring 
that slowly replaced the old union leadership. In 1987 petroleiros in 
Campinas, Paraná, and Minas Gerais affiliated themselves with CUT and 
formed Departamento Nacional dos Petroleiros da CUT (DNP-CUT). The 
recognition of CUT as a unifying political actor that placed labour back in 
national political arenas was fundamental in ending the legitimacy of old 
labour leaders who responded by creating a new labour organisation, called 
Federação Nacional dos Petroleiros (FENAPE). In 1988 in the national 
assembly, DNP-CUT refused to recognise FENAPE as the national 
representative of workers in mobilisation and collective negotiations. The 
question of who genuinely represents the workers is really an open one, 
especially because in reality no union was capable of unifying all the workers 
across the country. During deadlocks, and this was a period of instability and 
restructuring within PETROBRAS, the company held parallel negotiations 
with FENAPE and regional collective bargaining agreements were reached 
with their leaders. In a final push to dilute the power of FENAPE, the 
opposition petroleum workers created in June 1993 the Federação Única 
Cutistas dos Petroleiros (FCUP) during the Second National Congress of the 
Workers of PETROBRAS System. Antônio Carlos Spis was appointed leader 
by 11 formally affiliated unions. In the following year, 1994, the Third 
National Congress ended the existence of FENAPE and established 
Federação Única dos Petroleiros (FUP). PETROBRAS recognised the 
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legitimacy of FUP as the legal representative of petroleum unions in 
collective bargaining agreements.153 This process led to the establishment of a 
single national entity with a strong cutista identity, 154  which is able to 
command workers across the Brazilian petroleum industry. This effectively 
consolidates the fragmented labour movement in upstream, midstream and 
downstream activities across the public and private realms. The federation 
currently represents 150,000 workers, retirees and pensioners across 
companies in the oil industry. And in line with its long history of worker 
radicalism, FUP asserts its position against the history of old bureaucratic 
authoritarian model and in favour of a new developmentalist state capable of 
asserting sovereignty from international financial institutions and defending 
the nationalisation of petroleum.155 It is, by far, the most successful labour 
organisation to have consolidated a legitimate voice among workers in the 
PETROBRAS system and in the private sector. To summarise briefly, the 
nadir of authoritarianism then coincided with the new structure of a more 
independent labour movement. As path dependency literature suggests, class 
politics was profoundly influenced by state corporatism, especially if one 
accounts for the extensive reach and scope of state control over the formation 
of the new labour movement. For example, the structure of the movement 
itself was a product of state incorporation, in which workers are organised 
according to sectors and regions and are then grouped into federations and 
then confederations depending on the sector. In the petroleum industry, 
workers form unions –SINDIPETRO – with strong presence in oil-producing 
municipalities and regions (Rio de Janeiro, Norte Fluminense, Santa 
Catarina, etc). The unions in E&P sector are then connected to workers in the 
petrochemicals and refining sectors through federations of petroleum 
workers, most notably FUP, who are then connected to the   central unions 
                                                   
 
153 These are called Federação no Acordo Coletivo de Trabalho.    
154 Cutista refers to an entity associated with the national confederation of workers, CUT. 
155 The discussion below is based on documents and discussions from FUP and Sindipetro. 
See http://www.fup.org.br/historia.php. 
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like CUT and Força Sindical.156 Quite clearly, the historical struggles shared 
by CUT and FUP were fundamental in shaping emerging political alliances 
between leftist parties and labour unions during the high tide of neoliberal 
reforms in the oil industry. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
8.2.2 Labour as opposition during neoliberal restructuring 
 
What I have discussed thus far is the consolidation of political alliances 
between labour-based parties and centralised unions prior to and 
immediately after the democratic transition. As Chapter 7 showed, oil 
governance reforms were not as far reaching and as entrenched as in mining 
and steel sectors, and certainly incomparable to Chile when it comes to the 
valorisation of private sector and attempts at eliciting labour acquiescence 
(see Chapter 6 on labour in Chile). However, we cannot explain the outcomes 
of neoliberal reforms simply as constitutive of elite calculations or as 
exclusively deliberate strategies of the political classes to control labour. An 
alternative explanation rests on unions’ views that market opening reforms 
had deleterious effects to working class politics. We can trace the changing 
continuities of state-labour relations by looking at phases of neoliberal 
reforms in Brazil. Political time is as important as the structural factors and 
ideational motivations to explain how far neoliberalism has been embedded 
in national political economies. In other words, market reforms were 
contested, and subsequently modified, in response to political mobilisation. 
This brings us back to the Coxian argument (1999, 1981) that the hegemony 
of neoliberalism is in fact checked by the limitations set by societal actors by 
way of not giving consent to the logic of free market. 
 
                                                   
 
156 In the petroleum industry, however, unions have affiliated themselves with FUP and CUT, 
which means that workers in the petroleum sector are most likely associated with CUT 
(and PT) and less with other competing unions. The existence of competing unions for 
legitimacy and representation is not uncommon in Latin America, most notably in 
Argentina, which is exemplar of the combined effects of fragmentation of the labour 
movement and elite strategy of dividing unions to achieve political (and labour) 
acquiescence in neoliberal reforms (Levitsky 2003a, 2003b; Levitsky & Murillo 2005; 
Murillo 2001).   
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It is reasonable to conceptualise oil governance and labour reforms into two 
stages. In the first phase, which I refer to as the early stages of neoliberalism, 
new unionism was clearly enfranchised as a result of the strength of labour 
mobilisation under José Sarney (1985-1989) and Collor de Melo (1990-1992). 
Whilst CUT and PT were able to secure labour protection clauses in the 1988 
Constitution (Cook 2007) – a clear achievement for union organising, Collor 
de Melo sought to win labour support to acquire legitimacy for his short-lived 
anti-oligarchy discourse.157 However, the labour movement did not extend 
support to Collor de Melo, who ran for presidency as the ‘conservative right’ 
in the political spectrum, certainly when compared to trade unionist Lula da 
Silva and veteran populist Lionel Brizola in 1989 (Panizza 2000). In fact, the 
fate of unions under Collor de Melo rested not so much on the lack of a 
political desire to achieve labour flexibility as on the failure of his economic 
strategy, Plan Collor, to achieve macroeconomic stability. He was 
unsuccessful in curbing inflation, ending stagnation, and stabilise the 
economy more generally. Without any solid political base and institutional 
roots, his credibility to govern unravelled as soon as a corruption scandal 
erupted and civil society activism gained its own momentum.  
 
In the second phase, complex reforms were introduced in Brazil after the 
success of 1994 Real Plan, which gained political support as reflected in the 
electoral victory of Fernando Cardoso. His strategy was a combination of 
inflation targeting, trade liberalisation and privatisation of essential services 
(including state enterprises). As literature on reforms suggests (Haggard & 
Kaufman 1995; Kingstone 1999; Schneider 2004b), there are winners and 
losers in restructuring national economies. Labour unions perceived 
themselves as the main losers as a result of heightened fears of job insecurity, 
expansion of the informal sector, and the weakness of PT to defend work 
place demands. The state was also more willing to use coercion to put labour 
in its place, to which the 1995 oil workers’ strike was emblematic of such 
                                                   
 
157 Author interview with José Maria Rangel, General Coordinator, SINDIPETRO-NF, 29 
July 2010. 
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contentious relationship between a reformist government and a combative 
labour movement. 
 
By the end of 1994, there was no agreement in collective bargaining in the oil 
industry, which elicited two national strikes in September and November 
1995 chiefly to pressure PETROBRAS to replace the salaries lost by workers, 
which at that time was at 100 percent. The agreement with Itamar Franco, 
Ministry of Mines and Energy led by Delcídio Gomes, and PETROBRAS 
President Joel Rennó was a readjustment salary between 12 and 18 percent. 
Brazil was just coming out of a crisis and PETROBRAS had just sold off some 
of its assets, thereby, making these demands quite difficult to meet. The year 
after was a conjectural period for the consolidation of neoliberalism and the 
reversal of labour protection, which was underpinned by the electoral victory 
of Fernando Cardoso who saw himself as a reformist, vindicated publicly by 
his stabilisation plan. PETROBRAS managers, whose primary objective was 
to control wage increases at a time of austerity, had the political support from 
the state. Upon assuming presidency in January 1995, FUP launched a 
national strike together with other public sector workers in the electricity, 
telecommunications, postal and federal services sectors. The grand 
mobilisation took place on 03 May 1995, known today as the oil workers’ 
strike, during which PETROBRAS argued it did not have the autonomy to 
comply with the negotiations at the sectoral level (FUP 2011). The unified 
movement fought in defence of state monopoly in the oil and 
telecommunications industries, which brought back workers’ rights in public 
sectors at the centre of national politics. Beyond narrow demands of 
defending wages and working conditions of petroleum workers, the strike 
had in fact received expressions of solidarity from a broad range of actors. A 
symbolic march from the factories in the historic ABC region towards the 
refineries in São Paulo by PT President Lula da Silva and CUT President 
Vicente Paulo da Silva showed unconditional working class solidarity, during 
which Lula expressed his ‘lamentations for the insensitivity of the [Cardoso] 
government’ (O Estado de São Paulo 1995). At the grassroots level, nearly 
4,000 metalworkers in protest entered the factories of Schuller, Indebrás, 
Villares, Toyota, among others, for two and a half hours to make apparent 
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workers’ support for oil workers’ demands (Folha de São Paulo 1995a). The 
unity in the labour movement was indeed a public spectacle drawn together 
by the overarching principle of petismo, which refers to the ideological 
discourses of PT vis-à-vis the reformist government. Petismo seeks for more 
inclusive political alliances between labour parties, trade unions, and social 
movements as well as the defence of an activist role for the state in response 
to Cardoso’s economic restructuring.  
 
The response of PETROBRAS was to use intimidation, for example, by 
dismissing workers on strike on 11 May 1995, including FUP Coordinator 
Antônio Carlos Spis. The political conflict escalated to the point that Cardoso 
called for military troops in 24 May 1995 to occupy the refineries in Paraná, 
Paulínia, Mauá and São José dos Campos (Folha de São Paulo 1995b; FUP 
2011). The tensions aggravated as the government refused to back down and 
to admit it would negotiate with oil workers, and instead, he sought to 
establish an image of a reformist with a firm commitment to strike down any 
resistance on his rational policy agenda (Folha de São Paulo 1995c). The 
petroleum workers decided to return to work after 31 days of paralysing 
production in the refineries with very little achievement except for resuming 
collective negotiations with PETROBRAS. The government body responsible 
for labour affairs, Tribunal Superior do Trabalho (TST), had declared the 
strikes as abusive and troublesome, with potential fines amounting to R$ 
35.7 million, which was immediately challenged by Antônio Spis (Diário do 
Grande ABC 1995). According to FUP (2011), each of the twenty participating 
unions were fined R$ 2.1 million and a total of 70 workers were dismissed. 
Beyond the material and physical costs of strikes for workers, the incident 
reflects the broader uneven relationships between states, private actors, and 
organised labour in the pursuit of global competitiveness. Although the 
contestation of neoliberalism indicates a distinctive politics of resistance to 
neoliberal hegemony as articulated by workers, it also undoubtedly manifests 
difficulties in shifting the costs of reforms away from workers. This, as 
Chapter 4 details, is a historical dialectic that transpired in twentieth century 
Latin America between national elites’ top down ideas of national 
development and labour movements’ demands from below. 
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Nevertheless the contentious relationship between Cardoso and oil workers 
further radicalised as the debate to pass a new oil regulatory law in National 
Congress intensified. With the initial rejection of the bill in April 1996, 
Cardoso sought to weaken labour by attempting to repeal the amnesty law 
offered by parliamentarians to the oil workers who went on strike in May 
1995. Until the end of Cardoso’s government in 2002, the Law on Amnesty 
was debated and could only be approved upon the election of Lula da Silva in 
December 2003. The passage of the law partially closed the distance (and 
conflict) between the state and labour movement. Cardoso was unable to 
secure labour support for his privatisation programme, and the full-fledged 
privatisation of CSN and Vale by all means widened the gap between the state 
and workers. There were both legal battles regarding the sales of state 
enterprises and protest marches of workers and social movements against 
the neoliberal agenda. Whilst political mobilisation against neoliberalism was 
not as spectacular in scale and scope as in Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela 
(Grugel & Riggirrozzi 2012; Panizza 2009; Silva 2009), oil workers in Brazil 
together with Lula’s PT and CUT played a central role in challenging 
Cardoso’s reform project. More importantly, although the petroleiros have 
failed to prevent the break-up of state monopoly in oil, they were 
nevertheless successful in defending the state’s majority ownership of 
PETROBRAS.158 The stark difference between Cardoso and Lula in terms of 
their relationship with unions was expressed by SINDIPETRO Coordinator, 
José Maria Rangel: 
 
The Lula government… made the choice of strengthening the state 
and maintaining PETROBRAS as a state company… I can cite a few 
examples: from the construction of platforms in Brazil to generate 
employment for Brazilians; in the increase in drilling and 
exploration of new areas of discovery; in the strengthening of 
PETROBRAS; all of which did not take place under Fernando 
Henrique’s vision of a minimal state. PETROBRAS under Lula 
                                                   
 
158 Author interviews with Enrique, FUP August 2010; José Maria Rangel, SINDIPETRO-NF, 
August 2010. 
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continued to invest in the oil industry, which have been financed 
by public sector banks. So, in fact, there is this differentiation. 
 
Whilst this can be easily interpreted as mere ideological positioning of oil 
workers vis-à-vis the reformist Cardoso government, one should not forget 
that national elites elsewhere in the region have had varied relationships with 
the labour movement. In Chile, the state used tripartite negotiations, 
bonuses, and moderate wage increases as a way of silencing resistance of 
unions – most especially copper workers – against market opening (Nem 
Singh 2012; Schurman 2001; Vergara 2008). In Argentina, a reconfigured 
state-labour pact was forged between Menem and segments of professional 
working classes to acquire support for neoliberal reforms (Cook 2007; 
Murillo 2001). In other words, despite the ideological proximity between 
labour movements and leftist parties, this has not frequently stimulated 
political alliances between actors in their concrete social struggles. Hence, 
the strength of labour unions in contemporary Brazil, especially in strategic 
sectors, has been exceptional despite the long history of state-led 
corporatism. Its newly acquired political autonomy is effective thus far in 
challenging state paternalism as well as in grafting alliances with labour 
party and social movements (Dagnino 2005; Riethof 2004). Some even argue 
that Brazil’s labour movement (and its changing relationship with the state) 
can be compared to the democratisation experiences of South Africa and 
South Korea, wherein the labour movement has manoeuvred in a complex 
web of relationships as neoliberalism and developmentalism transform the 
state and the economy (Ramalho 2007).159 The articulation of petismo as a 
coherent organising logic of political action for labour unions and the Left is, 
in fact, less common across the region. Ideological affinities do not 
necessarily translate to strategic collective action. In the next section, I 
examine how the return of state capitalism under Lula da Silva and Dilma 
Rousseff reconfigures the relationship between the state and labour.  
 
                                                   
 
159 Author interview with José Ricardo Ramalho, Academic Consultant, UFRJ, August 2010. 
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8.2.3 The return of state capitalism: What about the oil workers? 
 
The electoral victory of Lula da Silva generated contradictory effects with 
regard to the nature of bargaining between the state and the public. On one 
hand, Lula moderated his political discourse, primarily as a result of coalition 
deals with conservative forces. His economic programme was one of 
continuity rather than change with the Cardoso government, which 
generated tensions within PT and between Lula and his social movement 
base (Amann & Baer 2009; Arteris & Saad Filho 2007; Hunter 2010, 
2008).160 This has been a major source of tensions between the government 
and unions. On the other hand, Lula’s victory closed the gap between the 
state and the labour movement, which was widened by the privatisation 
agenda and a strategy of confrontation under Cardoso. Lula embarked on a 
top-down approach of resolving conflicts, for example through a policy of 
wage increase, expansion of social and anti-poverty measures, and 
appointments of union leaders as part of his governing coalition – all of 
which contributed to his successful attempt to run for a second term (Burges 
2009; Hall 2009; Melo 2008). Under the first PT government, what is 
evident is the greater space for negotiations to exercise the full extent of 
workers’ freedom of associations (liberdade sindical). Trade unions sought to 
differentiate Lula and Cardoso by emphasising the former’s attempts at 
inclusive politics by extending spaces for deliberative democracy to 
previously marginalised social groups. Lula’s economic programme may have 
failed to remove the pathologies of neoliberalism but his political strategy 
was certainly successful in acquiring consent, if not political acquiescence, of 
trade unions. But even under Lula, state-labour relations remained 
contentious. Strikes are considered the final stages of negotiations, usually 
when differences in demands between the managers and unions are 
irreconcilable. There have been two strikes to date, one in 2008 for five days 
                                                   
 
160 As Chapter 7 demonstrated, however, there are some key areas that Lula departed from 
Cardoso. His second term was also a break away from Cardoso, characterised by renewed 
emphasis on national industrial development and a stronger role for public institutions in 
facilitating economic growth. 
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and in 2009 for another five days. But unlike in Chile where negotiations 
have revolved excessively on wage increases and bonuses as a way of ending 
conflicts, oil unions also sought for health and safety as well as security in the 
workplace.161 Nevertheless compared to Cardoso, barring contentious issues 
in collective bargaining, Lula gained more support for his oil reforms, which 
attempt to reinvigorate a national industrial programme with PETROBRAS 
and petroleum at the core of its strategy (see Morgan Stanley Research 2010; 
Resende 2009).  
 
Between 2007 and 2010, the public debate on Brazilian energy policy 
focussed on the merits of switching from the concessions grant model 
towards production-sharing arrangement in light of the recent discovery of 
pre-salt reserves. The passage of the law in Congress, to a large extent, was 
brought about by the strength of public support for Lula. Among those who 
mobilised in defence of a stronger state in petroleum governance are the oil 
workers in FUP. The unions are unconditionally in support of oil monopoly 
and an end to Cardoso’s concessions grant model. During the 1990s, 
opposition forces defended state enterprises and countered the privatisation 
agenda. As José Rangel points out, the fundamental difference between Lula 
and Cardoso is precisely their commitment to private participation in oil 
activities. Lula da Silva’s lack of political will to end the 1997 Petroleum Law 
was one of the root causes of tensions between his government and oil 
workers.162 The discovery of pre-salt reserves thus offered a key opportunity 
to revitalise a state-led development project, which was underpinned by an 
aggressive investment package starting 2007 through the Programa de 
                                                   
 
161 Author interviews with Enrique, FUP, August 2010; José Maria Rangel, SINDIPETRO-
NF, August 2010. The health and safety issue becomes more contentious at a time when 
oil spills and accidents have been taking place across the world, for example, the Gulf of 
Mexico and refinery accident in Thailand. In the interviews, union leaders are quite 
aware of these incidents and fear that a drop in working conditions could easily lead to an 
accident in Brazil. They mentioned a few times the bypassing of health and security 
standards just to maintain oil production at cost effective rates. In addition, labour 
conflicts outside of petroleum, for example the recent strike in the construction sector, 
affect PETROBRAS indirectly because unresolved tensions between the service provider 
and its workers can slow down oil operations (Carvalho 2012). 
162 Author interview with José Maria Rangel, SINDIPETRO-NF, August 2010. 
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Acceleração do Crescimento (PAC) (see discussion in Section 8.3). It is not 
very difficult to imagine why unions would support the estatização agenda of 
Lula da Silva.  
 
The second area upon which Lula and the workers agreed on was the creation 
of the national stabilisation fund, sovereign wealth funds, and the rational 
distribution of royalty taxes to generate social redistribution. At the local 
levels, oil rents have not necessarily produced growth in the oil-producing 
municipalities, which is a clear sign of the resource curse effects (Postali 
2009, 2002a). In this context, SINDIPETRO and FUP have supported the 
government proposal to separate the expenditure policy of oil rents, which 
will exponentially increase in the coming years, from other aspects of 
economic governance. The ideational diffusion of ‘best practices’ in revenue 
management should not come as a surprise because Brazilian policy makers 
and academics have closely studied the Norwegian model of natural resource 
governance (see for example Lima 2009a; Sias 2008). This is not to say that 
depoliticised neoliberal practices of good governance are being blindly 
adopted by unions and government agencies. A union leader’s observation on 
how royalties have been utilised in one of the key recipients of oil money 
justifies this point quite well: 
 
I have no doubt resources are misused… the Senate and other 
legislators… should think more carefully on the use of resources. It is 
absurd to say that oil is [only] for those who sit in the petroleum fields 
like Macaé. Small towns like this receive petroleum rents, but was there 
[genuine] development? There might have been, but there is certainly 
more wastage. They think petroleum is infinite... [and that] if my 
generation is enjoying this bounty, the rest can be damned. We [unions] 
think differently. The vote on the legislative project approving the 
stabilisation fund, the sovereign wealth fund, is the right step to correct 
this distortion. It is important… to start… a fair allocation of resources, 
then the government will be taking a significant step, not only for our 
generation, but also for future generations… I was in Norway in 2003 
and I was impressed on how they intended to use the proceeds from 
petroleum. They think in today, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, for 
all the generations. So, for me this would be the ideal model in which we 
should be trying to build in our country. But unfortunately our leaders do 
not think this way… When the changes on the Petroleum Law were being 
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discussed, they were more concerned with discussing the royalties than 
our own country's sovereignty.163  
 
This quote is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the literature 
generally assumes that oil workers make unreasonable demands. There is 
also repudiation for the lack of ‘technical understanding’ among workers 
regarding the complex financial, operational, and economic factors that are 
being considered in investment decisions. Not only do workers understand 
the pitfalls of rent-seeking, they likewise argue that a rational use of natural 
resources is the only sustainable way of achieving social development. As 
Chapter 5 and 6 show, this is not necessarily the case for the Chilean mining 
workers who argue strongly in favour of redistribution to counter the 
neoliberal policies of Concertación government. Secondly, resource 
management is not legitimised because states or global governance 
institutions simply promote them. Instead, high powered economic theories 
are articulated in policy fields but they are ultimately adapted in specific local 
contexts (Weszkalnys 2011). The logic of neoliberalism, applied here as good 
governance, oftentimes appears as common sense, and therefore, it draws 
legitimacy from the apparent rationality of such action for actors. This 
demonstrates the fuzzy boundaries between neoliberalism and post-
neoliberalism in the real world. For example, unions logically support Lula’s 
national social fund not only because of the potential to link oil wealth and 
social development (a neo-developmentalist component), but also because it 
has provisions that can prevent rent-seeking and excessive spending sprees 
of politicians (a neoliberal component). 
 
To sum up briefly, I have shown the position of oil workers in the major 
national debates in Brazil during the break up of state monopoly under 
Cardoso, and subsequently, their support for the reconstitution of the 
developmentalist state under Lula. In the final section, I will further discuss 
how PETROBRAS’ corporate strategy and the management of labour 
                                                   
 
163 Author interview with José Maria Rangel, SINDIPETRO-NF, August 2010. 
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demands have gradually established a new pathway of growth for Brazil 
based on neo-developmentalism. 
 
8.3 PETROBRAS and Brazil’s national development strategy 
 
Lula’s new oil regulatory framework, which was backed by the trade unions, 
is part of a broader strategy of the state towards re-industrialisation. This 
coheres around the idea of an activist state capable of guiding strategically 
national industrial development (Bresser-Perreira 2009, 2006, 2004). As 
mentioned beforehand, Lula sought to take advantage of PETROBRAS’ 
technological advantage by facilitating the expansion of the oil industry 
through the pre-salt reserves. However, it can only happen if the state can 
inject substantial amounts of investment to generate economic dynamism. 
This materialised in 2007 when the Federal Government aggressively 
earmarked funding for infrastructure projects, with the long term view of 
creating jobs through Keynesian style public spending. An initial US$ 349 
billion (2007-2010) was invested followed by PAC 2 with an estimated 
spending of US$ 526 billion between 2011 and 2014 (SECOM 2010). Public 
expenditure rose from 0.5 percent of the GDP in 1990s towards 5 percent of 
the GDP between 2007 and 2010 (Resende 2009: 32). Investment under PAC 
was divided into three categories: (a) logistical infrastructure, which includes 
the construction and expansion of highways, railways, ports, airports and 
waterways; (b) energy infrastructure, which includes generation and 
transmission of electricity, as well as the production, exploration and 
shipping of petroleum, natural gas and renewable fuels; and (c) social and 
urban infrastructure, which covers sanitation, housing, subways and urban 
trains (Pardelli 2010: 54-57). Besides infrastructure investments, the 
program includes other measures, such as tax breaks and incentives 
(particularly for construction and for technological development), regulatory 
changes, special transactions with BNDES, new regulation on small and 
medium-sized enterprises, minimum wages increases, and the creation of a 
new R$ 5 billion Infrastructure Fund — using part of workers’ compulsory 
savings (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço or FGTS). The 
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government viewed the infrastructure package as the most effective way to 
allocate resources in facilitating new investment, which would subsequently 
focus on increasing productivity and competitiveness. The series of policies 
were aimed at enhancing the global competitiveness environment of Brazil by 
way of decreasing regulatory risks, improving the framework for private 
participation in infrastructure, and developing risk mitigation mechanisms 
(Resende 2009: 32).  
 
The PAC 1 and PAC 2 initiatives are either public, private, or public-private 
partnerships. The energy infrastructure projects are concentrated in oil and 
gas, to which the direct beneficiary is PETROBRAS. For example, 
PETROBRAS has about 127 projects under the PAC initiative, wherein 16 
projects were concluded, 35 projects are in operation, and 17 in green field 
projects. Its investment via PAC in 2009 and 2010 amounted to US$ 56 
billion and after 2010 it was at a record high of US$ 343 billion (Alonso 
2009: 15). As part of the expansion of the petroleum industry, as Table 8.5 
shows, infrastructure projects in the oil and gas commodity chain have been 
geared towards exploration mainly in the pre-salt layers. In some ways, these 
investments prove the argument that the Brazilian state works in conduit 
with domestic enterprises to promote (indeed accelerate) growth through a 
national development plan. PAC was quite successful in terms of increasing 
investment share of infrastructure in percentage of GDP from 16.4 percent in 
2006 jumping up to 18.4 percent in 2010.  Through state investment, Brazil 
has created 8.9 million formal jobs between January 2007 and June 2011, 
which was a record on its own and quite a feat taking into account the 2008 
economic crisis (see PAC website). 
 
Table 8.5 PETROBRAS participation in PAC initiative 
Sector Investments in US$ 
Exploration and Production 242.2 
Refineries, ethanol pipelines & 
ships 
54.8 
Gas infrastructure & gas power 
plants 
7.0 
  
Source: Alonso 2009 (Adapted), 19. 
Notes: 
(1) From second semester 2010 onwards; 
(2) US$ 1 = R$ 2; 
(3) Includes equipment and services.  
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With the oil and gas sector now constituting as high as 15 percent of the GDP 
and a solid industrial base, Brazil is certainly using the oil industry to 
promote national development strategy. One key component of this approach 
to growth is the use of national champions, such as PETROBRAS, in devising 
investments and expanding strategic sectors of the economy. In terms of 
investment, the state is using its financial institutions, i.e. BNDES, together 
with central agencies to mobilise the oil industry. This is exemplified very 
clearly in the Brazilian Oil & Gas National Industry Mobilization Program 
(PROMINP), whereas private and public operators in the oil sector (i.e. IBP 
and PETROBRAS) are invited in policy spaces to graft a more coherent 
industrial policy. Returning to the argument in Chapter 7, the role of the state 
is quite fundamental in the success of this strategy. In order for PETROBRAS 
to take a leading public role in the oil industry, however, the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy must take a steering role especially since PETROBRAS is 
still accountable to its private shareholders.  
 
8.4 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have shown the complexity of corporate governance and 
labour reforms undertaken by PETROBRAS and the state more generally. 
Consistent with historical institutionalist and political economy perspectives, 
I have argued that neoliberalism has had a substantially different outcome in 
Brazil. Whilst the reforms introduced competitiveness pressures for 
PETROBRAS, the state enterprise was then already quite efficient. In 
addition, the history of state corporatism did not necessarily weaken the 
power of oil workers to resist market reforms. Labour conflicts, as I have 
shown in Section 8.2, are managed through varying degrees of political 
intervention, such as the adoption of corporatist tools. Finally, the neo-
developmental state has indeed emerged in Brazil, and this is characterised 
by an aggressive investment policy aimed at expanding the oil industry in 
light of the pre-salt reserves. However, this was only possible because of (a) 
the strength of PETROBRAS as a commercially viable company and (b) the 
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existence of an autonomous labour movement capable of negotiating with an 
activist state. Although the return of state capitalism is not free of tensions, 
and indeed contradictions exist, it is certainly the case that neoliberalism has 
neither weakened state enterprises nor depoliticised labour unions. 
 
Combined with Chapter 7, I hope to have shown the following: (a) that 
Brazilian oil governance exhibits strong continuities with the country’s long 
history of state management; (b) that the corporate governance reforms in 
PETROBRAS have conformed to the ‘best practices’ among international oil 
companies and these were developed autonomously from the state; and (c) 
that labour conflicts have remained prevalent in post-dictatorial Brazil 
although this has evolved quite significantly as a result of differing 
governance styles between Cardoso and Lula. In the final chapter, I bring 
together the case studies on Brazil and Chile and the sector-specific dynamics 
in mining and oil industries to discuss their theoretical relevance to debates 
on political economy of (neoliberal) reforms, national development 
strategies, and state-society relations. 
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Chapter 9  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this thesis, I explore the ways in which states use their strategic resource 
sectors in achieving economic development. This, inevitably, must take into 
account the process of economic liberalisation and global market integration, 
which have conditioned global and national policy agendas in the extractive 
industries. The challenges for national elites are two-folds. Firstly, there 
appears to be a negative view regarding the contribution of natural resources 
to economic development. Terry Karl’s (1997) seminal work shows how oil 
wealth can lead to a protracted process of state-building and economic 
underdevelopment. Secondly, it is undoubtedly the case that all mining 
reforms in the last three decades have aimed at opening previously state-
controlled sectors for private capital participation. As the findings of the 
thesis suggest, natural resource management requires the state to become a 
central actor in grafting strategies of natural resource exploitation. And 
whilst neoliberalism was applied across countries and sectors, the unique 
characteristics of copper and oil – and extractive industries more generally – 
invariably shape the outcomes of these reforms. This, inevitably, has 
implications for how scholars view economic convergence towards 
neoliberalism, in particular in the context of middle income resource-rich 
countries. 
 
The task of this chapter is to bring together the comparative dimensions of 
economic restructuring in Brazil and Chile and to reflect on how national 
political elites wield political agency in designing reforms that produce 
economic growth in the resource sector. An important yet often 
unacknowledged aspect of resource-based development is the tension 
between economic liberalisation and persistence of state control in strategic 
sectors. My argument is that Brazil and Chile developed hybrid strategies of 
neo-developmentalism that cohere around a stronger role of states in 
managing natural resources for economic growth. But rather than showing 
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two identical cases or mirror images of state intervention in extractive 
industries, the cases illustrate quite vividly the differing pathways of 
designing economic reforms that blend market incentives and state 
regulation in the sectors. As argued throughout the thesis, what accounts for 
these differences are political legacies, sector-specific characteristics, and the 
exercise of (state) agency in negotiating reforms. In order to show this 
argument, I apply a framework that combines historical institutionalist (HI) 
and critical political economy perspectives. HI emphasises the role of state 
structures, historical contingency, and political conflicts as explanatory 
variables. But the analysis of institutions, ideas, and actors’ interests cannot 
be divorced from a political economy approach that probes into the 
international-domestic dynamics, the deployment of hegemonic ideas of 
neoliberalism and global competitiveness, and the sector-specific features of 
national economies. The approach offers a formidable complex account of 
how national development strategies based on resource exploitation can 
achieve sectoral competitiveness, and subsequently, economic development.  
 
Empirically, I demonstrate this argument by examining two distinctive 
pathways of neo-developmentalism in Brazil and Chile. In both cases, states 
have embraced private participation as the new driver of growth and 
competitiveness in extractive industries. State enterprises were reorganised 
to accommodate private firms. Labour unions were targeted through reforms 
aimed at increasing labour flexibility. Nevertheless, state ownership persists 
and state enterprises retain their dominant role in the sectors.  What is 
evident is the overwhelming state control in the oil and copper sectors 
despite the wave of reforms to legitimate private capital access to natural 
resources. To explore this general pattern of state-managed resource 
extraction in a neoliberal economic order, the chapter is structured in three 
sections. In Section 9.1, I explore the comparative dimensions of Brazil and 
Chile as well as oil and copper industries. I situate the cases into broader 
context of Latin American political economy. Secondly, at a more theoretical 
level, Section 9.2 demonstrates the need to combine historical 
institutionalism and critical political economy perspectives to answer the key 
questions of the PhD thesis. Finally, in Section 9.3, I offer some ways to move 
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the debate forward with respect to neoliberalism/post-neoliberalism and the 
relationship between natural resources and economic development.  
 
9.1 Comparative dimensions of the research 
 
My thesis aims to analyse the role of states in natural resource management. 
The central thread is therefore about how states apply economic reforms that 
respond to challenges of resource dependency and economic 
competitiveness. The policies that enhance economic growth in the resource 
sector are not separate to attempts at opening the sector for private 
competition. At face value, natural resource exploitation in the last three 
decades has followed neoliberalism as a policy paradigm. Indeed, market 
opening policies in Brazil and Chile have increased the access of private firms 
to natural resources by way of giving them exploration rights and 
restructuring state enterprises to accommodate new actors in the sector. 
However, as the following sections will show, neoliberal reforms did not 
achieve the goals set by the reformist governments. Instead, what we have 
today is a complex mix of state and market incentives to organise the sector 
into a competitive industry. I show this argument by highlighting 
comparatively three specific dimensions of neoliberal reforms in Brazil and 
Chile: regulatory frameworks, state enterprise restructuring, and labour 
relations in extractive sectors. I return to the core questions in the 
introduction and then answer them by way of exploring the similarities and 
differences of the case studies, and then probe into the contribution of the 
thesis to the literature. 
 
9.1.1 The politics of reforming the state 
 
To what extent have market-opening reforms in strategic resource sectors 
empowered the private sector in Brazil and Chile? 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that national elites in power between 1990s and 
2000s were successful in introducing private capital participation in the 
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economy. Mining reforms seeking private investment were conceived as the 
only way to recuperate the competitiveness of resource extractive sectors in 
Brazil and Chile. These reforms were implemented through gradual changes 
in the institutional framework, for example, in adopting the concessionary 
grant model that rewards firms taking risks in mineral extraction. Governing 
elites envisaged the reforms as the answer to the crisis of overproduction and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies of state-led development. The underlying 
justification was the assumption that private sector is productive and public 
enterprises are wasteful and highly politicised. In both cases, market reforms 
were attempted to introduce competition between state enterprises and 
private capital, usually foreign firms, in order to transfer technology, break 
up state monopolies, and shift the responsibility of developing the resource 
sector from public towards private authority. Most importantly, and in direct 
contrast to state intervention, economic restructuring was envisioned as 
depoliticised, technocratic and fairly insulated from rent-seeking groups. 
Neoliberalism was thus conceived as the ideology that would respond to what 
was then a crisis of development paradigm in the 1980s. It was, above all, 
perceived by its critics as an imposition from above – those working in the 
financial institutions based in Washington –that gave very little manoeuvres 
for national elites to autonomously design their own recipe of economic 
governance. 
 
However, the anticipated shift from the state to the private sector in the 
governance model was not as smoothly implemented as the reformists had 
initially desired. Firstly, timing, sequencing and the pace of reforms differed 
between the cases. These factors determine how far the reforms could be 
implemented. Neoliberalism was adopted as early as 1974 in Chile and as late 
as 1997 in Brazil. They were also adapted to fit into distinctive national 
contexts. Chile was the first country in Latin America, perhaps in the world, 
to embrace neoliberal mining reforms in 1974. The military government saw 
the reforms as a social reengineering project to radically break from its 
socialist past. The decision of the Concertación government to keep in place 
the economic rules of the military dictatorship was critical in so far as it 
locked in future political choices of the governing left-centre parties. The 
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longevity of neoliberal experimentation means that neoliberal ideas have 
been institutionally embedded in policy-making. Whilst initially the elites 
perceived the necessity to maintain the institutional framework to retain 
political stability, its longer term impact was to narrow the policy spaces for 
an alternative discourse and reduce the policy choices available in managing 
the copper industry and the economy writ large. At best, there was sporadic 
resistance from unions to contest some aspects of neoliberal mining 
management but ultimately the critiques were hollow in so far as pushing for 
a different paradigm of development. In contrast, neoliberal reforms were 
rendered incomplete, partial, and contested (if not negotiated) in Brazil 
(Almeida 1996; Monteiro 1998; Pinheiro et. al. 2004). The economic crisis in 
1982 opened up a space for the civilian government in 1985 to begin the sales 
of state enterprises and the arduous process of market-opening. However, it 
was not until 1995 when the Cardoso government fully privatised mining 
giant CVRD that a new law on petroleum would be narrowly passed in 
National Congress. These reforms ended state monopoly in the oil sector but 
Cardoso has neither succeeded in changing the ownership structure of 
PETROBRAS nor in substantively giving space for market competitors to 
challenge the dominance of the state enterprise. Requirements on national 
contents and use of domestic suppliers were also introduced at the same time 
as market-opening reforms were instituted. This policy, which is still 
applicable until today, is an effective constraint for private firms in cases they 
find domestic supply more expensive than elsewhere. Hence, neoliberalism 
was not only applied by national elites themselves rather than by the World 
Bank and IMF,164 but the examples of Brazil and Chile reflect a far more 
endogenous process of institutional adaptation, in which general principles 
of neoliberal economics were articulated but the specific applications across 
countries and sectors varied in considerable ways.  
                                                   
 
164 An important point here is made by Judith Teichman (2001) when she argues that policy 
networks consisting of international and national technocrats and funding agencies were 
key in engineering the reform project. This is true as far as the post-1980s reforms in 
Chile are concerned. However, the far-reaching reforms in the copper sector were issued 
in 1974 and 1983, which means that the military government stepped in to reform the 
copper sector without the support of the epistemic community. 
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More specifically, the depth and scope of neoliberalism in the oil and mineral 
sectors of Brazil and Chile co-vary depending on the interactions between the 
policy ideas of reformist governments and the political legacies of the 
military dictatorships. In Brazil, the long gestation of state monopoly in the 
oil industry and the persistent pressures of securing domestic energy needs 
for industrialisation – both of which go further back during the formative 
years of the Brazilian modern state Estado Novo – have rendered neoliberal 
reforms very difficult to implement in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, whilst 
Brazil has succeeded in welcoming private firms in oil exploration and 
development, the fact is that PETROBRAS remains the dominant actor in the 
oil industry. As Chapter 8 demonstrates, the state enterprise maintains its 
position as the major player in domestic refining and distribution sectors. In 
the upstream sector, PETROBRAS emerged as the winner after ten round of 
bidding for the resale of oil blocs in Brazil. Crucially, between 1997 and 2010, 
private firms have not challenged PETROBRAS. Instead, they have worked 
with the company through joint ventures and partnership agreements in 
exploring, developing and producing oil reserves. Upon the discovery of the 
pre-salt, the idea of a new developmentalist state floated within the PT 
government and was subsequently pushed in the oil industry (see Chapter 7). 
Furthermore, Brazil has gone farther than most extractive-based economies 
by directly linking social and anti-poverty policies with oil wealth as well as 
by renegotiating the terms of state-foreign capital relations through the 
adoption of the production-sharing arrangement in the pre-salt reservoir. 
This was only possible because of the relative efficiency of PETROBRAS as a 
globally competitive state enterprise. Some scholars have described Brazilian 
politics as one of changing continuities rather than dramatic breaks from the 
past, in which reforms are considerably negotiated rather than imposed by 
the executive (Almeida 1996; Nunes 1997). This is so far accurate if one looks 
at the oil industry and the evolution of regulatory frameworks. 
 
In comparison, Chile’s Concertación government had difficulty in fully 
challenging the economic rules inherited from the military dictatorship. 
Pinochet’s neoliberalism was a genuine critical juncture in so far as heralding 
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private capital as the new engine of growth. Politically, he was also able to 
secure the military and right parties with veto powers to prevent future 
changes in legislation. Pinochet created ‘organic laws’ requiring 2/3 majority 
votes in Congress for any change, which until today is still an arduous task 
given the retention of Pinochet’s electoral system (González 2008). The 
double bind created by the political transition in 1989 was therefore 
sufficiently powerful to compel the centre-left coalition to design reforms 
gradually. The coalition proved their credibility to govern Chile by 
ameliorating the costs of neoliberalism through expansive social policies 
without challenging the core elements of the model of growth. In the mining 
sector, the two important laws under Pinochet remains intact – 1974 DL 600 
(Foreign Investment Law) and 1983 Mining Code – and the economic 
reforms since 2000s are considerably minor compared to that of Brazil. 
Chapter 5 shows the changes in the economic policy under the left-led 
Concertación governments, specifically the passage of new royalty taxes in 
2006 and the re-regulation of labour standards through the Subcontracting 
Law in 2007. 
 
Secondly, sector-specific features of extractive industries have rendered 
neoliberal reforms incomplete, partial and fragmented. One metric of the 
reform outcome can be derived from the emergent relationship between 
states and foreign capital after the restructuring period. Presumably, 
resource sector reforms valorise the importance of foreign investment as the 
new source of economic dynamism. The assumption, then, is that either the 
state enterprise has been unsuccessful or insufficient in maintaining the 
competitiveness of resource sectors. Although articulated in both cases, 
political elites have applied the idea of foreign participation quite differently 
in the oil and copper industries. Both devised a discourse of legitimation for 
private capital in their resource sectors. But beyond political legacies, sector-
specific characteristics have influenced the decision-making processes in 
Brazil and Chile. In mining, transnational firms mainly North American and 
European companies have been dominant in the market, thereby, according 
little developmental space for national mining companies to emerge in the 
developing world. There appear to be very few countries with relatively 
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successful national state enterprises and therefore mining-based 
development would have been more reliant on foreign capital for economic 
dynamism (Nem Singh & Bourgouin Forthcoming; Lawrence Forthcoming). 
However, petroleum was generally considered as too strategic to be left in the 
hands of foreign oil companies. Unlike minerals, oil offers a pathway of 
growth through national industrial development. Fluctuations in oil prices 
also affect countries with oil endowments and those which import oil for 
consumption. In a high carbon economy, resource-seeking and resource-rich 
states have reasons to secure access over hydrocarbons. From the perspective 
of oil-rich countries, experimentation in favour of endogenous exploitation of 
oil reserves was attractive, which was achieved through the nationalisation of 
oil and the formation of oil cartel (OPEC). In short, oil was conceived as a 
weapon to rebalance the relations of power between the developed and 
developing countries (Parra 2004). In this context, Brazil sought to protect 
the oil industry from foreign interference even at a time when they could not 
find oil in its vast territory (Smith 1976). In the advent of the new discovery 
in 2007, it seems natural for the Brazilian state to reclaim ownership of oil 
resources, thereby, paving the way for the introduction of new legislation in 
2010. Hence, the sector-specific characteristics of strategic resources matter 
in terms of how national elites formulate policies to accommodate foreign 
interests. 
 
In many ways, Brazil and Chile have succeeded in attracting private capital in 
the oil and copper sectors. These middle-income, late capitalist states have 
sought to manage the challenge of economic liberalisation in strategic 
industries by adapting the discourses of neoliberalism and selectively 
applying some elements of the growth model. Both states have dealt with the 
‘foreign dependency’ question in varying methods of accommodation. In 
Brazil, it remains contested to allow transnational firms to operate freely, and 
the crucial evidence here is the new petroleum law in 2010. Chile, in contrast, 
has actively sought foreign investment to generate national income in the 
  344 
copper sector.165 These are two distinctive ways of adapting to the global 
political economy, which is today characterised by aggressive mergers and 
acquisitions and dominance of multinational enterprises (Goldstein 2007). 
Nevertheless, the contradiction of roles between the state as regulator of the 
market and as direct participant in the economy has not dissipated. 
 
To conclude, we can observe a shift in terms of the regulatory and 
entrepreneurial role of states from state intervention towards a more hybrid 
developmental role, in which the promotion of private initiatives meld with 
the continuing presence of state enterprises. Consequently, states and foreign 
capital are reconfiguring their relationships as global market integration in 
resource sectors becomes inevitable. However, this does not follow the 
convergence hypothesis of leading towards the demise of state control and 
valorisation of private capital. Whilst the thesis accepts the premise that a 
neoliberal recipe for resource governance was conceived, it suggests, 
crucially, that the application of the recipe, across countries and sectors was 
far from uniform. In order to understand the contestation and application of 
neoliberalism, we must give more agency to states and state actors in 
development processes and, specifically, in the transformation of resource 
wealth into productive capital. 
 
9.1.2 Restructuring state enterprises 
 
To what extent have state enterprises achieved political autonomy from the 
state and what does this imply for resource management? 
 
The significance of this thesis stems from the existence of relatively 
successful state enterprises, which have provided some degree of policy 
latitude for states to exercise control in strategic resource sectors. For post-
                                                   
 
165 In a rather convincing fashion, Concertación government argued that it can maintain its 
contradictory roles unproblematically, that is, the state can retain CODELCO whilst also 
maintain its credibility and impartiality as regulators of the market. 
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colonial resource-rich states, a viable pathway in transforming resource 
wealth into productive capital is through the direct exploitation of natural 
resources through the establishment of state enterprises as an alternative to 
foreign capital-led growth model. Broadly speaking, state companies play 
three important functions for their national economies. Firstly, SOEs act on 
behalf of public interests by delivering revenues to the state treasury or 
securing energy needs of the country. The profitability of state companies is 
vital for growth as we have seen in Brazil and Chile. CODELCO is the biggest 
copper producer in the world and owns the richest deposits of copper 
alongside significant technological breakthroughs in seeking alternative ways 
of utilising copper cathodes. Since the 2002 export boom, CODELCO 
contributed as high as 20 percent of Chile’s total fiscal revenue. Between 
2004 and 2009, its contribution was above 15 percent peaking at 22 percent 
in 2006 (US$ 8,334 million out of US$ 37,830 million) (COCHILCO Annual 
Report 2010). Conversely, price fluctuations in copper have historically 
influenced export earnings, balance of payments, and macroeconomic 
stability. The commercial viability of CODELCO has always been a political 
issue for the Chilean state. Equally, the flux in oil prices had historically 
affected input prices for industrial production in Brazil. PETROBRAS was 
given political autonomy from the federal government to pursue whatever 
commercial strategy was necessary to achieve the country’s energy security 
goals. When Brazil has finally achieved self-sufficiency in 2006, PETROBRAS 
has become more important than ever. Its role in transforming hydrocarbons 
as the new key export was further underlined upon the discovery of pre-salt 
reserves. PETROBRAS is undoubtedly one of the best state enterprises in 
recent history. The firm is currently the third largest energy company in the 
world, and its vertical integration of operations allows the company to extend 
its scope and reach across all phases of the hydrocarbons commodity chain. 
Globally, its presence is increasingly visible in Latin America, Gulf of Mexico, 
and West Africa. 
 
Secondly, both state enterprises have played an indispensable role in national 
development by consolidating export-driven economic growth. Unlike 
Venezuela and Bolivia, Brazil’s oil industry was established to support 
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national industrialisation through the expansion of the petrochemicals 
industry as well as the development of the refining and distribution sectors 
(Além & Giambiagi 2010; Randall 1993). Although Chile is dependent on a 
single commodity, its country-specific knowledge and technical applications 
in the resource extractive sector effectively expanded what appears to be a 
‘fixed’ resource endowment in the country (Barbier 2011). In other words, 
Brazil and Chile are part of the few countries endowed with natural resources 
which have averted resource dependency and succeeded in creating 
competitive resource markets.  
 
In the case of Chile, copper mining has been managed through a combination 
of market incentives and public ownership of minerals. CODELCO’s 
performance, as shown in Chapter 6, is fairly comparable to that of private 
mining companies. In respect of export diversification, the mining industry 
has begun to produce other metal minerals, such as iron, molybdenum, and 
gold alongside recent initiatives to create national innovation in the 1990s 
(COCHILCO 2010; see Chapter 5). And although mining does not create the 
forward and backward linkages within mining regions to address resource 
dependency, the sheer volume of production makes the industry very 
important for regional economic development (Aroca 2001, 2000). 
Nevertheless, as Figure 9.1 shows, copper clearly remains the most dominant 
export at 89.5 percent of Chile’s total mineral exports. Whilst there have been 
attempts at expanding the base of natural resource exports in Chile towards 
mining, export agriculture, and forestry in the 1990s, the commodity boom 
fuelled by Chinese demands for metal minerals have locked in the Chilean 
economy to copper as its primary export. This exemplifies the weakness of 
the national economy in terms of its capacity to produce other tradable goods 
apart from copper (Barton 2009a, 2009b). However, we cannot discount the 
fact that copper contributed enormously to national income and resource 
dependency has not deterred growth prospects. Considering the economic 
size of Chile and the firm’s technological advancements in refining copper, it 
is largely successful not only in bringing streams of revenues but also in 
securing research and innovation to expand its range of economic activities. 
Its sheer access to high quality ores and increasing flexibility to acquire 
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capital for financing new mining projects make CODELCO an important 
player in the global copper industry. 
 
Figure 9.1 Share of Chilean mineral exports, 2010 
 
 Source: Central Bank, available in COCHILCO website. 
 
To compare, PETROBRAS was a key player in supplying domestic fuel and 
energy to productive sectors, such as transport, manufacturing, and 
industrial sectors. Consequently, the national company was called upon by 
the military government in the 1970s to respond to the second oil shock. 
Since Brazil had insufficient oil reserves onshore, PETROBRAS was forced to 
invest in technological know-how to seek potential oil reserves in ultra deep 
waters. This eventually became PETROBRAS’ niche in the global oil 
market.166 Global economic uncertainty caused by the oil crises resulted to an 
aggressive investment strategy and expansive overseas operations that led to 
the development of PETROBRAS’ culture of innovation. During the 1990s, 
privatisation was the dominant prescription across Latin America. Whilst 
under the military government developmentalism was conceived as the 
economic strategy for national industrial development, the balance between 
states and markets were being radically altered in favour of the latter. The 
consensus around PETROBRAS as a leading player was therefore questioned. 
                                                   
 
166 Currently, its commercial strategy focuses on applying deep sea drilling technology to 
geographical areas with similar features as that of Brazil, for example in West Africa and 
Gulf of Mexico. 
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PETROBRAS had to undergo a restructuring process that exposed the firm to 
competition with foreign and domestic private capital. After years of market 
opening, PETROBRAS emerged as the dominant player once again, thereby, 
proving its capacity to compete with private firms. Subsequently, the national 
government under PT reinforced financial and political support to 
PETROBRAS through for example, capitalisation of the company and the 
exclusive rights to explore and develop the pre-salt reserves in 2010. Just like 
other national oil companies, PETROBRAS is once again favoured by the 
Brazilian state to tap its natural resources for the country. 
 
Finally, an important metric for the relevance of these state enterprises is the 
political aspect. They are salient in terms of their historical roles as bastions 
of national ambitions of development. Consequently, the internal 
management of SOEs is consequential for national politics. With a mix of 
commercial and non-commercial goals, state enterprises have subject to 
recurring patterns of state intervention. Crucially, some contemporary 
managerial decisions have received substantial criticisms from the public. 
For example, labour relations and subcontracting in Chile have been decided 
not by CODELCO alone but also through public interventions in Congress 
and in the media. Although PETROBRAS was shielded from government 
interference, Chapter 8 details how labour opposition to reforms had 
unintended consequences of derailing technocratically conceived solutions to 
pressures of global competitiveness. Collective bargaining agreements – a 
point source of industrial conflicts – have been politicised by mining unions 
by pushing the issues into national political arenas. Collective mobilisation 
has therefore challenged the technocratic solutions offered by state managers 
in resolving contentious management issues.  
 
However, we should not isolate the politics of state enterprise restructuring 
as an outcome of neoliberalism. State companies, by nature, are always 
subject to political intervention. Markets and politics are intricately woven, 
which cannot be separated from corporate governance. Let us take 
PETROBRAS – the company with marked autonomy from the state – as an 
example. Ostensibly, the management of state enterprises in Brazil became 
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part of the national government’s macroeconomic policy in the 1970s. The 
expenditure of SOEs had produced balance of payment problems and public 
deficits. In 1979, the Federal Government created the Secretary for the 
Control of Public Enterprises (SEST) directly under the command of the 
Presidency’s Planning Secretary. Its main role was to define global 
expenditure budgets of state owned corporations, which at that time was 
expanding overseas through trading companies and via direct investments 
(Almeida 1996). The end result of this process was the reorganisation of the 
PETROBRAS system by partially selling some of its non-performing assets 
and integrating other subsidiaries to reduce bureaucratic bottlenecks 
(Randall 1993). During the 1990s and 2000s, PETROBRAS has become 
further isolated from the state because the nature of state control over the 
company has been altered. As an outcome of privatisation, the Brazilian state 
began to exert political influence to the state enterprises like Embraer, 
PETROBRAS, and Vale through the national development bank BNDES 
(Além & Giambiagi 2010). The role of the state thus shifted from directly 
producing commodities to financier of capital. Nevertheless, after the 
restructuring, the state remains an important veto player in key decision-
making within the company, and consequently, affects the strategic 
industries more generally. 
 
The general point here is that the success of competitiveness strategies is 
driven primarily by the extent state enterprises can exercise political 
autonomy from the state. The main impact of neoliberalism is to expose more 
thoroughly CODELCO and PETROBRAS to competition with private 
(foreign) capital, which was facilitated by the economic reforms aimed at 
market opening of extractive industries. In response, corporate governance 
reforms were also implemented to accommodate the changes in the external 
environment. For example, changes in the decision-making processes, 
appointments in the board of directors, and flexibility in labour practices 
have all been altered to compete at par with multinational firms. 
Nevertheless, their capital ownership structure – inherited from the military 
dictatorships – has been left unchanged although the reasons for doing so are 
nationally contextualised. In Brazil, PETROBRAS was already 49 percent 
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owned by private shareholders and thus had commercial goals even prior to 
economic reforms. With the political resistance to fully privatise the oil 
industry under Cardoso, it has become even more difficult to hand ownership 
of the company to private capitalists under Lula da Silva. Upon the election 
of the Left, PETROBRAS has been strengthened through a complex system of 
direct and indirect support to the oil industry. In Chile, however, reforms to 
extend the assets of CODELCO to private investors were almost impossible to 
‘sell to the public’. No politician across the political spectrum campaigned 
publicly to privatise CODELCO, and this includes current Right President 
Sebastian Piñera. The reason, as historical institutionalism argues, is the 
contentious nature of political settlement between the state and the public. 
With the extensive market reforms in Chile, the only vestige of nationalism is 
CODELCO and resistance persisted all throughout the military dictatorship 
and democratic governments to alter its corporate governance arrangement. 
Hence, in both cases, the state has remained an important veto player in the 
restructuring process of the state enterprises regardless of the political 
orientation of the government in power. This argument challenges the view 
that neoliberalism is a monolithic logic of organising state-market relations 
in Latin America, wherein the withdrawal of the state led to the dominance of 
private firms in the economy.  
 
Based on the discussion above, one consequential observation is the state of 
political autonomy of SOEs from the state. This is also not a uniform process. 
On the one hand, in PETROBRAS, it was fairly easy for the state managers to 
argue for its commercial independence from the state because of its 
accountability to private shareholders. On the other hand, a fierce battle 
persisted between Concertación reformists who want to see CODELCO as 
politically independent from the state and those who believe the state 
enterprise should remain under the direct control of the state. We thus have 
a paradox here. Brazil would have exhibited a case of excessive state 
intervention in the corporate affairs of public enterprises as a result of its 
long tradition of developmentalism whilst Chile is the neoliberal poster child 
in which public companies are exposed to metrics of private sector efficiency 
(and hence less state control). In reality, CODELCO has been subject to 
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various forms of state control and public intervention, including in making 
investment decisions and regulating third party subcontracting, making the 
company less autonomous from the state. PETROBRAS, on the other hand, 
has been less politicised and has utilised the power of technocratic state 
managers to argue for its independence vis-à-vis the government. As Chapter 
8 detailed, this was achieved through a culture of innovation and an 
internationalisation strategy that provided leverage for PETROBRAS to 
operate overseas. Evidently, competitiveness pressures do not necessarily 
lead to economic convergence. States and state enterprises in late capitalism 
formulate different strategies depending on specific national contexts and 
available resources to respond to their external economic environment. 
 
9.1.3 Managing labour demands 
 
What has been the role of labour unions in shaping labour relations in 
extractive industries in the context of global market integration? 
 
The triangular social relations between states, markets, and labour unions 
signify that organised workers also play a role in the reconfiguration of power 
in strategic sectors. Indeed, labour has played a general role of questioning, if 
not challenging outright, the neoliberal orientation of the governance model. 
They have politicised debates on resource ownership and the role of the state. 
Unions likewise substantiated claims on the uniqueness of oil and copper for 
national development, which also makes apparent the role of resource sector 
unions in challenging neoliberalism. Crucially, workers in the sectors have 
technocratic knowledge to contest labour practices that institutionalise 
labour flexibility. In Chapters 6 and 8, I have demonstrated the positions of 
petroleum and mining workers towards a variety of national issues. For 
example, subcontracting has been a unifying theme for Chilean copper 
workers in rejecting collective agreements offered by public and private 
mining companies. Both permanent and subcontracted workers in the copper 
industry have been affected by this business practice, their decision to strike 
in CODELCO and Minera Escondida – the two biggest copper producers – 
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has implications to future attempts in securing labour peace in the mines. 
Equally, a new social contract is emerging between FUP, SINDIPETRO and 
CUT on the one hand and the Brazilian state under PT government on the 
other hand. Whilst under Cardoso state-labour relations were conflictual and 
managed through the coercive power of the state, the PT and specifically Lula 
were able to resolve antecedent tensions. Lula resorted to corporatist tactics, 
which only became possible due to his role in the union leadership. The 
unions backed up most of the plans to reinvigorate the strength of 
PETROBRAS as a state enterprise. However, they also sought for a 
technocratic response to the question of oil rents by supporting the law that 
will deposit oil profits as sovereignty wealth funds (SWFs).  
 
A general pattern between the two cases is the labour opposition to neoliberal 
reforms. We can infer two reasons for this. Firstly, a core consequence of the 
reforms in resource sectors is the adoption of globalised models of business 
management, in which subcontracting and the specialisation of capital-
intensive operations dictate labour practices in Brazil and Chile. Labour 
unions, whose role is to offer protection to workers and increase their 
bargaining power through collective action, are threatened by neoliberal 
reforms. Workers have naturally come to support a model of resource 
management where the public sector is more dominant than private 
production. Put somewhat differently, public companies tend to maintain 
greater accountability to the state and the workers – and can be pressured to 
wield to political intervention – than their private counterparts. Secondly, 
goals of improved competitiveness and labour protection are not easily 
achievable simultaneously. CODELCO has suffered in finding the balance 
between these goals. Successive public pressures have compelled CODELCO 
to absorb subcontracted workers as a result of the excessive unregulated 
practice of third party outsourcing. In PETROBRAS, a more balanced system 
has emerged between workers and the company. A generous system of wage 
and benefits is allocated to permanent workers, which has expanded quite 
recently as a result of the successful competitive strategy of the company. 
Hiring and firing in the company follows the public sector rules, which 
means that the company is indirectly contributing to public employment.  
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What are the sources of union power to resist neoliberal policies? Again HI 
and political economy insights are useful here. The means of interest 
aggregation in the Southern Cone has been expressed in terms of class 
politics (Fonseca 1999; Matos 2009; Moulian 2009; Salazar & Pinto 1999). 
Generally, the political classes sought labour incorporation to produce 
mechanisms of social control. The labour movement, particularly in enclave 
economies, has developed autonomous political identities that challenge 
some conservative traditions and were left relatively coherent as a result of 
the strong bonds formed in mining communities (Bergquist 1986; Collier & 
Collier 2002). But it is the strategic position of enclave economies that also 
strengthens the relative power of labour unions vis-à-vis the government and 
big business. Any disruption in the work place generates very high costs for 
production. In Chile, this was so costly that economic crises have been 
punctuated by mass demonstrations by mining workers in the past. In Brazil, 
the strong hand of the state has made it difficult to reform but petroleum 
workers enjoy some privileges that other workers in less productive state 
enterprises do not get. In this context, their resistance to neoliberal reforms 
during 1990s and 2000s are deemed politically salient. Labour relations 
invariably affect the production in resource-dependent economies, although 
at varying degrees and extent. 
 
Ostensibly, the unions have been the weakest in the tripartite relationship 
between the state, state enterprise and workers. In the copper industry where 
private production is more common than public ownership of extraction, 
capital-labour relations is more contentious, in which episodes of contentious 
mobilisation sparked broader resistance among the different classes of 
workers. Because PETROBRAS is the dominant actor in the oil industry, 
industrial relations are derived from PETROBRAS-FUP relations. Unlike in 
Chile where the task of the movement is to recuperate collective rights and 
greater bargaining power in negotiations, in Brazil the unions must assert 
their political autonomy from the state and extend the privileges of the oil 
workers to other sectors. Most importantly, the workers in the oil and copper 
industries are the main actors who pushed for the repoliticisation of resource 
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governance. This is characterised by more contentious political actions of 
organised workers in defence of greater state involvement in strategic 
industries. This, of course, occurs in the context of high commodity prices 
and therefore greater bargaining power for unions to make their demands 
appeal for public acquiescence. Although labour movements across Latin 
America are in decline (Haarstad 2009a, 2009b; Oxhorn 1998), it is more 
difficult for political elites to ignore the social clamour for a ‘return of the 
state’ in the post-Washington Consensus context. If we place resource sector 
union demands in the regional context, then evidently labour unions have 
been one of the strongest backers of the post-neoliberal agenda. In 
circumstances where they have bargaining power, for example in strategic 
industries in Brazil and Chile, the contestation of exports-led growth is 
principally led by unions. 
 
9.2 Theoretical implications of the findings 
 
My thesis has several theoretical implications for the study of natural 
resources and economic growth in late capitalism. Firstly, my research has 
implications for debates on neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism in the 
context of growing resource dependency in Latin America. The political 
economy literature has documented extensively the principal causes of the 
rise of the ‘New Left’ since 1998 (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012, 2009; Levitsky & 
Roberts 2011; Panizza 2009; Petras & Veltmeyer 2012). Whilst the empirical 
detail is exceptional, the literature has remained atheoretical in drawing the 
broader significance of the new politics of Leftist governments to the political 
economy of development. My theoretical engagement with this literature is 
through a focussed comparison on the source of renewed economic growth in 
the region: the commodity boom and the emergent form of resource 
dependency. Recent studies looking at the linkages between export oriented 
strategies and national income argue that there is no stark difference 
between neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism especially when it comes to 
macro-economic policies aimed at resource extraction (Bebbington & 
Humphreys-Bebbington 2011; Kaup 2010). What is evident is the clash 
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between resource nationalist imaginaries embedded in contentious social 
movements and the realities of long-term extractive economies (Bebbington 
et. al. 2008; Kohl & Farthing 2012). For them, there is nothing ‘post’ in 
extractive industries governance.  
 
As I showed in my thesis, historical institutionalism and critical political 
economy offer some advantages in analysing the export bonanza and its 
implications for the political economy of development in Latin America. 
From HI perspective, I draw upon the significance of gradual and 
incremental routes of institutional change from neoliberal to post-neoliberal 
political economy models as a way of explaining the transformative capacities 
of states in managing resources. Unlike other research assuming 
neoliberalism and neo-developmentalism as binary opposites, my thesis 
shows that they are phases of capitalist modernisation within a continuum. 
Policy innovations are applied by national elites through simultaneous 
adaptation of market incentives and state regulation to manage the natural 
resource sectors. Crucially, the explanation why radical change away from 
neoliberalism is so difficult stems from policy legacies, historical conflicts 
and political uncertainty. I advance a more nuanced approach to the political 
economy of natural resource governance. We cannot understand economic 
transformations without tracing continuities and changes in resource 
management. In turn, HI perspectives analyse states not as a ‘black box’ but 
as constitutive of various agents who contest the rules and norms to redefine 
a new paradigm of economic growth. 
 
From critical political economy perspectives, domestic institutional 
arrangements are situated within the global economy. Tellingly, Chinese 
economic growth has locked the region back into primary commodity 
production through its strategy of seeking natural resources via foreign 
investment and bilateral negotiations (Gallagher & Porzecanski 2010; 
Jenkins 2012, 2011; Jenkins & Dussel Peters 2009; Moran 2010). However, 
Latin American states have responded quite differently to the commodity 
boom. Brazil and Chile have implemented reforms prior to the commodity 
boom, most exemplary in taxation and social spending, to take advantage of 
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the export boom. But their distinctive approaches to a global economy 
dominated by Chinese capital are shaped by the capacity of states to exalt 
policy autonomy. As a result of copper dependency, Chile has fully welcomed 
Chinese investment in the copper mines through bilateral agreements with 
China that sold copper at an invariable price rate in the next fifteen years 
(Barton 2009a; Jenkins 2012). Brazil, on the other hand, made access to 
newly discovered oil reserves even more difficult by giving preference to 
PETROBRAS as the primary service contractor in the pre-salt reservoir. Of 
course, a different case can be said if we examine manufacturing or 
agriculture in Brazil (e.g. Jenkins & Dussel Peters 2009). A sectoral analysis 
sheds light to the complexity of relationships between states and private 
capital. 
 
In effect, HI and critical IPE can offer new answers regarding the question of 
what is ‘post’ in post-neoliberalism. For example, on the question of the 
relative commitment of the Left governments to social redistribution, 
comparative analysis of Brazil and Chile demonstrates the distinctive ways of 
implementing change in taxation policies and linking resource wealth to 
social development.167 An emerging literature on the need to link resource 
wealth and social development more thoroughly have shown that political 
leadership and state agency are critical elements in realising a redistributive 
agenda in policy-making (Hinojosa et. al. 2010; Hujo & McClanahan 2009; 
Rosser 2009). A second area in the debate on ‘post-neoliberalism’ is the 
extent to which resource dependency can be averted whilst still exploiting 
natural resources for development. In both cases, resource abundance is 
                                                   
 
167 In the debate on royalty taxes, the law was passed in Chile by arguing that the state must 
impose special taxes in the mining sector because of the degree of resource dependency of 
the country to copper. A substantial amount of these new taxes is earmarked for 
innovation and development that could finance public-private initiatives. This is patently 
a growth-centred argument and makes latent any redistributive component. Instead, 
social policies are financed indirectly through general budget allocation. In contrast, the 
new petroleum law in Brazil clearly stipulates the direct use of natural resource rents in 
research and innovation as well as social and anti-poverty policies. As a counter cyclical 
measure, the law has created a national social fund that would be managed by a 
specialised committee in charge of the investments of SWFs and pensions. 
 357 
economically neutral and policy innovations on resource management can 
lead to stable growth over time. 
 
Secondly, my thesis speaks to debates on neoliberal convergence (Bell 2005; 
Taylor 2010) and the so-called varieties of capitalism debate (Bruff & Horn 
2010; Ebenau 2010; Schmidt 2009). 168  The analysis of oil and copper 
industries clearly support claims regarding the incomplete, fragmented and 
contested nature of neoliberal reforms in Latin America. The strategic 
importance of extractive sectors both in historical and contemporary periods 
means that market opening reforms have neither dismantled state 
enterprises nor depoliticised resource governance. Through a detailed 
analysis of how reforms have been contested and how the role of the state has 
been reconstituted, the thesis has shown the fallacy of neoliberal convergence 
across countries and sectors.169 In this context, the commodity boom has 
fuelled public sentiments to repoliticise mineral governance and implement 
new policies to capture greater rents on behalf of public interest. These 
reforms which diverge from neoliberal doctrines affirm the national 
importance of point resources as well as the ability of states or social groups 
to mobilise popular support in favour of public ownership of resources. 
  
This contribution is further bolstered by the discussion on state enterprise 
restructuring in oil and copper industries. The resource curse literature has 
thus far not engaged with the actual and practical operations of state 
enterprises in resource sectors and treats relatively successful cases of 
                                                   
 
168  Some have extended the VoC framework and argued that Latin America posits a 
hierarchical market economy (HME) model, where the relations between firms and other 
actors are primarily based on orders and directives from those with more economic 
power whilst market relations and coordination are less influential mechanisms 
(Sánchez-Ancochea 2009; Soskice & Schneider 2009). 
169  In Brazil, scholars have preferred to characterise economic reforms as changing 
continuities of a developmentalist state with national industrialisation as its core strategy 
(Bielchowsky 1988; Nunes 1997). In contrast, Taylor (2010) describes neoliberalism in 
Chile as one marked by power asymmetries and persistent conflicts between states, 
organised businesses and labour unions. My thesis confirms the accuracy of this 
description if one closely examines the contradictions in the management of the copper 
industry. The state serves as the regulator (and provider of public goods for the market) 
as well as an entrepreneur via the state enterprise. 
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resource-based development as exceptional (e.g. Malaysia, Chile, and South 
Africa). The closest literature probing into the role of state enterprises 
examines multinational capital in the context of emerging markets 
(Gameltoft et. al. 2010; Goldstein 2007; Ramamurti & Singh 2009). My 
thesis complements this literature by analysing the politics of devising 
competitive strategies for state enterprises, including reforms aimed at 
corporate governance and the internationalisation of operations. Brazil and 
Chile are exemplary of ‘politicised capitalism’, wherein economic power of 
state enterprises are derived from a combination of SOEs’ concentration of 
market share, control over high grade deposits of minerals, and alliances 
between states and state enterprises. This, inevitably, implies the need to link 
more systematically the role of emerging powers and multinational capital in 
our explanations of policy reforms and corporate restructuring in the context 
of global market integration.  
 
Finally, my research offers a political perspective on resource dependency 
and substantiates claims regarding institutional quality and policy failures. 
In environmental economics, chronic underdevelopment of many resource-
rich developing countries has been explained through the resource curse 
hypothesis, open access exploitation hypothesis, and factor endowment 
hypothesis (Barbier 2011: 555-560).170 They reflect the arguments separately 
made by Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer in the 1950s, which conclude that 
the terms of trade of developing countries’ primary-product exports relative 
to imports of manufacturing were falling (Prebisch 1959, 1949; Singer 1950). 
                                                   
 
170 Barbier (2011: 558) offers a summary here: “The resource curse thesis posits that 
commodity price booms do not lead to the investment of resource rents in more dynamic 
sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing, and instead directs investment and factor 
inputs towards the resource sector. The Dutch disease also affects the competitiveness of 
other products – agriculture and manufacturing – through exchange rate effects of the 
price boom. The open access exploitation hypothesis suggests that not only does 
extraction under open access conditions generate no resource rents to be reinvested but it 
also leads to over exploitation of natural capital in the long run. Finally, the factor 
endowment hypothesis maintains that unfavourable environmental conditions may 
directly inhibit the efficient generation of natural resource rents and returns from 
reinvesting these rents into other productive assets, as well as indirectly through a long-
lasting influence on patterns of political and legal institutional development.” For other 
references, see Auty 1993, 2001; Barbier 2003, 2005; Easterly & Levine 2003. 
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This literature implicitly suggests poor development performance as 
indirectly related to institutional factors. Douglass North (1994) goes further 
by arguing how economic development is institutionally determined. 
Similarly, recent studies have concurred that the resource curse 
phenomenon, including the Dutch disease and other economic impacts, does 
not adequately explain the complexity of economic development and 
underdevelopment (Auty 2001; Di John 2009; Karl 1997; Rosser 2007). 
Instead, we need to look at political economy factors, including the 
persistence of policy and institutional failures that lead to myopic decision-
making and fail to control rent-seeking behaviour by resource users. 
Consequently, the emphasis of factor endowment hypothesis on poorly 
defined property rights as the cause of negative growth is an important 
starting point but does not go beyond describing in static form how 
institutions evolve to respond to the challenges associated with natural 
resource exploitation. 
 
My thesis complements these economic analyses in two ways. Firstly, I have 
shown how resource endowments may shape political choices in institutional 
design, for example the decision of open access to foreign capital or the 
establishment of state enterprises in natural resource exploitation. Secondly, 
I have demonstrated that institutions in equal measure affect the types of 
regime in natural resource exploitation (rent-seeking, taxation, labour 
practices, and so on). But rather than treating institutions as a constraining 
factor that sets the rules of the game (as rational choice institutionalism 
does), a comparative historical approach explains how state capacity is 
accumulated and how policy innovations occur. Brazil and Chile are excellent 
examples of how different political choices of institutional configuration 
(persistent state ownership in resource sectors) have been shaped by 
markedly divergent political legacies, contingency of history, and varying 
positions in the international system. In other words, political conflicts and 
historical legacies are determinants of emergent institutional arrangements 
in natural resource exploitation. This leads me to the third point: resource 
endowment and institutional choices reinforce each other to affect the long 
run performance of resource-based economies (resource curse). Evidently, 
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policy innovations occur when institutional properties deemed permeable to 
change are transformed to address resource dependency and economic 
liberalisation. My work thus engage with the body of research that attempts 
to link more systematically resource dependency and macro-processes of 
institution-building, state capacity, and democratisation (Hertog 2010a, 
2010b; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010; Slater 2010; Smith 2007, 2004). Even 
in Venezuela where some claim the resource curse is at play (Karl 1997), 
economic breakdown in the early 1990s cannot be attributed to the structural 
constraints of the oil economy but the misalignment between economic 
liberalisation and political reforms (Di John 2009). Equally, a more robust 
explanation is needed if we want to understand the success of resource-based 
growth in Brazil and Chile within the context of economic liberalisation.  
 
9.3 Moving the debate forward 
 
The thesis has benefited from the analysis of states and natural resource 
management. However, there are three key areas which will be useful for 
future research. Firstly, we need to systematically analyse the relationship 
between policies aimed at economic liberalisation and resource exploitation 
within a comparative historical framework. States with resource endowments 
face a distinctive set of challenges in transforming natural resource wealth 
into productive capital. They acquire institutional properties that constrain 
the development of effective state capacity to manage the cyclical flows of 
national income (Humphreys et. al. 2007; Karl 1997; Ross 2001a, 2001b, 
2012). However, the process of building state capacity does not have a finite 
point in time but is rather punctuated by critical moments of decisive 
intervention. We need a more thorough understanding of how political and 
institutional factors, which are temporally contextualised, affect economic 
decisions regarding natural resource exploitation. Future research can draw 
from the large body of comparative historical research on large processes that 
problematise the image of a coherent state emerging from the European 
experience of state-building (Migdal 2001, 2009; Skocpol 1979; Slater 2010; 
Smith 2007; Tilly 1984). It accounts for the importance of taxation in 
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economic growth but also argues that state capacity is historically 
accumulated that cannot be divorced with questions of political time and 
historical conflicts. 
 
Secondly, we need to examine the different ways states deal with the realities 
of long-term extractive economies. As the literature on social movements 
demonstrates, extractive resources are now the new spaces of intense social 
and political conflicts (Bebbington 2012; Bebbington et. al. 2008; Haarstad 
2012). Interestingly, countries which have averted becoming rentier states 
have implemented complex systems of managing surplus profits of extractive 
resources, for example through the creation of sovereignty wealth funds 
(SWFs) to channel rents into productive investments (Afonso & Gobetti 
2008; Bagattini 2011). Brazil follows a path of social learning in which its 
revenue management policies are increasingly patterned after successful oil 
exporters (Lima 2009c; Sias 2008). We must go beyond pessimistic accounts 
of the ‘resource curse’ thesis, and integrate the key insights from 
environmental economics on resource dependency, to better explain the 
intersection of policies aimed at market opening and resource exploitation. 
These reforms are distinctive but certainly inseparable. The major challenge 
of growth for resource-rich states is how to find the appropriate balance 
between states and markets to transform resource wealth into productive 
wealth.  
 
Finally, we must integrate more thoroughly insights from critical political 
economy, which problematise broader configurations of power in the 
international system. Economic reforms are ideationally diffused through 
policy transfers and linkages between international and domestic actors. A 
more complete account of the new political economy of development among 
resource-rich states should recognise the invariably crucial role of 
globalisation, market integration, and the rise of emerging powers in the 
analysis of policies ranging from trade, development, resource extraction, 
and even governance issues. But as we analyse the growing complexity of the 
world, we must not forget that power is unevenly distributed, and that 
hegemony is in fact contested rather than coherent. Neoliberalism does not 
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have the same intellectual credibility, and certainly the current global 
financial crisis challenges the coherence of this political project. But the 
starting point in thinking about post-neoliberalism and post-Washington 
Consensus political economy is to recognise the diverse applications of 
neoliberalism. Consequently, we can find a variety of post-neoliberal projects 
in Latin America, and perhaps in the wider developing world, in which free 
market orthodoxy was challenged and reconfigured to fit into various 
national contexts. 
 
9.4 Conclusions 
 
How important are states (and state enterprises) in the management of 
strategic resources? I have analysed this question through the dual lenses of 
historical institutionalism and critical political economy perspectives. Its 
departing point is that development policies towards natural resources in 
Latin America have been shaped by neoliberalism. At face value, economic 
restructuring appears to be a critical juncture in the region, and in particular 
reference to resource-rich states, its adoption involved the opening of 
previously state-controlled extractive industries, corporate restructuring of 
state enterprises, and flexibilisation of labour relations. This constituted an 
apparently radical break away from state-led development. However, as the 
cases of Brazil and Chile show, neoliberalism was not a hegemonic paradigm 
that inevitably resulted to convergence towards open markets and weakened 
state enterprises. Far from the predictions of convergence hypothesis, sector-
specific characteristics as well as historical legacies have mediated the design, 
implementation, and outcomes of neoliberal reforms in Brazil and Chile.  
 
My argument has implications for debates on institutional theory and on 
post-neoliberalism in Latin America. The contemporary export boom in 
South America is, in fact, underlined by the extensive and intensive 
exploitation of natural resources. Indeed, the commodity boom is permitting 
national elites in the region to reconstitute the bargain between the state and 
the public. Resource management is therefore at the heart of the debate on 
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post-neoliberalism. I hope to have moved beyond stark dichotomies between 
neoliberal and post-neoliberal political economies by way of analysing 
continuities and changes in resource management in Brazil and Chile. I have 
shown that economic reforms in the strategic sectors of copper and oil are 
phases of capitalist modernisation underpinned by a renegotiated pact 
between states, markets and organised labour. Whilst economic imperatives 
have produced a general pattern of market-opening in extractive industries, 
neoliberalism was mediated by various institutional and political economy 
variables. Distinctive national governance styles, strength of party politics, 
and the relative capacity of unions to express resistance have all influenced 
state-market relations in the post-neoliberal era. The fundamental question 
that remains unanswered is whether neo-developmentalist policies aimed at 
intensifying the role of the state in the economy as well as grafting a new 
politics based on inclusive growth will be sustainable in the long run. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 List of Interviewees 
Fieldwork in Chile 
Name Institutional Affiliation Interview Date Place of Interview 
Ricardo Ffrench Davis Department of Economics, University of 
Chile 
August 18, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Juan Salvidia GS3 Consultores August 25, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
José Piga Independent researcher September 01, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Dante Pesce Director, Vincular September 10, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Regina Massai MCT Consultancy  September 28, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Adrien Lopez Corporate Social Responsibility September 11, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Rajiv Maher IFG Consultant September 25, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Carlos Gajardo Roberts Sociedad Nacional del Minería (SONAMI) September 15, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Marco Fluckiger Stahle Comisión Chilena del Cobre (COCHILCO) October 01, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Jorge Cantallopts Araya 
and Patricio Perez 
Oportus 
COCHILCO October 02, 2009 
Santiago de Chile, Chile 
José Herrera Mining Cluster, CORFO October 05, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Pablo Lazo Department of External Relations October 07, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Raul Campusano 
Droguett 
Director, Comision Nacional del Medio 
Ambiental (CONAMA) October 07, 2009 
Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Eduardo Astorga 
Jorquera  
Corporación Chileno del Cobre (CODELCO) 
– Andina division 
October 14, 2009 CODELCO Andina Site, 
Chile 
Antonio Vargas CODELCO – Andina division October 14, 2009 
CODELCO Andina Site, 
Chile 
Victor Olivares CODELCO – Andina division October 14, 2009 
CODELCO Andina Site, 
Chile 
Lariza Palma Centro Unita de Trabajadores (CUT) October 16, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Nicolas Maljuf 
Department of Engineering, Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC) October 21, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Javier Karmy Independent researcher October 21, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Javier Cox Secretary General, Consejo Minero October 22, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Juan Carlos Guajardo 
Executive Director, Centro de Estudios del 
Cobre y Minería (CESCO) 
October 23, 2009 
Santiago de Chile, Chile 
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Rosanna Brantes COCHILCO October 26, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Luis Galdames CODELCO – Andina division October 27, 2009 
CODELCO Andina Site, 
Chile 
Esteban Valenzuela Diputado, Camara de Chile October 28, 2009 Valparaiso, Chile 
Hector Cerda Ortíz  CODELCO – Andina division October 30, 2009 
CODELCO Andina Site, 
Chile 
Carlos Chico Ramos 
Corporación Chileno del Cobre (Andina 
division) October 30, 2009 
CODELCO Andina Site, 
Chile 
Pedro Marin  President, Federación Minera de Chile 
(FMC) 
November 02, 2009 Antofagasta, Chile  
Jaime Gutierez Castillo  CODELCO Norte November 03, 2009 Calama, Chile 
Juan Patricio Ibanez CODELCO Norte November 03, 2009 Calama, Chile 
Ivan Jofre CODELCO Norte November 03, 2009 Calama, Chile 
Agustin Latorre Risso 
Union Leader, Sindicato de Empresa de 
Trabajadores Xstrata Copper AltoNorte, 
and FMC Member  
November 04, 2009 Antofagasta, Chile 
Patricio Aroca Professor in Economics, PUC Antofagasta November 04, 2009 Antofagasta, Chile 
Zeiso Mercado  
Union Leader, Sindicato MEL and FMC 
Member November 04, 2009 Antofagasta, Chile 
Mario Plaza Union Leader, Minera Meridian and FMC 
Member 
November 04, 2009 Antofagasta, Chile 
Jorge Oporto Marin 
Presidente del Grupo de Acción Ecológica 
de Atacama (GAEDA) November 08, 2009 
Copiapo, Chile 
José Escobar Serrano CONAMA – Atacama November 09, 2009 Copiapo, Chile 
Christian Varias Lopez Vialidad Atacama November 09, 2009 Copiapo, Chile 
Roberto Carlos Salinas 
Encargado de Recursos Naturales y Defensa 
Territorial de la Comunidad Indígena Colla 
de Río Jorquera y Sus Afluentes 
November 09, 2009 Copiapo, Chile 
Ramon Rada Consultant Subcontracting November 11, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Marcos Lima Former President, CODELCO November 13, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Gustavo Lagos 
Centro de Minería, PUC Chile / External 
Consultant and Former CODELCO Director 
November 12, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Jonathan Barton Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, 
PUC Chile 
November 13, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Nancy Nicholls Lopendia Historian November 19, 2009 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Jorge Bande Member, Executive Board, CODELCO April 25, 2012 Santiago de Chile, Chile 
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Fieldwork in Brazil 
Name Institutional Affiliation Interview Date Place of Interview 
Roberto Guimarães 
Faculty Member and Consultant, Fundaçao 
Getúlio Vargas (FGV) July 07, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Helder Quieroz Pinto  
Institute of Economics, Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) / 
Consultant on Energy 
July 08, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Heitor Chagas de Oliviera PETROBRAS July 08, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Roberto Schaeffer 
Faculty Member, Energy Planning 
Program, COPPE, UFRJ July 09, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Ricardo Nascimento e 
Silva do Valle 
Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE) July 13, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Adilson de Oliviera Institute of Economics, UFRJ July 13, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
David Zylbersztajn 
Former Executive Secretary, Agência 
Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustiveis (ANP) 
July 15, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Maria Aparecida Neves  Financiadora de Estudos e Projectos 
(FINEP) 
July 16, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
Enrique Federaçao Única dos Petroleiros (FUP) July 23, 2010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
José Maria Rangel 
Coordinador Geral, Sindicatos dos 
Petroleiros no Brasil (Sindipetro) – Norte 
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Appendix 2 PETROBRAS' Performance as a State Enterprise 
 
 
Source: Randall 1993 (Adapted), 13. 
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Source: Randall 1993 (Adapted), 13. 
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Appendix 3 Continuity and Changes in Chilean Mining Governance, 1971-2011 
Key Mining Laws in Chile, 1971-2010 
Mining Laws Description Incremental Changes 
Copper Nationalisation Act 
(DL 17.450) 
The law amended the Constitution to expropriate large-scale 
copper mining from foreign firms. It established the State as the 
ultimate owner of copper through sub-soil rights.  
One of the key continuities between Allende and 
Pinochet (and maintained Concertación). In terms of 
institutional change, this is exemplary of institutional 
conversion, wherein old rules are enacted in new ways. 
Foreign Investment Statute 
(DL 600) 
The law consists of three components: a definition of what 
constitutes foreign investment and a contract; the specific 
provisions on the rights and responsibilities of foreign investors, 
including how taxes and exemptions are calculated; and the 
composition and responsibilities of the Foreign Investment 
Committee as the sole authority in making contracts. 
One of the key continuities between Pinochet and 
Concertación governments.  
DL 1.349 
The law was approved in 1976 to create the Chilean Copper 
Commission (COCHILCO), which has direct responsibility in the 
accounting of CODELCO and setting up rules for private 
investment. The special agency is responsible for the 
management of foreign investors' contracts via the Foreign 
Investment Committee.  
This has remained the same. 
DL 1.350  
The law was approved in 1976 to create the Corporación 
Nacional del Cobre de Chile or CODLECO (Chilean National 
Copper Corporation) as a state-owned company to take over the 
copper mines expropriated under DL 17.450. Following this, DL 
1.167 (February 1976) was established to consolidate CODELCO 
and the subsequent centralisation of the administration of the 
four mines of La Gran Minería. 
New institutional structures were created alongside DL 
1.350 to respond to major changes after the transition: 
DN 146, approved in 1991, reflects the new corporate 
structure under the democratic system; and DL 19.137, 
approved in 1992, allows CODELCO to sign joint 
ventures with third parties in exploring and developing 
new mines. 
Ley Reservada del Cobre (DL 
1.530/18.443/13.196) 
The law, which originated in 1958 under Carlos Ibañez to 
transfer natural resource rents to the armed forces, was modified 
in 1976 to allocate 10 percent from gross receipts of CODELCO 
coming from copper sales abroad in addition to 10 percent of 
deposits of CODELCO abroad. The copper rent was used for 
arms purchase and the modernisation of the armed forces. 
There are on-going legislation proposals initiated first 
by Michelle Bachelet 2006-2009) and Sebastian Piñera 
(2010-present) to alter the financial scheme by 
establishing a four-year budget and abolishing the 
current law.  
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Mining Code  
Approved in 1983, the Mining Code consolidates all procedures, 
responsibilities, and payments in acquiring mining licenses, 
forming partnerships, and authorising the concessions from 
state to private individuals and firms. Its main implication is to 
establish in law the property rights regime in natural resources. 
This has remained the same. 
DL 20.026 
The Royalty II legislation, approved in 2005 by Congress, alters 
the rules as regards tax payments in the mining sector by 
subjecting all firms producing more than 12,000 metric tons of 
fine copper to a variable tax rate of 0.5 to 5 percent. 
One of the key changes under La Concertación 
government of Ricardo Lagos. 
Ley de Responsabilidad 
Fiscal (DL 20.128) 
The law created in 2006 to institutionalise the financial scheme 
in managing copper revenues through the establishment of two 
sovereignty wealth funds - Pension Reserve Funds (FRP) and 
Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund or FEES - both of which 
is preceded by the Copper Stabilisation Fund. The law sets out 
the rules and regulations as regards the funds as well as 
institutionalising the mechanisms in using the funds as 
counterbalance to the cyclical fluctuations of copper prices. 
Rather than directly using the funds to pay for social 
programmes, SWFs are used as buffer to price shocks and are 
managed jointly by the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance. 
One of the key changes under Concertación 
governments of Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet. 
Ley de Subcontratación 
(Subcontracting Law/DL 
20.123) 
Established in 2007, the Subcontracting Law is applied across all 
sectors to manage third party contractors to follow minimum 
standards on labour and working conditions. Amongst many 
things, the law guarantees worker security, wages, and certain 
amount of social benefits.  
Although labour reforms were implemented under 
Ricardo Lagos, the subcontracting law was passed 
under the pressure of Bachelet. 
Ley  20.392 
This legislative project was completed in November 2009 to 
incorporate changes to the CODELCO Corporate Governance. 
One key modification was the composition of the governing 
Board of Directors effective in March 2010. 
Under Bachelet government, the law modified existing 
regulations regarding corporate governance, specifically 
DL 1350/1976 (CODELCO Chile Articles of Association) 
and Ley 19.137 (provisions on current mining 
properties). One key change is the elimination of 
ministers in the board of directors to be replaced by 
selected professionals based on the technocratic 
recommendations. 
Source: Author compilation of various laws and legislations. 
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Appendix 4 Key Aspects of Alianza Estratégica Phase III (2007-2010)  
Key Aspects of Alianza Estratégica (2007-2010) 
Goals 
♦ Develop all business potentials with strong emphasis on growth and competitive leadership; 
♦ Ensure the development of social and human capital placing the people at the heart of CODELCO’s business 
strategy; 
♦ Compromise between sustainable development, corporate social responsibility and transparency in management; 
♦ Lead innovation, technological development, and knowledge management as building blocks of competitiveness; 
♦ Secure operational excellence, continuous process of improvement and high performance organisation;  
♦ Lead the creation of new markets, promotion of copper consumption, and assist the development of regional 
clusters; and 
♦ Promote the improvement in corporate governance and modernise the institutionalisation of CODELCO as a 100% 
state enterprise. 
Agreement of 
CODELCO with the 
Owner (State) 
♦ Comply with the Portfolio and Phases of Structural Project and Targets (2007-2010) including the following: 
mining development in Ministro Hales mine, Radomiro Tomic sulphur, shifting towards underground mining in 
Chuquicamata Rajo, the productive reconversion of Salvador mine, the expansion of Andina Phases I and II, the 
development of a new level in the Teniente mine, and the expansion of FURE; 
♦ Increase the scale of production, asset optimisation, and personnel management; and 
♦ Technological development in various areas. 
Agreement of the 
Administration and 
the Workers 
♦ Deepen the personal development of people; 
♦ Promote quality of life for miners; 
♦ Strengthen measures on risk prevention, work security and occupational safety; 
♦ Implement a holistic staff management programme; and 
♦ Improve competitiveness and labour productivity.  
Agreement of the 
Owner with 
CODELCO 
The state, through the government, commits to support the Alianza Estratégica Agreement, which includes: 
♦ Approving the Business and Development Plan annually, which aims a total sum of US$ 8,000 million between 
2007 and 2010; 
♦ Supporting the CODELCO Capitalisation Programme;  
♦ Fostering the improvement of CODELCO’s corporate governance; and 
♦ Backing the political dialogue and social concertation within the state enterprise. 
Source: Alianza Estratégica. Fase III. 2007-2010 (author summary and translation).  
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Appendix 5 Oil Wealth Governance under 1997 Petroleum Law 
Oil Revenue Management Policy in Brazil (1997-2010) 
Main Sources of 
Revenues 
 
♦ Signature bonus; Royalty; Special participation fee; Fees for the 
occupation or retention of the area 
Distribution of 
royalty quota value if 
produced onshore, in 
lakes, rivers or 
river/lake islands 
♦ 52.5 % to states where production occurs; 15% to municipalities 
where production occurs;  
♦ 7.5% to municipalities affected by the operations of landing or 
shipment of petroleum and natural gas according to criteria set 
by ANP; and  
♦ 25% to the Ministry of Science and Technology for financing 
scientific research and technology development programmes 
applied to petroleum, natural gas and biofuels industry. 
Distribution of 
royalty quota value if 
produced on the 
continental shelf 
♦ 22.5% to states where production occurs;  
♦ 22.5% to municipalities where production occurs;  
♦ 15% to the Navy Ministry to meet the requirements of inspection 
and protection of the production areas;  
♦ 7.5% to municipalities affected by the operations of landing and 
shipment of petroleum and natural gas according to the criteria 
set by ANP;  
♦ 7.5% for the build up of a Special Fund to be distributed among 
all states, territories and municipalities; and  
♦ to the Ministry of Science and Technology for financing scientific 
research and technology development programmes applied to 
petroleum, natural gas and biofuels industry. 
Distribution of 
Special participation 
fee 
(a) 40% to the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), 70% of the 
amount will be financing geology and geophysics studies and 
services applied to prospecting for fossil fuels, 15% for payments 
of the costs of planning studies for expansion of energy system, 
and 15% for financing studies, research projects, activities and 
services for basic geological studies on Brazilian territory;  
(b) 10% to the Ministry of Environment, Hydrous Resources, and of 
the Legal Amazon Region, which is aimed at the protection of the 
environment and recovery of the environmental damage caused 
by petroleum industry activities;  
(c) 40% to the State where the onshore production occurs or which 
fronts the continental shelf where production occurs; and  
(d) 10% to the Municipality where the onshore production occurs or 
which fronts the continental shelf where production occurs. 
Source: DL 9.478 (1997 Petroleum Law). 
 
  374 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abidin, Mahani Zainal (2001) ‘Competitive Industrialisation with Natural 
Resource Abundance: Malaysia’, in Richard M Auty, editor, Resource 
Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 147-164. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, & James Robinson (2003) ‘An African 
Success: Botswana’, in Dani Rodrik, editor, In Search of Prosperity: 
Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 80-119.  
Afonso, José & Sérgio Gobetti (2008) ‘Rendas do Petróleo no Brasil: Alguns 
Aspectos Fiscais e Federativos’, Revista do BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, 51 
(30): 231-269.  
Alchian, Armen A (1950) ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 58: 211-221.  
Alexander, Christopher (2002) ‘The Architecture of Militancy: Workers and 
the State in Algeria, 1970-1990’, Comparative Politics, 34 (3): 315-335.  
Alexander, William L, editor (2009) Lost in the Long Transition: Struggles 
for Social Justice in Neoliberal Chile. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Além, Ana Cláudia & Fabio Giambiagi (2010) O BNDES em um Brasil em 
Transição. Rio de Janeiro: BNDES. 
Almeida, Maria Hermínia Tavares de (1996) Crise Econômica e Interesses  
Organizados. São Paulo: Edusp/Fapesp. 
Almeida, Maria Hermínia Tavares de & Maurício Moya (1997) ‘A Reforma 
Negociada: O Congresso e a Política de Privatização’, Revista Brasileira 
de Ciências Sociais, 12 (34): 119-132 (São Paulo: ANPOCS). 
Almeida, Paul (2008) ‘The Sequencing of Success: Organising Templates and 
Neoliberal Policy Outcomes’, Mobilisation: An International Quarterly, 
13 (2): 165-187.  
Amann, Edmund & Werner Baer (2009) ‘The Macroeconomic Record of the 
Lula Administration, the Roots of Brazil’s Inequality, and Attempts to 
Overcome Them’, in Joseph Love & Werner Baer, editors, Brazil under 
 375 
Lula: Economy, Politics and Society under the Worker-President. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 27-43.  
Amann, Edmund, Germano Mendes de Paula, & João Carlos Ferraz (2004) 
‘Ownership Structure in the Post-privatised Brazilian Steel Industry: 
Complexity, Instability, and the Lingering Role of the State’, Working 
Paper No. 75, Manchester: Centre on Regulation and Competition, 
University of Manchester.  
Ames, Barry (2001) The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.  
Ames, Barry (1995) ‘Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork 
Barrel’, Journal of Politics, 57 (2): 324-343. 
Amsden, Alice (1989) Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late 
Industrialisation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Andersson, Martin (2009) ‘More to the Picture than Meets the Eye: On the 
Ultimate Causes behind the Chilean Economic Transformation’, 
European Review of Latin America and Caribbean Studies, 86: 21-37.  
Angell, Alan (2010) ‘Chile: The Right in Power’, Open Democracy, 2 
February. Accessed online on 10 August 2011 at 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/alan-angell/chile-right-in-power. 
Angell, Alan (2006) Democracy after Pinochet: Politics, Parties and 
Elections in Chile. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 
University of London.  
Angell, Alan (1993) ‘Chile Since 1958’, in Leslie Bethell, editor, Chile Since 
Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 129-202. 
Angell, Alan (1972) Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile. London: 
Oxford University Press.  
Aroca, Patricio (2001) ‘Impacts and Developments in Local Economies based 
on Mining: The Case of the Chilean II Region’, Resources Policy, 27 (2): 
119-134. 
 Aroca, Patricio (2000) ‘Crecimiento, Convergencia y Espacios en las 
Regiones Chilenas: 1960-1998’, Estudios de Economía, 27 (2): 199-224. 
Available online at 
http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/91f4f5ba-e26e-41ca-
97fc-8ef6627cfc37.pdf. 
  376 
Arrighi, Giovanni. 2000. The Long Twentieth Century. London: Verso 
Books.  
Artestis, Philip, and Alfredo Saad Filho, editors (2007) Political Economy of 
Brazil: Recent Economic Performance. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Auty, Richard M, editor (2001) Resource Abundance and Economic 
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Auty, Richard M (1995) ‘Industrial Policy, Sectoral Maturation, and Postwar 
Economic Growth in Brazil: The Resource Curse Thesis’, Economic 
Geography, 71 (3): 257-272. 
Auty, Richard M (1993) Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The 
Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge. 
Álvarez, Roberto E (2004) The Export Performance of Chilean Firms: Some 
Stylised Facts’, CEPAL Review, 83: 115-127.  
Bagattini, Gustavo Yudi (2011) ‘The Political Economy of Stabilisation Funds: 
Measuring their Success in Resource-Dependent Countries’, IDS 
Working Paper 356, Brighton: IDS Publications.  
Bair, Jennifer, editor (2009) Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Baker, Andy (2009) The Market and the Masses in Latin America: Policy 
Reform and Consumption in Liberalising Economies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Baker, Andy (2003) ‘Why is Trade Reform so Popular in Latin America? A 
Consumption-based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences’, World 
Politics, 55 (3): 423-455. 
Barbier, Edward (2011) Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have 
Developed through Natural Resource Exploitation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Barbier, Edward (2005) Natural Resources and Economic Development. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barbier, Edward (2003) ‘The Role of Natural Resources in Economic 
Development’, Australian Economic Papers, 42 (2): 253-272. 
Barham, Bradford, Stephen Bunker, & Denis O’Hearn, editors (1994) States, 
Firms and Raw Materials: The World Economy and Ecology of 
Aluminum. Wisconsin Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.  
 377 
Barrera, Manuel (1998) ‘Macroeconomic Adjustment in Chile and the Politics 
of the Popular Sectors’, in Philip Oxhorn & Graciela Ducatenzeiler, 
editors, What Kind of Democracy? What Kind of Market? Latin 
America in the Age of Neoliberalism. University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 127–50. 
Barrera, Manuel (1981) Worker Participation in Company Management in 
Chile: A Historical Experience. Geneva: UNRISD Publications.  
Barrera, Manuel (1973) El Conflicto Obrero en el Enclave Cuprífero. 
Santiago: Universidad de Chile.   
Barrientos, Armando & Claudio Santibañez (2009) ‘New Forms of Social 
Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America’, 
Journal of Latin American Studies, 41 (1): 1-26. 
Bartley, Tim (2005) ‘Corporate Accountability and the Privatisation of 
Labour Standards: Struggles over Codes of Conduct in the Apparel 
Industry’, Research in Political Sociology, 14: 211-244. 
Barton, Jonathan (2009a) ‘The Impact of China’s Global Expansion on 
Chile’, The Impact of China’s Global Economic Expansion on Latin 
America. Working Paper Series no. 6, February. 
Barton, Jonathan (2009b) ‘A Study of the Impact of China’s Global 
Expansion on Chile: The Copper and Textile Value Chains’, The Impact 
of China’s Global Economic Expansion on Latin America. Working 
Paper Series no. 7, February.   
Barton, Jonathan R (2006) ‘Eco-dependency in Latin America’, Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography, 27: 134-149.  
Barton, Jonathan (2002) ‘State Continuismo and Pinochetismo: The Keys to 
the Chilean Transition’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 21 (3): 
358-374. 
Barton, Jonathan (1997) ‘Environment, Sustainability and Regulation in 
Commercial Aquaculture: The Case of Chilean Salmonid Production’, 
Geoforum, 28 (3-4): 313-328. 
Barton, Jonathan & Warwick Murray (2002) ‘The End of Transition? Chile 
1990-2000’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 21 (3): 329-338. 
  378 
Bebbington, Anthony, editor (2012) Social Conflict, Economic Development, 
and the Extractive Industry: Evidence from South America. London: 
Routledge. 
Bebbington, Anthony (2010) ‘Extractive Industries and Stunted States: 
Conflicts, Responsibility, and Institutional Change in the Andes’, in K. 
Ravi Raman & Ronnie Lipschutz, editors, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Comparative Critiques. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 97-115. 
Bebbington, Anthony (2004) ‘NGOs and Uneven Development: Geographies 
of Development Intervention’, Progress in Human Geography, 28 (6): 
725-745.  
Bebbington, Anthony & Denise Humphreys Bebbington (2011) ‘An Andean 
Avatar: Post-neoliberal and Neoliberal Strategies for Securing the 
Unobtainable’, New Political Economy, 16 (1): 131-145. 
Bebbington, Anthony & Denise Humphreys Bebbington (2010) ‘Anatomy of a 
Regional Conflict: Tarija and Resource Grievances in Morales’ Bolivia’, 
Latin American Perspectives, 37 (4): 140-160. 
Bebbington, Anthony, Jeffrey Bury, Denise Humphreys Bebbington, Jeannet 
Lingan, Juan Pablo Muñoz, & Martin Scurrah (2008) ‘Mining and 
Social Movements: Struggles over livelihood and rural territorial 
development in the Andes’, Brooks World Poverty Institute Working 
Paper No. 33, Manchester: Brooks World Poverty Institute. 
Bebbington, Anthony, Leonith Hinojosa, Denise Humphreys Bebbington, 
Maria Luisa Burneo, & Ximena Warnaars (2008) ‘Contention and 
Ambiguity: Mining and Possibility of Development’, Brooks World 
Poverty Institute Working Paper No. 57, Manchester: Brooks World 
Poverty Institute.    
Beblawi, Hazem (1990) ‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’, in Giocamo 
Luciani, editor, The Arab State. London: Routledge, 85-98.   
Beblawi, Hazem & Giocamo Luciani, editors (1987) The Rentier State. 
London: Croom Helm.  
Beeson, Mark, Mills Soko, & Wang Yong (2011) ‘The New Resource Politics: 
Can Australia and South Africa Accommodate China?’, International 
Affairs, 87 (6): 1365-1384. 
 379 
Bell, Stephen (2012a) ‘The Power of Ideas: The Ideational Shaping of the 
Structural Power of Business’, International Studies Quarterly, 1-14, 
published online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
2478.2012.00743.x/pdf. 
Bell, Stephen (2012b) ‘Where Are the Institutions? The Limits of Vivien 
Schmidt’s Constructivism’, British Journal of Political Science, 42 (3): 
714-719.  
Bell, Stephen (2011) ‘Do We Really Need a New “Constructivist 
Institutionalism” to Explain Institutional Change?’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 41 (4): 833-906.  
Bell, Stephen (2005) ‘How Tight are the Policy Constraints? The Policy 
Convergence Thesis, Institutionally Situated Actors and Expansionary 
Monetary Policy in Australia’, New Political Economy 10 (1): 65-89. 
Bendaña, Alejandro (2006) ‘NGOs and Social Movements: A North/South 
Divide?’, Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper 
Number 22, Geneva: United Nations Research on Social Development. 
Bendix, Reinhard (1978) Kings or People. Power and the Mandate to Rule. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bergquist, Charles (1986) Labour in Latin America. Comparative Essays on 
Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.   
Berman, Sheri (2011) ‘Ideology, History, and Politics’, in Daniel Béland & 
Robert Henry Cox, editors (2011) Ideas and Politics in Social Science 
Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 105-126. 
Berrio, Ruben, Andrae Marak, & Scott Morgenstern (2011) ‘Explaining 
Hydrocarbon Nationalisation in Latin America: Economics and Political 
Ideology’, Review of International Political Economy, 18 (5): 673-697. 
Béland, Daniel & Robert Henry Cox, editors (2011) Ideas and Politics in 
Social Science Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bielchowsky, Ricardo (2009) ‘Sixty Years of ECLAC: Structuralism and Neo-
structuralism’, CEPAL Review, 97: 171-192. 
Bielchowsky, Ricardo (1988) Pensamento Econômico Brasileiro. O Ciclo 
Ideológico do Desenvolvimentismo. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES. 
  380
Biersteker, Thomas (1978) Distortion or Development? Contending 
Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Biglaiser, Glen (2003) ‘Military Rule, State Autonomy and Privatisation in 
the Southern Cone’, Armed Forces and Society, 29 (4): 591-615.  
Blakemore, Harold (1993) ‘From the War of the Pacific to 1930’, in Leslie 
Bethell, editor, Chile Since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 33-86.   
Blakemore, Harold (1974) British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896: 
Balmaceda and North. London: University of London, Athlone Press.    
Blyth, Mark (2009) ‘An Approach to Comparative Analysis or A Subfield 
within a Subfield? Political Economy’, in Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan 
S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and 
Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 193-219. 
Blyth, Mark (2003) ‘Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: 
Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science’, Perspectives on 
Politics, 1 (4): 695-706. 
Blyth, Mark (2002) Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and 
Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.    
Blyth, Mark (2001) ‘The Transformation of the Swedish Model: Economic 
Ideas, Distributional Conflict, and Institutional Change’, World Politics, 
54 (1): 1-26.   
Bob, Clifford (2005) The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and 
International Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Bourne, Richard (2008) Lula of Brazil: The Story So Far. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Böhm, Steffen, Ana C Dinerstein, & André Spicer (2010) ‘(Im)Possibilities of 
Autonomy: Social Movements in and beyond Capital, the State and 
Development’, Social Movement Studies, 9 (1): 17-32.  
Brady, Henry & David Collier (2004) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse 
Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  
Braga, Vanessa Mesquita (2004) A Logística Como Diferencial na Indústria 
do Petróleo: O Caso do Downstream Brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: 
 381 
BNDES. Available online at 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/
Galerias/Arquivos/conhecimento/especial/petroleo.pdf. 
Brainard, Lael & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, editors (2009) Brazil as an 
Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the 
Global Economy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Branford, Sue, Bernardo Kucinski, & Hilary Wainwright (2005) Lula and the 
Workers’ Party in Brazil. New York: New Press. 
Braun-Llona, Juan, Matías Braun-Llona, Ignacio Briones, José Díaz, Rolf 
Lüders, & Gert Wagner (2000) ‘Economía Chilena 1880-1995. 
Estadísticas Históricas’, Documento de Trabajo 187. Santiago de Chile: 
Instituto de Economía Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile. 
Available online at http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/dt_187.pdf. 
Brautigam, Deborah (2009) The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in 
Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Brautigam, Deborah, Odd-Helge Fjelstad, & Mick Moore, editors (2008) 
Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and 
Consent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bresser-Perreira, Luiz Carlos (2009) ‘From Old to New Developmentalism in 
Latin America’, Texto Para Discussão 193, São Paulo: Fundação Getulio 
Vargas. 
Bresser-Perreira, Luiz Carlos (2006) ‘O Novo Desenvolvimentismo e a 
Ortodoxia Convencional’, São Paulo em Perspectiva, 20 (3): 5-24. 
Bresser-Perreira, Luiz Carlos (2004) Democracy and Public Management 
Reform. Building the Republican State. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bridge, Gavin (2008) ‘Global production networks and the extractive sector: 
Governing resource-based development’, Journal of Economic 
Geography, 8 (3): 389-419.   
Bridge, Gavin (2004a) ‘Contested Terrain: Mining and the Environment’, 
Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 29: 205-259.  
Bridge, Gavin (2004b) ‘Mapping the Bonanza: Geographies of Mining 
Investment in an Era of Neoliberal Reform’, The Professional 
Geographer, 56 (3): 406-421.  
  382 
Bridge, Gavin (2002) ‘Grounding Globalisation: The Prospects and Perils of 
Linking Economic Processes of Globalisation to Environmental 
Outcomes’, Economic Geography, 78 (3): 361-386.  
Bridgman, Benjamin, Victor Gomes, & Arilton Teixeira (2008) ‘The Threat of 
Competition Enhances Productivity’, Meeting Papers 302. Society for 
Economic Dynamics, available online at 
http://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2008/paper_302.pdf. 
Brooks, Sarah (2009) Social Protection and the Market: The 
Transformation of Social Security Institutions in Latin America. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brownlee, Jason (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratisation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bruce Hall, Rodney & Thomas J. Biersteker, editors (2002) The Emergence 
of Private Authority in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Bruff, Ian & Laura Horn (2012) ‘Varieties of Capitalism in Crisis?’ 
Competition and Change, 16 (3): 161-168. 
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (1994) The Economic History of Latin America since 
Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Bunker, Stephen G (1985) Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, 
Unequal Exchange and the Failure of the Modern State. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press.   
Bunker, Stephen G & Paul S Ciccantell (2005) Globalization and the Race for 
Resources. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Burdick, John, Philip Oxhorn, and Kenneth Roberts, editors (2009) Beyond 
Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the 
Crossroads. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Burges, Sean (2009) ‘Brazil: Toward a (Neo) Liberal Democracy’, in Jean 
Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, editors, Governance after Neoliberalism in 
Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 195-215. 
Burgess, Katrina & Steven Levitsky (2003) ‘Explaining Populist Party 
Adaptation in Latin America: Environmental and Organisational 
Determinants of Party Change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela’, Comparative Political Studies, 36 (8): 881-911. 
 383 
Burnham, Peter (2001) ‘New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3 (2): 127-149.  
Burnham, Peter (1999) ‘The Politics of Economic Management in the 1990s’, 
New Political Economy, 4 (1): 37-54. 
Bury, Jeffrey (2005) ‘Mining Mountains: Neoliberalism, Land Tenure, 
Livelihoods, and the New Peruvian Mining Industry in Cajamarca’, 
Environment and Planning A, 37 (2): 221-239. 
Calderón, Fernando (2008) ‘A Historic Turning Point: Political Change and 
the Socio-institutional Situation in Latin America’, CEPAL Review, 96: 
123-136.  
Campbell, John L (2001) ‘Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in 
Political Economy’, in John L Campbell & Ove K Pedersen, editors, The 
Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis. Princeton, NJ & 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 159-190.  
Campbell, John L & Ove K Pedersen, editors (2001a) The Rise of 
Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis. Princeton, NJ & Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
Campbell, John L & Ove Pedersen (2001b) ‘The Second Movement in 
Institutional Analysis’, in John L Campbell & Ove K Pedersen, editors, 
The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis. Princeton, NJ & 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 249-275. 
Capoccia, Giovanni & R. Daniel Kelemen (2007) ‘The Study of Critical 
Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical 
Institutionalism’, World Politics, 59 (3): 341-369.  
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2009) ‘New Paths: Globalisation in Historical 
Perspective’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 44 
(4): 296-317. 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique & Enzo Faletto (1979) Dependency and 
Development in Latin America. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Carruthers, David V, editor (2008) Environmental Justice in Latin America: 
Problems, Promise, and Practice. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT 
Press.  
  384 
Carvalho, José Murilo (1996) Teatro de Sombras – A Política Imperial. Rio 
de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ/Relume Dumará. 
Castañeda, Jorge (2006) ‘Latin America’s Left Turn’, Foreign Affairs, 85 (3, 
May/June): 28–43. 
Castañeda, Jorge & Marco Morales (2008) Leftovers: Tales of the Latin 
American Left. London: Routledge. 
Castree, Noel (2007a) ‘Neo-liberalising Nature: Processes, Outcomes and 
Effects’, Environment and Planning A, 40 (1): 153-173. 
Castree, Noel (2007b) ‘Neo-liberalising Nature: The Logics of Deregulation 
and Reregulation’, Environment and Planning A, 40 (1): 131-152.  
Castree, Noel & Bruce Braun, editors, (2001) Social Nature: Theory, 
Practice, and Politics. Malden, MT: Blackwell Publishers.  
Cerny, Philip G (2010) ‘The Competition State today: From Raison d’État to 
Raison du Monde’, Policy Studies, 31 (1): 5-21.  
Cerny, Philip G (2008) ‘Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a 
Hegemonic Paradigm’, The Journal of International Trade and 
Diplomacy, 2 (1): 1-46.   
Cerny, Philip G (2000a) ‘Restructuring the Political Arena: Globalisation and 
the Paradoxes of the Competition State’, in Randall Germain, editor, 
Globalisation and its Critics: Perspectives from Political Economy. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 117-138. 
Cerny, Philip G (2000b) ‘Political Globalization and the Competition State’, 
in Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey Underhill, editors, The Political Economy 
of the Changing Global Order, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 300-9. 
Cerny, Philip G (1997) ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of 
Political Globalisation’, Government and Opposition, 32 (2): 252-274. 
Cerny, Philip G (1995) ‘Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective 
Action’, International Organization, 49 (4): 595-626.   
Cerny, Philip G & Mark Evans (2004) ‘Globalisation and Public Policy under 
New Labour’, Policy Studies, 25 (1): 51-65. 
Chang, Ha Joon (2011) ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, 
Policy, and History’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 7 (4): 473-
498. 
 385 
Chang, Ha Joon (2002) ‘Breaking the Mould – An Institutionalist Political 
Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market and the 
State’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26 (5): 539-560. 
Ciccantell, Paul S & David A Smith (2005) ‘Nature, Raw Materials, and 
Political Economy: An Introduction’, in Paul S Ciccantell, David A 
Smith, & Gay Seidman, editors, Nature, Raw Materials, and Political 
Economy: Research in Rural Sociology and Development, Volume 10, 
1-20. 
Claver, Enrique, Juan Llopis, Daniel Garcia, & Hipolito Molina (1998) 
‘Organisational Culture for Innovation and New Technological 
Behaviour’, Journal of High Technology Management Research, 9 (1): 
55-68. 
Coe, Neil M, Peter Dicken, & Martin Hess (2008) ‘Global Production 
Networks: Realising the Potential’, Journal of Economic Geography, 8 
(3): 271-295.  
Colburn, Forrest D (2002) Latin America at the End of Politics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
Collier, Ruth Berins & David Collier (2002) Shaping the Political Arena. 
Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement, and Regime Dynamics in 
Latin America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.  
Collier, Simon (1993) ‘From Independence to the War of the Pacific’, in Leslie 
Bethell, editor, Chile Since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1-32. 
Collier, Simon & Willliam F. Slater (2004) A History of Chile, 1808-2002. 
Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cook, Maria Lorena (2007) The Politics of Labour Reform in Latin America: 
Between Flexibility and Rights. University Park, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press.    
Costoya, Manuel Mejido (2007) ‘Toward a Typology of Civil Society Actors: 
The Case of Movement to Change International Trade Rules and 
Barriers’, Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper 
Number 30, Geneva: United Nations Research on Social Development.  
  386 
Cox, Robert (2004) ‘The Path Dependency of an Idea: Why Scandinavian 
Welfare States Remain Distinct’, Social Policy and Administration, 38 
(2): 204-219.  
Cox, Robert (1999) ‘Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for 
an Alternative World Order’, Review of International Studies, 25: 3-28.  
Cox, Robert (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 10 (2): 126-155. 
Crespo, Horacio (2007) ‘Trade Regimes and the International Sugar Market, 
1850-1980: Protectionism, Subsidies and Regulation’, in Steven Topik, 
Carlos Marichal, & Zephyr Frank, editors, From Silver to Cocaine: 
Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World 
Economy, 1500-2000. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 147-
173.     
Crouch, Colin (2011) The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Crowson, Phillip (2007) ‘The Copper Industry, 1945-1975’, Resources Policy, 
32: 1-18. 
Cruzat A, Ximena (1981) El Movimiento Mancomunal en el Norte Salitrero: 
1901-1907. Santiago de Chile: CLACSO (Mimeo). 
Cumbers, Andy, Corinne Nativel, & Paul Routledge (2008) ‘Labour Agency 
and Union Possibilities in the Global Production Networks’, Journal of 
Economic Geography, 8 (3): 369-387.  
Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter (1999a) ‘Private Authority 
and International Affairs’, in A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony 
Porter, editors, Private Authority and International Affairs. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 3-30.  
Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter (1999b) ‘The Contours and 
Significance of Private Authority in International Affairs’, in A. Claire 
Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter, editors, Private Authority and 
International Affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 333-
376.  
Dagnino, Evelina (2005) ‘Meanings of Citizenship in Latin America’, IDS 
Working Paper No. 258, Sussex: IDS. Available online at 
 387 
http://www.drc-
citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734448/original/1052734448-
dagnino.2005-meanings.pdf. 
Dantas, Eva (2006) The Development of Knowledge Networks in Latecomer 
Innovation Systems: The Case of PETROBRAS in the Brazilian 
Offshore Oil Industry, DPhil Thesis, SPRU, University of Sussex, UK. 
Dantas, Eva & Martin Bell (2009) ‘Latecomer Firms and the Emergence and 
Development of Knowledge Networks: The Case of PETROBRAS in 
Brazil’, Research Policy, 38 (5): 829-844. 
Dantas, Eva & Martin Bell (2006) ‘The Development of Firm-centred 
Knowledge Networks in Emerging Economies: The Case of 
PETROBRAS in the Offshore Oil Innovation System in Brazil’, Paper 
presented in the DRUID Summer Conference, Copenhagen, June. 
Dauvergne, Peter & Jane Lister (2010) ‘The Power of Big Box Retail in Global 
Environmental Governance: Bringing Commodity Chains Back into IR’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39 (1): 145-160.  
David, Paul (1985) ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’, American 
Economic Review, 75 (2): 332-337.  
Dávila, Mireya A. & Claudio Fuentes S, editors (2002) Promesas de Cambio. 
Izquierda y derecha en el Chile contemporáneo. Santiago de Chile: 
FLACSO & Editorial Universitaria.  
Dauvergne, Peter (2008) The Shadows of Consumption: Consequences for 
the Global Environment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.   
De Janvry, Alain, Elisabeth Sadoulet, & Wendy Wolford (2001) ‘From State-
led to Grassroots-led Land Reform in Latin America’, in Alain de 
Janvry, Gustavo Gordillo, Jean-Philippe Platteu, & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 
editors, Access to Land, Rural Poverty, and Public Action. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
DeShazo, Peter (1983) Urban Workers and Labour Unions in Chile: 1902-
1927. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.  
Diani, Mario (1996) ‘Linking Mobilisation Frames and Political 
Opportunities: Insights from Regional Populism in Italy’, American 
Sociological Review, 61: 1053-1069. 
  388
DiJohn, Jonathan (2009) From Windfall to Curse? Oil and Industrialisation 
in Venezuela, 1920 to present, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press.   
Dinerstein, Ana C (2010) ‘Autonomy in Latin America: Between Resistance 
and Integration. Echoes from the Piqueteros Experience’, Community 
Development Journal, 45 (3): 356-366. 
Dinerstein, Ana C (2008) ‘'Here is the Rose, Dance Here!' A Riposte to the 
Debate on the Argentinean Crisis’, Historical Materialism, 16 (1): 101-
114. 
Dinerstein, Ana C (2007) ‘Workers’ Factory Takeovers and New State 
Policies in Argentina: Towards an ‘Institutionalisation’ of Non-
governmental Public Action?’, Policy & Politics, 35 (3): 529-550.  
Dinerstein, Ana C (2003) ‘Power or Counter Power? The Dilemma of the 
Piquetero Movement in Argentina Post Crisis’, Capital & Class, 81: 1-7. 
Doyle, David & John Hogan (2009) ‘A Comparative Framework: How 
Broadly Applicable is a Rigorous Critical Junctures Framework?’, Acta 
Politica, 44 (2): 211-240. 
Doyle, David & John Hogan (2008) ‘Macroeconomic Policy Change: Ireland 
in Comparative  Perspective’, Irish Political Studies, 23 (1): 77-97. 
Doyle, David & John Hogan (2007) ‘The Importance of Ideas: An A Priori 
Critical Juncture Framework’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 
40 (4): 883-910.  
Drake, Paul (1996) Labour Movements and Dictatorships: The Southern 
Cone in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Drake, Paul (1993) ‘Chile, 1930-1958’, in Leslie Bethell, editor, Chile Since 
Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 87-128. 
Drezner, Daniel W (2010) ‘Afterword: Is Historical Institutionalism Bunk?’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 17 (4): 791-804. 
Dunning, John H. (1998) ‘Location and the Multinational Enterprise: A 
Neglected Factor?’, Journal of International Business Studies, 29 (1): 
45–66. 
Dunning, Thad (2008) Crude democracy: Natural resource wealth and 
political regimes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 389 
Easterly, William & Ross Levine (2003) ‘Tropics, Germs and Crops: How 
Endowments Influence Economic Development’, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50: 3-39. 
Ebenau, Matthias (2012) ‘Varieties of Capitalism or Dependency? A Critique 
of the VoC Approach for Latin America’, Competition and Change, 16 
(3): 206-223. 
Eckstein, Susan, editor (1989) Power and Popular Protest: Latin American 
Social Movements. Berkeley & London: University of California Press. 
Eden, Lorraine (1991) ‘Bringing the Firm Back In: Multinationals in 
International Political Economy’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 20 (2): 197-224. 
Ertman, Thomas (1997) Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes 
in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Espinosa, Malva (1996) Sindicalismo en la Empresa Moderna: Ni Ocaso ni 
Crisis Terminal. Santiago de Chile: Dirección del Trabajo. 
Etchemendy, Sebastián and Ruth Berins Collier (2007) ‘Down but Not Out: 
Union Resurgence and Segmented Corporatism in Argentina (2003-
2007)’, Politics and Society, 35 (3): 363-401. 
Evans, Mark (2010) ‘Cameron’s Competition State’, Policy Studies, 31 (1): 95-
115. 
Evans, Peter (2009) ‘From Situations of Dependency to Globalised Social 
Democracy’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 44 
(4): 318-336.  
Evans, Peter (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial 
Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Evans, Peter (1979) Dependent development: The alliance of multinational, 
state, and local capital in Brazil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
Evans, Peter & John Stephens (1988) ‘Studying Development since the 
Sixties: The Emergence of a New Comparative Political Economy’, 
Theory and Society, 17 (5): 713-745. 
Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, & Theda Skocpol (1985) Bringing the 
State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
  390
Faoro, Raimundo (1998) Os Donos do Poder - Formação do Patronato 
Político Brasileiro. Porto Alegre: Globo. 
Farrell, Henry & Abraham Newman (2010) ‘Introduction. Making global 
markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 17 (4): 609-638.  
Fernández Jilberto, Alex (1996) ‘Open Regionalism and Democratic 
Transition in Chile’, International Journal of Political Economy, 26 
(4): 71-95. 
Finer, Samuel (1975) ‘State- and Nation-building in Europe: The Role of the 
Military’, in Charles Tilly, editor, The Formation of National States in 
Western Europe. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Fleury, Alonso & Maria Tereza Leme Fleury (2011) Brazilian Multinationals: 
Competences for Internationalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Fonseca, Pedro Cézar Dutra (1989) Vargas: o Capitalismo em Construção: 
1906-1954. Rio de Janeiro: Brasiliense. 
Foweraker, Joe (1981) The Struggle for Land. A Political Economy of the 
Pioneer Frontier in Brazil from 1930 to the Present Day. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Francks, Penelope (2000) ‘Japan and an East Asian model of agriculture’s 
role in industrialization’, Japan Forum, 12 (1): 43-52.   
Frank, Zephyr & Aldo Musacchio (2007) ‘Brazil in the International Rubber 
Trade, 1870-1930’, in Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, & Zephyr Frank, 
editors, From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains 
and the Building of the World Economy, 1500-2000. Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 271-299.  
Frank, Volker (2004) ‘Politics without Policy: The Failure of Social 
Concertation in Democratic Chile, 1990-2000’, in Peter Winn, editor, 
Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the 
Pinochet Era, 1973-2002. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 
125-163. 
Frank, Volker (2002) ‘The Labour Movement in Democratic Chile, 1990-
2000’, Working Paper 298. Notre Dame: Helen Kellogg Institute of 
International Studies, University of Notre Dame.   
 391 
Furtado, Celso (1970) Economic Development of Latin America. A Survey 
from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution. Translated by Suzette 
Macedo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Furtado, Celso (1963) The Economic Growth in Brazil. A Survey from 
Colonial to Modern Times. Translated from Formação Econômica do 
Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Fundo de Cultura, 1959). Berkeley & 
Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Galeano, Eduardo (1973) Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of a 
Pillage of a Continent. New York: Monthly Review Press.   
Gallagher, Kevin & Roberto Porzecanski (2010) The Dragon in the Room: 
China and the Future of Latin American Industrialisation. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.  
Gallitelli, Bernardo & Andres A. Thompson, editors (1982) Sindicalismo y 
Regimenes Militares en Argentina y en Chile. Amsterdam: CEDLA.  
Gallo, Carmenza (2008) ‘Tax Bargaining and Nitrate Exports: Chile, 1880-
1930’, in Deborah Brautigam, Odd-Helge Fjelstad, & Mick Moore, 
editors, Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: 
Capacity and Consent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 160-
182. 
Gameltoft, Peter, Jaya Prakash Pradhan, & Andrea Goldstein (2010) 
‘Emerging Multinationals: Home and Host Country Determinants and 
Outcomes’, International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5 (3/4): 254-
265.  
Garretón, Manuel Antonio (2003) Incomplete Democracy: Political 
Democratisation in Chile and Latin America, Chapel Hill & London: 
University of North Carolina Press.   
Geddes, Barbara (2003) Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and 
Research Design in Comparative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Geddes, Barbara (1994) Politician’s Dilemma. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Geddes, Barbara (1990) ‘How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You 
Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics’, Political Analysis, 2 (1): 
131-150.  
  392 
George, Alexander & Andrew Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. MA & London: MIT Press. 
Giannotti, Vito (2007) História das Lutas dos Trabalhadores no Brasil. Rio 
de Janeiro: MAUAD Editoria. 
Gill, Stephen & David Law (1989) ‘Global Hegemony and the Structural 
Power of Capital’, International Studies Quarterly, 33 (4): 475-499. 
Giugni, Marco (2004) Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, 
Antinuclear and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.     
Godoy, Ricardo (1985) ‘Mining: Anthropological Perspectives’, Annual 
Review of Anthropology, 14: 199-217. 
Gofas, Andreas & Colin Hay, editors (2010) The Role of Ideas in Political 
Analysis: A Portrait of Contemporary Debates, London & New York: 
Routledge. 
Goldstein, Andrea (2010) ‘The Emergence of Multilatinas: The PETROBRAS 
Experience’, Universaria Business Review, 1: 98-111. 
Goldstein, Andrea (2007) Multinational Companies from Emerging 
Economies. Composition, Conceptualisation, and Direction in the 
Global Economy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Goldstein, Andrea (1999) ‘Brazilian Privatisation in International 
Perspective: The Rocky Path from State Capitalism to Regulatory 
Capitalism’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 8 (4): 673-711. 
Goldstein, Andrea & Fazia Pusterla (2010) ‘Emerging Economies’ 
Multinationals: General Features and Specificities of the Brazilian and 
Chinese Cases’, International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5 (3/4): 
289-306. 
González, Francisco E (2008) Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
Institutionalised Regimes in Chile and Mexico, 1970-2000. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.  
González Miranda, Sergio (2002) Hombres y Mujeres de la Pampa: 
Tarapacá en el Ciclo de Expansión del Salitre. Edición Segundo. 
Santiago de Chile: LOM Editorial. 
 393 
Gómez-Mera, Laura (2009) ‘Domestic Constraints on Regional Cooperation: 
Explaining Trade Conflict in MERCOSUR’, Review of International 
Political Economy, 16 (5): 746-777. 
Grindle, Merilee, editor (1980) Politics and Policy Implementation in the 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Grugel, Jean (2009) ‘“Basta de Realidades, Queremos Promesas”: Democracy 
after the Washington Consensus’, in Jean Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 
editors, Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-48. 
Grugel, Jean (2002) ‘Conservative Elites and State Incapacities’, Debate: 
Democracy and Development, New Political Economy, 7 (2): 277-279.  
Grugel, Jean (1999) ‘The Chilean State and New Regionalism: Strategic 
Alliances and Pragmatic Integration’, in Jean Grugel & Wil Hout, 
editors, Regionalism across the North-South Divide: State Strategies 
and Globalistion. London & New York: Routledge, 62-78. 
Grugel, Jean & Wil Hout (1999) ‘Regions, Regionalism and the South’, in 
Jean Grugel & Wil Hout, editors, Regionalism across the North-South 
Divide: State Strategies and Globalisation. London & New York: 
Routledge, 3-13. 
Grugel, Jean & Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros (1999) ‘Brazil and 
MERCOSUR’, in Jean Grugel & Wil Hout, editors, Regionalism across 
the North-South Divide: State Strategies and Globalistion. London & 
New York: Routledge, 46-61. 
Grugel, Jean & Jewellord T Nem Singh (Forthcoming) ‘Citizenship, 
Democratisation and Resource Politics’, in Jewellord T Nem Singh & 
France Bourgouin, editors, Resource Governance and Developmental 
States: Critical International Political Economy Perspectives. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Grugel, Jean & Pia Riggirozzi (2012) ‘Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: 
Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State after Crisis’, Development and 
Change, 43 (1): 1-21. 
Grugel, Jean & Pia Riggirozzi, editors (2009) Governance after 
Neoliberalism in Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
  394 
Grugel, Jean, Pia Riggirozzi, & Ben Thirkell-White (2008) ‘Beyond the 
Washington Consensus?  Asia and Latin America in search of more 
autonomous development’, International Affairs, 84 (3): 499-517. 
Guajardo, Juan Carlos B (2012) ‘Mineral Rents and Social Development in 
Chile’, in Katja Hujo, editor, Mineral Rents and the Financing of Social 
Policy: Opportunities and Challenges. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
and UNRISD, 185-222. 
Guajardo, Juan Carlos B (2008) Mineral Rents and Social Development in 
Chile. Geneva: UNRISD Publications. 
Gudynas, Eduardo (2011a) ‘Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow’, Development, 54 
(4): 441-447. 
Gudynas, Eduardo (2011b) ‘Alcances y Contenidos de las Transiciones al 
Post-extractivismo’, Ecuador Debate, 82: 61-79, CAAP: Quito.  
Gudynas, Eduardo (2010) ‘Agropecuaria y Nuevo Extractivismo bajo los 
Gobiernos Progresistas de América del Sur’, Territorios, 5: 37-54, 
Instituto de Estudios Agrarios y Rurales, CONGCOOP: Guatemala. 
Guimarães, Alexandre Quieroz (2005) ‘Historical Institutionalism and 
Economic Policymaking – Determinants of the Pattern of Economic 
Policymaking in Brazil, 1930-1960’, Bulletin of Latin American 
Research, 24 (4): 529-544.  
Guimarães, Alexandre Quieroz (2003) Institutions, State Capacity and 
Economic Development – The Political Economy of Import 
Substitution Industrialisation in Brazil, PhD Dissertation, University of 
Sheffield, United Kingdom.  
Gunvald Nilsen, Alf (2008) ‘Political Economy, Social Movements and State 
Power: A Marxian Perspective on Two Decades of Resistance to the 
Narmada Dam Projects’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 21 (2/3): 303-
330. 
Haagh, Louise (2002) ‘The Emperor's New Clothes: Labour Reform and 
Social Democratisation in Chile’, Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 37 (1): 86-115. 
Haarstad, Håvard, editor (2012) New Political Spaces in Latin American 
Natural Resource Governance. London & New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 395 
Haarstad, Håvard (2009a) ‘Globalisation and the New Spaces for Social 
Movement Politics: The Marginalisation of Labour Unions in Bolivian 
Gas Nationalisation’, Globalizations, 6 (2): 169-185.   
Haarstad, Håvard (2009b) ‘FDI Policy and Political Spaces for Labour: The 
Disarticulation of the Bolivian Petroleros’, Geoforum, 40 (2): 239-248. 
Haggard, Stephan (1990) Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of 
Growth in Newly Industrializing Countries. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Haggard, Stephan & Robert Kaufman (1995) The Political Economy of 
Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hagopian, Frances (1996) Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hagopian, Frances (1994) ‘Traditional politics against state formation in 
Brazil’, in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, & Vivienne Shue, editors, State 
Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the 
Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 37-64.  
Hall, Anthony (2005) Global Impact. Local Action: New Environmental 
Policy in Latin America. London: Institute, for the Study of the 
Americas.  
Hall, John A, editor (1986) States in History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hall, Michael (2009) ‘The Labour Policies of the Lula Government’, in 
Joseph Love & Werner Baer, editors, Brazil under Lula: Economy, 
Politics and Society under the Worker-President. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 151-165. 
Hall, Peter (2010) ‘Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological 
Perspective’, in James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, editors, Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 204-223. 
Hall, Peter (2003) ‘Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative 
Politics’, in James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer, editors, 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 373-404. 
Hall, Peter (1999) ‘The Political Economy of Europe in an Era of 
Interdependence’, in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, & 
  396 
John Stephens, editors, Continuity and Change in Contemporary 
Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 135-163.  
Hall, Peter (1993) ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, 
Comparative Politics, 25: 275-296. 
Hall, Peter (1992) ‘The movement from Keynesianism to monetarism: 
Institutional analysis and British economic policy in the 1970s’, in Sven 
Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, & Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90-113. 
Hall, Peter (1989) The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism 
Across Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Hall, Peter (1986) Governing the Economy: The Politics of State 
Intervention in Britain and France. New York: Oxford University Press.   
Hall, Peter & David Soskice (2003) ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Change: A Response to Three Critics’ Comparative European Politics 1 
(2): 241-250. 
Hall, Peter & David Soskice, editors (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hall, Peter & Rosemary CR Taylor (1998) ‘The Potential of Historical 
Institutionalism: a Response to Hay and Wincott’, Political Studies, 46: 
958-962.  
Harris, John (2009) ‘How Much Space is there for Political Agency in 
Dependent Economies? Reflections on Papers on Contemporary 
Development Inspired by Cardoso and Falcetto’s Dependencia y 
Desarollo en America Latina’, Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 44 (4): 435-440.  
Hammond, John L (2009) The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola 
and Venezuela, Draft Manuscript presented at the Politics and Protest 
Workshop, Graduate Centre Sociology Department, City University of 
New York, May 14, 2009.  
Handlin, Samuel & Ruth Berins Collier (2011) ‘The Diversity of Left Party 
Linkages and Competitive Advantages’, in Steven Levitsky & Kenneth 
 397 
Roberts, editors, The Resurgence of the Latin American Left. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 139-161.  
Harvey, David (2010) The Enigma of Capital: And the Crisis of Capitalism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, David (2003) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hay Colin (2011) ‘Ideas and the Constructions of Interests’, in Daniel Béland 
& Robert Henry Cox, editors, Ideas and Politics in Social Science 
Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 65-82. 
Hay Colin (2006) ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’, in R.A.W. Rhodes, S. 
Binder and B. Rockman, editors, Oxford Handbook of Political 
Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 56–74. 
Hay, Colin (2004a) ‘Re-Stating Politics, Re-Politicising the State: Neo-
liberalism, Economic Imperatives and the Rise of the Competition 
State’, The Political Quarterly, 75 (1): 35-80. 
Hay, Colin (2004b) ‘The normalising role of rationalist assumptions in the 
institutional embedding of neoliberalism’, Economy and Society, 33 
(4): 500-527.  
Hay, Colin (2002) Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hay, Colin (2001) ‘The “Crisis” of Keynesianism and the Rise of 
Neoliberalism in Britain: An Ideational Institutionalist Approach’, in 
John L Campbell & Ove K Pedersen, editors, The Rise of Neoliberalism 
and Institutional Analysis. Princeton, NJ & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 193-218.  
Hay, Colin (1999) ‘Crisis and Structural Transformation of the State: 
Interrogating the Process of Change’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 1 (3): 317-344.  
Hay, Colin & David Marsh, editors (2000) Demystifying Globalization. 
Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press.   
Hay, Colin & Daniel Wincott (1998) ‘Structure, Agency and Historical 
Institutionalism’, Political Studies, 46: 951-957. 
  398 
Heiss, Claudia & Patricio Navia (2007) ‘You Win Some, You Lose Some: 
Constitutional Reforms in Chile’s Transition to Democracy’, Latin 
American Politics and Society, 49 (3): 163-190. 
Hellinger, Daniel (2010) ‘Oil, Petro-Diplomacy, Trade’, in Daniel Hellinger, 
Global Security Watch – Venezuela. New York: Praeger, Chapter 3.  
Hellinger, Daniel (2008) ‘Changes in the Andean Subsoil: Why the 
Venezuelan, not the Chilean, Model’, Paper presented at Changes in the 
Andes, Brown University, Providence, USA, February 12-13. 
Hellinger, Daniel (2006) ‘Venezuelan Oil: Free Gift of Nature or Wealth of a 
Nation?’, International Journal, Winter: 55-66. 
Helms, Ludger, editor (2012) Comparative Political Leadership. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Herb, Michael (2005) ‘No Representation without Taxation? Rents, 
Development, and Democracy’, Comparative Politics, 37 (3): 297-316. 
Herb, Michael (2003) ‘Taxation and Representation’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 38 (3): 3-31. 
Herb, Michael  (1999) All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and 
Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
Hertog, Steffen (2010a) ‘Defying the Resource Curse. Explaining Successful 
State-Owned Enterprises in Rentier States’, World Politics 62 (2): 261-
301. 
Hertog, Steffen (2010b) Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats. Oil and the State 
in Saudi Arabia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Hinojosa, Leonith, Anthony Bebbington, Armando Barrientos, & Tony 
Addison (2010) ‘Social Policy and State Revenues in Mineral-Rich 
Contexts’, Social Policy & Development Programme Paper 44, Geneva: 
UNRISD. 
Hira, Anil (2007) An East Asian Model for Latin American Success: The 
New Path. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate.    
Hobson, John M & M Ramesh (2002) ‘Globalisation Makes of States What 
States Make of It: Between Agency and Structure in the 
State/Globalisation Debate’, New Political Economy, 7 (1): 5-22. 
 399 
Hochstetler, Kathryn & Margaret Keck (2007) Greening Brazil: 
Environment Activism in State and Society. Durham & London: Duke 
University Press.  
Hogenboom, Barbara (2012) ‘Depoliticised and Repoliticised Minerals in 
Latin America’, Journal of Developing Societies, 28 (2): 133-158.  
Hogenboom, Barbara & Alex Fernández Jilberto (2009) ‘The New Left and 
Mineral Politics: What’s New?’, European Review of Latin American 
and Caribbean Studies, 87: 93-102. 
Hollingsworth, J Rogers & Robert Boyer, editors (1999) Contemporary 
Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Horsfall, Daniel (2010) ‘From Competition State to Competition States?’, 
Policy Studies, 57-76. 
Hout, Wil (1999) ‘Theories of International Relations and the New 
Regionalism’, in Jean Grugel & Wil Hout, editors, Regionalism across 
the North-South Divide: State Strategies and Globalisation. London & 
New York: Routledge, 14-28.  
Hout, Wil & Jean Grugel (1999) ‘Regionalism across the North-South Divide’, 
in Jean Grugel & Wil Hout, editors, Regionalism across the North-
South Divide: State Strategies and Globalistion. London & New York: 
Routledge, 169-177. 
Houtzager, Peter P (2001) ‘Collective action and political authority: Rural 
workers, church and state in Brazil’, Theory and Society, 30 (1): 1-45.   
Houtzager, Peter P (2000) ‘Social Movements amidst Democratic 
Transitions: Lessons from Brazilian Countryside’, Journal of 
Development Studies, 36 (5): 59-88.  
Houtzager, Peter P. & Marcus J. Kurtz (2000) ‘The Institutional Roots of 
Popular Mobilisation: State Transformation and Rural Politics in Brazil 
and Chile, 1960-1995’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 42 
(2): 394-424.  
Huber, Matthew T & Jody Emel (2009) ‘Fixed Minerals, Scalar Politics: The 
Weight of Scale in Conflicts over the ‘1872 Mining Law’ in the United 
States’, Environment and Planning A, 41 (2): 371-388. 
  400
Hudson, Rex (1997) Brazil: A Country Study. Washington DC: Library of 
Congress. Accessed online at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/brtoc.html. 
Hughes, Steve & Rorden Wilkinson (1998) ‘International Labour Standards 
and World Trade: No Role for the World Trade Organisation?’, New 
Political Economy, 3 (3): 375-389. 
Hujo, Katja, editor (2012) Mineral Rents and the Financing of Social Policy: 
Opportunities and Challenges. New York: Palgrave Macmillan and 
UNRISD. 
Hujo, Katja & Shea McClanahan, editors (2009) Financing Social Policy: 
Mobilising Resources for Social Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan and UNRISD. 
Humphreys, MacCartan (2005) ‘Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict 
Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 49 (4): 508-537. 
Humphreys, MacCartan, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz (2007) Escaping 
the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Hunter, Wendy (2010) The Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, 
1989-2009. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hunter, Wendy (2008) ‘The Partido dos Trabalhadores: Is the PT Still a 
Party of the Left?’, in Peter Kingstone & Timothy Power, editors, 
Democratic Brazil Revisited. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
15-32. 
Hunter, Wendy (2007) ‘The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers' 
Party in Brazil’, World Politics, 59: 3: 440–475. 
Hunter, Wendy (1997) Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians 
Against Soldiers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Huntington, Samuel (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.    
Immergut, Ellen M (1998) ‘The Theoretical Core of the New 
Institutionalism’, Politics and Society, 26 (1): 5-34.  
Immergut, Ellen M (1992) ‘The rules of the game: The logic of health policy-
making in France, Switzerland and Sweden’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen 
Thelen, & Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical 
 401 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 57-89. 
Infante, Ricardo & Osvaldo Sunkel (2009) ‘Chile: Towards Inclusive 
Development’, CEPAL Review, 97: 133-152. 
Isham, Jonathan, Michael Woolcock, Lant Pritchett, & Gwen Busby (2005) 
‘The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export 
Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth’, World 
Bank Economic Review, 19 (2): 141-174.  
Jaffe, Amy Myers & Ronald Soligo (2007) The International Oil Companies. 
Houston, Texas: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 
November, available online at 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/NOC_IOCs_Jaffe-
Soligo.pdf.   
James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy (2007) The Changing Role of 
National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets, Number 35, 
April, available online at 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/BI_PolicyReport_35.pdf.  
Jasper, James M (1997) The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography and 
Creativity in Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jenkins, Rhys (2012) ‘Latin America and China – A New Dependency?’, 
Third World Quarterly, 33 (7): 1337-1358. 
Jenkins, Rhys (2011) ‘The "China Effect" on Commodity Prices and Latin 
American Export Earnings’, Revista CEPAL, 103 (April): 73-87. 
Jenkins, Rhys (1987) Transnational Corporations and Uneven 
Development: The Transnationalisation of Capital and the Third 
World. London: Routledge. 
Jenkins, Rhys (1984) Transnational Corporations and Industrial 
Transformation in Latin America. London: Macmillan. 
Jenkins, Rhys & Enrique Dussel Peters, editors, (2009) China and Latin 
America: Economic Relations in the Twenty-first Century. Bonn: 
German Development Institute. 
Jensen, Nathan & Leonard Wantchekon (2004) ‘Resource wealth and 
political regimes in Africa’, Comparative Political Studies, 37: 816-841.  
  402
Jessop, Bob (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Johnson, Chalmers (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of 
Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Johnston, Hank & Bert Klandermans, editors (1995) Social Movements and 
Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Jones Luong, Pauline & Erika Weinthal (2010) Oil is Not a Curse. Ownership 
Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jordan, Grant & William Maloney (1997) The protest business? Mobilising 
campaign groups. Manchester & New York: Manchester University 
Press. 
Kaplinsky, Raphael (2001) ‘Is globalisation all it is cracked up to be?’, Review 
of International Political Economy, 8 (1): 45-65. 
Karl, Terry Lynn (1999) ‘The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the 
Paradox of the Plenty’, Journal of International Affairs, 53 (1): 31-48.  
Karl, Terry Lynn (1997) The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. 
California: University of California Press.  
Karl, Terry Lynn (1990) ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America’, 
Comparative Politics, 23 (1): 1-21.  
Katznelson, Ira (2009) ‘Strong Theory, Complex History:  Structure and 
Configuration in Comparative Politics Revisited’, in Mark Irving 
Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: 
Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 96-133. 
Kaup, Brent Z (2010) ‘A Neoliberal Nationalisation? The Constraints on 
Natural Gas-led Development’, Latin American Perspectives, 37 (3): 
123-138.  
Kay, Cristóbal (2002) ‘Why East Asia overtook Latin America: Agrarian 
reform, industrialisation and development’, Third World Quarterly, 23 
(6): 1073-1102. 
Kay, Cristóbal (1981) ‘Political Economy, Class Alliances and Agrarian 
Change in Chile’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 8 (4): 485-513.   
 403 
Keck, Margaret (1992) The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Keck, Margaret & Kathryn Sikkink (1998) Activists beyond Borders. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Keohane, Robert (1984) After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Khagram, Sanjeev (2004) Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles 
for Power and Water. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
King, Gary, Robert Keohane & Almond Verba (1994) Designing Social 
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Kingstone, Peter (1999) Crafting Coalitions for Reform: Business 
Preferences, Political Institutions and Neoliberalism in Brazil. 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press.   
Kirby, Peader (2009) ‘Neo-structuralism and Reforming the Latin American 
state: Lessons from the Irish Case’, Economy and Society, 38 (1): 132-
153. 
Kirby, Peader & Mary Murphy (2010) ‘Globalisation and Models of State: 
Debates and Evidence from Ireland’, New Political Economy, iFirst, 1-
21.   
Kuruvilla, Sarosh, & Verma, Anil (2006) International Labour Standards, 
Soft Regulation, and National Government Roles, Working Paper. 
Itacha: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labour Relations, 
accessed online on 31 July 2012 at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/37. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, & John Stephens, editors, 
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Knight, Jack (1992) Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambrige: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Knutsen, Hege Merete (2000) ‘Environmental practice in the commodity 
chain: the dyestuff and tanning industries compared’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 7 (2): 254-288.  
  404
Kobrin, Stephen J (1997) ‘The Architecture of Globalisation: State 
Sovereignty in a Networked Global Economy’, in John H Dunning, 
editor, Governments, Globalisation, and International Business. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 146-171.   
Kohli, Atul (2009) ‘Nationalist versus Dependent Capitalist Development: 
Alternative Pathways of Asia and Latin America in a Globalised World’, 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 44 (4): 386-410.  
Kohli, Atul (2004) State-Directed Development: Political Power and 
Industrialisation in the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kohli, Atul & Vivienne Shue (1994) ‘State power and social forces: on 
political contention and accommodation in the Third World’, in Joel S. 
Migdal, Atul Kohli, & Vivienne Shue, editors, State Power and Social 
Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 293-326.    
Kurtz, Marcus J (2009) ‘Social Foundations of Institutional Order: 
Reconsidering War and “Resource Curse” in Third World State-
Building’, Politics and Society, 37 (4): 479-520.  
Kurtz, Marcus J. (2001) ‘State developmentalism without a Developmental 
State: The public foundations of the “Free Market Miracle” in Chile’, 
Latin American Politics and Society, 43 (2): 1-25. 
Kurtz, Marcus J & Sarah Brooks (2008) ‘Embedded Neoliberal Reform in 
Latin America’, World Politics, 60 (2): 231-280.  
Kvale, Steinar (1996) Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Kvale, Steinar & Svend Brinkmann (2009) InterViews: Learning the Craft of 
Qualitative Research Interviewing. Second Edition. Los Angeles: Sage 
Publications.  
Lagos, Gustavo (1997) ‘Developing National Mining Policies in Chile: 1974-
1996’, Resources Policy, 23 (1/2): 51-69.  
Lagos, Gustavo & Marcos Lima (2005) ‘“Pay Your Taxes!” Faulty Calculations 
or Ideological Prejudice?’, in UNRISD, The “Pay Your Taxes” Debate. 
Perspectives on Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility in the 
Chilean Mining Industry. Geneva: UNRISD Publications, 35-52.  
 405 
Lawrence, Andrew (Forthcoming) ‘Neoliberalism, Mineral Resource 
Governance, and Developmental States’, in Jewellord T Nem Singh & 
France Bourgouin, editors, Resource Governance and Developmental 
States in the Global South: Critical International Political Economy 
Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Leiva, Fernando Ignacio (2008) Latin American Neostructuralism: The 
Contradictions of Post-Neoliberal Development. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Leiva, Fernando Ignacio (2006) ‘Neoliberal and Neostructuralist 
Perspectives on Labour Flexibility, Poverty and Inequality: A Critical 
Appraisal’s, New Political Economy, 11 (3): 337-359.    
Leiva Gómez, Sandra (2009) ‘La Subcontratación en la Minería en Chile: 
Elementos Teóricos Para el Análisis’, Polis: Revista Latinoamericana, 
24, accessed online at http://polis.revues.org/1540 ; DOI : 
10.4000/polis.1540. 
Levi, Margaret (1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Levitsky, Steven (2003) ‘From Labour politics to Machine politics: The 
Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983-
1999’, Latin American Research Review, 38 (3): 3-36. 
Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth Roberts, editors (2011) The Resurgence of the 
Latin American Left. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lichbach, Mark Irving & Alan S. Zuckerman, editors (2009) Comparative 
Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Linder, Johannes & Berthold Rittberger (2003) ‘The Creation, Interpretation 
and Contestation of Institutions – Revisiting Historical 
Institutionalism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41 (3): 445-473.  
Locke, Richard M & Monica Romis (2010) The promise and perils of private 
voluntary regulation: Labour standards and work organisation in two 
Mexican garment factories’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 17 (1): 45-74. 
  406
Locke, Richard M & Kathleen Thelen (1995) ‘Apples and Oranges Revisited: 
Contextualised Comparisons and the Study of Comparative Labour 
Politics’, Politics and Society, 23 (3): 337-367. 
Love, Joseph & Werner Baer, editors (2009) Brazil under Lula: Economy, 
Politics and Society under the Worker-President. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Loveman, Brian (2001) Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism. 3rd 
edition, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lowndes, Vivien (2002) ‘Institutionalism’, in David Marsh & Gerry Stoker, 
editors, Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd edition. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 90-108.  
Lunt, Neil (2010) ‘Winning hearts and minds for the Competition State’, 
Policy Studies, 31 (1): 23-37. 
MacDonald, Laura & Arne Ruckert, editors (2009) Post-neoliberalism in the 
Americas. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Machado, Iran F (1997) ‘The CVRD Privatisation a Hard Victory for the 
Government’, Minerals and Energy - Raw Materials Report, 14 (4): 
36-41. 
Machado, Iran F & Silvia F de M Figueirôa (2001) ‘500 Years of Mining in 
Brazil: A Brief Review’, Resources Policy, 27: 9-24. 
 
Mahoney, James (2003) ‘Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative 
Historical Analysis’, in James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ed, 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 337-372. 
Mahoney, James (2000) ‘Path dependence in historical sociology’, Theory 
and Society, 29 (4): 507-548. 
Mahoney, James & Dietrich Rueschemeyer, editor (2003) Comparative 
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mahoney, James & Kathleen Thelen, editors (2010) Explaining Institutional 
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 407 
Mahony, Mary Ann (2007) ‘The Local and the Global: Internal and External 
Factors in the Development of Bahia’s Cacao Sector’, in Steven Topik, 
Carlos Marichal, & Zephyr Frank, editors, From Silver to Cocaine: 
Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World 
Economy, 1500-2000. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 174-
203. 
Mann, Michael (1986) The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1: A History of 
power from the beginning to AD 1760. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Marsh, David, Nicola Smith, & Nicola Hothi (2005) ‘Globalisation and the 
State’, in Colin Hay, Michael Lister, & David Marsh, editors, The State: 
Theories and Issues, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 172-189. 
Martin, Pamela L (2003) The Globalization of Contentious Politics: The 
Amazonian Indigenous Rights Movements. New York & London: 
Routledge. 
Matos, Marcelo Badaró (2009) Trabalhadores e Sindicatos no Brasili. Sao 
Paulo: Editora Expressão Popular. 
Mattli, Walter & Tim Büthe (2005) ‘Accountability in Accounting? The 
Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest’, Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 18 
(3): 399-429. 
McCormick, Sabrina (2009) ‘Damming the Amazon: Local Movements and 
Transnational Struggles Over Water’, Society and Natural Resources, 
24 (1): 34-48. 
McCormick, Sabrina (2007) ‘The Governance of Hydro-electric Dams in 
Brazil’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 39 (2): 227-261. 
McDaniel, Josh (2002) ‘Confronting the Structure of International 
Development: Political Agency and the Chiquitanos of Bolivia’, Human 
Ecology, 30 (3): 369-396. 
McNeill, John R (2000) Something New under the Sun: An Environmental 
History of the Twentieth Century. New York & London: Norton Books. 
Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, & Ragnar Torvik (2006) ‘Institutions and the 
Resource Curse’, The Economic Journal, 116: 1-20. 
  408
Mejía Acosta, Andrés & Paolo de Renzio (2008) ‘Aid, Rents, and the Politics 
of the Budget Process’, IDS Working Paper Series 311, Brighton: 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. 
Melo, Marcus André (2008) ‘Unexpected Successes, Unanticipated Failures: 
Social Policy from Cardoso to Lula’, in Peter R Kingstone & Timothy 
Power, editors, Democratic Brazil Revisited. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 161-184. 
Menezes-Filho, Naercio, Helio Zylberstajn, Jose Paulo Chahad & Elaine 
Pazello (2005) ‘Unions and Economic Performance of Brazilian 
Establishments’, in Peter Kuhn & Gustavo Márquez, editors, What 
Difference Do Unions Make? Their Impact on Productivity and Wages 
in Latin America. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 
77-99. 
Migdal, Joel (2009) ‘Researching the State’, in Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan 
S. Zuckerman, editors, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and 
Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 162-192. 
Migdal, Joel (2001) State in Society: Studying How States and Societies 
Transform and Constitute One Another. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Migdal, Joel (1994) ‘The state in society: an approach to struggles for 
domination’, in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, & Vivienne Shue, editors, 
State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the 
Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 7-34. 
Miller, Rory & Robert Greenhill (2007) ‘The Fertilizer Commodity Chains: 
Guano and Nitrate, 1840-1930’, in Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, & 
Zephyr Frank, editors, From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American 
Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500-
2000. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 228-270. 
Mir, Pablo (2010)  ‘Mining Royalties and Taxation, the Chilean Experience’, 
Bofil Mir & Alvarez Hinzpeter Jana, Abogados, Accessed online on25 
March 2012 at 
http://www.ibram.org.br/sites/1300/1382/00000615.pdf.  
 409 
Mitlin, Diana (2008) ‘With and beyond the state – co-production as a route 
to political influence, power and transformation for grassroots 
organizations’, Environment and Urbanization, 20 (2): 339-360. 
Moe, Terry (2006) ‘Power and Political Institutions’, in Ian Shapiro, Stephen 
Skowronek, & Daniel Galvin, editors, Rethinking Political Institutions: 
The Art of the State. New York & London: New York University Press, 
32-71.   
Montenegro, Ricardo Sá (2003) ‘O Setor Petroquimico’, in BNDES Histórias 
Setoriais. Rio de Janeiro: BNDES. 
Montero, Alfredo P (1998) ‘State Interests and the New Industrial Policy in 
Brazil: The Privatisation of Steel, 1990-1994’, Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, 40: 27-62. 
Moore, Barrington Jr (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: 
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Moran, Theodore (2010) China’s Strategy to Secure Natural Resources: 
Risks, Dangers and Opportunities. Washington DC: Peter G. Peterson 
Institute for International Economics.  
Moran, Theodore (1977) Multinational Corporations and the Politics of 
Dependence: Copper in Chile. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Morgenstern, Scott & Benito Nacif, editors (2002) Legislative Politics in 
Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mosley, Layna (2010) Labour Rights and Multinational Production. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mosley, Layna (2005) ‘Globalisation and the State: Still room to move?’, New 
Political Economy, 10 (3): 355-362. 
Mosley, Layna (2003) Global Capital and National Governments. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mosley, Lana & David A Singer (2010) ‘Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and 
Opportunities for International Political Economy’, in Nicola Phillips & 
Catherine Weaver, editors, International Political Economy: Debating 
the Past, Present, and Future. London: Routledge. 
Moulian, Tomas (2009) Contradicciones del Desarollo Político Chileno. 
1920-1990. Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones. 
  410 
Mueller, Bernardo & André Rossi de Oliveira (2009) ‘Regulation during the 
Lula Government’, in Joseph Love & Werner Baer, editors, Brazil under 
Lula: Economy, Politics and Society under the Worker-President. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 93-114. 
Munck, Gerardo L (2009) ‘Democracy and Development in a Globalised 
World: Thinking about Latin America from Within’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 44 (4): 337-358. 
Muñoz Goma, Oscar, editor (1996) Después de las Privatizaciones: Hacia el 
Estado Regulador. Santiago de Chile: CIEPLAN/Dolmen Ediciones. 
Murillo, Maria Victoria (2009) Political Competition, Partisanship and 
Policy Making in Latin American Public Utilities. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Murillo, Maria Victoria (2001) Labour Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and 
Market Reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Murillo, Maria Victoria, Lucas Ronconi, & Andrew Schrank (2011) ‘Latin 
American Labour Reforms: Evaluating Risk and Security’, in José 
Antonio Ocampo & Jaime Ros, editors, The Oxford Handbook of Latin 
American Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 790-812. 
Naím, Moisés (1994) ‘Latin America: The Second Stage of Reform’, Journal 
of Democracy, 5 (4): 32-48. 
Nash, June (1989) ‘Cultural Resistance and Class Consciousness in Bolivian 
Tin-Mining Communities’, in Susan Eckstein, editor, Power and 
Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley & 
London: University of California Press, 182-202. 
Nem Singh, Jewellord T (2012) ‘Chile’s Mining Unions and the ‘New Left’, 
1990-2010’, in Barry Cannon & Peadar Kirby, editors, Civil Society and 
the State in Left-led Latin America: Challenges and Limitations to 
Democratisation. London: Zed Books, 141-157. 
Nem Singh, Jewellord T (2010) ‘Reconstituting the Neostructuralist State: 
The Political Economy of Continuity and Change in Chilean Mining 
Policy’, Third World Quarterly, 31 (8): 1-20. 
Nem Singh, Jewellord T & France Bourgouin, editors (Forthcoming) 
Resource Governance and Developmental States in the Global South: 
 411 
Critical International Political Economy Perspectives. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Nem Singh, Jewellord T & Eliza Massi (Forthcoming) ‘Rethinking 
Neoliberalism in Brazil: The Political Economy of Reforms in Oil and 
Mining’, Politics and Society, Special issue on Post-Neoliberalism in the 
Southern Cone. 
North, Douglass C (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nunes, Edson (1997) A Gramática Política do Brasil. Clientilismo e 
Insulamento Burocrático. Terceira Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar 
Editor. 
O’Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, & Marc Williams 
(2000) Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic 
Institutions and Global Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ohmae, Kenichi (1995) The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional 
Economies. New York: Free Press. 
Ohmae, Kenichi (1990) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the 
Interlinked Economy. London: Collins.  
Orihuela, José Carlos (2011) Journeys Towards Sustainable Development: 
Policy Entrepreneurs and the Rise of the Green State in Chile and Peru. 
PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, USA. 
Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.   
Otto, James, Craig Andrews, Fred Cawood, Michael Doggett, Pietro Guj, 
Frank Stermole, John Stermole, & John Tilton (2006) Mining 
Royalties: A Global Study of Their Impact on Investors, Government 
and Civil Society. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Oxhorn, Philip (1998) ‘Is the Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism 
and the Rise of Neopluralism’, in Philip Oxhorn & Graciela 
Ducatenzeiler, editors, What Kind of Democracy? What Kind of 
Market? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism. University Park, 
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press: 195-218. 
  412 
Oxhorn, Philip (1996) Organising Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the 
Struggle for Democracy in Chile. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Oxhorn, Philip & Graciela Ducatenzeiler, editors (1998) What Kind of 
Democracy? What Kind of Market? Latin America in the Age of 
Neoliberalism. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Paczynska, Agnieszka (2007) ‘Confronting change: Labour, State, and 
Privatisation’, Review of International Political Economy, 14 (2): 333-
356. 
Palan, Ronen (2000) ‘Recasting Political Authority: Globalisation and the 
State’, in Randall Germain, editor, Globalisation and its Critics: 
Perspectives from Political Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
139-163. 
Paley, Julia (2001) Marketing Democracy. Power and Social Movements in 
Post-Dictatorial Chile. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Panizza, Francisco (2009) Contemporary Latin America: Development and 
Democracy beyond the Washington Consensus. London: Zed Books. 
Panizza, Francisco (2000) ‘Neopopulism and its Limits in Collor’s Brazil’, 
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 19 (2): 177-192. 
Parra, Francisco (2004) Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum. 
London: IB Taurus. 
Peck, Jamie (2010) Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pedersen, Jørgen Dige (2008) Globalisation, Development and the State. 
The Performance of Brazil and India since 1990. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Pérez, Patricio & Pablo Villalobos (2010) ‘¿Por qué Subcontratan las 
Empresas Mineras de Chile?’, Estudios Públicos, 119 (Winter): 63-91. 
Perreault, Thomas (2008a) ‘Popular Protest and Unpopular Policies: State 
Restructuring, Resource Conflict, and Social Justice in Bolivia’, in David 
Carruthers, editor, Environmental Justice in Latin America: Problems, 
Promise and Practice, Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 239-262. 
 413 
Perreault, Thomas (2008b) ‘Natural Gas, Indigenous Mobilization and the 
Bolivian State’, UNRISD Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme 
Paper No. 12, Geneva: UNRISD. 
Perreault, Thomas (2008c) ‘Latin American Social Movements: A Review 
and Critique of the Geographical Literature’, Geography Compass, 2 
(5): 1363-1685. 
Perreault, Thomas (2006) ‘From the Guerra Del Agua to the Guerra Del 
Gas: Resource Governance, Neoliberalism and Popular Protest in 
Bolivia’, Antipode, 38 (1): 150-172. 
Perreault, Thomas & Gabriela Valdivia (2010) ‘Hydrocarbons, Popular 
Protest and National Imaginaries: Ecuador and Bolivia in Comparative 
Context’, Geoforum, 41 (5): 689-699. 
Petras, James (1972) ‘Chile: Nacionalización, Transformaciones 
Socioeconómicas, y Participación Popular’, Cuadernos de la Realidad 
Nacional 11: 3-24. 
Petras, James (1969) Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development. 
Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Petras, James & Henry Veltmeyer (2012) Beyond Neoliberalism: A World to 
Win. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing. 
Philip, George (1982) Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist 
Movements and State Companies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Phillips, Nicola (2007) Consequences of an Emerging China: Is development 
space disappearing for Latin America and the Caribbean? Waterloo, 
Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation (Working 
Paper 14).    
Phillips, Nicola (2005) ‘State Debates in International Political Economy’, in 
Nicola Phillips, editor, Globalising International Political Economy. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 82-115. 
Phillips, Nicola (2004) The Southern Cone Model: The Political Economy of 
Regional Capitalist Development in Latin America. London: 
Routledge. 
  414 
Phillips, Nicola (1998) ‘Globalisation and the “Paradox of State Power”: 
Perspectives from Latin America’, CSGR Working Paper No. 16/98, 
University of Warwick. 
Pierson, Paul (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social 
Analysis. Princeton, NJ & Oxford: Princeton University Press.   
Pierson, Paul (2000) ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics’, American Political Science Review, 94 (2): 251-267. 
Pierson, Paul (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and 
the Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Pinheiro, Armando Castelar (2002) ‘The Brazilian Privatisation Experience: 
What’s Next?’, Working Paper Series CBS 30-02, Oxford: University of 
Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies.  
Pinheiro, Armando Castelar (1994) ‘Structural Adjustment and Privatisation 
in Brazil’, Texto para Discussão Numero 356, Rio de Janeiro: IPEA.  
Pinheiro, Armando Castelar, Regis Bonelli, & Ben Ross Schneider (2004) 
‘Pragmatic Policy in Brazil: The Political Economy of Incomplete 
Market Reform’, Texto Para Discussão Numero 1035, Rio de Janeiro: 
IPEA. 
Pirages, Dennis & Ken Cousins (2005) From Resource Scarcity to Ecological 
Security. Exploring New Limits to Growth. MA & London: MIT Press.  
Pitelis, Christos & Roger Sugden (2000) The Nature of the Transnational 
Firm. London: Routledge. 
Portes, Alejandro (2010) Economic Sociology: A Systematic Inquiry. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Postali, Fernando Antonio (2009) ‘Petroleum Royalties and Regional 
Development in Brazil: The Economic Growth of Recipient Towns’, 
Resources Policy, 34 (4): 205-213. 
Postali, Fernando Antonio (2002a) ‘Relações entre Governo e Investidores na 
Indústria de Petróleo no Brasil: Algumas Considerações’, Revista do 
BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, 9 (17): 221-236. 
Postali, Fernando Antonio (2002b) Renda Mineral, Divisão de Riscos e 
Beneficios Governamentais na Exploração de Petróleo no Brasil. Rio 
de Janeiro: BNDES. 
 415 
Powell, Walter & Paul DiMaggio (1991) ‘Introduction’, in Walter Poweell & 
Paul DiMaggio, editors The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1-40. 
Prebisch, Raúl (1959) ‘Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries’, 
American Economic Review, 49 (2): 251-273. 
Prebisch, Raúl (1949) El Desarrollo Económico de la América Latina y 
Algunos de sus Principales Problemas. Santiago: CEPAL (E/CN.12/89). 
Przeworski, Adam (1991) Democracy and the Market. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Puga, Fernando (2007) ‘Petróleo e Álcool Mudam a Pauta Exportadora 
Brasileira’, BNDES Visão do Desenvolvimento Numero 33, 20 July 
edition, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES.  
Radcliffe, Sarah (2010) ‘Non-rational aspects of the competition state – the 
case of policy consultation in Australia’, Policy Studies, 31 (1): 117-128. 
Radcliffe, Sarah (2005) ‘Neoliberalism as we know it, but not in conditions of 
its own choosing: a commentary’, Environment and Planning A, 37: 
323-329. 
Radetzki, Manuel, Roderick Eggert, Gustavo Lagos, Marcos Lima, & John 
Tilton (2008) ‘The Boom in the Mineral Markets: How Long Might it 
Last?’, Resources Policy, 33: 125-128. 
Radon, Jenkins (2005) ‘The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-
concession Agreements, Joint Ventures and Production-sharing 
Agreements’, in Svetalana Tsalik, & Anya Schiffrin, editors, Covering 
Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development. New York: Open 
Society Institute, 61–86. 
Ramalho, José Ricardo (2007) ‘Trade Unions and Politics in Brazil’, in Craig 
Phelan, editor, Trade Union Revitalisation. Trends and Prospects in 34 
Countries. Bern & Oxford: Peter Lang Publications, 91-104. 
Ramamurti, Ravi (2009) ‘What Have We Learned About Emerging-Market 
MNEs?’, in Ravi Ramamurti & Jitendra Singh, editors, Emerging 
Multinationals from Emerging Markets. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 399-426. 
Ramamurti, Ravi & Jitendra Singh, editors (2009) Emerging Multinationals 
from Emerging Markets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  416 
Randall, Laura (1993) The Political Economy of Brazilian Oil. New York: 
Praeger. 
Raw, Silvia (1987) ‘The Making of a State-Owned Conglomerate: A Brazilian 
Case Study’, Working Paper No. 97. Kellogg Institute for International 
Studies, University of Notre Dame, August. Accessed on 15 July 2011 at 
http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/097.pdf.   
Rendfew, Daniel (2011) ‘The Curse of Wealth: Political Ecologies of Latin 
American Neoliberalism’, Geography Compass, 5 (8): 581-594 
Rénique, Gerardo (2009) Latin America: The New Neoliberalism and 
Popular Mobilisation, Socialism and Democracy, 23 (3): 1-26. 
Riesco, Manuel (2008) ‘On ‘Mineral Rents and Social Development – 
Commentary Paper for Carlos Gajardo, Juan (2008) Mineral Rents and 
Social Development in Chile. Geneva: UNRISD Publication’, Geneva: 
UNRISD Publications. Accessed online on 15 May 2012 at 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/d2a23ad2d50cb
2a280256eb300385855/ee80779d53a6e7f6c12574f00039c8dc/$FILE/
draft_Riesco.pdf.   
Riesco, Manuel (2005) ‘Pay Your Taxes! Corporate Social Responsibility and 
the Mining Industry in Chile’, in UNRISD, The “Pay Your Taxes” 
Debate. Perspectives on Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility 
in the Chilean Mining Industry. Geneva: UNRISD Publications, 1-32. 
Riethof, Marieke (2004) ‘Changing Strategies of the Brazilian Labour 
Movement: From Opposition to Participation’, Latin American 
Perspectives, 31 (6): 31-47. 
Riggirozzi, Pia (2010) Advancing Governance in the South: What are the 
Roles for International Financial Institutions in Developing States? 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Riisgard, Lone & Nikolaus Hammer (2011) ‘Prospects for Labour in Global 
Value Chains: Labour Standards in the Cut Flower and Banana 
Industries’, British Journal of International Studies, 49 (1): 168-190. 
Rindefjäll, Teresia (2009) ‘Continuity and Change in Chile’s Neoliberal 
Democracy’, in Jean Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, editors, Governance after 
Neoliberalism in Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 175-
194. Roberts, Kenneth (1998) Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left 
 417 
and Social Movements in Chile and Peru. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.   
Robinson, William I (2008) Latin America and Global Capitalism: A 
Critical Globalisation Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.  
Ross, Michael (2012) The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the 
Development of Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ross, Michael (2006) ‘A Closer look at Oil, Diamonds and Civil War’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 9: 265-300.   
Ross, Michael (2001a) Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in 
Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ross, Michael (2001b) ‘Does Oil hinder democracy?’, World Politics, 53 (3): 
325-361. 
Ross, Michael (2001c) Extractive Sector and the Poor. An Oxfam Report. 
Washington DC: Oxfam America. 
Ross, Michael (1999) ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, World 
Politics, 51: 297-322. 
Rosser, Andrew (2009) ‘Natural Resource Wealth, Development and Social 
Policy: Evidence and Issues’, in Katja Hujo & Shea McClanahan, 
editors, Financing Social Policy: Mobilising Resources for Social 
Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan & UNRISD, 165-182. 
Rosser, Andrew (2007) ‘Escaping the Resource Curse? The Case of 
Indonesia’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 37 (1): 38-58.  
Rosser, Andrew (2006) ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A 
Literature Survey’, IDS Working Paper 268, Sussex: Institute of 
Development Studies. 
Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic 
of the Universal Welfare State. New York: Cambridge University Press.   
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (2003) ‘Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical 
Gains?’, in James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer, editors, 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 305-336.   
  418 
Ruiz-Dana, Alejandra (2007) Commodity Revenue Management: The Case 
of Chile´s Copper Boom. Manitoba: International Institute for Social 
Development.    
Sachs, Jeffrey & Andrew Warner (2001) ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, 
European Economic Review, 45: 827-838. 
Sachs, Jeffrey & Andrew Warner (1997) ‘Natural Resource Abundance and 
Economic Growth – Revised Version’, Working Paper, Harvard 
University. 
Sachs, Jeffrey & Andrew Warner (1995) ‘Economic Reform and the Process of 
Global Integration’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995 (1): 
1-118.   
Salazar, Gabriel & Julio Pinto (1999) Historia Contemporánea de Chile II. 
Actores, Identidad, y Movimiento. Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones.  
Sanabria, Harry (1999) ‘Consolidating States, Restructuring Economies and 
Confronting Workers and Peasants: The Antimonies of Bolivian 
Neoliberalism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 41 (3): 
535-562.  
Sant’Anna, André Albuquerque (2010) ‘Brasil é a Principal Fronteira de 
Expansão do Petróleo no Mundo’, BNDES Visão do Desenvolvimento 
Numero 87, 18 October edition, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES. 
Santana, Marco Aurélio & Ruy Braga (2009) ‘Brazil: The Swinging Pendulum 
Between Labour Sociology and Labour Movement’, Work and 
Occupations, 36 (2): 96-109.  
Sawyer, Suzana (2004) Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational 
Oil, and Neoliberalism in Ecuador. Durham & London: Duke 
University Press. 
Sánchez Albavera, Fernando, Georgina Ortiz, & Nicole Moussa (2001) 
‘Mining in Latin America in the Late 1990s’, ECLAC Serie en Recursos 
Naturales e Infraestructura ˚1, Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. 
Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego (2009) ‘State, Firms and the Process of Industrial 
Upgrading: Latin America's Variety of Capitalism and the Costa Rican 
Experience’, Economy and Society, 38(1): 62-86. 
 419 
Schamis, Hector E (2002) Re-Forming the State. The Politics of 
Privatisation in Latin America and Europe. Ann Arbor: Michigan 
University Press. 
Schamis, Hector E (1999) ‘Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of 
Economic Reform in Latin America’, World Politics, 51 (2): 236-268. 
Scheuerman, William E (2001) ‘False humanitarianism? US advocacy of 
transnational labour protections’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 8 (3): 359-388. 
Schmidt, Vivien (2012) ‘A Curious Constructivism: A Response to Professor 
Bell’, British Journal of Political Science, 42 (3): 705-713. 
Schmidt, Vivien (2010) ‘Taking Ideas and Discourses Seriously: Explaining 
Change through Discourse Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New 
Institutionalism’, European Political Science Review, 2 (1): 1-25. 
Schmidt, Vivien (2009) ‘Putting the Political Back Into Political Economy by 
Bringing the State Back in Yet’, World Politics, 61 (3): 516-546. 
Schmidt, Vivien (2008) ‘Discourse Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power 
of Ideas and Discourse’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11: 303-
326. 
Schmidt, Vivien (2006) Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schmidt, Vivien (2002) The Future of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Schmitter, Philippe (1972) Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.   
Schneider, Ben Ross (2009a) ‘A Comparative Political Economy of 
Diversified Business Groups, or how States organise Big Business’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 16 (2): 178-201. 
Schneider, Ben Ross (2009b) ‘Big Business in Brazil: Leveraging Natural 
Endowments and State Support for International Expansion’, in Lael 
Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, editors, Brazil as an Economic 
Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global 
Economy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 159-185. 
  420
Schneider, Ben Ross (2008) ‘Economic Liberalisation and Corporate 
Governance: The Resilience of Business Groups in Latin America’, 
Comparative Politics, 40 (4), 379-397. 
Schneider, Ben Ross (2004a) Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-
Century Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Schneider, Ben Ross (2004b) ‘Organising Interests and Coalitions in the 
Politics of Market Reform in Latin America’, World Politics, 56 (3): 
456-479.    
Schneider, Ben Ross (1999) ‘The Desarollista State in Brazil and Mexico’, in 
Meredith Woo-Cumings, editor, The Developmental State. Ithaca, 
Cornell: Cornell University Press, 276-305.  
Schneider, Ben Ross & David Soskice (2009) ‘Inequality in Developed 
Countries and Latin America: Coordinated, Liberal, and Hierarchical 
Systems’, Economy and Society, 38 (1): 17-52. 
Schurman, Rachel A (2001) ‘Uncertain gains: Labour in Chile’s New Export 
Sectors’, Latin American Research Review, 36 (2): 3-29. 
Scott, W. Richard (2001) Institutions and Organisations. Second Edition. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Scott, W. Richard (1991) ‘Unpacking Institutional Arguments’, in Walter 
Powell & Paul DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in 
Organisational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 164-
182. 
Selwyn, Ben (2011) ‘The Political Economy of Class Compromise: Trade 
Unions, Capital-Labour Relations and Development in Northeast 
Brazil’, Antipode, 43 (4): 1305-1329. 
Shafer, D. Michael (1994) Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the 
Development Prospects of States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   
Shepsle, Kenneth (2006) ‘Old Questions and New Answers about 
Institutions: The Riker Objection’, in Barry Weingast & Donald 
Wittman, editors, Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1031-1049. 
Sias, Rodrigo (2008) ‘O Fundo Soberano Brasileiro e suas Implicações para a 
Política Econômica’, Revista de BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, 15 (30): 93-
127. 
 421 
Sicsú, João, Luiz Fernando de Paula, & Renaut Michel (2007) ‘Por que Novo-
Desenvolvimentismo?’, Revista de Economia Política, 27 (4): 507-524.  
Sikkink, Kathryn (1993) ‘Las Capacidades y la Autonomia del Estado en 
Brasil y la Argentina. Un Enfoque Neoinstitucionalista’, Desarrollo 
Economico, 32 (128): 543-574. 
Sikkink, Kathryn (1991) Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil 
and Argentina. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Silva, Eduardo (2009) Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Silva, Eduardo (1996) The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, 
Technocrats, and Market Economics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press. 
Silva, Patricio (2009) In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in 
Chile. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Silva, Patricio (2004) ‘Doing Politics in a Depoliticized Society: Social Change 
and Political Deactivation in Chile’, Bulletin of Latin American 
Research, 23 (1): 63-78.  
Silva, Patricio (1999) ‘The New Political Order in Latin America: Towards 
Technocratic Democracies?’, In Robert N. Gwynne & Cristóbal Kay, 
editors, Latin America Transformed: Globalisation and Modernity. 
Arnold: London, 51-65. 
Silva, Patricio (1991) ‘Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago 
Boys to the Cieplan Monks’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 23 (2): 
385-410. 
Skidmore, Thomas (1973) ‘Politics and Economic Policy Making in 
Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71’, in Alfred Stepan, editor, Authoritarian 
Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 3-46. 
Sklair, Leslie (2001) The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Skocpol, Theda (1994) Social Revolutions in the Modern World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Skocpol, Theda (1979) States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative 
Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.    
  422 
Slater, Dan (2010) Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian 
Leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smelser, Neil (1963) Theory of Collective Behaviour. New York: Free Press.    
Smith, Benjamin (2007) Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil Politics in 
Iran and Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Smith, Benjamin (2004) ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing 
World, 1960-1990’, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2): 232-
246.   
Smith, Nicola J (2006) ‘Mapping Processes of Policy Change in 
Contemporary European Political Economies: The Irish Case’, British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations, 8 (4): 519–38. 
Smith, Nicola J (2005) Showcasing Globalisation: The Political Economy of 
the Irish Republic. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Smith, Peter Seaborne (1976) Oil and Politics in Modern Brazil. Toronto: 
Macmillan. 
Soederberg, Susanne (2010) ‘The Mexican Competition State and the 
Paradoxes of Managed Neo-liberal Development’, Policy Studies, 31 (1): 
77-94. 
Standing, Guy (1997) ‘Globalisation, Labour Flexibility and Insecurity: The 
Era of Market Regulation’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 3 
(1): 7-37. 
Starosta, Guido (2010) ‘The Outsourcing of Manufacturing and the Rise of 
Giant Global Contractors: A Marxian Approach to Some Recent 
Transformations of Global Value Chains’, New Political Economy, 15 
(4): 543-563.  
Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen, & Frank Longstreth, editors (1992) 
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Stepan, Alfred, editor (1989) Democratizing Brazil. Problems of Transition 
and Consolidation. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.     
Stepan, Alfred, editor (1973) Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, Future. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Stepan, Alfred (1971) The Military in Politics. Changing Patterns in Brazil. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 423 
Stevis, Dimitris & Terry Boswell (1997) ‘Labour: From National Resistance to 
International Politics’, New Political Economy, 2 (1): 93-104. 
Stokes, Susan (2001) Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise 
in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Strange, Gerard (2002) ‘Globalisation, Regionalism and Labour Interests in 
the New International Political Economy’, New Political Economy, 7 
(3): 343-365.  
Strange, Susan (1997) ‘An International Political Economy Perspective’, in 
John H Dunning, editor, Governments, Globalisation, and 
International Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 132-145.   
Strange, Susan (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the 
World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Strange, Susan (1991) ‘Big Business and the State’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, 20 (2): 245-250.  
Streeck, Wolfgang & Kathleen Thelen (2005) Beyond Continuity: 
Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Taylor, Marcus (2010) ‘Evolution of the Competition State in Latin America: 
Power, Contestation, and Neo-liberal Populism’, Policy Studies, 31 (1): 
39-56. 
Taylor, Marcus (2006) From Pinochet to the ‘Third Way’: Neoliberalism and 
Social Transformation in Chile. London & Ann Arbour: Pluto Press.  
Teichman, Judith A (2001) The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin 
America: Chile, Argentina and Mexico. Chapel Hill & London: 
University of North Carolina Press.  
Thelen, Kathleen (2003) ‘How Institutions Evolve: Insights from 
Comparative Historical Analysis’, in James Mahoney & Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, editors, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 305-336.  
Thelen, Kathleen (1999) ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 369-404. 
Thelen, Kathleen & Sven Steinmo (1992) ‘Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Politics’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, & Frank 
  424 
Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-32. 
Thuber, Mark C & Benedicte Tangen Istad (2011) ‘Norway's Evolving 
Champion: Statoil and the Politics of State Enterprise’, in David Victor, 
David Hults, & Mark Thurber, editors, Oil and Governance: State-
Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Thuber, Mark C, David Hults, & Patrick Hellner (2011) ‘Exporting the 
‘Norwegian Model’: The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector 
Performance’, Energy Policy, 39 (9): 5366-5378. 
Tilly, Charles (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992. 
Cambridge, MA & Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 
Tilly, Charles (1984) Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Tilly, Charles (1975) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Tilly, Charles & Sidney Tarrow (2007) Contentious Politics. Boulder & 
London: Paradigm Publishers.   
Tockman, Jason (2010) ‘Varieties of Post-neoliberalism: Ecuador and 
Bolivia’s divergent paths of citizenship, participation, and natural 
resource policy’, Paper presented at the 2010 Congress of the Latin 
American Studies Association (LASA), Toronto, Canada, October 6-9. 
Tooze, Roger (1990) ‘Understanding the Global Political Economy: Applying 
Gramsci’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 19: 273-280.  
Topik, Steven & Mario Samper (2007) ‘The Latin American Coffee 
Commodity Chain: Brazil and Costa Rica’, in Steven Topik, Carlos 
Marichal, & Zephyr Frank, editors, From Silver to Cocaine: Latin 
American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 
1500-2000. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 118-146.  
Topik, Steven, Carlos Marichal, & Zephyr Frank, editors (2007) From Silver 
to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the 
World Economy, 1500-2000. Durham & London: Duke University 
Press.  
 425 
Topik, Steven, John M. Talbot & Mario Samper (2010) ‘Introduction: 
Globalisation, Neoliberalism, and the Latin American Coffee Societies’, 
Latin American Perspectives, 37 (2): 5-20.  
Torfing, Jacob (2001) ‘Path-Dependent Danish Welfare Reforms: The 
Contribution of the New Institutionalisms to Understanding 
Evolutionary Change’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 24 (4): 277-309. 
Trebat, Thomas J (1983) Brazil’s State-Owned Enterprises. A Case Study of 
the State as Entrepreneur. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Triner, Gail D (2011) Mining and the State in Brazilian Development. 
London: Pickering & Chatto Publishers. 
Triner, Gail D (2007) ‘Minerals, Institutions and Industrialisation: Iron Ore 
and the Brazilian State in the 20th Century’, Draft paper presented at 
the Economic History Association Conference in Austin, Texas, 8 
September. 
Tussie, Diana (2009) ‘Economic Governance after Neoliberalism’, in Jean 
Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, editors, Governance after Neoliberalism in 
Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 67-87.     
Uba, Katrin (2007) Do Protests Make a Difference? The Impact of Anti-
Privatization Movements in India and Peru, PhD dissertation, Uppsala 
Universitet, Sweden. 
Uba, Katrin (2005) ‘Political Protest and Policy Change: The Direct Impacts 
of Indian Anti-privatization mobilizations, 1990-2003’, Mobilization: 
An International Journal, 10 (3): 383-396. 
Ubiraci Sennes, Ricardo & Thais Narciso (2009) ‘Brazil as an International 
Energy Player’, in Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, editors, 
Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing 
Role in the Global Economy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 17-54. 
Ugarte Cataldo, José Luis (2006) ‘Sobre relaciones laborales triangulares: La 
subcontratación y el suministro de trabajadores’, Ius et Praxis, 12 (1): 
11-29 (Available online at http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-
00122006000100002&script=sci_arttext&tlng=pt).   
Ulfelder, Jay (2007) ‘Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of 
Autocracy’, Comparative Political Studies, 40 (8): 995-1018.  
  426 
Vacs, Aldo C (2010) ‘Conclusions. Paved with Good Intentions: The Bachelet 
Administration and the Decline of the Consensus’, in Silvia Borzutzky & 
Gregory Weeks, editors, The Bachelet Government: Conflict and 
Consensus in Post-Pinochet Chile. Florida: University Press of Florida, 
215-222. 
Valdivia, Gabriela (2008) ‘Governing relations between people and things: 
Citizenship, territory, and the political economy of petroleum in 
Ecuador’, Political Geography, 27: 456-477. 
Valenzuela, Arturo (1978) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Van Cott, Donna Lee (2008) Radical Democracy in the Andes. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Veggeland, Noralv (2009) Taming the Regulatory State: Politics and Ethics. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.  
Vergara, Angela (2008) Copper Workers, International Business and Do-
mestic Politics in Cold War Chile. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Vergara, Pilar (1985) Auge y Caída del Neoliberalismo en Chile. Santiago: 
FLACSO. 
Victor, David, David Hults, & Mark Thurber, editors (2011) Oil and 
Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vilhena Filho, Carlos Augusto (1997) ‘Brazil’s Mineral Policy’, Resources 
Policy, 23 (1): 45-50. 
Villarroel Bloomfield, Francisca María (2007), Subcontratación en la 
Industria Salmonera: Algunos Efectos sobre el Mercado del Trabajo. 
Dissertation for Professional degree, Department of Sociology, 
University of Chile, Chile.    
Vivoda, Vlado (2009) ‘Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International 
Oil Companies: Challenges and Change in the New Millennium’, New 
Political Economy, 14 (4): 517-534. 
Wade, Robert H (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the 
Role of Government in East Asia’s Industrialisation. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
 427 
Waterbury, John (1997) ‘Fortuitous By-Products’, Comparative Politics, 
Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart 
Rustow, 29 (3): 383-402. 
Waterbury, John (1994) ‘Democracy without Democrats? The Potential for 
Political Liberalization in the Middle East’, in Ghassan Salamé, editor, 
Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politcs in the Muslim 
World. London: I. B. Taurus, pp. 23-47. 
Waters, Sarah (2008) ‘Situating Movements Historically: May 1968, Alain 
Touraine, and New Social Movement Theory’, Mobilization: An 
International Quarterly, 13 (1): 63-82.  
Webb, Michael C (1999) ‘Private and Public Management of International 
Mineral Markets’, in A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter, 
editors, Private Authority and International Affairs. New York, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 53-96. 
Weingast, Barry R (2002) ‘Rational-Choice Institutionalism’, in Ira 
Katznelson & Helen Milner, editors, Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline. New York: W.W. Norton, 660-692. 
Weingast, Barry R (1996) ‘Political Institutions: Rational Choice 
Perspectives’, in Robert E. Goodman & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 
editors, A New Handbook of Political Science. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Weiss, Linda (2005) ‘Global Governance, National Strategies: How 
Industrialised States Make Room to Move under the WTO’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 12 (5): 723-749. 
Weiss, Linda (2003) States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic 
Institutions Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weiss, Linda (1999) ‘Globalisation and national governance: Antinomy or 
interdependence?’, Review of International Studies, 25: 59-88.  
Weiss, Linda (1998) The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the 
Economy in the Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Weiss, Linda & John Hobson (1995) States and Economic Development: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Weller, Jürgen, editor (2009) Regulation, Worker Protection and Active 
Labour-Market Policies in Latin America. Santiago: Economic 
  428 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.   
Weszkalnys, Gisa (2011) ‘Cursed Resources, or Articulations of Economic 
Theory in the Gulf of Guinea’, Economy and Society, 40 (3): 345-372. 
Weyland, Kurt (2008) ‘Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change’, World 
Politics, 60 (2): 281-314. 
Weyland, Kurt (2002a) The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile 
Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. Princeton, New 
Jersey & Oxford, England: Princeton University Press.  
Weyland, Kurt (2002b) ‘Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for 
the Study of Latin American Politics’, Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 37 (1): 57-85.  
Wibbels, Erik (2009) ‘Cores, Peripheries, and Contemporary Political 
Economy’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 44 (4): 
441-449.  
Wickstrom, Stefanie (2008) ‘Cultural Politics and the Essence of Life: Who 
Controls the Water?’, in David V. Carruthers, editor, Environmental 
Justice in Latin America: Problems, Promise, and Practice. Cambridge, 
MA & London: MIT Press, 287-320. 
Winn, Peter. Editor (2004) Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and 
Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002. Durham & London: 
Duke University Press. 
Wirth, John D (1970) The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Wise, Carol & Riordan Roett, editors (2003) Post-Stabilization Politics in 
Latin America: Competition, Transition, Collapse. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Wolford, Wendy (2010) This Land is Ours: Social Mobilisation and the 
Meanings of Land in Brazil. Durham & London: Duke University Press. 
Wolford, Wendy (2008) ‘Environmental Justice and Agricultural 
Development in the Brazilian Cerrado’, in David V. Carruthers, editor, 
Environmental Justice in Latin America: Problems, Promise, and 
Practice. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 213-238. 
 429 
Woo-Cumings, Meredith, editor (1999) The Developmental State. Ithaca, 
Cornell: Cornell University Press. 
Wood, Thomaz & Miguel Caldas (2007) ‘Brazilian Firms and the Challenge of 
Competitiveness’, in Robert Grosse & Luiz Mesquita, editors, Can Latin 
American Firms Compete?. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 233-249.   
Wylde, Christopher (2011) ‘State, Society and markets in Argentina: The 
Political Economy of Neodesarrollismo under Nestor Kirchner, 2003-
2007’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 30 (4): 436-452. 
Yin, Robert (2008) Case Study Research. Designs and Methods. Fourth 
Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Yin, Robert (2003) Applications of Case Study Research. Second Edition. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Zapata, Francisco (1975) Los Mineros de Chuquicamata ¿Productores o 
Proletarios? Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, Colegio de 
México. 
Zeller, Christian (2008) ‘From the gene to the globe: Extracting rents based 
on intellectual property monopolies’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 15 (1): 86-115. 
Zien, Karen Anne & Sheldon Buckler (1997) ‘From Experience Dreams to 
Market: Crafting a Culture of Innovation’, Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 14 (4): 274-287. 
  430
Primary and Secondary Documents: 
 
Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustiveis (ANP) (2011) 
ANP Annuario 2011. Rio de Janeiro: ANP.  
Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustiveis (ANP) (2010) 
ANP Annuario 2010. Rio de Janeiro: ANP. 
Alianza Estratégica. Fase III. 2007-2010. Santiago de Chile: CODELCO & 
FTC. 
Alonso, Paulo Sergio (2009) ‘PETROBRAS and PAC Initiative: An 
Opportunity for Foreign Investments in Brazil’, Growth Accelaration 
Program (PAC), November 10-13, accessed online on 15 July 2012 at 
http://www.brasemb.or.jp/economy/pdf/PAC%20Seminar/11PauloSR
Alonso.pdf.  
Bande, Jorge (2011) ‘CODELCO’s New Corporate Governance: 18 Months 
After’, Presentation to the 2011 Meeting of the Latin American Network 
of Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, Bogotá, 
Colombia, September 8-9.  
Bogniotti, Lauro Doniseti (2010) ‘Oil and Natural Gas Sector in Brazil’, Rio 
de Janiero: MME. Available online at 
http://www.mdic.gov.br/sistemas_web/renai/public/arquivo/arq1274
359563.pdf. 
Boletin N° 3.588-08. 2009. ‘Nuevo Primer Informe de las Comisiones de 
Educación, Cultura, Ciencia y Technología, de Minería y Energía, y 
Especial de Ciencia, Technología e Innovación, Unidas,  Recaído en el 
Proyecto de Ley, en Segundo Trámite Constitucional, que crea el Fondo 
de Innovación para la Competitividad’. 19 August, Valparaiso: Chile.  
Comisión Chilena del Cobre (COCHILCO) (2010) COCHILCO Annual 
Statistics 2010. Santiago de Chile: CODELCO. 
Comisión Chilena del Cobre (COCHILCO) (2009) COCHILCO Annual 
Statistics 2009. Santiago de Chile: CODELCO. 
Consejo Nacional de Inovación para la Competitividad (CNIC) (2010) 
Evaluation Report on National Innovation Strategy for 
Competitiveness, Chile: International Evaluation Panel. Santiago de 
Chile: CNIC. 
 431 
Constituição da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil (1934) Article 119, 
§4. 
Constituição da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil (1891) Article 72. 
Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) (2012) Plan de Inversiones 
CODELCO 2012. March. Accessed online on 03 April 2012 on 
http://www.codelco.cl/prontus_codelco/site/artic/20120306/asocfile/
20120306130444/plan_de_inversiones_codelco_2012_05032012.pdf.  
Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) (2010) CODELCO Annual 
Report 2010. Santiago de Chile: CODELCO. 
Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) (1998) CODELCO Annual 
Report 1998. Santiago de Chile: CODELCO.  
Dirección del Trabajo (2009) Compendio de Series Estadísticas 1990-2008. 
Dirección Nacional del Trabajo. Santiago de Chile: Dirección del 
Trabajo. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
(2010a) Social Panorama of Latin America. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
(2010b) Time for Equality: Closing Gaps, Opening Trails. Thirty-third 
Session of ECLAC. Brasilia: ECLAC. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2008) 
Structural Change and Productivity Growth: 20 Years Later. Old 
Problems, New Opportunities. Thirty-second Session of ECLAC. Santo 
Domingo: ECLAC.  
Empresa Pesquisa de Energética (EPE) (2011) Brazilian Energy Balance 
2011. Rio de Janeiro: EPE. 
Gabrielli, José Sergio & Almir Barbassa (2010) PETROBRAS Business Plan 
2010-2014. Rio de Janeiro: PETROBRAS. 
International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) (2009) Minerals 
Taxation Regimes. A Review of Issues and Challenges in their Design 
and Application. The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: Using Resource 
Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development. February. London: 
ICMM.   
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) (2002) 
Breaking New Ground. Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
  432 
Development Project (MMSD) Final Report. Accessed online on 21 May 
2012 at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9084IIED.pdf. 
Libertad y Desarollo (2005) ‘El Primer Costo del Royalty’, Temas Públicas, 
No. 713, March 18 issue. Accessed online at http://www.lyd.com.  
Libertad y Desarollo (2004) ‘Royalty a la Minería: Aserruchando la Viga 
Maestra’, Temas Públicas, No. 671, April 23 issue. Accessed online at 
http://www.lyd.com. 
Libertad y Desarollo (2002) ‘Propuestas de Impuesto a la Minería: ¿Debate 
Razonable? Temas Públicas, No. 589, August 2 issue. Accessed online at 
http://www.lyd.com. 
Lima, Paulo César (2010) Dados Econômicos e Política Fiscal do Setor 
Mineral. Brasilia: Library of Câmara dos Diputados, August, available 
online at 
http://www.aslegis.org.br/images/stories/artigospessoais/Publicacoes-
Artigos-pessoais-Politica-Energetica-
II/Dados_economicos_e_politica_fiscal_do_setor_mineral_Agosto_2
010.pdf. 
Lima, Paulo César (2009a) O Pré-Sal e o Novo Marco Legal. Brasilia: 
Library of Câmara dos Diputados, August, available online at 
http://www.aslegis.org.br/images/stories/artigospessoais/Publicacoes-
Artigos-pessoais-Politica-Energetica-II/O_Pre-
Sal_e_o_novo_marco_legal_Agosto_2009.pdf. 
Lima, Paulo César (2009b) Modelo Institucional do Setor Petrolífero 
Nacional e Possíveis Alterações. Brasilia: Library of Câmara dos 
Diputados, July, available online at 
http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/4845/model
o_institucional_lima.pdf?sequence=1. 
Lima, Paulo César (2009c) Novas Fontes de Recursos para o Fundo Social. 
Brasilia: Associação dos Consultores Legislativos e de Orçamento e 
Fiscalização Financeira da Câmara dos Diputados, October, available 
online at 
http://www.aslegis.org.br/images/stories/artigospessoais/Publicacoes-
Artigos-pessoais-Politica-Energetica-
 433 
II/Novas_fontes_de_recursos_para_o_Fundo_Social_Outubro_2009.
pdf.  
Mining Code 1983 of Chile. National Library Archives, Santiago de Chile. 
Ministerio de Hacienda (2010) Informe Anual Fondos Soberanos. Santiago 
de Chile: Ministerio de Hacienda. 
Ministerio del Trabajo (2006) Agenda Laboral, 28, December, Santiago de 
Chile.  
Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) (2010) Novo Marco Regulatório: Pre-
Sal e Áreas Estratégicas. Available online at 
http://www.mme.gov.br/mme/galerias/arquivos/pre_sal/marcoregula
torio.pdf. 
Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) (2007) Plano Nacional de Energia 
2030. Rio de Janeiro: MME & EPE (in collaboration with EPE). 
Morgan Stanley Research (2010) Brazil Infrastructure: Paving the Way. 
Morgan Stanley Blue Paper, May 05, access online on 15 July 2012 at 
http://www.morganstanley.com/views/perspectives/pavingtheway.pdf.  
Pardelli, Guilliana (2010) ‘Appendix 1: The Growth Acceleration Programme 
(PAC)’, in Morgan Stanley Research (2010) Brazil Infrastructure: 
Paving the Way. Morgan Stanley Blue Paper, May 05,  access online on 
15 July 2012 at 
http://www.morganstanley.com/views/perspectives/pavingtheway.pdf.  
Petróleo Brasileiro (PETROBRAS) (2010) PETROBRAS Annual Report 2010. 
Rio de Janeiro: PETROBRAS. 
Petróleo Brasileiro (PETROBRAS) (2007) PETROBRAS Annual Report 
2007. Rio de Janeiro: PETROBRAS. 
Punto Minero (2005) Royalty II en la Cámara 86 a Favor/14 en Contra, No. 
3, Santiago de Chile: Ministerio de Minería en Chile. 
Resende, Paulo (2009) ‘Chapter 2.1. Infrastructure: Will PAC Really 
Accelerate Growth?’, in Irene Mia, Emilio Lozoya Austin, Carlos Arruda, 
Marina Silva Araújo, editors, Brazil Competitiveness Report 2009. 
Geneva: World Economic Forum, 31-39. 
Secretariat for Social Communication of the Presidency of Brazil (SECOM) 
(2010) ‘Brazil Announces Phase 2 of the Growth Acceleration 
Programme’, March 30, accessed online on 15 July 2012 at 
  434 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/brazil-announces-phase-two-
growth-acceleration-program#secom. 
Servicio Nacional de Geologia y Minería (SERNAGEOMIN). Annual 
Statistics. Available online at http://www.sernageomin.cl/.  
Silva, Consuelo (2007) ‘La Subcontratación en Chile: Aproximación 
Sectorial’, Consejo Asesor Presidencial Trabajo y Equidad, Santiago de 
Chile, accessed online on 28 May 2012 at 
http://www.estudiosdeltrabajo.cl/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/la-
subcontratacion-en-chile-c1-silva.pdf. 
Villarzu, José R. (2005) CODELCO y El Modelo de Alianza Estrategica 
[PowerPoint presentation], October 21. 
World Bank (2006) Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital for 
the 21st Century. Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
World Bank (1997) World Development Report: The State in a Changing 
World. Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
World Bank (1993) Latin America and the Caribbean: A Decade after the 
Debt Crisis. Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
World Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive 
Industries, and Development. New York & Geneva: UNCTAD. 
  
 435 
Newspaper Clippings: 
 
Carvalho, Luiz (2012) ‘Trabalhadores da Construção Civil Paralisam Obra de 
PETROBRAS no Espirito Santo’. 
Castañeda, Lina (2004) ‘Proyecto de Ley: Piñera Reprocha Nivel de Debate 
del Royalty’, El Mercurio, 30 July, accessed online at 
http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={825f4a62-6652-
407c-9779-12f08b3d2f41}. 
Cerda, Rodrigo Q (2004) ‘Iniciativa de Ley:  Clima de Guerra en Proyecto de 
Royalty’, El Mercurio, 08 August, accessed online at 
http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={c2d7ebac-716c-4217-
b580-c5f337add76a}. 
Damasceno, Eduardo (1995) ‘Reservas Minerais e as Privatizações’, Folha de 
Sao Paulo, December 23, accessed online on 18 June 2012 at 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1995/12/23/dinheiro/5.html.  
Diário do Grande ABC (1995) ‘Petroleiros Acabam com a Greve de 31 Dias 
sem Conseguir Nada’, Diário do Grande ABC, 03 June, accessed online 
on 14 July 2012 at 
http://www.abcdeluta.org.br/materia.asp?id_CON=788. 
Economist, The (2012) State Capitalism: The Visible Hand. Special Report, 
21 January, Accessed online on 25 January 2012 at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931. 
El Mercurio (2012) ‘Camila Vallejo: “Hay un Intento Claro y Sistemático por 
Ahogar al Movimiento Estudiantil”, El Mercurio, August 19, accessed 
online on 10 February 2013 at 
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2012/08/19/556416/camila-
vallejo-hay-un-intento-claro-y-sistematico-por-ahogar-al-movimiento-
estudiantil.html.  
El Mercurio (2011) ‘PS Plantea Sumar el Movimiento Estudiantil a la 
Oposición’, El Mercurio, September 23, accessed online on 10 February 
2013 at 
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/09/23/504747/ps-
plantea-sumar-el-movimiento-estudiantil-a-la-oposicion-politica.html. 
  436 
El Mercurio (2010a) ‘Autoridades de Calama Convocan a Movilización para 
Rechazar Royalty del Ejecutivo’, El Mercurio, 04 September, accessed 
online at 
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?id
noticia=434462. 
El Mercurio (2010b) ‘Convocados por “El Mercurio”. 
Costos, Royalty y Aguas: Las Definiciones de los Cuatro Gigantes de la 
Minería Privada’, El Mercurio, 27 June, accessed online at 
http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={77d3629a-3456-
478e-a1b6-2e241886d872}. 
El Mercurio (2010c) ‘Editorial: Debate sobre el Royalty Minero’, El Mercurio, 
22 April, accessed online at 
http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={f4655f6a-3bef-4eba-
aade-ad88e4c18cba}.  
El Mostrador (2011a) ‘Trabajadores de CODELCO inician paro de 24 horas 
en protesta a eventual privatización de la minera’, El Mostrador, July 
11, accessed on 12 July 2011 at http://elmo.st/pzdEHz. 
El Mostrador (2011b) ‘Sindicatos de CODELCO dicen que la paralización es 
total’, El Mostrador, July 11, accessed online on 12 July 2011 at 
http://elmo.st/oHiv4l. 
El Mostrador (2011c) ‘“No hay ninguna intención de privatizar CODELCO’, 
El Mostrador, July 11, accessed online on 12 July 2011 at 
http://elmo.st/o0ge4Y. 
El Mostrador (2010) ‘Sindicatos mineros: “Estamos vendiendo cobre con 
sangre’, El Mostrador, August 09, accessed online on 08 August 2011 at 
http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2010/08/09/sindicatos-
mineros-estamos-vendiendo-cobre-con-sangre/. 
Farje, Javier (2011) ‘Chile: Public or Private Education?’, Latin American 
Bureau, 10 August 2011, accessed online on 10 August 2011  at 
http://www.lab.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=1054:chile-public-or-private-
education&catid=66:analysis&Itemid=39. 
 437 
Federación de los Trabajadores del Cobre (FTC) (2006) Propuesta Nacional 
II. Los Trabajadores del Cobre para El Futuro del CODELCO – Chile. 
Santiago de Chile: FTC, June. 
Federação Única dos Petroleiros (FUP) (2012) ‘A FUP e a Capitalização da 
PETROBRÁS’, January 23, accessed online on 09 July 2012 at 
http://www.fup.org.br/2012/lutas/capitalizacao-petrobas.  
Federação Única dos Petroleiros (FUP) (2011). ‘Greve – 1995’, December 01, 
accessed online on 10 April 2012 on 
http://www.fup.org.br/2012/greve/greve-1995.  
Folha de São Paulo (2003) ‘Outro Lado: Maioria Contesta Dados da Lista’, 
Folha de São Paulo, May 15, accessed online on 18 June 2012 at 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1505200323.htm. 
Folha de São Paulo (1995a) ‘Ato de Apoio a Petroleiros Reúne 4,000 
Metalúrgicos’, Folha de São Paulo, 01 June, accessed online on 14 July 
2012 at http://www.abcdeluta.org.br/materia.asp?id_CON=788. 
Folha de São Paulo (1995b) ‘Operação Foi Determinada por FHC na 
Segunda’, Folha de São Paulo, 25 May, accessed online on 14 July 2012 
at http://www.abcdeluta.org.br/materia.asp?id_CON=788.  
Folha de São Paulo (1995c) ‘Governo Recua e Já Admite a Negociação’, Folha 
de São Paulo, 19 May, accessed online on 14 July 2012 at 
http://www.abcdeluta.org.br/materia.asp?id_CON=788.  
La Nación (2011) ‘Acogen querella de mineros de la San José contra el 
Estado’, La Nación, August 05, accessed online on 12 September 2011 at 
http://www.nacion.cl/noticias/site/artic/20110805/pags/20110805135
222.html#. 
Landau, Elena (1995) ‘O Ritmo das Privatizações no Brasil’, Folha de Sao 
Paulo, September 03, accessed online on 18 June 2012 at 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1995/9/03/dinheiro/4.html. 
Morandé, Felipe (2004) ‘Royalty, Populismo y Otras Yerbas’, El Mercurio, 27 
July, accessed online at 
http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={a22323de-0eba-
4b88-890e-04fb2a04aeb6}. 
  438 
O Estado de São Paulo (1995) ‘Lula e Vicentinho Recorrem ao ABC’, O 
Estado de São Paulo, 28 May, accessed online on 14 July 2012 at 
http://www.abcdeluta.org.br/materia.asp?id_CON=788.  
Palma, Ignacio (2010) ‘CUT hace balance negativo de gobiernos de la 
Concertación en temas sociales’, El Mercurio, February 21, accessed 
online on 12 July 2011 Available online at 
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?id
noticia=399719. 
Ramírez, Natacha (2013) ‘FECh Inicia Ofensiva contra Rebaja del CAE para 
Evitar su Aprobación en Marzo’, El Mercurio, February 07, accessed on 
10 February 2013 at 
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2012/02/07/525190/fech-
inicia-ofensiva-contra-rebaja-del-credito-con-aval-del-estado-para-
evitar-que-se-apruebe-en-marzo.html. 
Senate Press (2010) ‘Comisión de Minería Estimó que Parte de los Recursos 
del Aumento del Royalty debe ir a Regiones Mineras’, June 4, accessed 
on 29 May 2012 at 
http://www.senado.cl/prontus_galeria_noticias/site/artic/20100604/
pags/20100604095748.html. 
Senate Press (2009a) ‘Por Amplia Mayoría Aprobaron Legislar sobre Fondo 
de Innovación para la Competitividad’, September 9, accessed online on 
29 May 2012 at 
http://www.senado.cl/prontus_galeria_noticias/site/artic/20090909/
pags/20090909195034.html. 
Senate Press (2009b) ‘Regiones recibirían un 35% de los recursos 
provenientes del Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad’, 
Summary of Boletín Nº 3588-08, accessed online on 29 May 2012 at 
http://www.senado.cl/prontus_galeria_noticias/site/artic/20090730/
pags/20090730105251.html. 
Senate Press (2005) ‘Senado Aprobó Idea de Legislar del Proyecto Royalty 
II’, May 17, accessed online on 28 May 2012 at 
http://www.senado.cl/prontus_galeria_noticias/site/artic/20080128/
pags/20080128160647.html. 
 439 
Senate Press (2004) ‘Empresarios Mineros: “No es el Momento de Hablar de 
Royalty”’, October 4, accessed online on 28 May 2012 at 
http://www.senado.cl/prontus_galeria_noticias/site/artic/20080204/
pags/20080204153811.html. 
 Vial, Fernando (2009) ‘Cómo se gestó el bono de $14 milliones: Asesores de 
sindicato de minera Escondida ganaron $112 milliones por la 
negociación colectiva’, El Mercurio Sección Economía y Negocios, 22 
October: B7. 
 
 
